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NathanielCriderSecondPaper 5 - 09 May 2015 - Main.NathanielCrider
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The First Amendment & Autonomy | | | An Aristotelian conception of happiness also asserts that human beings have unique capacities, but the focus is on the maximal potential that distinguishes humans from other animals. A good life is one in which the individual realizes her full potential by the development of her faculties. | |
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< | Self-development requires the individual to explore the limits of her mind. Because self-development is stultified by isolationism, she needs to externalize the contents of her own mind and access the contents of others. She must read, write, speak and listen. So understood, she has strong autonomy interests in having authentic deliberations and reactions, exercising judgment, and living among other autonomous individuals. Her ability to think freely therefore must be unabridged. | >
> | Self-development requires the individual to explore the limits of her mind. Because self-development is stultified by isolationism, she needs to externalize the contents of her own mind and access the contents of others. She must read, write, speak and listen. So understood, she has strong autonomy interests in having authentic deliberations and reactions, exercising judgment, and living among other autonomous individuals. Any limitation on her ability to think freely is hence unwarranted. | | | This argument, however, fails to distinguish intellectual self-fulfillment from other important desires less peculiarly human. Because restrictions on freedom of thought are usually justified by interests in physical well-being and security, the argument should tell us why intellectual self-fulfillment is more important than those interests. The circle is not squared by doubling down on the unique capacities of humans, for it is just as plausible that those desires shared by humanity and animals are more basic and therefore more important. | | | A third argument asserts that the mind is simply off limits to the coercive powers of the state. While an individual may cede authority to the state to draw the necessary boundaries between their respective spheres of action, her interest in autonomy forbids her from ceding authority to the state to limit her use of rational powers. Even if by choosing one alternative she will be punished by the state, she retains the right to receive information, weigh conflicting justifications, and make her choice. She is absolutely sovereign in her deliberations. | |
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< | It is a virtue of this theory that its narrow conception of autonomy is consistent with our moral and political history. From a non-positivist legal perspective, however, we might be concerned that a state is not precluded – at least morally – from limiting sources information that might produce non-compliance of a just law. To that end, the argument may be significantly underinclusive in its protection of the individual from efforts by the state to subvert rational deliberation. | >
> | It is a virtue of this theory that its narrow conception of autonomy is consistent with our moral and political history. From a non-positivist legal perspective, however, we might be concerned that a state is not precluded – at least morally – from limiting sources information that might produce non-compliance of a just law. To that end, the argument may also be significantly underinclusive in its protection of the individual from efforts by the state to subvert rational deliberation. | | | Free Expression as a Necessary Condition for Self-Governance |
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