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BrandonGeFirstPaper 14 - 14 May 2010 - Main.BrandonGe
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| | | -- By BrandonGe - 26 Feb 2010 | |
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< | | | | Introduction | |
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< | When I lived in Maryland, I picked up my mom from work everyday. With two people in the vehicle, we took advantage of the highway's high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane. On days when traffic was especially bad and the time saved by sneaking in a few miles in the HOV lane was especially great, I noticed that there would be a high number of solo commuters in the HOV lane; seeing a solo commuter for every multi-occupant vehicle was common. Police officers infrequently patrolled this particular stretch of the highway, and on the occasions when a police officer would be enforcing the HOV lane, he would virtually always be camped at the same spot. I often saw violators milk the benefits of driving in the lane until they switched back into an unrestricted lane before the predictable checkpoint.
This experience with poor HOV enforcement made me think about what makes enforcement so difficult, and what possible solutions are. In this paper I argue that because enforcement is so difficult and costly, creating social norms and stigmatizing cheating will be the driving force behind achieving compliance with HOV lane rules (a theory that has also been described by Professor Strahilevitz).
History and Benefits | >
> | HOV lanes were created in the 1960s and 1970s in response to rising foreign oil prices and the consequent desirability of lowering gas consumption. Creation of the lanes became popular among cities to encourage carpooling, thereby increasing person throughput and road capacity, and improving air quality. Some have criticized HOV lanes as actually lowering road capacity and increasing overall congestion. Proponents point to the development of "slugging," an organized system of taking advantage of HOV lanes, as evidence of effectiveness. | | | | |
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< | HOV lanes were created in the 1960s and 1970s in response to rising foreign oil prices and the consequent desirability of lowering gas consumption. Creation of HOV lanes became popular among cities as a way of encouraging carpooling, thereby increasing person throughput and road capacity, and improving air quality. However, HOV lanes have been criticized as actually lowering road capacity and increasing overall congestion. Proponents point to the development of "slugging," an organized system of taking advantage of HOV lanes, as evidence of effectiveness. | >
> | Although it appears that HOV lanes can potentially be very beneficial, much of this benefit has not been realized because of the difficulty in enforcing lawful use. Violation rates are high throughout the country and problems inhere in human enforcers trying to distinguish violators from innocent carpoolers in moving vehicles travelling on high-traffic highways. Because enforcement is difficult and costly, I propose that cities should focus more on creating social norms and stigmatizing cheating in achieving higher compliance with HOV lane rules (a theory that has also been described by Professor Strahilevitz) | | | | |
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< | The effectiveness of HOV lanes is a matter of great debate, one that is not the topic of this paper. This paper will proceed under the assumption that increased compliance with HOV lane rules is desirable. | >
> | Enforcement Methods | | | | |
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< | Problems With Enforcement | >
> | A commonly proposed solution is devoting more patrol time to enforcement. This fails as a long-term solution. It can be difficult to see whether a particular vehicle is in compliance with HOV lane rules. Occupants such as babies and sleeping passengers are hard to see with the naked eye, especially when they are inside a fast-moving vehicle. Further complicating matters, some states, such as Arizona, have allowed owners of certain hybrid vehicles to apply for special license plates that let them use HOV lanes regardless of occupancy. Devoting more police officer time to enforcement can also be counterproductive. The draw of HOV lanes for potential carpoolers lies in their faster transit times, but police officers often slow traffic because many drivers slow down when they see a police car ahead. Lastly, many object to devoting valuable resources to enforcing relatively innocuous HOV lane violations. | | | | |
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< | HOV lane use is notoriously difficult to enforce, as evidenced by high violation rates throughout the country. A commonly proposed solution is devoting more patrol time to enforcement. This fails as a long-term solution. It can be difficult to see whether a particular vehicle is in compliance with HOV lane rules. Occupants such as babies and sleeping passengers are hard to see with the naked eye, especially when they are inside a fast-moving vehicle. Further complicating matters, some states, such as Arizona, have allowed owners of certain hybrid vehicles to apply for special license plates that let them use HOV lanes regardless of occupancy. Devoting more police officer time to enforcement can also be counterproductive. The draw of HOV lanes for potential carpoolers lies in their faster transit times, but police officers often slow traffic because many drivers slow down when they see a police car ahead. Lastly, many object to devoting valuable resources to enforcing relatively innocuous HOV lane violations. | >
> | Many also propose increasing fines and making sure drivers know of the high fines in an effort to deter violators. | | | Most alternatives are flawed. Barriers between HOV and unrestricted lanes can increase the effectiveness of police officer enforcement, but may lead to slower transit times in the HOV lane, as the effect of one slow driver is amplified. Also, the lower number of exits and entries for the HOV lane would discourage use even by carpoolers. Video and photographic surveillance is fraught with inaccuracies since it often cannot detect children and sleeping people. | | | The FasTrak program has created a social norm against cheating. The popularity of the program, the stupidity of violation and risking hefty fines, and the availability of meaningful alternatives have helped create a community-wide stigma against violation. As violation rates decrease further, it becomes internalized that cheating is socially unacceptable, eventually reaching a point where people adhere to the rules voluntarily and with little enforcement. Guilt becomes the deterrent.
HOV lane enforcement is costly and ineffective. Thus, creation of a social norm that produces guilt in violators will be the main factor in improving nationwide compliance with HOV lane rules. | |
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< | This isn't actually an
essay that earns the conclusion you've put on it. What happened was
that Strahilevitz wrote a too-clever-by-half piece designed to misuse
a metaphor: he was going to prove the value of pollution emission
permits by analogy with selling HOV lane access. You came along and
took his HOV access material, his arguments, and his conclusion hook,
line and sinker, including the social norms implications. But
Strahilevitz is just a wise-ass law clerk, and he's writing a paper
designed to get him a teaching job by sounding smart, so there's no
reason to believe he's actually got a tight argument on his
jumping-off point, which is just a metaphor anyway. When you come
along and borrow this organ-grinder's monkey, you're now responsible
for your data and your conclusions. So how about moving away from
San Diego and DC, and looking at the San Jose metropolitan area,
where the penalty for violating the HOV lane rules, like the penalty
for littering on the coast highway, is heart-stoppingly high. If you
charge people $1,000 for littering or $500 for driving under-loaded
in HOV lanes, or for speeding in construction zones, you make even
sporadic enforcement very effective, because the fines are larger
than many drivers' cars are worth.
Effective by what means? Effective, as in actually deterring the behavior? I think there is ample evidence to show that when the probability of something occurring is sufficiently small (as I imagine getting caught in HOV lanes is), humans discount the probability of its occurrence entirely, or "round down." I have not looked specifically at San Jose's HOV program. I have, however, seen that students will plagiarize and cheat academically, even when facing extremely harsh penalties, because the probabilities of being caught are miniscule.
Of course, the real solution to HOV lane cheating isn't trying to change social norms or instituting Draconian punishments. The solution is to install cameras to watch the HOV lane. I realize the essay deals with this idea, however, I think it vastly underestimates the extremely potent deterrent effect of cameras. If you are from the same part of Maryland that I am, you will know first hand what cameras will do to people when they go near them. People think they can evade cops, but not stationary cameras. Stopping HOV lane cheating is as simple as parking an empty cop car in a shoulder near the HOV lane to create the illusion of enforcement. Threatening is better than enforcing. -mz - 01 Mar 2010
You also create a good reason for
the Highway Patrol to make enforcement of these rules a significant
priority. That plus some points on the license, endangering the
ability to make a living in a place that so utterly requires each
worker to retain the privilege to drive, and you are likely to
prevent behavior quite effectively. No significant littering happens
on Highway 1, and at least in my experience with Silicon Valley
traffic, HOV violation is very uncommon conduct.
I think more statistics would be crucial to making this point about Sporadic Enforcement, whichever way it goes. The simple Risk calculation of Punishment*Likelihood isn't very informative. Most people aren't great at math, and even if they are it isn't all that influential. Sporadic Enforcement plus Heart Stopping fines seems to be the strategy used by the RIAA, and the consensus is that it is totally ineffective. Perhaps even counterproductive, as it turns public sentiment against them. I realize that traffic fines are much less sporadic than that, and that high fines give the Police incentive to increase enforcement, but I'm not prepared to assume, based on logic and an anecdote, that the strategy "works". Most data and metrics are subject to the criticism below, but it would give you some basis to begin your comparison. - Stephen Severo
So maybe you're right
and maybe you aren't: perhaps there's data showing that San Diego
does better than San Jose by some measurement we might be interested
in (though it probably wouldn't do by some other measure of equal
interest, because that's the problem with "policy science") but
you're not even going to find that data as long as you're relying on
Strahilevitz to do all your work for you. And whether the "social
norm," which it might be simpler to call "other social control" is
more powerful than law doesn't require extended analysis: law is
always a fairly weak means of social control. If every church
sermonized against HOV lane violation every Sunday, that would be
more effective at deterring than high fines, though perhaps less
effective than frequent public capital punishment. But other social
control is not usually incompatible with legal social control, except
in the thought experiments of smart-ass dudes trying to get a
teaching gig at Chicago. There are other matters to consider:
Whether enforcement is expensive, for example, depends on whether it
pays for itself. And so on. Strahilevitz has a bunch of other
problems, because he puts a ladder on top of this rickety stool and
tries to climb many times higher than his head on it, but you've
borrowed from him problems enough. Whether one wants to be
responsible for this organ grinder's monkey isn't clear to me, but if
you do, you need to ask some slightly broader questions and gather
some slightly more comprehensive information.
I agree with both Matt and Stephen above that simply raising fines while keeping enforcement low probably won't be very much of a deterrent, and they've already provided a couple of great examples that support this. Some more data, especially regarding the correlation between the amount of the fine and the violation rate, does seem to be in order, which I will hopefully include in a revision.
I have a couple of comments on Matt's proposed solutions. First of all, cameras. You're right in that I gave it short shrift in writing the essay and undeservedly so. What follows is stuff that I probably would've included if there were a higher word limit. I'm guessing you're referring to the speed cameras that are everywhere in Montgomery County. I concede that they're great speeding deterrents -- for the half mile or so of road that they cover. Everyone I know slows down when they approach a camera zone, sometimes to the point where you see pedestrians whizzing past them, but upon exiting the zone, they put the pedal to the metal and go back to moving at whatever speed they were traveling at before the cameras. Nonetheless, this works in the context of speeding when the cameras are placed in certain areas, e.g. near schools where children cross the street and whatnot, where a half-mile zone of non-speeding is enough to produce a significant improvement in public safety. But getting a camera to read a vehicle's speed is easier than having it detect the number of occupants in a vehicle. Some factors that make detecting the number of occupants in a vehicle difficult (factors that don't complicate reading vehicles' speeds) are the speed of the vehicle, less than optimal lighting conditions, obstacles like headrests and windshields, and the size/position of occupants (e.g. babies and nappers). Infrared technologies are riddled with similar problems. Even if an accurate technology were to develop, it'd probably be prohibitively expensive, especially given that there are thousands of miles of HOV lanes in the US. I won't get into the images of an Orwellian society conjured by a mass surveillance system of cameras that take pictures/video of occupants in vehicles.
I'm not sure how much it costs to install fake cameras along a highway, but I'm guessing that would be pretty expensive too since you'd need enough of them to prevent people from simply ducking in and out of lanes to avoid them. Likewise with empty police cars. Violators can switch out of the HOV lane when they see a cop car and switch back in when it's safely out of sight. Barriers that make it harder to switch in and out of the HOV lane might prevent all this, but they have their own problems. Commuters also usually travel the same way everyday, so they'll probably catch on quickly if all they see are empty cop cars.
I think, in the end, most modes of enforcement can't be justified based on their cost and the relative harmlessness of violating HOV rules. Yes, hefty fines give police an incentive to really crack down on HOV violators, and the income from the fines subsidizes such methods. However, there's only so much a cop can do on a highway of fast-moving vehicles. While a cop chases one violator, others go unnoticed. You'd need a shitload of cops to catch a sizable number of violators. It gets to a point where you have to ask, is it worth it? Social controls are low-cost and low-maintenance (once embedded in people's minds), and have the potential to reach the entire country.
-Brandon
I think this argument is missing a critical element of fact--policing and enforcing the toll roads is not terribly difficult. In fact, it's arguably too easy. In Miami, they've created a Fastpass lane on I-95. It used to be the HOV lane, and during off-hours, it remains the HOV lane. During high traffic periods, the roads become toll-based, with the toll ranging from $.25 to about $2.50, depending on traffic. There are cameras--actual working ones--at the entrances. There are also infrared scanners, which interact with the Fastpass module. If you drive into a lane without a Fastpass, the camera grabs your face and license plate, and they mail you a fine. Policing the toll roads doesn't require manpower--it's done through relatively affordable technology. The legality of fining people automatically is beginning to get challenged in court, but as of yet, the cameras remain operational.
However, false positives are becoming a growing problem. A few months ago, the Miami Herald spotlighted some horror stories of people being fined thousands of dollars because their Fastpass had run out of batteries, wasn't placed in the window correctly, etc. So, the system isn't perfect, and is prone to a damaging lack of oversight. Still, there's a fair chance that the cameras are here to stay.
By shifting the HOV periods to off-hours, the system ensures that those who choose to violate the HOV lanes are doing minimal damage and a negligible amount of social cost. During off-hours, I-95 is empty enough that the HOV lane isn't particularly attractive. As such, a failure to police the lane carries little consequence. By the same token, if someone violates during peak traffic, a system is in place which effectively distributes penalties. And while the ethos of encouraging more frugal driving through carpooling is somewhat lost in a toll-based system, one can argue that the system has simply shifted towards imposing externalities on those who place a premium on their time spent in traffic. And, from an environmental standpoint, cars get more mpg when they go fast.
In short, the premise that enforcement is difficult and costly may merit further examination, as technology is allowing cities to become much more effective at both deterrence and extracting valuable revenue from violators. At the same time, cities are becoming smarter about reducing the social cost of HOV violations. If FastTrak? roads are showing fewer violations, it would seem the contributing factor would be a greater certainty of getting caught, rather than any sense of social propriety.
P.S. I've never perceived any sense of meaningful social shaming on Miami roads. Miami has a lot of bad and angry drivers, so agressive driving/road rage/beeping+cursing is fairly commonplace. As such, outbursts are usually ignored and drivers are generally oblivious towards their fellow motorists. I imagine Miami is not unique in this respect, so I can't help but question the validity of the "social deterrent" argument.
RonMazor - 3 Mar 2010 |
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BrandonGeFirstPaper 12 - 04 Mar 2010 - Main.RonMazor
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| | | I think, in the end, most modes of enforcement can't be justified based on their cost and the relative harmlessness of violating HOV rules. Yes, hefty fines give police an incentive to really crack down on HOV violators, and the income from the fines subsidizes such methods. However, there's only so much a cop can do on a highway of fast-moving vehicles. While a cop chases one violator, others go unnoticed. You'd need a shitload of cops to catch a sizable number of violators. It gets to a point where you have to ask, is it worth it? Social controls are low-cost and low-maintenance (once embedded in people's minds), and have the potential to reach the entire country.
-Brandon | |
>
> | I think this argument is missing a critical element of fact--policing and enforcing the toll roads is not terribly difficult. In fact, it's arguably too easy. In Miami, they've created a Fastpass lane on I-95. It used to be the HOV lane, and during off-hours, it remains the HOV lane. During high traffic periods, the roads become toll-based, with the toll ranging from $.25 to about $2.50, depending on traffic. There are cameras--actual working ones--at the entrances. There are also infrared scanners, which interact with the Fastpass module. If you drive into a lane without a Fastpass, the camera grabs your face and license plate, and they mail you a fine. Policing the toll roads doesn't require manpower--it's done through relatively affordable technology. The legality of fining people automatically is beginning to get challenged in court, but as of yet, the cameras remain operational.
However, false positives are becoming a growing problem. A few months ago, the Miami Herald spotlighted some horror stories of people being fined thousands of dollars because their Fastpass had run out of batteries, wasn't placed in the window correctly, etc. So, the system isn't perfect, and is prone to a damaging lack of oversight. Still, there's a fair chance that the cameras are here to stay.
By shifting the HOV periods to off-hours, the system ensures that those who choose to violate the HOV lanes are doing minimal damage and a negligible amount of social cost. During off-hours, I-95 is empty enough that the HOV lane isn't particularly attractive. As such, a failure to police the lane carries little consequence. By the same token, if someone violates during peak traffic, a system is in place which effectively distributes penalties. And while the ethos of encouraging more frugal driving through carpooling is somewhat lost in a toll-based system, one can argue that the system has simply shifted towards imposing externalities on those who place a premium on their time spent in traffic. And, from an environmental standpoint, cars get more mpg when they go fast.
In short, the premise that enforcement is difficult and costly may merit further examination, as technology is allowing cities to become much more effective at both deterrence and extracting valuable revenue from violators. At the same time, cities are becoming smarter about reducing the social cost of HOV violations. If FastTrak? roads are showing fewer violations, it would seem the contributing factor would be a greater certainty of getting caught, rather than any sense of social propriety.
P.S. I've never perceived any sense of meaningful social shaming on Miami roads. Miami has a lot of bad and angry drivers, so agressive driving/road rage/beeping+cursing is fairly commonplace. As such, outbursts are usually ignored and drivers are generally oblivious towards their fellow motorists. I imagine Miami is not unique in this respect, so I can't help but question the validity of the "social deterrent" argument.
RonMazor - 3 Mar 2010 |
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BrandonGeFirstPaper 11 - 02 Mar 2010 - Main.BrandonGe
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| | | you do, you need to ask some slightly broader questions and gather
some slightly more comprehensive information.
\ No newline at end of file | |
>
> | I agree with both Matt and Stephen above that simply raising fines while keeping enforcement low probably won't be very much of a deterrent, and they've already provided a couple of great examples that support this. Some more data, especially regarding the correlation between the amount of the fine and the violation rate, does seem to be in order, which I will hopefully include in a revision.
I have a couple of comments on Matt's proposed solutions. First of all, cameras. You're right in that I gave it short shrift in writing the essay and undeservedly so. What follows is stuff that I probably would've included if there were a higher word limit. I'm guessing you're referring to the speed cameras that are everywhere in Montgomery County. I concede that they're great speeding deterrents -- for the half mile or so of road that they cover. Everyone I know slows down when they approach a camera zone, sometimes to the point where you see pedestrians whizzing past them, but upon exiting the zone, they put the pedal to the metal and go back to moving at whatever speed they were traveling at before the cameras. Nonetheless, this works in the context of speeding when the cameras are placed in certain areas, e.g. near schools where children cross the street and whatnot, where a half-mile zone of non-speeding is enough to produce a significant improvement in public safety. But getting a camera to read a vehicle's speed is easier than having it detect the number of occupants in a vehicle. Some factors that make detecting the number of occupants in a vehicle difficult (factors that don't complicate reading vehicles' speeds) are the speed of the vehicle, less than optimal lighting conditions, obstacles like headrests and windshields, and the size/position of occupants (e.g. babies and nappers). Infrared technologies are riddled with similar problems. Even if an accurate technology were to develop, it'd probably be prohibitively expensive, especially given that there are thousands of miles of HOV lanes in the US. I won't get into the images of an Orwellian society conjured by a mass surveillance system of cameras that take pictures/video of occupants in vehicles.
I'm not sure how much it costs to install fake cameras along a highway, but I'm guessing that would be pretty expensive too since you'd need enough of them to prevent people from simply ducking in and out of lanes to avoid them. Likewise with empty police cars. Violators can switch out of the HOV lane when they see a cop car and switch back in when it's safely out of sight. Barriers that make it harder to switch in and out of the HOV lane might prevent all this, but they have their own problems. Commuters also usually travel the same way everyday, so they'll probably catch on quickly if all they see are empty cop cars.
I think, in the end, most modes of enforcement can't be justified based on their cost and the relative harmlessness of violating HOV rules. Yes, hefty fines give police an incentive to really crack down on HOV violators, and the income from the fines subsidizes such methods. However, there's only so much a cop can do on a highway of fast-moving vehicles. While a cop chases one violator, others go unnoticed. You'd need a shitload of cops to catch a sizable number of violators. It gets to a point where you have to ask, is it worth it? Social controls are low-cost and low-maintenance (once embedded in people's minds), and have the potential to reach the entire country.
-Brandon |
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BrandonGeFirstPaper 10 - 02 Mar 2010 - Main.MatthewZorn
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| | | sporadic enforcement very effective, because the fines are larger
than many drivers' cars are worth. | |
<
< | Effective by what means? Effective, as in actually deterring the behavior? I think there is ample evidence to show that when the probability of something occurring is sufficiently small (as I imagine it is in HOV lanes), humans discount the probability of its occurrence entirely. I have not looked specifically at San Jose's HOV program. I have, however, seen that students will plagiarize and cheat academically, even when facing extremely harsh penalties, because the probabilities of being caught are almost non-existent.
Of course, the real solution to HOV lane cheating isn't trying to change social norms or instituting Draconian punishments. The solution is to install cameras to watch the HOV lane. I realize the essay deals with this idea, however, I think it vastly underestimates the extremely potent deterrent effect of cameras. If you are from the same part of Maryland that I am, you will know first hand what cameras will do to people when they come near (when the probability of something occurring is sufficiently small, we often discount the probability of its occurrence entirely). Stopping HOV lane cheating is simple--just park an empty cop car in a shoulder near the HOV lane and create the illusion of enforcement. -mz - 01 Mar 2010 | >
> | Effective by what means? Effective, as in actually deterring the behavior? I think there is ample evidence to show that when the probability of something occurring is sufficiently small (as I imagine getting caught in HOV lanes is), humans discount the probability of its occurrence entirely, or "round down." I have not looked specifically at San Jose's HOV program. I have, however, seen that students will plagiarize and cheat academically, even when facing extremely harsh penalties, because the probabilities of being caught are miniscule.
Of course, the real solution to HOV lane cheating isn't trying to change social norms or instituting Draconian punishments. The solution is to install cameras to watch the HOV lane. I realize the essay deals with this idea, however, I think it vastly underestimates the extremely potent deterrent effect of cameras. If you are from the same part of Maryland that I am, you will know first hand what cameras will do to people when they go near them. People think they can evade cops, but not stationary cameras. Stopping HOV lane cheating is as simple as parking an empty cop car in a shoulder near the HOV lane to create the illusion of enforcement. Threatening is better than enforcing. -mz - 01 Mar 2010 | | |
You also create a good reason for |
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