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BrandonGeFirstPaper 12 - 04 Mar 2010 - Main.RonMazor
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| | | I think, in the end, most modes of enforcement can't be justified based on their cost and the relative harmlessness of violating HOV rules. Yes, hefty fines give police an incentive to really crack down on HOV violators, and the income from the fines subsidizes such methods. However, there's only so much a cop can do on a highway of fast-moving vehicles. While a cop chases one violator, others go unnoticed. You'd need a shitload of cops to catch a sizable number of violators. It gets to a point where you have to ask, is it worth it? Social controls are low-cost and low-maintenance (once embedded in people's minds), and have the potential to reach the entire country.
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> | I think this argument is missing a critical element of fact--policing and enforcing the toll roads is not terribly difficult. In fact, it's arguably too easy. In Miami, they've created a Fastpass lane on I-95. It used to be the HOV lane, and during off-hours, it remains the HOV lane. During high traffic periods, the roads become toll-based, with the toll ranging from $.25 to about $2.50, depending on traffic. There are cameras--actual working ones--at the entrances. There are also infrared scanners, which interact with the Fastpass module. If you drive into a lane without a Fastpass, the camera grabs your face and license plate, and they mail you a fine. Policing the toll roads doesn't require manpower--it's done through relatively affordable technology. The legality of fining people automatically is beginning to get challenged in court, but as of yet, the cameras remain operational.
However, false positives are becoming a growing problem. A few months ago, the Miami Herald spotlighted some horror stories of people being fined thousands of dollars because their Fastpass had run out of batteries, wasn't placed in the window correctly, etc. So, the system isn't perfect, and is prone to a damaging lack of oversight. Still, there's a fair chance that the cameras are here to stay.
By shifting the HOV periods to off-hours, the system ensures that those who choose to violate the HOV lanes are doing minimal damage and a negligible amount of social cost. During off-hours, I-95 is empty enough that the HOV lane isn't particularly attractive. As such, a failure to police the lane carries little consequence. By the same token, if someone violates during peak traffic, a system is in place which effectively distributes penalties. And while the ethos of encouraging more frugal driving through carpooling is somewhat lost in a toll-based system, one can argue that the system has simply shifted towards imposing externalities on those who place a premium on their time spent in traffic. And, from an environmental standpoint, cars get more mpg when they go fast.
In short, the premise that enforcement is difficult and costly may merit further examination, as technology is allowing cities to become much more effective at both deterrence and extracting valuable revenue from violators. At the same time, cities are becoming smarter about reducing the social cost of HOV violations. If FastTrak? roads are showing fewer violations, it would seem the contributing factor would be a greater certainty of getting caught, rather than any sense of social propriety.
P.S. I've never perceived any sense of meaningful social shaming on Miami roads. Miami has a lot of bad and angry drivers, so agressive driving/road rage/beeping+cursing is fairly commonplace. As such, outbursts are usually ignored and drivers are generally oblivious towards their fellow motorists. I imagine Miami is not unique in this respect, so I can't help but question the validity of the "social deterrent" argument.
RonMazor - 3 Mar 2010 |
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