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BrandonGeFirstPaper 6 - 01 Mar 2010 - Main.EbenMoglen
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| | The FasTrak? program has created a social norm against cheating. The popularity of the program, the stupidity of violation and risking hefty fines, and the availability of meaningful alternatives have helped create a community-wide stigma against violation. As violation rates decrease further, it becomes internalized that cheating is socially unacceptable, eventually reaching a point where people adhere to the rules voluntarily and with little enforcement. Guilt becomes the deterrent.
HOV lane enforcement is costly and ineffective. Thus, creation of a social norm that produces guilt in violators will be the main factor in improving nationwide compliance with HOV lane rules.
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> > | This isn't actually an
essay that earns the conclusion you've put on it. What happened was
that Strahilevitz wrote a too-clever-by-half piece designed to misuse
a metaphor: he was going to prove the value of pollution emission
permits by analogy with selling HOV lane access. You came along and
took his HOV access material, his arguments, and his conclusion hook,
line and sinker, including the social norms implications. But
Strahilevitz is just a wise-ass law clerk, and he's writing a paper
designed to get him a teaching job by sounding smart, so there's no
reason to believe he's actually got a tight argument on his
jumping-off point, which is just a metaphor anyway. When you come
along and borrow this organ-grinder's monkey, you're now responsible
for your data and your conclusions. So how about moving away from
San Diego and DC, and looking at the San Jose metropolitan area,
where the penalty for violating the HOV lane rules, like the penalty
for littering on the coast highway, is heart-stoppingly high. If you
charge people $1,000 for littering or $500 for driving under-loaded
in HOV lanes, or for speeding in construction zones, you make even
sporadic enforcement very effective, because the fines are larger
than many drivers' cars are worth. You also create a good reason for
the Highway Patrol to make enforcement of these rules a significant
priority. That plus some points on the license, endangering the
ability to make a living in a place that so utterly requires each
worker to retain the privilege to drive, and you are likely to
prevent behavior quite effectively. No significant littering happens
on Highway 1, and at least in my experience with Silicon Valley
traffic, HOV violation is very uncommon conduct.
So maybe you're right
and maybe you aren't: perhaps there's data showing that San Diego
does better than San Jose by some measurement we might be interested
in (though it probably wouldn't do by some other measure of equal
interest, because that's the problem with "policy science") but
you're not even going to find that data as long as you're relying on
Strahilevitz to do all your work for you. And whether the "social
norm," which it might be simpler to call "other social control" is
more powerful than law doesn't require extended analysis: law is
always a fairly weak means of social control. If every church
sermonized against HOV lane violation every Sunday, that would be
more effective at deterring than high fines, though perhaps less
effective than frequent public capital punishment. But other social
control is not usually incompatible with legal social control, except
in the thought experiments of smart-ass dudes trying to get a
teaching gig at Chicago. There are other matters to consider:
Whether enforcement is expensive, for example, depends on whether it
pays for itself. And so on. Strahilevitz has a bunch of other
problems, because he puts a ladder on top of this rickety stool and
tries to climb many times higher than his head on it, but you've
borrowed from him problems enough. Whether one wants to be
responsible for this organ grinder's monkey isn't clear to me, but if
you do, you need to ask some slightly broader questions and gather
some slightly more comprehensive information.
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