RickSchwartzFirstPaper 5 - 08 Mar 2009 - Main.RickSchwartz
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper%25" |
What's Left of Privacy
-- By RickSchwartz - 07 Mar 2009 | |
< < | This paper is very loose update/adaptation of part of Warren and Brandeis' "The Right of Privacy," but with a more satirical approach to the development of privacy in history, given that I take the right's adoption as my starting point. | > > | This paper is very loose update/adaptation of the beginning of Warren and Brandeis' "The Right of Privacy," but with a more satirical approach to the development of privacy in history, given that I take the right's adoption as my starting point. | |
Living in a Material World | |
< < | That the individual shall have full protection in privacy and personality is a principle as old as Griswold, but it has been found expedient from time to time to circumscribe the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and technological changes entail the recognition of new interests, and the Constitution, in its eternal death, has contracted to meet the new demands of government and industry. In early times, the law was fit to give protection against interference with property and communications, with places and pamphlets. The Fourth Amendment served only to secure the subject from unreasonable physical searches and seizures; privacy meant freedom from actual coercion and public exposure; the right of publicity secured to the individual the commercial exploitation of his name, image and likeness; and the right to speech only secured to the individual the the right to speak anonymously when there is no accusation of fraud. Later, there came recognition of the state's authoritarian nature, of its desire to prosecute with the most evidence available. Gradually, the scope of these rights contracted, and now the right to privacy has come to insufficiently protect only physical autonomy and seclusion only insofar as required by specific constitutional guarantees, and only insofar as the government is culpable in its violation.
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| > > | That the individual shall have full protection in privacy and personality is a principle as old as Griswold, but it has been found expedient from time to time to circumscribe the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and technological changes entail the recognition of new interests, and the Constitution, in its eternal death, has contracted to meet the new demands of government and industry. In early times, the law was fit to give protection against interference with property and communications, with places and pamphlets. The Fourth Amendment served only to secure the subject from unreasonable physical searches and seizures; privacy meant freedom from actual coercion and public exposure; the right of publicity secured to the individual the commercial exploitation of his name, image and likeness; and the right to speak secured to the individual the the right to speak anonymously only when there is no accusation of fraud. Later, there came recognition of the state's authoritarian nature, of its desire to prosecute with the most evidence available. Gradually, the scope of these rights contracted, and now the right to privacy has come to protect only physical autonomy and seclusion only insofar as required by specific constitutional guarantees, and only insofar as the government is culpable in its violation.
Intrusion Upon Seclusion | | With the recognition of the legal value of seclusion, the protection against the invasion of the home was extended to prohibit intrusion into a physical place but still limited by the notion of "placiness". From the action of intrusion upon seclusion grew the right of privacy, which barred the government's use of evidence obtained intrusively at trial. Not much later, the "trespass" doctrine was replaced with the qualified "reasonable expectation of privacy." So regard for the state's "legitimate needs of law enforcement" soon extended the exception beyond the application of the rule. The reasonableness analysis, upon the assurance that the courts would "authorize the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance," prohibited physical intrusions into places where intimacy might be injured, but did not find a problem with intrusion into the intimacy itself. Occasionally the law halted, as in its refusal to exempt thermal-imaging devices from treatment as intrusions on the "curtilage" of the home. But even here, law enforcement needs were met with a mean fiction that privacy could no longer be expected once the tools of surveillance were in public use.
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< < | This development of the law was inevitable. The intensely interactive and scrutinized life, and the heightening of surveillance by private entities that came with the advance of networks, made it clear to men that only a part of a person's identity lay within physical seclusion. Observed thoughts, queries, and activity demanded economic exploitation, and the capacity for deference in the common law required judges to uphold a scheme requiring only a simple waiver of the protections against misappropriation of identity and disclosure of private facts enabled by the interposition of the legislature.
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| > > | What the Watchmen Watch
This development of the law was inevitable. The intensely interactive and scrutinized life, and the heightening of surveillance by private entities that came with the advance of networks, made it clear to men that only a part of a person's identity lay within physical seclusion. Observed thoughts, queries, and activity demanded economic exploitation, and the capacity for deference in the common law required judges to uphold a scheme requiring only a simple waiver of the protections against misappropriation of identity and disclosure of private facts enabled by the interposition of the legislature.
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< < | Such technologies and business methods call attention to the last step that has been taken toward the unraveling of privacy. The private subpoena strategy of circumvention was developed, and corporate data miners became a part of the state’s legal strategy of surveillance and obtaining admissible evidence. | > > | These technologies and business methods call attention to the last step that has been taken toward the unraveling of privacy. The subpoena of corporate data miners became a part of the state's strategy of surveillance and evidence-gathering. For the state, allowing private surveillance was necessary and anonymity was unacceptable. | |
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RickSchwartzFirstPaper 4 - 08 Mar 2009 - Main.RickSchwartz
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper%25" |
What's Left of Privacy | | That the individual shall have full protection in privacy and personality is a principle as old as Griswold, but it has been found expedient from time to time to circumscribe the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and technological changes entail the recognition of new interests, and the Constitution, in its eternal death, has contracted to meet the new demands of government and industry. In early times, the law was fit to give protection against interference with property and communications, with places and pamphlets. The Fourth Amendment served only to secure the subject from unreasonable physical searches and seizures; privacy meant freedom from actual coercion and public exposure; the right of publicity secured to the individual the commercial exploitation of his name, image and likeness; and the right to speech only secured to the individual the the right to speak anonymously when there is no accusation of fraud. Later, there came recognition of the state's authoritarian nature, of its desire to prosecute with the most evidence available. Gradually, the scope of these rights contracted, and now the right to privacy has come to insufficiently protect only physical autonomy and seclusion only insofar as required by specific constitutional guarantees, and only insofar as the government is culpable in its violation. | |
< < | With the recognition of the legal value of seclusion, the protection against the invasion of the home was extended to prohibit intrusion into a physical place but still limited by the notion of "placiness". From the action of intrusion upon seclusion grew the right of privacy, which barred the government's use of evidence obtained intrusively at trial. Not much later, the "trespass" doctrine was replaced with the qualified "reasonable expectation of privacy." So regard for the state's "legitimate needs of law enforcement" soon extended the exception beyond the application of the rule. The reasonableness analysis, upon the assurance that the courts would "authorize the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance," prohibited physical intrusions into places where intimacy might be injured, but did not find a problem with intrusion into the intimacy itself. Occasionally the law halted, as in its refusal to exempt thermal-imaging devices from treatment as intrusions on the "curtilage" of the home. But even here, law enforcement needs were met with a mean fiction that privacy could no longer be expected once the tools of surveillance were in public use.
Notes
:
| > > | With the recognition of the legal value of seclusion, the protection against the invasion of the home was extended to prohibit intrusion into a physical place but still limited by the notion of "placiness". From the action of intrusion upon seclusion grew the right of privacy, which barred the government's use of evidence obtained intrusively at trial. Not much later, the "trespass" doctrine was replaced with the qualified "reasonable expectation of privacy." So regard for the state's "legitimate needs of law enforcement" soon extended the exception beyond the application of the rule. The reasonableness analysis, upon the assurance that the courts would "authorize the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance," prohibited physical intrusions into places where intimacy might be injured, but did not find a problem with intrusion into the intimacy itself. Occasionally the law halted, as in its refusal to exempt thermal-imaging devices from treatment as intrusions on the "curtilage" of the home. But even here, law enforcement needs were met with a mean fiction that privacy could no longer be expected once the tools of surveillance were in public use. | | This development of the law was inevitable. The intensely interactive and scrutinized life, and the heightening of surveillance by private entities that came with the advance of networks, made it clear to men that only a part of a person's identity lay within physical seclusion. Observed thoughts, queries, and activity demanded economic exploitation, and the capacity for deference in the common law required judges to uphold a scheme requiring only a simple waiver of the protections against misappropriation of identity and disclosure of private facts enabled by the interposition of the legislature. | |
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RickSchwartzFirstPaper 3 - 07 Mar 2009 - Main.RickSchwartz
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper%25" |
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< < | The Updated Right of Privacy | > > | What's Left of Privacy | | -- By RickSchwartz - 07 Mar 2009 | |
< < | This paper is very loose update/adaptation of Warren and Brandeis' "The Right of Privacy," but with a more satirical approach to the development of privacy in history, given that I take the right's adoption as my starting point. In terms of the language parodied, I diverge liberally given my narrower range of history and word limit. | > > | This paper is very loose update/adaptation of part of Warren and Brandeis' "The Right of Privacy," but with a more satirical approach to the development of privacy in history, given that I take the right's adoption as my starting point. | |
Living in a Material World | |
< < | That the individual shall have full protection in privacy and personality is a principle as old as Griswold, but it has been found expedient from time to time to circumscribe the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and technological changes entail the recognition of new interests, and the Constitution, in its eternal death, has contracted to meet the new demands of government and industry. In early times, the law was fit to give protection against interference with property and communications, with places and pamphlets. The Fourth Amendment served only to secure the subject from unreasonable physical searches and seizures; privacy meant freedom from actual coercion and public exposure; the right of publicity secured to the individual the commercial exploitation of his name, image and likeness; and the right to speech only secured to the individual the the right to speak anonymously when there is no accusation of fraud. Later, there came recognition of the state's authoritarian nature, of its desire to prosecute with the most evidence available. Gradually, the scope of these rights contracted, and now the right to privacy has come to mean the protection of physical autonomy and seclusion only insofar as required by specific constitutional guarantees, and only insofar as the government is culpable in its violation. | > > | That the individual shall have full protection in privacy and personality is a principle as old as Griswold, but it has been found expedient from time to time to circumscribe the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and technological changes entail the recognition of new interests, and the Constitution, in its eternal death, has contracted to meet the new demands of government and industry. In early times, the law was fit to give protection against interference with property and communications, with places and pamphlets. The Fourth Amendment served only to secure the subject from unreasonable physical searches and seizures; privacy meant freedom from actual coercion and public exposure; the right of publicity secured to the individual the commercial exploitation of his name, image and likeness; and the right to speech only secured to the individual the the right to speak anonymously when there is no accusation of fraud. Later, there came recognition of the state's authoritarian nature, of its desire to prosecute with the most evidence available. Gradually, the scope of these rights contracted, and now the right to privacy has come to insufficiently protect only physical autonomy and seclusion only insofar as required by specific constitutional guarantees, and only insofar as the government is culpable in its violation. | | | |
< < | With the recognition of the legal value of seclusion, the protection against the invasion of the home was extended to prohibit intrusion into a physical place but still limited by the notion of place. From the action of intrusion upon seclusion grew the right of privacy. Much later, the "trespass" doctrine was replaced with the qualified "reasonable expectation of privacy." So regard for the state's "legitimate needs of law enforcement" soon extended the exception beyond the application of the rule. The reasonableness analysis, upon the assurance that the courts would "authorize the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance," prohibited physical intrusions into places where intimacy might be injured, but did not find a problem with intrusion into the intimacy itself. Occasionally the law halted, as in its refusal to exempt thermal-imaging devices from treatment as intrusions on the "curtilage" of the home. But even here, law enforcement needs were met with a mean fiction that seclusion could no longer be expected once the tools of surveillance were in public use. | > > | With the recognition of the legal value of seclusion, the protection against the invasion of the home was extended to prohibit intrusion into a physical place but still limited by the notion of "placiness". From the action of intrusion upon seclusion grew the right of privacy, which barred the government's use of evidence obtained intrusively at trial. Not much later, the "trespass" doctrine was replaced with the qualified "reasonable expectation of privacy." So regard for the state's "legitimate needs of law enforcement" soon extended the exception beyond the application of the rule. The reasonableness analysis, upon the assurance that the courts would "authorize the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance," prohibited physical intrusions into places where intimacy might be injured, but did not find a problem with intrusion into the intimacy itself. Occasionally the law halted, as in its refusal to exempt thermal-imaging devices from treatment as intrusions on the "curtilage" of the home. But even here, law enforcement needs were met with a mean fiction that privacy could no longer be expected once the tools of surveillance were in public use. | | | |
< < | This development of the law was inevitable. The intensely interactive and scrutinized life, and the heightening of surveillance by private entities that came with the advance of networks, made it clear to men that only a part of a person's identity lay within physical seclusion. Observed thoughts, queries, and desires demanded economic exploitation, and the capacity for deference in the common law required judges to uphold a scheme requiring only a simple waiver of the protections against misappropriation of identity and disclosure of private facts enabled by the interposition of the legislature. | | \ No newline at end of file | |
> > | This development of the law was inevitable. The intensely interactive and scrutinized life, and the heightening of surveillance by private entities that came with the advance of networks, made it clear to men that only a part of a person's identity lay within physical seclusion. Observed thoughts, queries, and activity demanded economic exploitation, and the capacity for deference in the common law required judges to uphold a scheme requiring only a simple waiver of the protections against misappropriation of identity and disclosure of private facts enabled by the interposition of the legislature.
Such technologies and business methods call attention to the last step that has been taken toward the unraveling of privacy. The private subpoena strategy of circumvention was developed, and corporate data miners became a part of the state’s legal strategy of surveillance and obtaining admissible evidence.
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RickSchwartzFirstPaper 2 - 07 Mar 2009 - Main.RickSchwartz
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper%25" |
The Updated Right of Privacy | | That the individual shall have full protection in privacy and personality is a principle as old as Griswold, but it has been found expedient from time to time to circumscribe the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and technological changes entail the recognition of new interests, and the Constitution, in its eternal death, has contracted to meet the new demands of government and industry. In early times, the law was fit to give protection against interference with property and communications, with places and pamphlets. The Fourth Amendment served only to secure the subject from unreasonable physical searches and seizures; privacy meant freedom from actual coercion and public exposure; the right of publicity secured to the individual the commercial exploitation of his name, image and likeness; and the right to speech only secured to the individual the the right to speak anonymously when there is no accusation of fraud. Later, there came recognition of the state's authoritarian nature, of its desire to prosecute with the most evidence available. Gradually, the scope of these rights contracted, and now the right to privacy has come to mean the protection of physical autonomy and seclusion only insofar as required by specific constitutional guarantees, and only insofar as the government is culpable in its violation. | |
< < | With the recognition of the legal value of seclusion, the protection against the invasion of the home was extended to prohibit intrusion into a physical place but still limited by the notion of place. From the action of intrusion upon seclusion grew the right of privacy. Much later, the "trespass" doctrine was replaced with the qualified "reasonable expectation of privacy." So regard for the state's "legitimate needs of law enforcement" soon extended the exception beyond the application of the rule. The reasonableness analysis, upon the assurance that the courts would "authorize the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance," prohibited physical intrusions into places where intimacy might be injured, but did not find a problem with intrusion into the intimacy itself. Occasionally the law halted, as in its refusal to exempt thermal-imaging devices from treatment as intrusions on the "intimate details" of the home. But even here, law enforcement needs were met, as the reasonable expectation could no longer be expected once the tools of surveillance were in public use.
Notes
:
| > > | With the recognition of the legal value of seclusion, the protection against the invasion of the home was extended to prohibit intrusion into a physical place but still limited by the notion of place. From the action of intrusion upon seclusion grew the right of privacy. Much later, the "trespass" doctrine was replaced with the qualified "reasonable expectation of privacy." So regard for the state's "legitimate needs of law enforcement" soon extended the exception beyond the application of the rule. The reasonableness analysis, upon the assurance that the courts would "authorize the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance," prohibited physical intrusions into places where intimacy might be injured, but did not find a problem with intrusion into the intimacy itself. Occasionally the law halted, as in its refusal to exempt thermal-imaging devices from treatment as intrusions on the "curtilage" of the home. But even here, law enforcement needs were met with a mean fiction that seclusion could no longer be expected once the tools of surveillance were in public use.
This development of the law was inevitable. The intensely interactive and scrutinized life, and the heightening of surveillance by private entities that came with the advance of networks, made it clear to men that only a part of a person's identity lay within physical seclusion. Observed thoughts, queries, and desires demanded economic exploitation, and the capacity for deference in the common law required judges to uphold a scheme requiring only a simple waiver of the protections against misappropriation of identity and disclosure of private facts enabled by the interposition of the legislature. | | \ No newline at end of file |
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RickSchwartzFirstPaper 1 - 07 Mar 2009 - Main.RickSchwartz
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper%25" |
The Updated Right of Privacy
-- By RickSchwartz - 07 Mar 2009
This paper is very loose update/adaptation of Warren and Brandeis' "The Right of Privacy," but with a more satirical approach to the development of privacy in history, given that I take the right's adoption as my starting point. In terms of the language parodied, I diverge liberally given my narrower range of history and word limit.
Living in a Material World
That the individual shall have full protection in privacy and personality is a principle as old as Griswold, but it has been found expedient from time to time to circumscribe the exact nature and extent of such protection. Political, social, and technological changes entail the recognition of new interests, and the Constitution, in its eternal death, has contracted to meet the new demands of government and industry. In early times, the law was fit to give protection against interference with property and communications, with places and pamphlets. The Fourth Amendment served only to secure the subject from unreasonable physical searches and seizures; privacy meant freedom from actual coercion and public exposure; the right of publicity secured to the individual the commercial exploitation of his name, image and likeness; and the right to speech only secured to the individual the the right to speak anonymously when there is no accusation of fraud. Later, there came recognition of the state's authoritarian nature, of its desire to prosecute with the most evidence available. Gradually, the scope of these rights contracted, and now the right to privacy has come to mean the protection of physical autonomy and seclusion only insofar as required by specific constitutional guarantees, and only insofar as the government is culpable in its violation.
With the recognition of the legal value of seclusion, the protection against the invasion of the home was extended to prohibit intrusion into a physical place but still limited by the notion of place. From the action of intrusion upon seclusion grew the right of privacy. Much later, the "trespass" doctrine was replaced with the qualified "reasonable expectation of privacy." So regard for the state's "legitimate needs of law enforcement" soon extended the exception beyond the application of the rule. The reasonableness analysis, upon the assurance that the courts would "authorize the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance," prohibited physical intrusions into places where intimacy might be injured, but did not find a problem with intrusion into the intimacy itself. Occasionally the law halted, as in its refusal to exempt thermal-imaging devices from treatment as intrusions on the "intimate details" of the home. But even here, law enforcement needs were met, as the reasonable expectation could no longer be expected once the tools of surveillance were in public use. |
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