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AndresZambranoFirstPaper 3 - 13 May 2015 - Main.AndresZambrano
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
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< < | Taking into account Venezuela’s different media culture, solutions to their censorship/surveillance issues might look different than those proposed within the United States. First, as a country with a transient internet population, meaning one where internet users change their access points constantly (logging onto cybercafé computers as opposed to one, home-based computer), evading government surveillance of opposition communications can be both easier and more difficult. On the one hand, changing cybercafés constantly is A) easier given the lack of a sunk cost (the cost of a computer and monthly Internet access) and B) harder for the government to pinpoint or identify a unique user given the constant change in location. However, evading prying government eyes might be harder since the user cannot take additional measures to maintain anonymity, by installing a safe browser, like Tor. Users can also be easily identified once they log onto Facebook or Twitter from a particular location using a default browser, like safari. A cost effective solution would be to convince owners of cybercafés to install Tor or PGP encryption services on their computers for users to use freely if they desire. Educating opposition leaders in ways to cheaply, freely communicate without having to look over their shoulder could fundamentally change Venezuela's situation for generations to come. | > > | Taking into account Venezuela’s different media culture, solutions to their censorship/surveillance issues might look different than those proposed within the United States. First, as a country with a transient internet population, meaning one where internet users change their access points constantly (logging onto cybercafé computers as opposed to one, home-based computer), evading government surveillance of opposition communications can be both easier and more difficult. On the one hand, changing cybercafés constantly is A) easier given the lack of a sunk cost (the cost of a computer and monthly Internet access) and B) harder for the government to pinpoint or identify a unique user given the constant change in location.
Burner Phones
Luckily, Venezuelans, for the most part, tend to use prepaid SIM cards when using mobile phones, facilitating the easy switch from mobile device to mobile device. If however, opposition leaders prefer to use smart phones for communication, there exist applications that can be used to create the illusion that a mobile phone user is calling from many different phone numbers, making a connection between two individuals difficult to trace. Additionally, individuals can use a virtual private network (VPN) to mask their IP address, allowing them to make untraceable calls with applications such as google voice, which assigns a user a phone number that is not technically linked to an actual phone number. All that is necessary is a fake email address, which is very simple and cheap to create.
Hardened Browsers
Opposition leaders can be easily identified once they log onto Facebook or Twitter from a particular location using a default browser, like safari. A cost effective solution to this problem would be to convince owners of cybercafés to install Tor or PGP encryption services on their computers for users to use freely if they desire. This is a simple and cheap solution. Using a hardened web browser like for, or even firefox with the appropriate add ons, can make a huge difference in maintaining anonymity in the digital world. Educating opposition leaders in ways to cheaply, freely communicate without having to look over their shoulder could fundamentally change Venezuela's situation for generations to come. | |
This draft contains too much background and too little actual discussion of the subject. You can find more resources addressing the ostensible subject: online organizing in monitored environments. If the real object of the technology is to evade monitoring, you should be writing about how to use VPNs to have secure phone calls, hardened web applications and other relatively simple measures. You would also be investigating how to use free software to make every cast-off computer into secure communications equipment. |
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