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| | -- By LeonHuang - 05 Mar 2017 (Revised - 17 May 2017) |
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< | Service providers typically keep anonymized records of how users are using their services, and the users’ agreements typically require the users to agree to such practice. Users who care about both convenience and privacy may be motivated to argue that they should have a say over data about themselves. Is this position well-justified? |
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> | Service providers typically keep anonymized records of how users are using their services, and the users’ agreements typically require the users to agree to such practice.
Why do you say these
records are "anonymized"? That's the one thing they are pretty sure
not to be.
Users who care about both convenience and privacy may be motivated to argue that they should have a say over data about themselves. Is this position well-justified?
What does
"well-justified" mean? Legally, ethically, logically?
Generally
speaking, you would want to begin an essay with an idea, not an
open-ended question. The reader needs to know why she should read
the essay. Obviously, if the reader is a philosopher who doesn't
care about time, whether or not to have an idea may be precisely the
stage at which she likes to begin reading. But for the remaining
fraction of humanity, you haven't provided a reason to read the
essay, and that means it will most likely not be read.
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| | Review of the Argument
The position appeals to our intuition in two ways. First, the content of the records is produced by the users. Users may deem themselves as the author of such data and hence the owner of the data. Second, users expect to have control over their privacy. The records on users’ behaviors contain private information that users do not expect others to know, and therefore the users would think that they should have some say in how the records are being used. |
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> | Once again the
unclarity about what sort of argument is being rehearsed makes
reading difficult. One sentence seems to be discussing a legal
concept, ownership, while the next appears to be stating a political
principle, though whether the principle is that things other people
don't know we should have some say in controlling, or whether we
have some stake in controlling things others know too is left vague.
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| | There are counterarguments too. The keeping of the records is performed by the service providers. Although the content of the records is largely dependent on users’ behaviors, the service providers are nevertheless the author of the records in the same way that the people writing biographies are the authors of those biographies rather than the subjects of those biographies. In addition, anonymization alleviates the privacy concerns. After identity-sensitive information is striped from the dataset, the record of each individual’s behavior becomes less likely to violate that individual’s privacy. The data is no longer about each of the individual users but rather about a set of users sharing some demographic characteristics. Users cannot be justified to argue for more when the data about them is perfectly anonymized. |
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> | Cannot, why? What is
"perfectly anonymized" data? Why is data always either about one
person or about nobody? If someone is keeping track of all Jews,
all Muslims, or all Tutsi, that's not about privacy because privacy
is only about one person at a time? Perhaps the definition of
"privacy" is at fault. But we don't know what that definition is
because you haven't given one.
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| | But perfect anonymization is a high standard. Stripping away identifiable information is not always enough. For example, the TLC Trip Record Data provides publicly available information on the dates, times and locations of all taxi pick-ups/drop-offs in the New York City in a given year. Although the data does not include the identity of the passengers, it nevertheless increases the risks of privacy violations when it is used in conjunction with other publicly available information. Celebrity cab rides become easier to identify. People may simply find a photo of a celebrity getting into a cab and use the date, time, and location to find out where the celebrity was going. And in turn people may easily find out where the celebrity lives. The average Joe faces the same risks. An acquaintance may easily find out where you live after seeing you leaving in a cab after work. This tension between privacy and highly-accurate geolocation data has led to a proposal that the TLC should reveal only census tracts instead of the exact coordinates.1
Anonymized data is still capable of revealing key information about users’ identity when such data is used in combination of data from other sources. A link can be established between datasets when there are significant overlaps, which are not as difficult to achieve as one would expect. In the case of the TLC Trip Record Data, date, time, and location provide enough overlaps to link a particular cab ride to the cab rider being photographed. In the case of purportedly anonymized records collected by cloud service providers, there have already been efforts to combine such data from multiple sources to construct the complete profiles.2 The combination of datasets dilutes the responsibility of each service provider from whom the datasets are obtained. The more service providers complicit in guilt, the more diluted their individual responsibility is. |
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I don't understand the idea of diluted responsibility. Is that like when three polluters each put one poison into a river?
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| | A Way Out?
Upon review, I realized that it may not be productive to argue for the right to control data about ourselves in order to seek changes in the practices of service providers. I cannot avoid making a choice between convenience and privacy. The calculus partly depends on exactly how much convenience I would have to sacrifice. In March I set out to install a personal cloud in order to obtain a rough frame of reference. |
| | I cannot think of any files that I need remote access from time to time, that I am willing to tolerate the quirkiness of my personal cloud so as to prevent any service providers to harvest any data on me, and that are not sensitive enough for me to worry about targeted hacking. In the end, I do not know what to do with my personal cloud. I pulled the plug by the end of April. |
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This anecdote doesn't seem to me related in any way to the previous
analysis. I do think that it would probably have been a good idea
to consult somebody else rather than trying to do your engineering
by the light of nature. By spending $150 instead of $90, you could
have had a single-board computer much faster than a RasberryPi? , and
if you had installed FreedomBox? software your personal cloud would
have done a great deal more for you than it appears you could figure
out yourself how to do, which isn't surprising considering that
dozens of experts have already been working on it for seven years
and you took a couple of hours.
But how did this help us to determine whether something or other was
"justified"? And what was the idea the essay wanted to communicate
to the reader? I think it was "privacy, whatever that is, isn't
very important even though we intuit at first that it might be. But
mostly it's just a lot of unnecessary trouble." Did I get that
right?
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