Rick,

Thank you for the critique, as much as for the compliments. Your point is entirely well taken. I’m not directly (or indirectly) addressing a Constitutional or privacy concern in this essay. I just happened to be thinking a lot about ¬The Brothers Karamazov this term and felt there were some interesting textual and philosophical links between the Grand Inquisitor’s tale and free software/free information, which, to be perfectly honest, I just wanted to take this opportunity to explore. There really isn’t a necessary legal point to take from the essay, though I appreciate your valiant attempts to draw one out. If I am making a legal point, it is merely that laws that restrict freedom may not represent an unnatural imposition on man, but perhaps instead reflect his inherent desire to submit--- to give up the terrible burden of freedom. (Note I do not believe, nor I hope, suggest in my essay, that freedom is anything other than a necessary condition for life. I just want to point out that man does not always want it, even though he should hold it above all else).

You asked if my point was “that once people accept the technological and intellectual empowerment made possible through digital distribution of knowledge they might begin to question the authority that seeks to limit and control those means of distribution.” I appreciate the question and the necessity of you posing it, since I didn’t make a direct legal point in the essay, thought I’m not sure it’s quite right. I will say that I think, to the extent my essay makes or suggests a “legal” point, it is that the legal structures in place for distribution and control of knowledge are not necessarily artificial constructs, imposed from “outside.” Men are the fuel for the engine of the law, and it may be man’s desire to pass his freedom (and responsibility) to another (in our case, the owners of culture as defined by the law) that actually maintains a system which may seem unfair. The system couldn’t exist without our submission. You ask also if accepting freedom might lead to a new legal order. I think it might, but my hope was to point out that perhaps the biggest obstacle to freedom is the not the “state” writ large that you discuss, but men themselves. Thank you for pressing me on these points, however; it can be difficult as a writer to signal both the scope and “point” (within a class structure) in such a short essay.

Those things said, I certainly could have written a piece about the relationship of Grand Inquisitor problem to privacy and freedom (though it is clear that this not the piece that I wrote). We easily see the Grand Inquisitor’s rhetoric, for example, in the post-9/11 discourse about balancing freedom and security. How “terrible” freedom seemed to many when it appeared (falsely) to come at the cost of safety, and how easily people gave their freedom up in favor of having “security.”

There is also an interested related Constitutional question, which is the question of what sort of Constitution, exactly, ours is. Does it speak to the better angels of our nature, coming as “Christ” to deliver freedom, unbidden or not? Or does it (can it, should it) reflect instead what also seems to be a part of our nature, that desire to submit, to give up our freedom in favor of other gains? In many senses, the document does both, serving as it does as a tightrope between the rights of the individual and the state. How it this balance should play out may depend in part on how we answer the Grand Inquisitor’s charges.

I hope that was responsive to your concerns. As I said, you are right that this essay itself isn’t directly aimed at the topic or title of the class, but I hope at least that the questions it poses resonate also in the subject matter we’ve discussed in class.

-- DanaDelger - 05 May 2009

Dana, I think this is a fantastically well-written piece, and I very much enjoyed reading it. I think you very poetically describe the challenge presented to most of humanity to deal with the uniquely new problem of non-scarcity.

I was, however, unsure about what point you were trying to make with the piece from a legal perspective. I think this piece would fit in very nicely with LawNetSoc, but I am less certain of the Constitution/Privacy angle. Is your point that once people accept the technological and intellectual empowerment made possible through digital distribution of knowledge they might begin to question the authority that seeks to limit and control those means of distribution? Are you suggesting that this might lead to a new political order capable of recognizing the legal path not chosen? How will the state react to the public's assertion of itself? You seem to say that once man is accustomed to the freedom of ideas, he will be able to feed himself, but what if the state demands authority to monitor this free consumption?

Still, a very nice paper.

-- RickSchwartz - 04 May 2009

The Grand Inquisitor Meets Free Information

“In the end they will lay their freedom at our feet, and say to us, ‘Make us your slaves, but feed us.’ They will understand themselves, at last, that freedom and bread enough for all are inconceivable together, for never, never will they be able to share between them… They will marvel at us and look on us as gods, because we are ready to endure the freedom which they have found so dreadful and to rule over them—so awful it will seem to them to be free.”

When the Grand Inquisitor in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov condemns Christ to the fires for having himself condemned mankind to freedom, those of us who look to throw open the cloistered doors of technology and intellectual property --- that is, to make free-as-in-freedom software and to loosen if not lose the property rights that have accumulated in ideas--- must remember that it is the flame of our auto-da-fé, too, the old priest is stoking. The closing of technology and the privatization of thought represents to many the immoral exclusion of some human beings from the world “intellectual work(s) of beauty and utility” when it is now possible to provide “all the human value of every increase of knowledge” to everyone for virtually nothing. This divide, this terrible imposition of caste where it does not belong and need not be, may well be the central crime of our age. But solving this problem, bridging the gap, means more than simply overcoming those “owners of culture” who cling to their entrenched interest in the old world. We must overcome also the natural resistance residing in the very world we seek to change, for information may want to be free, but it isn’t so clear that people always do.

The problem of spurning freedom is not at all unique to the technology and intellectual property context, but Dostoyevsky suggests to us that it may be particularly acute here. The Grand Inquisitor taunts Christ: “There are three powers, three powers alone, able to conquer and to hold captive for ever, the conscience of these impotent rebels for their happiness. Those forces are miracle, mystery and authority.” It is precisely these forces that closed source technologies so perfectly harness. Why would a man look beyond the black box of his cell phone, the impenetrable wall of his computer, when their function is alternately magical and miraculous to him? These things are as impenetrable to him as the rituals of his Church, which he knows to be of unquestionable authority. There is fear, too, in attempting to look beyond the black box. The Grand Inquisitor says: “Freedom, free thought and science, will lead them into such straits and will bring them face to face with such marvels and insoluble mysteries, that some of them, the fierce and rebellious, will destroy themselves, others, rebellious but weak, will destroy one another, while the rest, weak and unhappy, will crawl fawning to our feet..." If this true, man may not easily accept a free information world.

What then, is the answer, if the Grand Inquisitor is right, if man will either himself destroy the freedom we offer or spurn it, finding it awful? One meta-answer, provided by Dostoyevsky’s novel, is merely that we offer freedom anyway. (The Grand Inquisitor may condemn Christ, but The Brothers Karamazov doesn’t, at least not entirely). Indeed, in the end, the Grand Inquisitor releases Christ before he is killed. Christ kisses the Grand Inquisitor, but despite having saved him, the priest does not repent of his condemnation: “The kiss glows in his heart, but the old man adheres to his idea.” But if our aim is to have people take not merely what we offer but indeed own what is already theirs, then we must address the Grand Inquisitor’s charge more directly than to merely point the way to freedoms that may in turn be freely spurned.

Another solution may be contained in the Grand Inquisitor’s charge itself. Men, he says, can have either freedom or bread, but not both, and accordingly they will always choose bread. But just as technological contexts may be particularly susceptible to the rejection of freedom, so too might they carry with them their cure, for “(i)f Rome possessed the power to feed everyone amply at no greater cost than that of Caesar's own table, the people would sweep Caesar violently away if anyone were left to starve.” It is perhaps only in the universe of the mind and machine that we are able to produce unlimited bread. No one must go hungry in a world of ideas, and so it seems that free-as-in-free software and the sweeping away of the ownership of knowledge may answer the charge the Grand Inquisitor levels. If man can have “freedom and bread enough for all” perhaps he may finally be convinced to accept both.

Merely abolishing private property in ideas will not necessarily result in man’s acceptance of his own freedom, however, though it may nudge him along that path. Coming to offer the “curse of the knowledge of good and evil” as anyone who seeks to upturn to social order does, means also that we must be careful to not merely install ourselves in the Grand Inquisitor’s shoes: Man does not live by bread alone, and if all we offer him is a different loaf, there will have been no worth at all in our endeavour. But if we can ensure that the bread of free-as-in-free ideas and technology are not divorced from freedom itself and allow that there is, indeed, enough for all, then we may see the coming of the day in which “(a)ll that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.”

-- DanaDelger - 04 May 2009

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