| | Discussion of statutes
begins always with the statutory language. Much water has been
flowed under the bridge below before Arlene even mentions the |
| | Turning it into a choice of whether to positively qualify for the rebate certainly seems to transform the question into one of affirmative volition, rather than latent inaction. At least I think that is what the hypothetical is aiming at. Also, wrapping up the tax-penalty in the framework of the income tax adds a layer of complication onto things, making it that much more difficult to identify the tax-penalty as one or the other (or both). At its core though, I don't see the situation as being very different, since the additional tax-penalty (now piggybacked onto the income tax), is still hinging on an refusal to take special action. The default operation in both situations is that people will be losing additional money to the government, unless and until they go out of their way to avoid it. |
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<
< | The idea of a positive transaction being the touchstone of a properly-named "tax" takes the default operation to be that people won't be losing additional money to the government, unless and until something about the status quo changes. |
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> | In contrast to the above situations, the idea of a positive transaction being the touchstone of a properly-named "tax" takes the default operation to be that people won't be losing additional money to the government, unless and until something about the status quo changes. |
| | But the point is that in
fact nothing has changed. The words haven't altered anything at all |
| | of any realist, the situations are identical, and to attach any
consequences requires invention of what Felix Cohen calls
"transcendental nonsense," which your made-up law about "default |
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<
< | operations" provides a superb sample of. |
>
> | operations" provides a superb sample of.
So we agree that the situations are not different. And yes, my "law" is made up. I don't mean to say this is how tax-law actually is, or should be. I am suggesting what my perception of the common notion of taxation is, and trying to compare that to how taxes actually operate in reality.
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| | On the question of
taxes based on non-actions: If I sell my house for more than I paid |
| | In either event, the law says you must pay taxes on your profit in
selling a house unless you buy another one quickly. All your extra
words prove is that this is neither a tax on doing nor a tax on not |
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<
< | doing, because that distinction is mere verbal trickery. |
>
> | doing, because that distinction is mere verbal trickery.
Is the point then that any action is just a non-action (and vice versa), if we describe it in different terms?
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| | If we determine that money exacted on the basis on a non-event can't be termed a "tax," and that the Affordable Care Act falls under this head, then we'd have a problem with arguing in favor of the Act under the taxing power. |
| | Revenue Code to set higher or lower penalties for particular taxpayer
actions, and it doesn't use the word "tax" but only "penalty," does
that statute not take its constitutional basis from the power to lay |
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<
< | and collect taxes? |
>
> | and collect taxes?
I don't mean to make this all rest on the alchemical invocation of the word "tax." My question is, what are the sorts of situations in which the government can constitutionally lay claim to our money as permitted by the taxing power? If the penalty named in the Affordable Care Act is one of them, it doesn't matter if anyone labels it with the word "tax."
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-- RyanBingham - 25 Jan 2012 |