| | |
|
EveShabtoFirstPaper 5 - 12 Apr 2017 - Main.EveShabto
|
| |
| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
|---|
| | | In order for CSLI to possess Fourth Amendment protection, the traditional Katz two-prong test tells us that individuals must have (1) an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in their CSLI, and (2) society must be prepared to acknowledge that expectation as reasonable. Americans have a subjective expectation of privacy in the CSLI, and the Supreme Court has indicated that Americans have an objective expectation to be free from warrantless government surveillance.
Subjective | |
<
< | The majority of Americans has no idea that cell phone service provides store their CSLI and regularly allow the government access to those stored records, without a showing probable cause. It is absurd for courts to decide that cell phone users assume the risk their CSLI will be shared if they are not aware that the information is being stored in the first place. Furthermore, the Americans who are aware that their CSLI is stored and shared with the government still consider CSLI to be sensitive information. In 2014, the Pew Research Center found that 82% of American adults considered data that showed the details of their physical location over time to be more sensitive information than the content of their text messages, relationship history, web browser history, and religious or political views. | >
> | The majority of Americans have no idea that cell phone service provides store their CSLI and regularly allow the government access to those stored records, without a showing probable cause. It is absurd for courts to decide that cell phone users assume the risk their CSLI will be shared if they are not aware that the information is being stored in the first place. Furthermore, the Americans who are aware that their CSLI is stored and shared with the government still consider CSLI to be sensitive information. In 2014, the Pew Research Center found that 82% of American adults considered data that showed the details of their physical location over time to be more sensitive information than the content of their text messages, relationship history, web browser history, and religious or political views. | | | Objective
The objective prong in Katz requires courts to “make a normative finding about whether users should be entitled to view the object of the search as private.” The question for courts to ask is whether under “under our system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should impose on our citizens the risk of the electronic listener or observer without at least the protection of a warrant requirement.” |
|
|
|
|
This site is powered by the TWiki collaboration platform.
All material on this collaboration platform is the property of the contributing authors.
All material marked as authored by Eben Moglen is available under the license terms CC-BY-SA version 4.
|
|
| | |