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Navigating a Free Net | | |
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Navigating a Free Net | |
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< | | | | The Fourth Amendment, as we discussed in class, has a place-dependent quality. It is this place-dependence, in part, that has defeated its application to the digital landscape of today. The unbounded and interconnected nature of the digital network of today challenges conventional law enforcement notions generally. What, if any, might be a legitimate role for law enforcement in a state of freedom? | |
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< | | | | Imagine the positive outcome in the freedom/totalitarianism binary – the net is a single landscape – no firewalls that fence off people from certain websites, no nets which trap users who add or view content that is unacceptable to a sovereign regime. This outcome is not improbable or far-fetched. Indeed it seems quite natural in a way, since trying to place restrictions on portions of the web in a certain jurisdiction is like trying to slice up the sky, or to bottle a ray of sunlight. | |
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< | Yet it is hard to resist the urge to compare the net to physical spaces, to superimpose on it existing conceptions of society. Perhaps the net should be conceived of as a collection of completely privatized “roadways” “storefronts” and “homes.” If so, any sort of protection of copyrighted works or any potential cybercrimes might be handled on a completely private basis, with minimal-to-no involvement from conventional state-based law enforcement. It is up to individuals as well as web site and database hosts, and perhaps search engines to figure out the security precautions they take, and the individuals, if any, they wish to exclude.
This is how matters work. Networks are secured by the people who make and run them, the way properties in the physical world are secured. From a first-order point of view, law is an infinitesimal part of the application of social control in both settings. So?
The possible downsides of this scenario might be an increased segmentation of the net, and perhaps a closing down of certain resources if their hosts do not feel adequately protected.
What "scenario"? My personal network is personal, regardless of the physical location of the devices comprising it. The content traveling over that network is encrypted strongly, and access to the machines comprising the network is very strictly controlled. In this regard, I am like millions of other individuals and businesses maintaining networks that are "closed down" in order to be "adequately protected." This is not a "scenario," it's just a commonplace technical fact. And again, so what? What is your idea in relation to this simple reality?
This scheme of private control might well create a more “free” though a less predictable environment than is the case today. How will the government catch criminals on the internet? Perhaps private actions brought by aggrieved individuals might be a partial solution.
It seems necessary, from a public policy perspective, to curb things like fraud, or drug deals, or child exploitation that might take place on the internet. However, there are at least two constitutional considerations based on what we have discussed in class so far. First, it is crucial to steer clear of infringing on First Amendment territory. For this consideration, we must develop a distinction between what is “action” and what is expression in a virtual reality. Is anything that happens on the net really “real” in a physical sense? Should this matter if major financial transactions, for example, take place in a virtual reality?
No more a virtual reality than "telephone space" created by the telephone system. This, as I said at the beginning of the course, is the confusion created by the misunderstanding of the Net in spatialized terms. The point of the essay, ostensibly, is also to avoid this trap in thinking, but here we have tumbled into it after all.
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> | Our physical interaction with the “web” happens via browsers (computer screens, laptops, and smartphones equipped with certain software). Behind the keys we click is a connection to the internet service provider’s server, and then a possible further jump to a host server, the repository for various websites and sources of information. Individuals or firms sometimes “lock up” access to browsers, or servers, or certain websites from within with the use of passwords and encryption. | | | | |
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< | Second, if we adopt the schematization of the internet as a series of buildings and roads, can we then still rely on Fourth Amendment principles to protect the “home” like structures? What about the “storefronts”? If we allow the state to comprehensively police the “roads,” this may again undermine the notion of a free net, and pretty much take us back to the surveillance status quo of today. Will some of the roads be “private property?” That possibility may lead to the sort of “federalized” internet we discussed in our last class session, especially if everyone avoids the public road that is the leading search engine. | >
> | The efforts on the part of a government, or a private entity, to block the public’s access to certain content at one of these points, however, is different from the dynamics described above due to both its technical implications and its intent. From a technical perspective, blocking efforts are somewhat clumsy and the restrictions they pose somewhat artificial. A number of companies, working at the direction of governments, have blocked access at a point between the browser and the ISP server – the request is flagged and blocked. However, an individual using the ISP in a different location from a different browser, or and individual using a different ISP, still has access to the destinations to which access has been blocked; the same collection of websites remains on host servers. Then there comes the question of taking a website down – if a country finds a website to be in contravention of its laws and asks the host to take it down, the issue is that this website has the potential to be viewed by multiple individuals, in different countries, with different laws, at the same time, and these individuals lose access to the information the website provides, while the individual is (at least temporarily) unable to get out her message in a place where it is not unlawful. | | | | |
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< | Law enforcement are not the only players we need to keep in mind. To make the general public the “owners” of the internet, and to place law enforcement activity closer to the periphery, there should be a greater distribution of knowledge. Imagine driving a car on the highway without having taken any driving lessons. This terrifying scenario illustrates how many of us interface with technology and the internet without understanding the implications of our digital footprint, and without taking the appropriate actions to protect themselves. We are being watched, however, by police cameras and speedometers, and might be flagged down and have our vehicle searched at any minute. Users can really be “steering” their journey through the internet by understanding what exactly happens when they share a photo or click on a link, and by taking the quiet roads if they choose. | >
> | Second, and intertwined with the considerations above, is the issue of the government’s intent in blocking or taking down content. Here, our focus is on content and spaces that have not been internally “locked down” through password and encryption protection, but rather impositions on what has been left in the public domain. Why? There are things the government does not want the people to know/see/talk about, presumably, particularly in the case of blocking. The case of taking down websites may concern the prosecution of specific criminal activities rather than a blanket imposition of state control, but nevertheless ends up denying access to the content where it may not be illegal. | | | | |
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< | Ultimately, consideration of these issues suggests that allowing law enforcement in beyond the perimeters of the net, while still preserving a free net, requires a couple of important initial steps. First, we need a vocabulary, which I have clumsily attempted to articulate here, for the various cells and arteries that make up the digital network. Second, regulations need to be carefully tailored to this new vocabulary. Antecedent to these steps, in turn, is a very strong understanding of the way the internet works, and of security measures, by lawmakers; to have knowledgeable lawmakers, there must also be a more knowledgeable body of users. | >
> | What emerges then is the image of a uniformed police officer attempting to catch streams of flowing packets of data (which, of course, are not a tangible thing). Packets are packets are packets, and they have the ability to take different routes should one entrance be blocked. What the packets, put together, amount to, is information, which, if shared publicly, should remain available to all. In the equilibrium of freedom, law enforcement in one country must not impinge on the liberties afforded by another country’s set of legal norms. In the case of the First Amendment, as we have discussed in class, the underlying concept is the absolute access to information, without normative judgments by the government, and its mirror image, namely the right to disseminate this information. Thus the convergence of regulation tends to zero. | | | | |
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We have better means of description and discussion in the native language of the Net itself. But you have not used technical details or descriptions of any kind here, which has caused more confusion than it could possibly prevent. The best way forward is to put the ideas expressed here in direct touch with technical reality, which should clarify the argument substantially.
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> | But what about a government’s need to take law enforcement action in the face of a concrete crime, as opposed to what we can call either censorship, or preventive policing? Is any police activity compatible with a free net? The idea of physical space does not hold up in the net, as discussed at length in class and as illustrated with the case of blocking in this essay. As we have talked about in our discussion of the fourth amendment, however, the new target of investigation is the individual. This is not really an acceptable target for law enforcement activity, however, since, although an individual can be easily tapped from the periphery of the network as a discrete “unit,” the potential for prosecution for an unfortunate set of searches (something already employed today) becomes unacceptably great. Employing an indexing tool that might crawl web pages looking for content indicative of criminal activity can perhaps be an acceptable measure, but automated “crawlers” introduce, again, a risk of over-designation and perhaps self-censorship. Also, the crawlers run into the issue of possibly capturing activity in different countries. | | |
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> | If either or both of these mechanisms are employed by law enforcement, they will undoubtedly subtract from the free-ness of the internet. Ways to mitigate the dangers of overreaching in such policing tactics would focus on education about internet use and transparency about the criminal investigation process, and extremely careful tailoring of legal provisions and technological implementation. |
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