|
JustinColanninoFirstPaper 18 - 26 Mar 2009 - Main.DanielHarris
|
| |
| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper%25" |
|---|
Does Copyright Deter Social Movements? | | | Daniel, thanks for pointing out my factual inaccuracy. I clearly did not read the article well. I had found this, did a bit more research and seized on the visual of a song and dance. That was sloppy. However, I did get to link to a video of the Macarena, which was a plus. | |
<
< | On to your other two points. First, your McCain example is exactly the type of speech that I attempted to show concern with in the idea expression dichotomy section. If you check out the old and new versions of his attack on the media's love of Obamba at this link, you might agree that the value added to the political message by the recognizable tune is substantial. I argued that in certain political speech, expression is as important as idea -- McCain is no exception. | >
> | On to your other two points. First, your McCain example is exactly the type of speech that I attempted to show concern with in the idea expression dichotomy section. If you check out the old and new versions of his attack on the media's love of Obama at this link, you might agree that the value added to the political message by the recognizable tune is substantial. I argued that in certain political speech, expression is as important as idea -- McCain is no exception. | | | I think your second point finds what I think could be the weakest part of my argument: do the educational, not for profit and other fair use provisions do enough to allow people to come together to learn music and dance and build culture? Maybe they do, and maybe they don't. Remember, ASCAP still demanded payment from Girl Scouts to sing This Land Is Your Land, despite my bungling of the facts. The threat of lawsuit can chill speech. But I do think you make a good point. | | | -- JustinColannino - 20 Mar 2009 | |
>
> |
Justin,
The end of my third paragraph was responding to Dana's characterization--thanks for clarifying the separation. I read your title as "...Deter [the creation/existence of] Social Movements," but perhaps it should be better read as "...Make Social Movements Less Effective."
I got the implied threat to meatspace protests under infringement law (rather than by impoverishment of public memory) from the combination of "making it impossible ... to sing their own songs" and "copyright puts a burden on social organizers to limit their musical expression to newly created or very old songs."
I get the invocation of protests better now--I just don't really buy the argument that it's hard (or going to become hard) for songs to catch on. Of course, it would be easier for songs to catch on without copyright (assuming the Net does its part and they still get distributed as widely), but currently the vested interests of rightsholders in popularizing their work seem to be doing well enough. I pointed out a couple examples where copyright law has (so far) completely failed to make songs hard to catch on. I have a hard time imagining a copyright owner, even one represented by the RIAA, who would want to prosecute copyright infringement in a way extreme enough to significantly retard uptake of the song into the collective consumer conscious (although here again term extension is meddlesome, as commercial incentives for song uptake may deteriorate somewhat over the copyright term). I worried about DRM's potential anti-viral properties, but that seems to be on its way out.
I didn't really see an idea-expression merger in the McCain ad. Sure, more people liked the infringing-barring-fair-use form. However, if we remove the leftover lyrics in the video, is it actually impossible (or even significantly harder) to get this idea across without using that particular copyrighted work? We Shall Overcome has, to raid trademark, a secondary meaning, but the idea that the media was in love with candidate Obama wasn't wedded to the Valli track.
-- DanielHarris - 26 Mar 2009 | | |
\ No newline at end of file |
|
|
JustinColanninoFirstPaper 17 - 20 Mar 2009 - Main.JustinColannino
|
| |
| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper%25" |
|---|
Does Copyright Deter Social Movements? | | | Dana, I completely agree re: the shrinking of the public domain via term consolidation and extension. I am a bit wary, though, of the chilling effect arguments as applied to the copyright law itself: I don't want to blame the copyright statute (with the possible exception of the potentially ridiculous statutory damages) for overzealous attorneys' going beyond it. It seems to me that the GS should fall under 110(4)(B) -- if we treat the demand for licensing as a notice of disapproval under that section, I am tempted to say that the press will sort things out. Less-connected camps have the advantage of being small enough to be less noticeable and not really worth bugging--and even they can generate a local outcry sufficient to enrage a representative. I doubt (but welcome anecdotes) that any social move-rs are scrapping their plans to fight for justice out of fear of copyright, or even consulting a lawyer (much less receiving counsel) about the copyright consequences of appropriating popular culture.
-- DanielHarris - 11 Mar 2009 | |
>
> | Daniel, you say: “I was just objecting to the implication that copyright law as it stands can be an impediment to protesters singing songs in 'meatspace'--this is an overreach and weakens the other valuable points to be made here.”
This implication is a miscommunication and as the author this is likely my fault. I tried to argue that the way that copyright deters social movements is that it is hard for songs to catch on, because they are deterred from being distributed by record (even the compulsory license has limitations see §115(2)), at camp, or through youtube. I believe copyright can be an impediment to 'meatspace' singing, but it is only because people end up not knowing the tune, but I don't think that this impediment is what you are objecting to. If you could point out where you got this implication, I would appreciate it.
Also, I think your last sentence shows another point of miscommunication, I think you got hung up on Dana's characterization of my argument (“the movements that never happen or those that fail because of what they are unable to take from the culture around them”). My paper is not about social movements not being started because of copyright law. It is about copyright making social movements less effective by limiting the expression available to the movement, which deters the movement's growth. The incremental harm of restricting expression leads to the message becoming less effective, and thus, less people hearing it. Your John McCain example illustrates this point well.
-- JustinColannino - 20 Mar 2009 | | | |
|
|
JustinColanninoFirstPaper 16 - 11 Mar 2009 - Main.DanielHarris
|
| |
| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper%25" |
|---|
Does Copyright Deter Social Movements? | | | I've noted to Justin offline that the weakest part of his argument is that he hasn't quite proved his point that music, particularly familiar music, which draws on lyrical or musical themes recognizable to a population, can be an agent for social change. If you spend your Friday nights like I sometimes do, hanging out at Woody Guthrie sing-a-longs (or, if, like Justin, your wife is the archivist at the Woody Guthrie Foundation's archives), that point is evident; knowing about black slave songs, the folk movement and other rebellions and revolutions based around music is what enables one to accept the second part of the argument. But if you don't know, then it's easy, I think, to miss the subtler point, which is that part of the success of early social and musical social movements is owed to the less restrictive copyright, particularly in terms of length (see my comment above). They were able to access the familiar, to speak to people in a language they understood, and their movements were able to succeed thereby. In a world where that doesn't happen because of copyright, there is an inhibition on social movements, both nascent and existent, an inhibition which doesn't depend on a few nefarious copyright owners clumsily trying to put down change.
-- DanaDelger - 11 Mar 2009 | |
>
> |
Admittedly, I was being a little devilish in my advocacy -- arguing for ASCAP is not my normal role in life, and I'm more comfortable with Guthrie's copyright notices. I was just objecting to the implication that copyright law as it stands can be an impediment to protesters singing songs in "meatspace"--this is an overreach and weakens the other valuable points to be made here. I agree that an emphasis on the changing nature of social movements and how they fall out of the exceptions set out in the Act (including the not-quite-as-cutting-edge but still relevant issue of documentaries) would be a good way to shore this up.
I blame being tired for not thinking of the Soulja Boy teaching example: the youtubing of the public square obviously does threaten teaching by video recording. This isn't new--you might get a takedown for teaching the Macarena on public access cable, if anyone lawyerly were to watch--but more people have the opportunity to infringe (if not under fair use) with Youtube. This implicates a few things: the common problem of the Act's failure to adapt to digital media and the need for "reproduction" of a digital work to experience it, the possible net-video-enhanced transformation of social communication from synchronous to asynchronous communication, AND "those infernal machines" Lessig likes to remind us about Sousa's predicting would lead to the destruction of music.
Dana, I completely agree re: the shrinking of the public domain via term consolidation and extension. I am a bit wary, though, of the chilling effect arguments as applied to the copyright law itself: I don't want to blame the copyright statute (with the possible exception of the potentially ridiculous statutory damages) for overzealous attorneys' going beyond it. It seems to me that the GS should fall under 110(4)(B) -- if we treat the demand for licensing as a notice of disapproval under that section, I am tempted to say that the press will sort things out. Less-connected camps have the advantage of being small enough to be less noticeable and not really worth bugging--and even they can generate a local outcry sufficient to enrage a representative. I doubt (but welcome anecdotes) that any social move-rs are scrapping their plans to fight for justice out of fear of copyright, or even consulting a lawyer (much less receiving counsel) about the copyright consequences of appropriating popular culture.
-- DanielHarris - 11 Mar 2009 | | | |
|
|
JustinColanninoFirstPaper 15 - 11 Mar 2009 - Main.JustinColannino
|
| |
| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper%25" |
|---|
Does Copyright Deter Social Movements? | | | Adaptation, both lyrically and musically, is a factor in the success of music to encourage collective action. Guthrie, Seeger, and others had a large public domain to draw upon to craft their songs, including the country and African-American traditions. However, there was a concern even at that time that copyright could deter the civil rights movement and be used in support of Jim Crow. In a 1952 issue of Sing Out! Irwin Silber wrote, "at a time when a growing Negro people's cultural movement is rediscovering its own heritage and proudly and beautifully re-creating it, [pirates] have set barriers in the path of this development by attempting to take this music out of the area of the 'public domain' and making it impossible for the Negro people to sing their own songs without getting (and paying for) permission from the white copyright owners." The problem that Mr. Silber was afraid of in 1952 is more dire today because of the greatly expanded copyright term. Now, copyright controls the current generation's familiar songs so that these songs are impossible, absent permission, to adapt to a specific social movement.
Notes
:
| |
<
< | At a minimum, copyright puts a burden on social organizers to limit their musical expression to newly created or very old songs. According to recent supreme court language, when free speech and copyright come into conflict the protections of fair use and the idea expression dichotomy provide protection for political First Amendment values. This essay concludes by arguing that both of these copyright exceptions do not protect from the harm done to social movements.
Notes
:
:
:
| >
> | At a minimum, copyright puts a burden on social organizers to limit their musical expression to newly created or very old songs. According to recent supreme court language, when free speech and copyright come into conflict the protections of fair use and the idea expression dichotomy provide protection for political First Amendment values. However, these copyright exceptions do not protect from the harm done to social movements. | | | Idea expression dichotomy | | | Fair use | |
<
< | Fair use is a defense to a copyright infringement. Its application balances multiple non-determinative factors, and its litigation is expensive and risky. Even if political use of a particular song is found to be 'fair' after trial, copyright erects barriers to social movements not circumvented by fair use. The problem is that copyright can prevent art from becoming a part of culture that can be drawn upon in the future for political speech. For example, in 1996 the Girl Scouts of America were asked by ASCAP to pay royalties for, among other things, performing This Land Is Your Land at camp. Enforcing copyright on groups of people singing and dancing together results in others not singing and dancing for fear of lawsuit. This lowers the chance that song and dance will be known, taught, and adapted for social use in he future. Thus, the chilling effect on free speech can occur before the 'fair' political use is ever contemplated.
Notes
:
:
| >
> | Fair use is a defense to a copyright infringement. Its application balances multiple non-determinative factors, and its litigation is expensive and risky. Even if political use of a particular song is found to be 'fair' after trial, copyright erects barriers to social movements not circumvented by fair use. The problem is that copyright can prevent art from becoming a part of culture that can be drawn upon in the future for political speech. For example, in 1996 the Girl Scouts of America were asked by ASCAP to pay royalties for, among other things, performing This Land Is Your Land at camp. Similarly, when people attempt to teach a song or dance on youtube, they are censored. Enforcing copyright on groups of people singing and dancing together results in others not singing and dancing for fear of lawsuit. This lowers the chance that the expression will be known, taught, and adapted for social use in the future. Thus, the chilling effect on expression can occur before the 'fair' political use is contemplated. | | | |
|
|
|
|
This site is powered by the TWiki collaboration platform.
All material on this collaboration platform is the property of the contributing authors.
All material marked as authored by Eben Moglen is available under the license terms CC-BY-SA version 4.
|
|