| |
| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
|---|
The Drug Prisoner’s Dilemma | | | | |
<
< | The Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates both the great potential and likely pitfall of some collective action. Two men are charged with a crime. Each must choose whether to implicate his partner in a bargain with the police or remain steadfast and trust that his partner will do the same. The total punishment is least when both criminals remain silent and force the police to trial. American drug criminals face an analogous choice. Possibly the most effective way of reducing punishment for drug offenses is through coordination of prisoners, by refusing pleas for any punishment more severe than treatment. Like any coordination problem, there are obstacles to success. Prisoner’s Dilemma is deceiving because there is no dilemma; each knows that the other will plea because it always results in a lesser punishment for the individual. | >
> | The Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates both the great potential and likely pitfall of some collective action. Two men are charged with a crime. Each must choose whether to implicate his partner in a bargain with the police or remain steadfast and trust that his partner will do the same. The total punishment is least when both criminals remain silent and force the police to trial. American drug criminals face an analogous choice. Possibly the most effective way of reducing punishment for drug offenses is through coordination of prisoners, by refusing pleas for any punishment more severe than treatment. Like any coordination problem, there are obstacles to success. Prisoner’s Dilemma is deceiving because there is no dilemma; each knows that the other will plea
because it always
Almost always?
results in a lesser punishment for the individual.
In other words, this
isn't a prisoner's dilemma because the payoff matrices of the players
are independent. You are going to assert the possibility of
collective action, not convincingly, but in any event the type of
collective action difficulty you have at hand isn't a prisoner's
dilemma, and your self-editing should have removed this the
trope. | | | Some Are Winning the War On Drugs | | | However there may be a bottleneck in the War On Drugs’ support loop. While a long list of parties benefit from the War, prosecutors and courts bear a substantial cost burden and see few of its benefits. Unlike prisons and police, increased funding to these administrative departments is unattractive, invisible to the public, and tastes more of bureaucracy than justice. The lobbying interest in expanding judicial resources and DA budgets is less focused than the prison lobby and wields less influence than the public’s concern with safety. The War is leaving courts overstrained and underfunded. | |
>
> | Courts are always
overstrained and underfunded. Whether the law enforcement effort is
against presently illegal drugs, or alcohol, or public drunkenness,
or slaves congregating in illegal dramhouses, courts face more work
than they can deal with by adjudication. | | | The Courts Have a Weakness | |
<
< | Facing tough budgets and short time, the adjudication of an ever-expanding volume of drug cases survives on plea bargains. Virtually no one goes to trial and the system has come to rely on this. Facing limited resources, prosecutors must prioritize the cases they bring to court, and a trial costs much more than a plea. With the huge volume of the docket that relatively minor drugs crimes occupy, there exists real potential to exacerbate this adjudication bottleneck. Drug criminals, acting in concert, could put serious pressure on current enforcement policies by refusing to accept pleas that carry conditions more severe than treatment. By bringing every question to a jury that faces a stiffer plea than treatment, drug criminals will fundamentally change the equation prosecutors face when deciding who and how to prosecute. Where a preferred legislative solution offers little hope of reform, collective action could succeed in changing policy de facto. | >
> | Facing tough budgets and short time, the adjudication of an ever-expanding volume of drug cases survives on plea bargains. Virtually no one goes to trial and the system has come to rely on this.
Guilty plea rates in New
York City were above 90% in the 1760s, and they are at approximately
the same level now, as they were in the 1860s or (as far as I know,
not having studied them intensively) the 1920s. This has nothing
whatever to do with the "war on drugs."
Facing limited resources, prosecutors must prioritize the cases they bring to court, and a trial costs much more than a plea. With the huge volume of the docket that relatively minor drugs crimes occupy, there exists real potential to exacerbate this adjudication bottleneck. Drug criminals, acting in concert, could put serious pressure on current enforcement policies by refusing to accept pleas that carry conditions more severe than treatment. By bringing every question to a jury that faces a stiffer plea than treatment, drug criminals will fundamentally change the equation prosecutors face when deciding who and how to prosecute. Where a preferred legislative solution offers little hope of reform, collective action could succeed in changing policy de facto. | | | There Is Strength in Numbers
The mass incarceration of drug offenders is possible today only because the victims are coerced into helping the system function. Not only the judge and jailor, but the prisoner and his lawyer grease the cogs of the very machine that imprisons him. In one respect at least, the indicted masses are in a position of power. Given the number of those charged with drug crimes, the tremendous weight burdening the judicial system, and the enormous cost of trial, prosecutors will have little choice as the gears of the machine seize. Furthermore, there is potential to bring even more claims demanding a speedy trial as the docket continues to backlog.
| |
>
> |
This is nonsense. You should not have taken very long to find the
problem with this logic for yourself. Defendants are not out on
bail. If they choose to go to trial, the resulting delays in the
system will be visited upon them directly in the form of additional
incarceration. The sentence increase for each defendant is
automatic, and he begins serving it immediately. Later, after
conviction, which is all but certain in the vast majority of cases,
the sentence will be further extended. As you point out, no lawyer
could in good conscience counsel a client to serve a lengthy sentence
for the supposed consequence of changing enforcement procedure. More
important, no sensible defendant will agree to remain in jail for a
long period, in order to remain in jail for a longer period, in order
to protest against the war on drugs for your benefit.
| | | Is There A Dilemma?
There are, of course, very large hurdles to achieving collective action. First, even after a critical mass has been reached to sufficiently impact the system, each prisoner would still enjoy a benefit by pleading while the rest cooperate. The terms of pleading will become more favorable as the system groans louder, and each prisoner will face his “dilemma.” Second, although cooperating prisoners can improve their collective fate, early actors are especially prone to severe punishment before a critical mass is reached. Additionally, there are ethical concerns for counsel. Game theory often presents scenarios expecting extra-human rationality, but a lawyer likely cannot advise his client to take actions that will knowingly enhance his sentence. One lawyer may be able to represent a sufficient number of clients to overcome the Prisoner’s Dilemma by acting as a single decision maker. He could promote the group’s collective interest rather than fall prey to individual incentives. With confidence in this lawyer, prisoners may decide to transcend their dilemma. | |
>
> |
In other words, he can simultaneously fail in his duty of zealous
representation for more clients, thus turning his failure into
success for some other people?
| | | Conclusion
In this realm of social policy where economic interests align with public opinion and habit, we can look for a weakness in the system to force change. The sheer size of the War On Drugs creates its own vulnerability; the system cannot sustain itself if the subjugated act in resistance rather than facilitation. With a sufficient number of drug criminals forcing trial, two outcomes are likely: either prosecutorial discretion will de facto institute a policy change favoring treatment over punishment, or a de jure legislative response will be forced. | |
>
> |
Your first draft suffered from unrealism. My comments suggested that
you should do something about that by taking a closer look at the
system of imprisonment as a method of delivering social stability.
This draft has moved further from reality. I think the course I
recommended last time is still the best route to improvement for you,
if you want to write about this subject: try to get the political
economy right. Clarity about why we do what we do is achievable.
Whether that leads to "solutions" depends on how deep into the system
of class and race control in this society you are prepared to dig.
| | | “A minority is powerless while it conforms to the majority; it is not even a minority then; but it is irresistible when it clogs by its whole weight.” - Thoreau |
|