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AnaCorrea-SecondPaper 7 - 10 Apr 2008 - Main.AnaCorrea
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| | | An objective aesthetic theory would seemingly strengthen the artist’s stake against the property owner’s in an artwork destruction dispute; if the artwork has independent aesthetic value the property owner would have little incentive or right to have it destroyed. On the other hand, what happens when the artist is the one seeking destruction? The question has arisen numerous times in the literary context. Tradition says that on his deathbed, the Roman author Vergil ordered the manuscript of his masterpiece the Aeneid to be burned. To the dismay of Latin students everywhere, the request was not fulfilled. More recently, the son of Vladimir Nabokov faces the dilemma of whether or not to destroy his father’s last unpublished work as per the literary giant’s instructions before his death. An objective theory would quash both the fee holder’s and the artist’s rights while elevating the interests of society at large.
Subjective Aesthetic Theory and Property Owner’s Rights | |
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< | A subjective theory is seemingly more amenable to the property owner’s stakes. Arguably, when an artist sells his artwork he is giving the power of subjective judgment to its new owner. Thus, if the owner sees the art in a subjectively negative light, he has the right to destroy it. This too easy, however, for why should the artist’s subjective opinion be of lesser value then the property owners? In the case of graffiti, the answer is more clear-cut because the artist has squelched any moral rights he might have by violating the owner’s property rights. Other cases, however, are not so clear and the application of a subjective theory is informed by other considerations such as the audience and aim of the artwork. | >
> | A subjective theory is seemingly more amenable to the property owner’s stakes. Arguably, when an artist sells his artwork he is giving the power of subjective judgment to its new owner. Thus, if the owner sees the art in a subjectively negative light, he has the right to destroy it. This is too easy, however, for why should the artist’s subjective opinion be of lesser value then the property owners? In the case of graffiti, the answer is more clear-cut because the artist has squelched any moral rights he might have by violating the owner’s property rights. Other cases, however, are not so clear and the application of a subjective theory is informed by other considerations such as the audience and aim of the artwork. | | | VARA and Aesthetic Theory | |
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< | A discussion of aesthetic theory seems out of place in reference to a statute like VARA that purports to protect artwork whether “beautiful” or “ugly.” On the other hand, its [justifications allude to the protection of societal interests warranted by an application of objective theory. Additionally, subjective value judgments are certainly present in the statute. First, the Act only protects works of “visual art” and excludes audiovisual and other mixed-media works. By privileging the protection of traditional forms of art over more modern expressions, the Courts and drafters of the Act are inherently making value judgments about what is and is not worthy of protection. Second, the Act protects works of “recognized stature” from destruction and mutilation. This is seemingly an objective standard that seeks to protect art for art’s sake, but what constitutes recognized stature is undoubtedly a subjective judgment. Finally, the Act’s exclusion of site-specific and commissioned artwork also suggest a rejection of objective aesthetic theory, for society’s interest in the objective aesthetic value of such pieces of art should seemingly trump the fee holder’s right to destruction. Yet the Court has held otherwise: an artist has little right over a commissioned piece of artwork. These provisions when taken together reject a purely objective aesthetic theory of art. | >
> | A discussion of aesthetic theory seems out of place in reference to a statute like VARA that purports to protect artwork whether “beautiful” or “ugly.” On the other hand, its [justifications allude to the protection of societal interests warranted by an application of objective theory. Additionally, subjective value judgments are certainly present in the statute. First, the Act only protects works of “visual art” and excludes audiovisual and other mixed-media works. By privileging the protection of traditional forms of art over more modern expressions, the Courts and drafters of the Act are inherently making value judgments about what is and is not worthy of protection. Second, the Act protects works of “recognized stature” from destruction and mutilation. This is seemingly an objective standard that seeks to protect art for art’s sake, but what constitutes recognized stature is undoubtedly a subjective judgment. Finally, the Act’s exclusion of site-specific and commissioned artwork also suggest a rejection of objective aesthetic theory, for society’s interest in the objective aesthetic value of such pieces of art should seemingly trump the fee holder’s right to destruction. Yet the Court has held otherwise: an artist has little right over a commissioned piece of artwork and much can be legally done to site-specific which the artist would liken to destruction. These provisions when taken together reject a purely objective aesthetic theory of art. | | | Conclusion
In an objective aesthetic theory, where the value of the art is independent of human perception, and art is preserved for art’s sake, artist’s rights and societal interests are relevant. When VARA applies a subjective aesthetic theory to artwork, however, the right of destruction more often than not lies with the property owners. |
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