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KarlRaymondCruzFirstPaper 4 - 08 May 2022 - Main.KarlRaymondCruz
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< | It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | >
> | | | | The Need to Address Warrantless Targeted Pole Camera Surveillance | |
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< | -- By KarlRaymondCruz - 17 Mar 2022 (revised 06 May 2022) | >
> | -- By KarlRaymondCruz - 17 Mar 2022 | | | The Reality: Law Enforcement’s Resort to Targeted Pole Camera Surveillance |
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KarlRaymondCruzFirstPaper 3 - 07 May 2022 - Main.KarlRaymondCruz
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | |
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< | Convenience at the Expense of Privacy? The Need to Regulate Facial Recognition Technology | >
> | The Need to Address Warrantless Targeted Pole Camera Surveillance | | | | |
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< | -- By KarlRaymondCruz - 17 Mar 2022 | >
> | -- By KarlRaymondCruz - 17 Mar 2022 (revised 06 May 2022) | | | | |
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< | In our fast-paced world, people have been drawn to the benefits of facial recognition technology (FRT). Private and State entities are utilizing FRT under varying levels of regulation. Definite baseline standards must be set to ensure that individual privacy rights are adequately protected.
Current trends on the Use of Facial Recognition Technology | >
> | The Reality: Law Enforcement’s Resort to Targeted Pole Camera Surveillance | | | | |
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< | Innovations linked to the use of FRT seem to be endless. FRT is utilized for simple tasks such as unlocking a phone while wearing a mask or for streamlining more complicated processes such as airport checks. The Covid-19 pandemic also brought about the use of FRT to safeguard public health by using FRT to track Covid-19 infections. Against this backdrop, recent forecasts predict that the FRT market will be valued at $12.67 billion in 2028 from $ 5.012 billion in 2021, with the use of FRT in law enforcement and non-law enforcement applications to increase rapidly from 2021 to 2028. As of 2020, China and the United States lead the market in terms of funding FRT companies. Notably, in a report published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in August 2021, 16 out of 24 surveyed federal agencies reported using FRT for digital access or cybersecurity, and 10 of the 24 have plans to expand their use of FRT.
Significantly, public opinion on FRT is not consistent across all possible uses of the technology. For instance, in a recent survey, 59% of respondents from the United States found FRT use for law enforcement acceptable while only 36% of respondents trust the use of FRT by technology companies. Interestingly, only 86% of the respondents have heard about FRT, and only 25% have confirmed to have heard a lot about it. | >
> | The use of cameras has become common for law enforcement. For instance, in New York City, it was found that the New York City Police Department has access to over 15,000 surveillance cameras. While cameras stationed in public areas may be considered to indiscriminately record movement of people, law enforcement has also utilized cameras, particularly pole cameras, to conduct warrantless targeted surveillance of an individual. Different courts have tackled the issue of whether targeted pole camera surveillance of varying duration, where the pole camera is directed at a person’s home, is a search under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. | | |
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< | Risks posed by the use of Facial Recognition Technology | >
> | The Case of Tuggle | | | | |
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< | The promise of convenience and efficiency comes with a price. The use of FRT is criticized because of the risks it poses to individual privacy and other fundamental rights. FRT can potentially be misused on individuals without their consent. Moreover, the possibility of inaccurate results, the lack of transparency, and the absence of due diligence of FRT are feared to bring about violations of human rights. | >
> | In February 2022, the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the decision of the Seventh Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Tuggle. Tuggle determined whether targeted pole camera surveillance, where the cameras are directed at a person’s home, is considered a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. The government conducted surveillance without a warrant for eighteen months. Tuggle held that the "current formulation of a Fourth Amendment search often turns on whether a used technology becomes widespread." The court concluded that “the government’s use of a technology in public use, while occupying a place it was lawfully entitled to be, to observe plainly visible happenings, did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.” Tuggle observed that the area monitored by the camera was plainly visible to the public and the length of surveillance did not affect its analysis since it did not reveal a comprehensive record of a person’s movements, considering that it monitored only one location. | | | | |
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< | The use by States of FRT continue to spark controversies. For instance, China has resorted to the use of FRT to track and control Uyghurs and even detect changes in their behavior. While the use of FRT is praised for its ability to improve public safety, its use for law enforcement remains controversial. In New York City, it was found that more CCTV cameras which utilize FRT are stationed at neighborhoods with higher concentrations of non-white residents. Consequently, the disproportionate use of FRT is seen to reinforce discriminatory policing against minority communities. | >
> | Notably, Tuggle highlighted the existence of conflicting decisions on this issue. For instance, in Tafoya, the court held that the surveillance “involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.” Similar to Tuggle, the pole cameras were directed at a person’s residence. The surveillance was conducted for three months. Tafoya found the surveillance to be a search. However, it differentiated itself from Tuggle by considering that the pole camera in this case was used to surveil fenced in curtilage, as opposed to Tuggle where the public was given an unobstructed view of the area. | | |
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< | Regulation of Facial Recognition Technology | | | | |
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There is no unified response to the growing complexities of FRT and the dangers lurking with its continued use. | | | | |
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< | In July 2021, China’s Supreme Court issued a judicial interpretation which set out guidelines for the use of FRT and the protection of individual privacy. However, the judicial interpretation provides for exemptions when FRT is used to respond to a public health emergency or for maintaining public security. Notably, China’s Personal Information Protection Law, which took effect on November 1, 2021, allows the installation of image collection or personal identity recognition equipment in public venues to safeguard public security. An individual’s separate consent is required only when the collected personal images and personal distinguishing identity characteristic information is used for a purpose other than safeguarding public security. | >
> | Surveillance Technology Continues to Evolve - Use of Facial Recognition Technology | | | | |
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< | In contrast, several states and cities in the United States have banned government use of FRT. Currently, there is still no federal legislation governing the use of FRT. If the Facial Recognition and Biometric Technology Moratorium Act of 2021 becomes law, it will ban federal agencies and federal officials from using FRT unless explicitly authorized by an act of Congress. The bill also prohibits the use of information derived from FRT operated by another entity.
In October 2021, the European Parliament passed a non-binding resolution calling for strict democratic control and independent oversight of any AI-enabled technology in use of law enforcement and judicial authorities. It also called for a ban on the use of private facial recognition databases in law enforcement. Significantly, the proposed EU Artificial Intelligence Act specifies prohibited artificial intelligence practices and adopts a risk-based approach to regulate the use of artificial intelligence with varying risk categories. This would cover artificial intelligence used to power FRT. | >
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In Tuggle, the pole cameras recorded footage around the clock and made use of rudimentary lighting technology. The pole cameras also allowed law enforcement agents to remotely zoom, pan, and tilt the cameras and review the camera footage in real time. Moreover, the footage was stored and can later be reviewed. This was the type of technology which the court in Tuggle determined to be widespread and in “public use”. | | | | |
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< | In September 2021, the United Nations urged States to implement a moratorium on the use of artificial intelligence technology, which includes FRT, which poses a threat to human rights. | >
> | The technology used in Tuggle is not the most sophisticated. Cameras paired with other technology can do more than record images or videos. For instance, we know that law enforcement is using facial recognition technology(FRT) to aid in the performance of its functions. Would pairing facial recognition technology with pole camera surveillance necessarily constitute a “search”? Following Kyllo, unlike devices which use thermal imaging, FRT would not necessarily allow a camera to record images which are unknowable without physical intrusion of one’s home. However, it would also depend whether a court considers FRT to be in general public use. | | |
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< | Conclusion
The current landscape of FRT regulation is not sufficient to protect individual privacy rights. Baseline standards for both private and government use of FRT must be set. The use of FRT has been justified to respond to a public health crisis or to promote public safety, even in the absence of adequate safeguards to protect individual rights. As such, a moratorium on the use of FRT in the short term, until adequate safeguards are adopted, appears to be a good temporary measure in the absence of clear guidelines enumerating acceptable uses of FRT and regulating its use. Economic sanctions similar to that imposed by the United States on SenseTime? , a Chinese facial recognition startup, for its alleged role in the surveillance of Uyghurs, does not appear to be an effective deterrent to alleged misuse of FRT. Given the cross-border implications of the use of FRT, it would be ideal for there to be a collective approach to the regulation of FRT. However, it remains to be seen whether countries can arrive at a middle ground with respect to their stance on FRT use.
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The best routes to improvement here begin by reducing technical confusion. | >
> | Conclusion | | | | |
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< | Facial recognition is software, of a simple kind—pattern matching—now grandly and ridiculously referred to as "artificial intelligence" and "machine learning," actually a staple of what computer programs have been used to do since the beginning of digital computing. The program compares a target image against a large collection of other pictures of faces, in order to identify the person whose face is in the target image. Finding the needle in the haystack is comparatively easy. Building and maintaining the haystack, on the other hand, is harder. So the most obvious technology pattern in the current context is for "platform" companies that build and maintain immense data stores on the world's human beings to run the pattern matching programs "as a service," accepting target data from people paying for the service, giving them the output from pattern matching, and remembering forever who was looking for whom, when, and inferring why. | >
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The Supreme Court denied the petition concerning Tuggle. However, the continuing advances in surveillance technology suggests it should address this issue. In fact, in Tuggle, the court claimed to be bound by Supreme Court precedent but expressed unease about this type of surveillance. We can only speculate whether the use of more sophisticated cameras than that used in Tuggle, or using cameras paired with other technologies such as FRT, would get the Supreme Court’s attention. | | | | |
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< | The various moratoriums, pauses, decisions not to sell for now, etc. that you mention but do not actually analyze, reflect no particular understanding: they are reflexes in the governmental nervous system. | >
> | Significantly, Carpenter mentioned two guideposts, namely: (1) "the [Fourth] Amendment seeks to secure the “privacies of life” against “arbitrary power”"; and (2) "a central aim of the Framers was to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance." Given these guideposts, there is room to argue that the surveillance involved in Tuggle involves a too permeating police surveillance. However, there are cases like Tuggle which hold that targeted pole camera surveillance, regardless of length, does not qualify as a search. Since a warrant would not be necessary, this creates risk that law enforcement can simply rely on reports or information which may have varying degrees of reliability. | | | | |
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< | But the software that finds needles in haystacks is not the cameras everywhere that acquire all the images, nor the social processes that use or misuse the outputs. All of this confusedly lumped together as "FRT" produces no analytic purchase on any particular aspect of the problem, which is probably why your conclusion doesn't really conclude anything, | >
> | In Carpenter, the Court highlighted that a person has “a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.” In connection to this, Tafoya correctly points out that the extended duration and continuity of the surveillance are constitutionally significant. As Tafoya also points out, long-term camera surveillance directed at a person’s home can still provide “a wealth of detail” about a person, particularly information about a person’s everyday habits, routines, or visitors. The cameras may also catch anything which comes in or out of a person’s home. Moreover, even if the area surrounding a home is considered part of the public sphere, Carpenter held that protection under the Fourth Amendment is still available. | | | | |
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< | Perhaps we should ask instead a narrower and more productive question: What should be the limits on the State's complete real-time control over its citizens' identities? That will affect issues of constitutional limitation on cashless payments design and genomic identification as well as facial searching, but at the core hinges on what we mean by freedom. | >
> | All in all, the issue of warrantless targeted pole camera surveillance opens up possibilities of abuse and allows government intrusion in ways citizens do not expect. The fact that camera use is common or widespread should not diminish a person’s expectation that his or her movements will not be secretly monitored over a long period of time. Innovation should benefit, rather than burden, society. Advances in technology, or developments which make existing technologies more accessible, should not dictate what people expect to be private.
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< | Or maybe you actually want to write about regulating cameras, or civil manipulation of identity control, or something. But software for image searching, really?
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KarlRaymondCruzFirstPaper 2 - 13 Apr 2022 - Main.EbenMoglen
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< | | | | It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | | | | |
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The best routes to improvement here begin by reducing technical confusion.
Facial recognition is software, of a simple kind—pattern matching—now grandly and ridiculously referred to as "artificial intelligence" and "machine learning," actually a staple of what computer programs have been used to do since the beginning of digital computing. The program compares a target image against a large collection of other pictures of faces, in order to identify the person whose face is in the target image. Finding the needle in the haystack is comparatively easy. Building and maintaining the haystack, on the other hand, is harder. So the most obvious technology pattern in the current context is for "platform" companies that build and maintain immense data stores on the world's human beings to run the pattern matching programs "as a service," accepting target data from people paying for the service, giving them the output from pattern matching, and remembering forever who was looking for whom, when, and inferring why.
The various moratoriums, pauses, decisions not to sell for now, etc. that you mention but do not actually analyze, reflect no particular understanding: they are reflexes in the governmental nervous system.
But the software that finds needles in haystacks is not the cameras everywhere that acquire all the images, nor the social processes that use or misuse the outputs. All of this confusedly lumped together as "FRT" produces no analytic purchase on any particular aspect of the problem, which is probably why your conclusion doesn't really conclude anything,
Perhaps we should ask instead a narrower and more productive question: What should be the limits on the State's complete real-time control over its citizens' identities? That will affect issues of constitutional limitation on cashless payments design and genomic identification as well as facial searching, but at the core hinges on what we mean by freedom.
Or maybe you actually want to write about regulating cameras, or civil manipulation of identity control, or something. But software for image searching, really?
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You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. |
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KarlRaymondCruzFirstPaper 1 - 18 Mar 2022 - Main.KarlRaymondCruz
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.
Convenience at the Expense of Privacy? The Need to Regulate Facial Recognition Technology
-- By KarlRaymondCruz - 17 Mar 2022
In our fast-paced world, people have been drawn to the benefits of facial recognition technology (FRT). Private and State entities are utilizing FRT under varying levels of regulation. Definite baseline standards must be set to ensure that individual privacy rights are adequately protected.
Current trends on the Use of Facial Recognition Technology
Innovations linked to the use of FRT seem to be endless. FRT is utilized for simple tasks such as unlocking a phone while wearing a mask or for streamlining more complicated processes such as airport checks. The Covid-19 pandemic also brought about the use of FRT to safeguard public health by using FRT to track Covid-19 infections. Against this backdrop, recent forecasts predict that the FRT market will be valued at $12.67 billion in 2028 from $ 5.012 billion in 2021, with the use of FRT in law enforcement and non-law enforcement applications to increase rapidly from 2021 to 2028. As of 2020, China and the United States lead the market in terms of funding FRT companies. Notably, in a report published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in August 2021, 16 out of 24 surveyed federal agencies reported using FRT for digital access or cybersecurity, and 10 of the 24 have plans to expand their use of FRT.
Significantly, public opinion on FRT is not consistent across all possible uses of the technology. For instance, in a recent survey, 59% of respondents from the United States found FRT use for law enforcement acceptable while only 36% of respondents trust the use of FRT by technology companies. Interestingly, only 86% of the respondents have heard about FRT, and only 25% have confirmed to have heard a lot about it.
Risks posed by the use of Facial Recognition Technology
The promise of convenience and efficiency comes with a price. The use of FRT is criticized because of the risks it poses to individual privacy and other fundamental rights. FRT can potentially be misused on individuals without their consent. Moreover, the possibility of inaccurate results, the lack of transparency, and the absence of due diligence of FRT are feared to bring about violations of human rights.
The use by States of FRT continue to spark controversies. For instance, China has resorted to the use of FRT to track and control Uyghurs and even detect changes in their behavior. While the use of FRT is praised for its ability to improve public safety, its use for law enforcement remains controversial. In New York City, it was found that more CCTV cameras which utilize FRT are stationed at neighborhoods with higher concentrations of non-white residents. Consequently, the disproportionate use of FRT is seen to reinforce discriminatory policing against minority communities.
Regulation of Facial Recognition Technology
There is no unified response to the growing complexities of FRT and the dangers lurking with its continued use.
In July 2021, China’s Supreme Court issued a judicial interpretation which set out guidelines for the use of FRT and the protection of individual privacy. However, the judicial interpretation provides for exemptions when FRT is used to respond to a public health emergency or for maintaining public security. Notably, China’s Personal Information Protection Law, which took effect on November 1, 2021, allows the installation of image collection or personal identity recognition equipment in public venues to safeguard public security. An individual’s separate consent is required only when the collected personal images and personal distinguishing identity characteristic information is used for a purpose other than safeguarding public security.
In contrast, several states and cities in the United States have banned government use of FRT. Currently, there is still no federal legislation governing the use of FRT. If the Facial Recognition and Biometric Technology Moratorium Act of 2021 becomes law, it will ban federal agencies and federal officials from using FRT unless explicitly authorized by an act of Congress. The bill also prohibits the use of information derived from FRT operated by another entity.
In October 2021, the European Parliament passed a non-binding resolution calling for strict democratic control and independent oversight of any AI-enabled technology in use of law enforcement and judicial authorities. It also called for a ban on the use of private facial recognition databases in law enforcement. Significantly, the proposed EU Artificial Intelligence Act specifies prohibited artificial intelligence practices and adopts a risk-based approach to regulate the use of artificial intelligence with varying risk categories. This would cover artificial intelligence used to power FRT.
In September 2021, the United Nations urged States to implement a moratorium on the use of artificial intelligence technology, which includes FRT, which poses a threat to human rights.
Conclusion
The current landscape of FRT regulation is not sufficient to protect individual privacy rights. Baseline standards for both private and government use of FRT must be set. The use of FRT has been justified to respond to a public health crisis or to promote public safety, even in the absence of adequate safeguards to protect individual rights. As such, a moratorium on the use of FRT in the short term, until adequate safeguards are adopted, appears to be a good temporary measure in the absence of clear guidelines enumerating acceptable uses of FRT and regulating its use. Economic sanctions similar to that imposed by the United States on SenseTime? , a Chinese facial recognition startup, for its alleged role in the surveillance of Uyghurs, does not appear to be an effective deterrent to alleged misuse of FRT. Given the cross-border implications of the use of FRT, it would be ideal for there to be a collective approach to the regulation of FRT. However, it remains to be seen whether countries can arrive at a middle ground with respect to their stance on FRT use.
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.
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