ArchanHazra1FirstPaper 5 - 17 Jun 2015 - Main.EbenMoglen
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
| | The Supreme Court has never directly engaged the question of whether the border search doctrine extends to data, such as that retrieved from a computer or cell phone. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Ickes, found that the “cargo” language extended to a hard drive found in the defendant’s laptop, affirming the right to search through it. The Ninth Circuit, though, has drawn a distinction between “cursory inspection” and the “comprehensive and intrusive nature of a forensic examination.” Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 962. A forensic computer search is a time-intensive process that requires an image of the drive be made and special software be used to search the full contents of the drive. Undoubtedly, were it before the Supreme Court, the act of simply opening up a laptop and looking through the files would merit no Fourth Amendment protections. The thoroughness of a forensic search would, however, demand some protection if the Supreme Court is willing to accept the Ninth Circuit’s rhetoric from Cotterman, where it referred to such searches as “computer strip searches.” I contend that the probing nature of a forensic search—combined with the depth of intimate information that it can yield—demands reasonable suspicion in accordance with the Supreme Court’s prior precedent.
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> > |
But reasonable suspicion isn't probable cause, which is the whole point. So, to take the foreseeable question in light of current technical realities, is seizing data at the border so that you can search it later if you develop reasonable suspicion acceptable or not? Your efforts to make all this equivalent to some other form of searching don't help you. You are speculating, merely predicting the behavior of courts. Do you take as a methodological assumption of this process that the courts whose behavior you are predicting will have learned nothing about the facts at hand, and will only reason by narrow analogy to prior unrelated factual situations?
| | The Safeguards of the Fifth Amendment | | Encryption, however, does bring with it other protections. The Fifth Amendment provides protection against self-incrimination. When the government is unable to decrypt files on its own, courts have gone both ways on mandatory key disclosure—that is, whether the government can force someone to decrypt his files. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has found that unless the government can show knowledge of the specific files it seeks, compelling a defendant to decrypt the files is tantamount to forced self-incrimination. But courts elsewhere have ordered defendants to decrypt their files or be held in contempt of court, even where there is no specific knowledge of specific content. The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation is more consistent with prior Fifth Amendment precedent. But this issue gets even murkier when considering various methods of encryption. What if the data-holder has arranged it such that he has no actual knowledge of the decryption key, which is left in the hands of someone in the United States? Or consider the proposed password pill, an authentication pill being developed by Motorola that transmits an 18-bit signal that could be used to unlock one’s devices. Could a court require a defendant to take a pill for the purpose of decrypting his files? On one hand, it seems like such encryption would offer less Fifth Amendment protection, as one is not giving up the contents of one’s mind. Nonetheless, where the Fourth Amendment falls short, advanced encryption techniques—in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment—would appear to safeguard one’s data at the border. | |
> > |
Is this "would appear" to be a descriptive statement about the discoverable state of law? If so, I missed where the cases were discussed that showed this apparition. If this is a statement of legal speculation, as I believe, does it square with any observed phenomena? What will courts think of seizing a terabyte in data image order to decide later, if more than reasonable suspicion develops, that it would be a good idea not to throw it out after 24 hours, or 30 days, or whatever? It is feasible to ask, in other words, whether if govt detained a small percentage of devices at the border long enough to suck up an image of the data contained (from seconds to hours, depending) in order to have it available for searching if, at a subsequent time, they developed a reason to seek a warrant, that would violate the Fourth Amendment or any other statutory or constitutional rule. If yes, why, given that they can certainly do this with a crate of eggs? If no, what difference does all this other bullshit really make?
On encryption, I think you are still asking yourself an old
question: whether I can be compelled, without offending the Fifth
Amendment, to decrypt my hard drive at the border. Once again, the
question seems to me harder than it is non-obsolete. When I
actually cross a border I am concerned about, whether the US,
Chinese or other, no secret policeman on earth can compel me to
decrypt the hard drive, because I am literally unable to do so. I
could, thirty minutes earlier, on the plane; I will be able to
again, after I have crossed the border, with assistance. But on the
border, do what they will, I cannot. How do I technically achieve
this outcome? Once you have thought that problem through, and have
invented the answer which is simple daily familiarity to me, what is
the rest of that old bullshit really worth, either?
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ArchanHazra1FirstPaper 4 - 18 May 2015 - Main.ArchanHazra1
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
| | Introduction | |
< < | The border search doctrine carves out an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of either a warrant or even individualized suspicion prior to search and seizure. The Supreme Court has often articulated the broad authority that the federal government has in searching those that enter the United States: “[s]ince the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the contraband into this country.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 536 (1985). Indeed, Congress has used broad language to grant discretion to customs officers in safeguarding the borders. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), for example, grants officers the ability to “go on board of any vessel or vehicle . . . to search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board.” So while the Fourth Amendment ordinarily offers some protection against search and seizure, the protections it offers at the border are basically nonexistent. And at first blush, there is no reason to think that the protections it offers to one’s data are any less non-existent—even in the aftermath of Riley v. California. | > > | The border search doctrine carves out an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of either a warrant or individualized suspicion prior to search and seizure. The Supreme Court has often articulated the broad authority that the federal government has in searching those that enter the United States: “[s]ince the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the contraband into this country.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 536 (1985). Indeed, Congress has used broad language to grant discretion to customs officers in safeguarding the borders. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), for example, grants officers the ability to “go on board of any vessel or vehicle . . . to search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board.” So while the Fourth Amendment ordinarily offers some protection against search and seizure, the protections it offers at the border are basically nonexistent. | | | |
< < |
It is a border, after all. It would be odd to suppose that law with strong identification with place wouldn't be place-sensitive at the border. So?
| > > | But the Supreme Court has recognized that where a border search becomes more intrusive or invasive, the government must make some showing of reasonable suspicion. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 542. To that end, if we analogize the intrusiveness of a body cavity search to the forensic search of a hard drive, it is conceivable that the government must make a similar showing of reasonable suspicion when trawling through data, particularly in the aftermath of Riley v. California. | | | |
< < | Digital is Different | > > | The Safeguards of the Fourth Amendment? | | | |
< < | Digital is different is a common mantra of privacy advocates. In his concurrence in Riley, Justice Alito felt that “the Court’s broad holding favors information in a digital form over information in hard-copy form.” He noted that the police can seize and examine incriminating snapshots in a wallet, but would be unable to examine such snapshots if they were stored on a cell phone. 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014). But this ignores the fundamental difference between electronic devices and non-electronic mediums of storing information: the former “are capable of storing warehouses full of information.” Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 964. The former are capable of storing a person’s entire digital life—work files, photographs, emails, movies, music, browser history, etc.—making every small preference readily apparent. This is why allowing for the search of electronic devices without suspicion under the border search doctrine would be an affirmative step in extending its scope. A large number of Americans—lawyers, journalists, scholars—who travel internationally with sensitive information. Someone operating under the auspices of the First Amendment should not have to fear the possibility that the government is trawling through his or her encrypted data to dig up dirt. | > > | In his concurrence in Riley, Justice Alito felt that “the Court’s broad holding favors information in a digital form over information in hard-copy form.” He noted that the police can seize and examine incriminating snapshots in a wallet, but would be unable to examine such snapshots if they were stored on a cell phone. 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014). But this ignores the fundamental difference between electronic devices and non-electronic mediums of storing information: the former “are capable of storing warehouses full of information.” United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2013). The former are capable of storing a person’s entire digital life—work files, photographs, emails, movies, music, browser history, etc.—making every small preference readily apparent. | | | |
< < | The Supreme Court, however, has never examined the question of whether the border search doctrine extends to data, such as that retrieved from the computer or cell phone of someone looking to enter the United States. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Ickes, found that the “cargo” language extended to a hard drive found in the defendant’s laptop, affirming the right to search through it. The Ninth Circuit, though, has drawn a distinction between “cursory inspection” and the “comprehensive and intrusive nature of a forensic examination.” United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2013). In that case, while the border agents did initial searches of the laptops—and did not find anything—they also created copies of the hard drives. The government, at that point, conducted a forensic computer search, a time-consuming process that is as follows (as detailed by the court in United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547-548 (D. Md. 2014): | > > | The Supreme Court has never directly engaged the question of whether the border search doctrine extends to data, such as that retrieved from a computer or cell phone. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Ickes, found that the “cargo” language extended to a hard drive found in the defendant’s laptop, affirming the right to search through it. The Ninth Circuit, though, has drawn a distinction between “cursory inspection” and the “comprehensive and intrusive nature of a forensic examination.” Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 962. A forensic computer search is a time-intensive process that requires an image of the drive be made and special software be used to search the full contents of the drive. Undoubtedly, were it before the Supreme Court, the act of simply opening up a laptop and looking through the files would merit no Fourth Amendment protections. The thoroughness of a forensic search would, however, demand some protection if the Supreme Court is willing to accept the Ninth Circuit’s rhetoric from Cotterman, where it referred to such searches as “computer strip searches.” I contend that the probing nature of a forensic search—combined with the depth of intimate information that it can yield—demands reasonable suspicion in accordance with the Supreme Court’s prior precedent. | | | |
< < | 1) A “bitstream” copy or “image” of the original storage device is saved as a “read only” file. | | | |
< < | 2) Special software is used to search the full contents of the drive. | > > | The Safeguards of the Fifth Amendment | | | |
< < | 3) The “slack space” of the drive is probed for any deleted files. | > > | But is “reasonable suspicion” sufficient to safeguard one’s data? Consider that in Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit required a showing of reasonable suspicion and determined it had existed, relying primarily on (1) the defendant’s prior conviction, (2) the defendant’s frequent trips across the border, and (3) the existence of password-protected files on the defendant’s computer. Thus, the court was fairly deferential in its determination of reasonable suspicion, noting that the existence of encrypted files, when used in conjunction with “other indicia of criminal activity,” can be used to find suspicion. 709 F.3d at 969. So even if courts do adopt the “reasonable suspicion” standard, we can expect similar deference in other cases, especially where they concern efforts to stop serious crimes. | | | |
< < | The thoroughness of a forensic search raises the question of whether it requires any indicia of suspicion under the border search doctrine—simply opening up someone’s laptop at the border and looking through the files certainly does not. The Ninth Circuit thinks there is a difference, which is why it found that reasonable suspicion is required for the government to be able to do a forensic search—going so far as to call it a “computer strip search.” | > > | Encryption, however, does bring with it other protections. The Fifth Amendment provides protection against self-incrimination. When the government is unable to decrypt files on its own, courts have gone both ways on mandatory key disclosure—that is, whether the government can force someone to decrypt his files. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has found that unless the government can show knowledge of the specific files it seeks, compelling a defendant to decrypt the files is tantamount to forced self-incrimination. But courts elsewhere have ordered defendants to decrypt their files or be held in contempt of court, even where there is no specific knowledge of specific content. The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation is more consistent with prior Fifth Amendment precedent. But this issue gets even murkier when considering various methods of encryption. What if the data-holder has arranged it such that he has no actual knowledge of the decryption key, which is left in the hands of someone in the United States? Or consider the proposed password pill, an authentication pill being developed by Motorola that transmits an 18-bit signal that could be used to unlock one’s devices. Could a court require a defendant to take a pill for the purpose of decrypting his files? On one hand, it seems like such encryption would offer less Fifth Amendment protection, as one is not giving up the contents of one’s mind. Nonetheless, where the Fourth Amendment falls short, advanced encryption techniques—in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment—would appear to safeguard one’s data at the border. | | | |
< < |
Why should the government's authority to investigate data at the border be any different, from a constitutional point of view, than its authority to inspect, tax, and identify goods and persons? Is there some constitutional provision that you are depending on without mentioning?
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< < | Using Encryption to Safeguard One's Data
So what does this mean for the international traveler? It’s hard to tell considering that only one circuit has looked at whether forensic data searches can be conducted without suspicion. One important question to ask is what happens when one’s data is encrypted. At the very least, someone can encrypt his or her files, thus preventing a “cursory” search and requiring a forensic search. The Ninth Circuit in Cotterman found that the commonplace nature of password-protected files—for business travelers, students, and even casual computer users—meant that the government could not simply rely on the existence of encryption to find suspicion. On the other hand, the Cotterman court did assert that the existence of encrypted files—in conjunction with “other indicia of criminal activity”—can be used to find suspicion. 709 F.3d at 969. And courts are likely to be deferential to the authorities’ determination of suspicion Nonetheless, when crossing the border, encrypting one’s files may be the best means—short of just leaving them at home—of keeping one’s files out of government hands.
The more commonplace encryption, the less its use justifies any conclusion at all.
I don't understand why, if one is using technology in a sensible way, one's data wouldn't always be encrypted, regardless of the likelihood of crossing a border. All the data on any computer I have anything in is always encrypted.
The interesting question at the border you do not mention, which is whether an decryption key could be required at some point in the legal process resulting from a search at the border. For this reason, people who cross borders with encrypted material they do not want searched might arrange not to be able to decrypt the laptop or notebook hard drive. You might want to investigate or understand how it could be arranged, for example, that I use my notebook on the airplane, make some small changes before shutting down, and have rendered myself incapable of decrypting the drive. Thus I can honestly swear I have no decryption key available. But the data can nonetheless be unlocked by someone else inside the US once I have safely arrived and passed border inspection.
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ArchanHazra1FirstPaper 3 - 17 May 2015 - Main.ArchanHazra1
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
| | Introduction | |
< < | The border search doctrine carves out an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of either a warrant or even individualized suspicion prior to search and seizure. The Supreme Court has often articulated the broad authority that the federal government has in searching those that enter the United States: “[s]ince the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the contraband into this country.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 536 (1985). Indeed, Congress has used broad language to grant discretion to customs officers in safeguarding the borders. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), for example, grants officers the ability to “go on board of any vessel or vehicle . . . to search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board.” So while the Fourth Amendment ordinarily offers some protection against search and seizure, the protections it offers at the border are basically nonexistent. And at first blush, there is no reason to think that the protections it offers to one’s data are any less non-existent—even in the aftermath of Riley v. California. | > > | The border search doctrine carves out an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of either a warrant or even individualized suspicion prior to search and seizure. The Supreme Court has often articulated the broad authority that the federal government has in searching those that enter the United States: “[s]ince the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the contraband into this country.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 536 (1985). Indeed, Congress has used broad language to grant discretion to customs officers in safeguarding the borders. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), for example, grants officers the ability to “go on board of any vessel or vehicle . . . to search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board.” So while the Fourth Amendment ordinarily offers some protection against search and seizure, the protections it offers at the border are basically nonexistent. And at first blush, there is no reason to think that the protections it offers to one’s data are any less non-existent—even in the aftermath of Riley v. California. | |
It is a border, after all. It would be odd to suppose that law with strong identification with place wouldn't be place-sensitive at the border. So? |
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ArchanHazra1FirstPaper 2 - 28 Apr 2015 - Main.EbenMoglen
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
| | The border search doctrine carves out an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of either a warrant or even individualized suspicion prior to search and seizure. The Supreme Court has often articulated the broad authority that the federal government has in searching those that enter the United States: “[s]ince the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the contraband into this country.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 536 (1985). Indeed, Congress has used broad language to grant discretion to customs officers in safeguarding the borders. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), for example, grants officers the ability to “go on board of any vessel or vehicle . . . to search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board.” So while the Fourth Amendment ordinarily offers some protection against search and seizure, the protections it offers at the border are basically nonexistent. And at first blush, there is no reason to think that the protections it offers to one’s data are any less non-existent—even in the aftermath of Riley v. California. | |
> > |
It is a border, after all. It would be odd to suppose that law with strong identification with place wouldn't be place-sensitive at the border. So?
| | Digital is Different
Digital is different is a common mantra of privacy advocates. In his concurrence in Riley, Justice Alito felt that “the Court’s broad holding favors information in a digital form over information in hard-copy form.” He noted that the police can seize and examine incriminating snapshots in a wallet, but would be unable to examine such snapshots if they were stored on a cell phone. 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014). But this ignores the fundamental difference between electronic devices and non-electronic mediums of storing information: the former “are capable of storing warehouses full of information.” Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 964. The former are capable of storing a person’s entire digital life—work files, photographs, emails, movies, music, browser history, etc.—making every small preference readily apparent. This is why allowing for the search of electronic devices without suspicion under the border search doctrine would be an affirmative step in extending its scope. A large number of Americans—lawyers, journalists, scholars—who travel internationally with sensitive information. Someone operating under the auspices of the First Amendment should not have to fear the possibility that the government is trawling through his or her encrypted data to dig up dirt. | | The thoroughness of a forensic search raises the question of whether it requires any indicia of suspicion under the border search doctrine—simply opening up someone’s laptop at the border and looking through the files certainly does not. The Ninth Circuit thinks there is a difference, which is why it found that reasonable suspicion is required for the government to be able to do a forensic search—going so far as to call it a “computer strip search.” | |
> > |
Why should the government's authority to investigate data at the border be any different, from a constitutional point of view, than its authority to inspect, tax, and identify goods and persons? Is there some constitutional provision that you are depending on without mentioning?
| | Using Encryption to Safeguard One's Data
So what does this mean for the international traveler? It’s hard to tell considering that only one circuit has looked at whether forensic data searches can be conducted without suspicion. One important question to ask is what happens when one’s data is encrypted. At the very least, someone can encrypt his or her files, thus preventing a “cursory” search and requiring a forensic search. The Ninth Circuit in Cotterman found that the commonplace nature of password-protected files—for business travelers, students, and even casual computer users—meant that the government could not simply rely on the existence of encryption to find suspicion. On the other hand, the Cotterman court did assert that the existence of encrypted files—in conjunction with “other indicia of criminal activity”—can be used to find suspicion. 709 F.3d at 969. And courts are likely to be deferential to the authorities’ determination of suspicion Nonetheless, when crossing the border, encrypting one’s files may be the best means—short of just leaving them at home—of keeping one’s files out of government hands. | |
> > |
The more commonplace encryption, the less its use justifies any conclusion at all.
I don't understand why, if one is using technology in a sensible way, one's data wouldn't always be encrypted, regardless of the likelihood of crossing a border. All the data on any computer I have anything in is always encrypted. | | | |
< < |
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.
To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" character on the next two lines: | > > | The interesting question at the border you do not mention, which is whether an decryption key could be required at some point in the legal process resulting from a search at the border. For this reason, people who cross borders with encrypted material they do not want searched might arrange not to be able to decrypt the laptop or notebook hard drive. You might want to investigate or understand how it could be arranged, for example, that I use my notebook on the airplane, make some small changes before shutting down, and have rendered myself incapable of decrypting the drive. Thus I can honestly swear I have no decryption key available. But the data can nonetheless be unlocked by someone else inside the US once I have safely arrived and passed border inspection. | | | |
< < | | > > | | | | |
< < | Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules for preference declarations. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of these lines. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated ALLOWTOPICVIEW list. |
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ArchanHazra1FirstPaper 1 - 06 Mar 2015 - Main.ArchanHazra1
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> > |
META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
The Border Search Doctrine and Data
-- By ArchanHazra1 - 06 Mar 2015
Introduction
The border search doctrine carves out an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of either a warrant or even individualized suspicion prior to search and seizure. The Supreme Court has often articulated the broad authority that the federal government has in searching those that enter the United States: “[s]ince the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the contraband into this country.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 536 (1985). Indeed, Congress has used broad language to grant discretion to customs officers in safeguarding the borders. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), for example, grants officers the ability to “go on board of any vessel or vehicle . . . to search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board.” So while the Fourth Amendment ordinarily offers some protection against search and seizure, the protections it offers at the border are basically nonexistent. And at first blush, there is no reason to think that the protections it offers to one’s data are any less non-existent—even in the aftermath of Riley v. California.
Digital is Different
Digital is different is a common mantra of privacy advocates. In his concurrence in Riley, Justice Alito felt that “the Court’s broad holding favors information in a digital form over information in hard-copy form.” He noted that the police can seize and examine incriminating snapshots in a wallet, but would be unable to examine such snapshots if they were stored on a cell phone. 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014). But this ignores the fundamental difference between electronic devices and non-electronic mediums of storing information: the former “are capable of storing warehouses full of information.” Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 964. The former are capable of storing a person’s entire digital life—work files, photographs, emails, movies, music, browser history, etc.—making every small preference readily apparent. This is why allowing for the search of electronic devices without suspicion under the border search doctrine would be an affirmative step in extending its scope. A large number of Americans—lawyers, journalists, scholars—who travel internationally with sensitive information. Someone operating under the auspices of the First Amendment should not have to fear the possibility that the government is trawling through his or her encrypted data to dig up dirt.
The Supreme Court, however, has never examined the question of whether the border search doctrine extends to data, such as that retrieved from the computer or cell phone of someone looking to enter the United States. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Ickes, found that the “cargo” language extended to a hard drive found in the defendant’s laptop, affirming the right to search through it. The Ninth Circuit, though, has drawn a distinction between “cursory inspection” and the “comprehensive and intrusive nature of a forensic examination.” United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2013). In that case, while the border agents did initial searches of the laptops—and did not find anything—they also created copies of the hard drives. The government, at that point, conducted a forensic computer search, a time-consuming process that is as follows (as detailed by the court in United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547-548 (D. Md. 2014):
1) A “bitstream” copy or “image” of the original storage device is saved as a “read only” file.
2) Special software is used to search the full contents of the drive.
3) The “slack space” of the drive is probed for any deleted files.
The thoroughness of a forensic search raises the question of whether it requires any indicia of suspicion under the border search doctrine—simply opening up someone’s laptop at the border and looking through the files certainly does not. The Ninth Circuit thinks there is a difference, which is why it found that reasonable suspicion is required for the government to be able to do a forensic search—going so far as to call it a “computer strip search.”
Using Encryption to Safeguard One's Data
So what does this mean for the international traveler? It’s hard to tell considering that only one circuit has looked at whether forensic data searches can be conducted without suspicion. One important question to ask is what happens when one’s data is encrypted. At the very least, someone can encrypt his or her files, thus preventing a “cursory” search and requiring a forensic search. The Ninth Circuit in Cotterman found that the commonplace nature of password-protected files—for business travelers, students, and even casual computer users—meant that the government could not simply rely on the existence of encryption to find suspicion. On the other hand, the Cotterman court did assert that the existence of encrypted files—in conjunction with “other indicia of criminal activity”—can be used to find suspicion. 709 F.3d at 969. And courts are likely to be deferential to the authorities’ determination of suspicion Nonetheless, when crossing the border, encrypting one’s files may be the best means—short of just leaving them at home—of keeping one’s files out of government hands.
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.
To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" character on the next two lines:
Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules for preference declarations. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of these lines. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated ALLOWTOPICVIEW list. |
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