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GerryMoodyFirstPaper 10 - 26 Jun 2008 - Main.GerryMoody
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< | | | | Barbaric Yawp: Universal Spectrum Access and the Public Trust Doctrine
-- By GerryMoody - 27 Feb 2008 | | | “I sound my barbaric yawp over the roofs of the world.” Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass | |
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< | The public trust doctrine could invalidate the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) allocation of electromagnetic spectrum to private companies. In essence, the public trust doctrine forbids states from transferring to private parties any property or natural resource that the public has an inherent right to access and use. This paper argues that the doctrine should apply to the federal regulation of spectrum, especially as spectrum auctions further entrench the broadcast companies’ property-like interests in exclusive licenses to use particular frequencies. However, as discussed below, there are impediments to bringing a claim under public trust doctrine. This might explain why few commentators have discussed the approach. If successful, it could help to create a spectrum commons that would provide access to anyone who complies with technical standards and uses an unlicensed device. If unsuccessful, a failed attempt to apply the doctrine would at least contribute to debates concerning spectrum allocation. | >
> | The public trust doctrine could invalidate the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) allocation of electromagnetic spectrum to private companies. In essence, the public trust doctrine forbids states from transferring to private parties any property or natural resource that the public has an inherent right to access and use. This paper argues that the doctrine should apply to the federal regulation of spectrum, especially as spectrum auctions further entrench the broadcast companies’ property-like interests in exclusive licenses to use particular frequencies. However, as discussed below, there are impediments to bringing a claim under public trust doctrine. This might explain why few commentators have discussed the approach. If successful, it could help to create a spectrum commons that would provide access to anyone who complies with technical standards and uses an unlicensed device. If unsuccessful, a failed attempt to apply the doctrine would at least contribute to debates concerning spectrum allocation. | | | Public Trust Doctrine and Broadcast Spectrum | |
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< | The public trust doctrine in American jurisprudence has many antecedents, such as the Roman Institutes of Justinian, most of which forbade private ownership of navigable waters. In the landmark 1892 decision of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court voided the transfer of submerged lands to a railroad company by holding that the State of Illinois was incapable of transferring to private parties what it held in trust for the people of the state. In 1970, an article by Joseph Sax encouraged courts to apply the public trust doctrine to resources other than water. Controversially, courts have since applied it to state parks. | >
> | The public trust doctrine in American jurisprudence has many antecedents, such as the Roman Institutes of Justinian, most of which forbade private ownership of navigable waters. In the landmark 1892 decision of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court voided the transfer of submerged lands to a railroad company by holding that the State of Illinois was incapable of transferring to private parties what it held in trust for the people of the state. In 1970, an article by Joseph Sax encouraged courts to apply the public trust doctrine to resources other than water. Controversially, courts have since applied it to state parks. | | | | |
<
< | While public trust jurisprudence is somewhat amorphous, the history of electromagnetic spectrum regulation is clear. In 1906, Reginald Fessenden made a Christmas Eve broadcast to ships off the Massachusetts coast. Among the first to broadcast sound, Fesseden claimed a frequency on a first-in-time principle. As broadcast capabilities expanded, the interference caused by competing broadcast stations created a cacophony of competing voices necessitating federal regulation. The government first asserted control over the spectrum in the Radio Act of 1927, which was updated by the Communications Act of 1934. The 1934 Act codified two of the public trust doctrine’s main principles: a prohibition on private ownership and a public access requirement. | >
> | While public trust jurisprudence is somewhat amorphous, the history of electromagnetic spectrum regulation is clear. In 1906, Reginald Fessenden made a Christmas Eve broadcast to ships off the Massachusetts coast. Among the first to broadcast sound, Fesseden claimed a frequency on a first-in-time principle. As broadcast capabilities expanded, the interference caused by competing broadcast stations created a cacophony of competing voices necessitating federal regulation. The government first asserted control over the spectrum in the Radio Act of 1927, which was updated by the Communications Act of 1934. The 1934 Act codified two of the public trust doctrine’s main principles: a prohibition on private ownership and a public access requirement. | | | | |
<
< | The core public values that make the public trust doctrine applicable to navigable water include the rights to travel, trade, and fish. For spectrum, that value is free speech. The overwhelming importance of this value is seen in the fact that the federal government may not regulate speech absent a very strong justification. Indeed, the Supreme Court has applied a less rigorous standard of First Amendment review to broadcast spectrum allocation on the basis of a scarcity rationale. This enables the FCC to decide who receives broadcast licenses without running up against the prohibition on prior restraints. | >
> | The core public values that make the public trust doctrine applicable to navigable water include the rights to travel, trade, and fish. For spectrum, that value is free speech. The overwhelming importance of this value is seen in the fact that the federal government may not regulate speech absent a very strong justification. Indeed, the Supreme Court has applied a less rigorous standard of First Amendment review to broadcast spectrum allocation on the basis of a scarcity rationale. This enables the FCC to decide who receives broadcast licenses without running up against the prohibition on prior restraints. | | | Broadcast “Trustees” Are No Longer Necessary | |
<
< | Under the public trust doctrine described in Illinois Central Railroad, exclusive licenses would be permissible if necessary to avoid cacophony. Justice Story wrote that state control over the submerged lands could not be relinquished, “except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein.” According to some commentators, the scarcity rationale is no longer viable after the development of spread spectrum. If all citizens may use and access the spectrum without interference, the broadcast “trustees” are no longer needed to promote the public interest and exclusive licenses to use the broadcast spectrum should be revoked. | >
> | Under the public trust doctrine described in Illinois Central Railroad, exclusive licenses would be permissible if necessary to avoid cacophony. Justice Story wrote that state control over the submerged lands could not be relinquished, “except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein.” According to some commentators, the scarcity rationale is no longer viable after the development of spread spectrum. If all citizens may use and access the spectrum without interference, the broadcast “trustees” are no longer needed to promote the public interest and exclusive licenses to use the broadcast spectrum should be revoked. | | | By not promoting universal access, the federal government is unnecessarily abridging the right to speak in violation of the First Amendment. To give an example, in Silent Theft, David Boiller documented how the FCC in 2000 received 1,200 applications from schools, church and community organizations for the right to use low-power FM radio stations. The broadcasting lobby (including National Public Radio) responded by convincing the government to cut the number of FM radio stations by 75 percent. The public trust doctrine could ensure that these private parties do not interfere with the public’s right to access the spectrum.
Great in Theory, Bad in Practice | |
<
< | While it seems tailor-made for the cause, a claim under the public trust doctrine might fail for several reasons. First, the doctrine is grounded in state law, which is preempted by federal regulation. Although some commentators have attempted to ground it in federal law, it is not clear that one can bring a federal claim under the public trust doctrine. Second, courts would have to make a conceptual leap from navigable water to electromagnetic spectrum. Of course, some courts have already made a leap from water to state parks. But, because the public trust doctrine is controversial even for water rights, critics would inevitably decry its use here as judicial activism. Third, in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that spectrum licenses do not confer property rights. The public trust doctrine forbids certain property transfers, but is inapplicable to licensing regulation. | >
> | While it seems tailor-made for the cause, a claim under the public trust doctrine might fail for several reasons. First, the doctrine is grounded in state law, which is preempted by federal regulation. Although some commentators have attempted to ground it in federal law, it is not clear that one can bring a federal claim under the public trust doctrine. Second, courts would have to make a conceptual leap from navigable water to electromagnetic spectrum. Of course, some courts have already made a leap from water to state parks. But, because the public trust doctrine is controversial even for water rights, critics would inevitably decry its use here as judicial activism. Third, in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that spectrum licenses do not confer property rights. The public trust doctrine forbids certain property transfers, but is inapplicable to licensing regulation. | | | This third problem might be easiest to overcome. Even if licenses are not formal property rights, spectrum auctions have encouraged large capital investments that foresee long realization horizons. Additionally, under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, eligibility for advanced television licenses is limited to broadcasters who already possess a license. Finally, most licenses are routinely renewed. This suggests that broadcasters have effectively received property interests with their licenses, which means the public trust doctrine might not be presumptively inapplicable. |
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GerryMoodyFirstPaper 8 - 10 Mar 2008 - Main.GerryMoody
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Barbaric Yawp: Universal Spectrum Access and the Public Trust Doctrine | | | The public trust doctrine in American jurisprudence has many antecedents, such as the Roman Institutes of Justinian, most of which forbade private ownership of navigable waters. In the landmark 1892 decision of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court voided the transfer of submerged lands to a railroad company by holding that the State of Illinois was incapable of transferring to private parties what it held in trust for the people of the state. In 1970, an article by Joseph Sax encouraged courts to apply the public trust doctrine to resources other than water. Controversially, courts have since applied it to state parks. | |
<
< | While public trust jurisprudence is somewhat amorphous, the history of electromagnetic spectrum regulation is clear. In 1906, Reginald Fessenden made a Christmas Eve broadcast to ships off the Massachusetts coast. Among the first to broadcast sound, Fesseden claimed a frequency on a first-in-time principle. As broadcast capabilities expanded, the interference caused by competing broadcast stations created a cacophony of competing voices necessitating federal regulation. The government first asserted control over the spectrum in the Radio Act of 1927, which was updated by the Communications Act of 1934. The 1934 Act codified two of the doctrine’s main principles: a prohibition on private ownership and a public access requirement. | >
> | While public trust jurisprudence is somewhat amorphous, the history of electromagnetic spectrum regulation is clear. In 1906, Reginald Fessenden made a Christmas Eve broadcast to ships off the Massachusetts coast. Among the first to broadcast sound, Fesseden claimed a frequency on a first-in-time principle. As broadcast capabilities expanded, the interference caused by competing broadcast stations created a cacophony of competing voices necessitating federal regulation. The government first asserted control over the spectrum in the Radio Act of 1927, which was updated by the Communications Act of 1934. The 1934 Act codified two of the public trust doctrine’s main principles: a prohibition on private ownership and a public access requirement. | | | The core public values that make the public trust doctrine applicable to navigable water include the rights to travel, trade, and fish. For spectrum, that value is free speech. The overwhelming importance of this value is seen in the fact that the federal government may not regulate speech absent a very strong justification. Indeed, the Supreme Court has applied a less rigorous standard of First Amendment review to broadcast spectrum allocation on the basis of a scarcity rationale. This enables the FCC to decide who receives broadcast licenses without running up against the prohibition on prior restraints. | | | Under the public trust doctrine described in Illinois Central Railroad, exclusive licenses would be permissible if necessary to avoid cacophony. Justice Story wrote that state control over the submerged lands could not be relinquished, “except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein.” According to some commentators, the scarcity rationale is no longer viable after the development of spread spectrum. If all citizens may use and access the spectrum without interference, the broadcast “trustees” are no longer needed to promote the public interest and exclusive licenses to use the broadcast spectrum should be revoked. | |
<
< | By not promoting universal access, the federal government is unnecessarily abridging the right to speak in violation of the First Amendment. To give an example, in Silent Theft, David Boiller documented how the FCC once received 1,200 applications from schools, church and community organizations for the right to use low-power FM radio stations. The broadcasting lobby responded by convincing the government to cut the number of FM radio stations by 75 percent. The public trust doctrine could ensure that these private parties do not interfere with the public’s right to access the spectrum. | >
> | By not promoting universal access, the federal government is unnecessarily abridging the right to speak in violation of the First Amendment. To give an example, in Silent Theft, David Boiller documented how the FCC in 2000 received 1,200 applications from schools, church and community organizations for the right to use low-power FM radio stations. The broadcasting lobby (including National Public Radio) responded by convincing the government to cut the number of FM radio stations by 75 percent. The public trust doctrine could ensure that these private parties do not interfere with the public’s right to access the spectrum. | | | Great in Theory, Bad in Practice
While it seems tailor-made for the cause, a claim under the public trust doctrine might fail for several reasons. First, the doctrine is grounded in state law, which is preempted by federal regulation. Although some commentators have attempted to ground it in federal law, it is not clear that one can bring a federal claim under the public trust doctrine. Second, courts would have to make a conceptual leap from navigable water to electromagnetic spectrum. Of course, some courts have already made a leap from water to state parks. But, because the public trust doctrine is controversial even for water rights, critics would inevitably decry its use here as judicial activism. Third, in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that spectrum licenses do not confer property rights. The public trust doctrine forbids certain property transfers, but is inapplicable to licensing regulation. | |
<
< | This third problem might be easiest to overcome. Even if licenses are not formal property rights, spectrum auctions have encouraged large capital investments that foresee a long realization horizon. Additionally, under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, eligibility for advanced television licenses is limited to broadcasters who already possess a license. Finally, most licenses are routinely renewed. This suggests that broadcasters have effectively received property interests with their licenses, which means the public trust doctrine might not be presumptively inapplicable. | >
> | This third problem might be easiest to overcome. Even if licenses are not formal property rights, spectrum auctions have encouraged large capital investments that foresee long realization horizons. Additionally, under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, eligibility for advanced television licenses is limited to broadcasters who already possess a license. Finally, most licenses are routinely renewed. This suggests that broadcasters have effectively received property interests with their licenses, which means the public trust doctrine might not be presumptively inapplicable. | | | Conclusion
Although these impediments make the success of a public trust doctrine challenge unlikely, it might still make sense to bring a case. The doctrine’s populist rhetorical power could, at least, help generate opposition to a governmental regime that gives to the few exclusive access to a natural resource that technologically can and should be enjoyed by the many. | |
>
> | Word Count: 995 | | | # * Set ALLOWTOPICVIEW = TWikiAdminGroup, GerryMoody |
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GerryMoodyFirstPaper 7 - 10 Mar 2008 - Main.GerryMoody
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< | Work in Progress | >
> | Barbaric Yawp: Universal Spectrum Access and the Public Trust Doctrine | | | -- By GerryMoody - 27 Feb 2008 | |
>
> | “I sound my barbaric yawp over the roofs of the world.” Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass | | | | |
<
< | Public Trust Doctrine and Electromagnetic Spectrum | >
> | The public trust doctrine could invalidate the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) allocation of electromagnetic spectrum to private companies. In essence, the public trust doctrine forbids states from transferring to private parties any property or natural resource that the public has an inherent right to access and use. This paper argues that the doctrine should apply to the federal regulation of spectrum, especially as spectrum auctions further entrench the broadcast companies’ property-like interests in exclusive licenses to use particular frequencies. However, as discussed below, there are impediments to bringing a claim under public trust doctrine. This might explain why few commentators have discussed the approach. If successful, it could help to create a spectrum commons that would provide access to anyone who complies with technical standards and uses an unlicensed device. If unsuccessful, a failed attempt to apply the doctrine would at least contribute to debates concerning spectrum allocation. | | | | |
>
> | Public Trust Doctrine and Broadcast Spectrum | | | | |
<
< | Patrick S. Ryan Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum | >
> | The public trust doctrine in American jurisprudence has many antecedents, such as the Roman Institutes of Justinian, most of which forbade private ownership of navigable waters. In the landmark 1892 decision of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court voided the transfer of submerged lands to a railroad company by holding that the State of Illinois was incapable of transferring to private parties what it held in trust for the people of the state. In 1970, an article by Joseph Sax encouraged courts to apply the public trust doctrine to resources other than water. Controversially, courts have since applied it to state parks. | | | | |
<
< | Free Speech and Electromagnetic Spectrum | >
> | While public trust jurisprudence is somewhat amorphous, the history of electromagnetic spectrum regulation is clear. In 1906, Reginald Fessenden made a Christmas Eve broadcast to ships off the Massachusetts coast. Among the first to broadcast sound, Fesseden claimed a frequency on a first-in-time principle. As broadcast capabilities expanded, the interference caused by competing broadcast stations created a cacophony of competing voices necessitating federal regulation. The government first asserted control over the spectrum in the Radio Act of 1927, which was updated by the Communications Act of 1934. The 1934 Act codified two of the doctrine’s main principles: a prohibition on private ownership and a public access requirement. | | | | |
<
< | Yochai Benkler and Lawrence Lessig Net Gains: Will technology make CBS unconstitutional? New Reupblic, Dec 14, 1998 | >
> | The core public values that make the public trust doctrine applicable to navigable water include the rights to travel, trade, and fish. For spectrum, that value is free speech. The overwhelming importance of this value is seen in the fact that the federal government may not regulate speech absent a very strong justification. Indeed, the Supreme Court has applied a less rigorous standard of First Amendment review to broadcast spectrum allocation on the basis of a scarcity rationale. This enables the FCC to decide who receives broadcast licenses without running up against the prohibition on prior restraints. | | | | |
>
> | Broadcast “Trustees” Are No Longer Necessary | | | | |
<
< | Public Trust Doctrine as Constitutional Law | >
> | Under the public trust doctrine described in Illinois Central Railroad, exclusive licenses would be permissible if necessary to avoid cacophony. Justice Story wrote that state control over the submerged lands could not be relinquished, “except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein.” According to some commentators, the scarcity rationale is no longer viable after the development of spread spectrum. If all citizens may use and access the spectrum without interference, the broadcast “trustees” are no longer needed to promote the public interest and exclusive licenses to use the broadcast spectrum should be revoked. | | | | |
<
< | James L. HuffmanFish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy | >
> | By not promoting universal access, the federal government is unnecessarily abridging the right to speak in violation of the First Amendment. To give an example, in Silent Theft, David Boiller documented how the FCC once received 1,200 applications from schools, church and community organizations for the right to use low-power FM radio stations. The broadcasting lobby responded by convincing the government to cut the number of FM radio stations by 75 percent. The public trust doctrine could ensure that these private parties do not interfere with the public’s right to access the spectrum. | | | | |
<
< | Joseph L. Sax The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law | >
> | Great in Theory, Bad in Practice | | | | |
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< | Michael C. Blumm PUBLIC PROPERTY AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF WESTERN WATER LAW: A MODERN VIEW OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE | >
> | While it seems tailor-made for the cause, a claim under the public trust doctrine might fail for several reasons. First, the doctrine is grounded in state law, which is preempted by federal regulation. Although some commentators have attempted to ground it in federal law, it is not clear that one can bring a federal claim under the public trust doctrine. Second, courts would have to make a conceptual leap from navigable water to electromagnetic spectrum. Of course, some courts have already made a leap from water to state parks. But, because the public trust doctrine is controversial even for water rights, critics would inevitably decry its use here as judicial activism. Third, in FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that spectrum licenses do not confer property rights. The public trust doctrine forbids certain property transfers, but is inapplicable to licensing regulation. | | | | |
<
< | Charles F. Wilkinson THE HEADWATERS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST: SOME OF THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE | >
> | This third problem might be easiest to overcome. Even if licenses are not formal property rights, spectrum auctions have encouraged large capital investments that foresee a long realization horizon. Additionally, under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, eligibility for advanced television licenses is limited to broadcasters who already possess a license. Finally, most licenses are routinely renewed. This suggests that broadcasters have effectively received property interests with their licenses, which means the public trust doctrine might not be presumptively inapplicable. | | | | |
<
< | Dale B. Thompson OF RAINBOWS AND RIVERS: LESSONS FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SPECTRUM POLICY FROM TRANSITIONS IN PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMMONS IN WATER LAW | >
> | Conclusion | | | | |
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< | Carol Rose The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property
Subsection B
Yochai Benkler Free As The Air To Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain
Subsub 1
Subsub 2
Section II
Subsection A
Subsection B
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.
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> | Although these impediments make the success of a public trust doctrine challenge unlikely, it might still make sense to bring a case. The doctrine’s populist rhetorical power could, at least, help generate opposition to a governmental regime that gives to the few exclusive access to a natural resource that technologically can and should be enjoyed by the many. | | | # * Set ALLOWTOPICVIEW = TWikiAdminGroup, GerryMoody | |
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< | Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of that line. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated list | | | \ No newline at end of file |
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GerryMoodyFirstPaper 6 - 09 Mar 2008 - Main.GerryMoody
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Work in Progress | | | Public Trust Doctrine and Electromagnetic Spectrum | |
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< | The public trust doctrine has the potential to undo the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) misallocation of electromagnetic spectrum to private communications companies. Both the Supreme Court and President Bush have called spectrum a scarce natural resource, and the FCC grants its licenses to communications companies whom commentators claim hold hold them as "public trustees," or as the Supreme Court put it, "proxies for the entire community . . . ." This paper will argue that advances in technology make the public trust doctrine applicable to the federal regulation of spectrum, especially as spectrum auctions further entrench the property-like interests of broadcast companies in their exclusive licenses to use particular frequencies. To put it simply, we no longer need the federal government to appoint trustees to use and access our most valuable natural resource, the one that enables the greatest variety of speech. And we must beware as these trustees become more and more like de facto owners of However, as discussed below, there are both legal and functional impediments to using the public trust doctrine in either federal or state court. While acknowledging its shortcomings, the public trust doctrine is so rhetorically powerful that it should be discussed in order to generate political opposition to a regulatory regime that gives to the few exclusive access to a natural resource that can now be used by the many. | | | Patrick S. Ryan Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum |
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GerryMoodyFirstPaper 5 - 08 Mar 2008 - Main.GerryMoody
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< | It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | | | Work in Progress
-- By GerryMoody - 27 Feb 2008 | | | Public Trust Doctrine and Electromagnetic Spectrum | |
>
> | The public trust doctrine has the potential to undo the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) misallocation of electromagnetic spectrum to private communications companies. Both the Supreme Court and President Bush have called spectrum a scarce natural resource, and the FCC grants its licenses to communications companies whom commentators claim hold hold them as "public trustees," or as the Supreme Court put it, "proxies for the entire community . . . ." This paper will argue that advances in technology make the public trust doctrine applicable to the federal regulation of spectrum, especially as spectrum auctions further entrench the property-like interests of broadcast companies in their exclusive licenses to use particular frequencies. To put it simply, we no longer need the federal government to appoint trustees to use and access our most valuable natural resource, the one that enables the greatest variety of speech. And we must beware as these trustees become more and more like de facto owners of However, as discussed below, there are both legal and functional impediments to using the public trust doctrine in either federal or state court. While acknowledging its shortcomings, the public trust doctrine is so rhetorically powerful that it should be discussed in order to generate political opposition to a regulatory regime that gives to the few exclusive access to a natural resource that can now be used by the many. | | | Patrick S. Ryan Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum
Free Speech and Electromagnetic Spectrum |
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GerryMoodyFirstPaper 1 - 27 Feb 2008 - Main.GerryMoody
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.
Work in Progress
-- By GerryMoody - 27 Feb 2008
Public Trust Doctrine and Electromagnetic Spectrum
Patrick S. Ryan Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum
Free Speech and Electromagnetic Spectrum
Yochai Benkler and Lawrence Lessig Net Gains: Will technology make CBS unconstitutional? New Reupblic, Dec 14, 1998
Subsub 1
Subsection B
Subsub 1
Subsub 2
Section II
Subsection A
Subsection B
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.
To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" on the next line:
# * Set ALLOWTOPICVIEW = TWikiAdminGroup, GerryMoody
Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of that line. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated list |
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