Criminalization of Encryption

This draft is less an essay about the criminalization of encryption than it is about Turkish autocracy. The best route to improvement is to determine which subject should be retained.

If the subject is the criminalization of encryption, then Turkey is one country, pursuing not the criminalization of encryption in strict terms, but rather the use of communications services themselves employing encryption, which is operationally different, but well within the various forms of such legislation you might be considering. It would be relevant to point out that PGP was originally developed by Philip Zimmerman to obviate the possibility of another form of encryption criminalization introduced in the US Congress by the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Orrin Hatch, in 1989.

If the subject is Turkish despotism, I think attention would focus on the idea that a single IP connection could be sufficient evidence for conviction of any crime of any kind. That's incompatible with any international standard of criminal adjudication, or with our fundamental notions of due process here. No one supposes that a judiciary capable of affirming such convictions is not acting to secure the independent rule of law. Does encryption really matter in any way here, once the fact of making a TCP/IP connection is held to be evidence of anything?