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BrandonHoltFirstEssay 10 - 07 Jun 2022 - Main.BrandonHolt
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< | REVISING: Incentivizing Corporate Diversity through Debt Finance | >
> | Incentivizing Corporate Diversity through Debt Finance | | | -- By BrandonHolt - 13 Mar 2022 | | | Shareholder activism may seem like an obvious argument for corporate diversity given the home “diversity” seemingly has under "social" in ESG and the general corporate preference for market-dictated outcomes. Even the Financial Times noted companies and boards must be prepared for investors of varying shareholder interests attacking even “squishy matters where blunt profit maximi[z]ation is not the issue.” | |
<
< | While undeniably impactful, shareholder activism is also limited. Its strategies require motivated shareholders, continuous engagement, proxy coordination amongst investors, and significant advisory resources (e.g. legal, activist, and financial advisors). The strategies, like board overhauls, are also antagonistic to the business and can be met with resistance that further delays realized progress. And importantly, these strategies are generally limited to public companies, which only represent a minority of US firms. | >
> | While undeniably impactful, shareholder activism is also limited. Its strategies require motivated shareholders, continuous engagement, proxy coordination, and advisory resources (e.g. legal, activist, and financial advisors). The strategies, like board overhauls, are also antagonistic to the business and can be met with resistance that further delays progress. And importantly, these strategies are generally limited to public companies, which represent a minority of US firms. | | | Debt Financing | |
<
< | Unlike a traditional shareholder activist campaign, attaching corporate diversity to debt finance can include private companies and also create a precedent for multiple new parties. | >
> | Unlike a traditional shareholder activist campaign, attaching corporate diversity to debt finance can include private companies and also create a precedent for multiple new parties. As a result, this essay concludes that leveraging debt finance is one of the strongest options to incentive meaningful corporate diversity. | | | As bank loans are a contract, the repayment terms can include an adjustable interest rate. The bank lender would assign an initial rate (based on a market benchmark like LIBOR or another benchmark given LIBOR's phaseout) that may include a premium. The premium, reflecting the borrower's creditworthiness, is triggered if the company has "low" diversity at the consummation of the loan. The borrower and lender can further agree to increase or decrease the interest rate over time based on whether the borrower meets the agreed diversity targets. The borrower need not be the only entity subject to a diversity commitment. The borrower could further bargain for discounts on advising fees if their legal and financial advisors to these transactions similarly fail to meet agreed diversity targets. |
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BrandonHoltFirstEssay 9 - 07 Jun 2022 - Main.BrandonHolt
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| | | There is a precedent for this proposal in the climate space with "sustainability-linked loans". Under this loan structure, a borrower's interest rate is adjusted based on to their attainment of agreed to sustainability targets. Specifically, the loan's interest rate is lowered if the target is attained and the interest rate is increased if the borrower fails to meet the agreed targets. A related idea has been applied in the racial justice context. Napoleon Wallace’s firm, Activest, rates municipalities’ credit worthiness by incorporating police brutality prevalence into traditional municipal credit ratings. When occurrence of police brutality is high and the frequency and amount of lawsuit settlements are also high, the riskier the rating Activest assigns. | |
<
< | The public commitments corporations made to improve diversity could motivate lenders and borrowers to initially consider this type of proposal, particularly if special interest groups connected the sustainability-linked loan precedents to diversity attainment commitments and demands. But the benefits of this proposal to the bottom-lines of both lenders and borrowers provide reasons for parties to actually adopt and agree to these terms. For borrowers, this scheme provides access to favorable rates on funds that can be used for general corporate purposes and demonstrates a commitment to diversity to its stakeholders (e.g. boards, shareholders, employees, and consumers). For lenders, this scheme could increase the lender's executed deals and client base, result in higher returns, and bolster a lender’s reputation as assisting borrowers in fulfilling their public commitments on diversity. In essence, the scheme allows for borrowers and lenders to speculate on the ability of the borrower to diversify within established time frames. | >
> | The public commitments corporations made to improve diversity could motivate lenders and borrowers to initially consider this type of proposal, particularly if special interest groups connected the sustainability-linked loan precedents to diversity attainment commitments and demands. But the benefits of this proposal to the bottom-lines of both lenders and borrowers provide reasons for parties to actually adopt and agree to these terms. For borrowers, this scheme provides access to favorable rates on funds that can be used for general corporate purposes and demonstrates a commitment to diversity to its stakeholders (e.g. boards, shareholders, employees, and consumers). For lenders, this scheme could increase the lender's executed deals and client base, result in higher returns, and bolster a lender’s reputation as assisting borrowers in fulfilling their public commitments on diversity.
In essence, the scheme allows for borrowers and lenders to speculate (for profit maximization by lenders and savings maximization by borrowers) on the ability of the borrower to diversify within established time frames. In this way, diversity attainment and a corporation's financial interests align. | | |
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BrandonHoltFirstEssay 8 - 07 Jun 2022 - Main.BrandonHolt
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| | | Introduction | |
<
< | When the video of Derek Chauvin murdering George Floyd commanded the the world's attention in May 2020, many US corporations released statements decrying anti-Black racism and their own systemic failure at employee diversity. Corporations also disclosed their demographic data, exposing the lack of diversity attainment across Black, Latinx, queer, and women employee populations. The general sentiment of these disclosures was, “We need to and will do better.” | >
> | When the video of Derek Chauvin murdering George Floyd commanded the the world's attention in May 2020, many US corporations released statements decrying anti-Black racism and their own systemic failure at employee diversity. Corporations also disclosed their demographic data, confirming the lack of diversity attainment across Black, Latinx, queer, and women employee populations. The general sentiment of these disclosures was, “We need to and will do better.” | | | Now, two years later, there is still the same want of corporate diversity. While challenges to a corporation’s lack of diversity are more acceptable in corporate talk, actions that produce meaningful diversity attainment are sparse or do not produce expedient results. This introduces the question to be explored here: how can corporations be incentivized to expediently diversify their workforces? | |
<
< | Multiple industries at all levels of seniority remain inaccessible to diverse employees. Demands to diversify need to be attached to an incentive structure that compel corporate change. Morality––or the market shame that results from lack of adherence to a moral position––is an unmoving, or at best slow yielding, corporate incentive. Conversely, financial stipulations that impact a corporation’s bottom-line necessarily dictate a corporation's strategy. | >
> | Demands to diversify need to be attached to an incentive structure that compel corporate change. Morality, alone,––or the market shame that results from lack of adherence to a moral position––is an unmoving, or at best slow yielding, corporate incentive. Conversely, financial stipulations that impact a corporation’s bottom-line necessarily dictate a corporation's strategy. | | | Capital limits all corporations. Corporations routinely fund general corporate initiatives through equity and debt finance. In equity markets, corporations dilute their ownership with investors who can directly challenge a company’s strategic direction. Could corporate diversity attainment improve with the activism of prominent shareholders? In debt finance, the credit agreements that set a borrower's and lender's obligations are based in contract law, where parties bargain for the terms by which they are bound. This includes important terms like at what interest rate a loan is repaid to lenders and what advisory fees a borrower owes to legal and financial advisors. Could corporate diversity materially and expediently improve if these rates and fees were attached to diversity attainment over the course of the loan? | | | While undeniably impactful, shareholder activism is also limited. Its strategies require motivated shareholders, continuous engagement, proxy coordination amongst investors, and significant advisory resources (e.g. legal, activist, and financial advisors). The strategies, like board overhauls, are also antagonistic to the business and can be met with resistance that further delays realized progress. And importantly, these strategies are generally limited to public companies, which only represent a minority of US firms.
Debt Financing | |
<
< | Unlike a traditional shareholder activist campaign, attaching corporate diversity to debt finance can include private companies and also create a precedent for multiple new parties. As bank loans are a contract, the repayment terms can include an adjustable interest rate. The bank lender would assign an initial rate (based on a market benchmark like LIBOR or another benchmark given LIBOR's phaseout) that may include a premium. The premium, reflecting the borrower's creditworthiness, is triggered if the company has "low" diversity at the consummation of the loan. The borrower and lender can further agree to increase or decrease the interest rate over time based on whether the borrower meets the agreed diversity targets. The borrower need not be the only entity subject to a diversity commitment. The borrower could further bargain for discounts on advising fees if their legal and financial advisors to these transactions similarly fail to meet agreed diversity targets. | >
> | Unlike a traditional shareholder activist campaign, attaching corporate diversity to debt finance can include private companies and also create a precedent for multiple new parties.
As bank loans are a contract, the repayment terms can include an adjustable interest rate. The bank lender would assign an initial rate (based on a market benchmark like LIBOR or another benchmark given LIBOR's phaseout) that may include a premium. The premium, reflecting the borrower's creditworthiness, is triggered if the company has "low" diversity at the consummation of the loan. The borrower and lender can further agree to increase or decrease the interest rate over time based on whether the borrower meets the agreed diversity targets. The borrower need not be the only entity subject to a diversity commitment. The borrower could further bargain for discounts on advising fees if their legal and financial advisors to these transactions similarly fail to meet agreed diversity targets. | | | There is a precedent for this proposal in the climate space with "sustainability-linked loans". Under this loan structure, a borrower's interest rate is adjusted based on to their attainment of agreed to sustainability targets. Specifically, the loan's interest rate is lowered if the target is attained and the interest rate is increased if the borrower fails to meet the agreed targets. A related idea has been applied in the racial justice context. Napoleon Wallace’s firm, Activest, rates municipalities’ credit worthiness by incorporating police brutality prevalence into traditional municipal credit ratings. When occurrence of police brutality is high and the frequency and amount of lawsuit settlements are also high, the riskier the rating Activest assigns. | |
<
< | The public commitments corporations made to improve diversity could motivate lenders and borrowers to initially consider this type of proposal, particularly if special interest groups connected the sustainability-linked loan precedents to diversity attainment commitments and demands. But the benefits of this proposal to the bottom-lines of both lenders and borrowers provide reasons for parties to actually adopt and agree to these terms. For borrowers, this scheme provides access to favorable rates on funds that can be used for general corporate purposes and demonstrates a commitment to diversity to its stakeholders (e.g. boards, shareholders, employees, and consumers). For lenders, this scheme could increase the lender's executed deals and client base, result in higher returns, and bolsters the lender's reputation as assisting borrower's in fulfilling their public commitments on diversity. In essence, the scheme allows for borrowers and lenders to speculate on the ability of the borrower to diversify within established time frames. | >
> | The public commitments corporations made to improve diversity could motivate lenders and borrowers to initially consider this type of proposal, particularly if special interest groups connected the sustainability-linked loan precedents to diversity attainment commitments and demands. But the benefits of this proposal to the bottom-lines of both lenders and borrowers provide reasons for parties to actually adopt and agree to these terms. For borrowers, this scheme provides access to favorable rates on funds that can be used for general corporate purposes and demonstrates a commitment to diversity to its stakeholders (e.g. boards, shareholders, employees, and consumers). For lenders, this scheme could increase the lender's executed deals and client base, result in higher returns, and bolster a lender’s reputation as assisting borrowers in fulfilling their public commitments on diversity. In essence, the scheme allows for borrowers and lenders to speculate on the ability of the borrower to diversify within established time frames. | | |
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BrandonHoltFirstEssay 7 - 06 Jun 2022 - Main.BrandonHolt
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< | Incentivizing Corporate Diversity through Debt Finance | >
> | REVISING: Incentivizing Corporate Diversity through Debt Finance | | | -- By BrandonHolt - 13 Mar 2022
Introduction | |
<
< | When the video of Derek Chauvin murdering George Floyd commanded the attention of the world in May 2020, many United States corporations released statements decrying anti-Black racism and their own systemic failure at employee diversity. Corporations disclosed their demographic data, exposing the lack of diversity attainment across Black, Latinx, queer, and women employee populations. The general sentiment of these disclosures was, “We need to and will do better.” | >
> | When the video of Derek Chauvin murdering George Floyd commanded the the world's attention in May 2020, many US corporations released statements decrying anti-Black racism and their own systemic failure at employee diversity. Corporations also disclosed their demographic data, exposing the lack of diversity attainment across Black, Latinx, queer, and women employee populations. The general sentiment of these disclosures was, “We need to and will do better.” | | | | |
<
< | Now, two years later, there is still the same want of corporate diversity. While challenges to a corporation’s lack of diversity are more acceptable in corporate talk, actions that produce meaningful diversity attainment are sparse or do not produce expedient results. This introduces the question to be explored here: how can corporations be incentivized to expediently diversify their workforces? | >
> | Now, two years later, there is still the same want of corporate diversity. While challenges to a corporation’s lack of diversity are more acceptable in corporate talk, actions that produce meaningful diversity attainment are sparse or do not produce expedient results. This introduces the question to be explored here: how can corporations be incentivized to expediently diversify their workforces? | | | Multiple industries at all levels of seniority remain inaccessible to diverse employees. Demands to diversify need to be attached to an incentive structure that compel corporate change. Morality––or the market shame that results from lack of adherence to a moral position––is an unmoving, or at best slow yielding, corporate incentive. Conversely, financial stipulations that impact a corporation’s bottom-line necessarily dictate a corporation's strategy. | | | ESG and Shareholder Activism | |
<
< | For public companies, the equity markets are a central funding source for corporate initiatives. But dispensing equity yields shareholders who also have a say in a company's priorities. This shareholder activism is an increasingly popular tactic to move corporations in a particular strategic direction. Activism that targets ESG--Environmental, Social, and Governance--concerns usually take this form. Climate-conscious operations are a highly visible, and growing, cause for shareholder activists. For example, when ExxonMobil? did not commit to a net-zero status goal like its peers BP and Shell, an ESG-activist hedge fund initiated a proxy contest against the company. After receiving institutional investor support, the successful proxy challenge led to the removal and addition of hand-picked directors on Exxon's board. The new board is now exploring avenues for climate-friendlier operations. | >
> | For public companies, the equity markets are a central funding source for corporate initiatives. But dispensing equity yields shareholders who also have a say in a company's priorities. This shareholder activism is an increasingly popular tactic to move corporations in a particular strategic direction. Activism that targets ESG--Environmental, Social, and Governance--concerns usually take this form. Climate-conscious operations are a highly visible, and growing, cause for shareholder activists. For example, when ExxonMobil? did not commit to a net-zero status like its peers, an ESG-activist hedge fund initiated a successful proxy contest that led to the removal and addition of hand-picked directors on Exxon's board. The new board is now exploring avenues for climate-friendlier operations. | | | Shareholder activism may seem like an obvious argument for corporate diversity given the home “diversity” seemingly has under "social" in ESG and the general corporate preference for market-dictated outcomes. Even the Financial Times noted companies and boards must be prepared for investors of varying shareholder interests attacking even “squishy matters where blunt profit maximi[z]ation is not the issue.” | |
<
< | But shareholder activism is limited. Its strategies require motivated shareholders, continuous engagement, proxy coordination amongst investors, and significant advisory resources (e.g. legal, activist, and financial advisors). The strategies, like board overhauls, are also antagonistic to the business and can be met with resistance that further delays realized progress. And importantly, these strategies are generally limited to public companies, which only represent a minority of US firms. | >
> | While undeniably impactful, shareholder activism is also limited. Its strategies require motivated shareholders, continuous engagement, proxy coordination amongst investors, and significant advisory resources (e.g. legal, activist, and financial advisors). The strategies, like board overhauls, are also antagonistic to the business and can be met with resistance that further delays realized progress. And importantly, these strategies are generally limited to public companies, which only represent a minority of US firms. | | | | |
<
< | The Proposal: Bank Financing
In their paper “Corporate Carbon Reduction Pledges: Beyond Greenwashing,” co-authors John Armour, Luca Enriques, and Thom Wetzer present their “green pill” solution to pressure corporations into green compliance. The solution requires corporate borrowers to meet agreed environmental goals. The interest rate on their bank credit is indirectly tied to their environmental goal attainment: the greater the attainment, the lower the interest rate. | >
> | Debt Financing
Unlike a traditional shareholder activist campaign, attaching corporate diversity to debt finance can include private companies and also create a precedent for multiple new parties. As bank loans are a contract, the repayment terms can include an adjustable interest rate. The bank lender would assign an initial rate (based on a market benchmark like LIBOR or another benchmark given LIBOR's phaseout) that may include a premium. The premium, reflecting the borrower's creditworthiness, is triggered if the company has "low" diversity at the consummation of the loan. The borrower and lender can further agree to increase or decrease the interest rate over time based on whether the borrower meets the agreed diversity targets. The borrower need not be the only entity subject to a diversity commitment. The borrower could further bargain for discounts on advising fees if their legal and financial advisors to these transactions similarly fail to meet agreed diversity targets. | | | | |
<
< | A similar idea has been applied in the racial justice context. Napoleon Wallace’s firm, Activest, rates municipalities’ credit worthiness by incorporating police brutality prevalence into traditional municipal credit ratings. When occurrence of police brutality is high and the frequency and amount of lawsuit settlements are also high, the riskier the rating Activest assigns.
This proposal leverages both of the aforementioned concepts to make diversity attainment a measure of access to financing. The lower a company’s employee diversity, the higher the interest rate assigned at the start of the bank credit arrangement. In this way, a company’s existing employee diversity is a metric of its creditworthiness. As an incentive to improve diversity over the course of its term loan, a company’s interest rate improves as the firm’s employee diversity improves in keeping with the Armour, Enriques, and Wetzer model.
In order to glamorize their diversity metrics, companies often overstate their gender diversity at the expense of racial diversity or obfuscate their racial diversity through people of color metrics while specific racial groups remain underrepresented. For this financing model, employee diversity should be defined with specificity (i.e. identifying goals for particular marginalized groups) and the rate-based goal tiers should be ambitious in order to encourage material diversity.
Attaching diversity metrics to financing in this way will importantly drive expediency. Interest rates, particularly in the context of an acquisition or joint venture play an important role in how a target company is valued. If a valuation can become more favorable to an acquirer and borrower over time, multiple corporate parties, from senior leadership to boards and shareholders are motivated to realize the best rate which would be a direct result of diverse hiring and retention practices.
An excellent start, We need to make room for some further analysis, so the first step is an edit to make that room. We need the words that aren't pulling weight to go. Sentences can be shortened and simplified, and a few can be removed altogether. We need about 250-300 words back, which is eminently feasible.
With that recovered space the next draft needs to explain why banks will agree to perform this regulatory function. What legal regime sets interest rates, and determines the structure of these investment transactions, or in some other fashion motivates parties to consider interests other than their own in making their investment and lending decisions? This is also an issue in the global heating context on which you draw, where current efforts to use private financial interests to decarbonize the global economy, relying primarily on moral suasion, show the nature of the problem.
Your idea is also a potent illustration of David Graeber's point in his history of debt, that at the peak of debt cycles the position of creditors eclipses that of the State. The ability of the State to deliver social objectives has declined to the point that those seeking progress in social policy on which the State is blocked attempt to use private financial power to achieve their aims instead. But if they need the power of the State to compel or encourage private financial power to perform as desired?
| >
> | There is a precedent for this proposal in the climate space with "sustainability-linked loans". Under this loan structure, a borrower's interest rate is adjusted based on to their attainment of agreed to sustainability targets. Specifically, the loan's interest rate is lowered if the target is attained and the interest rate is increased if the borrower fails to meet the agreed targets. A related idea has been applied in the racial justice context. Napoleon Wallace’s firm, Activest, rates municipalities’ credit worthiness by incorporating police brutality prevalence into traditional municipal credit ratings. When occurrence of police brutality is high and the frequency and amount of lawsuit settlements are also high, the riskier the rating Activest assigns. | | | | |
>
> | The public commitments corporations made to improve diversity could motivate lenders and borrowers to initially consider this type of proposal, particularly if special interest groups connected the sustainability-linked loan precedents to diversity attainment commitments and demands. But the benefits of this proposal to the bottom-lines of both lenders and borrowers provide reasons for parties to actually adopt and agree to these terms. For borrowers, this scheme provides access to favorable rates on funds that can be used for general corporate purposes and demonstrates a commitment to diversity to its stakeholders (e.g. boards, shareholders, employees, and consumers). For lenders, this scheme could increase the lender's executed deals and client base, result in higher returns, and bolsters the lender's reputation as assisting borrower's in fulfilling their public commitments on diversity. In essence, the scheme allows for borrowers and lenders to speculate on the ability of the borrower to diversify within established time frames. | | |
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BrandonHoltFirstEssay 6 - 06 Jun 2022 - Main.BrandonHolt
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstEssay" |
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| | | ESG and Shareholder Activism | |
<
< | For public companies, the equity markets are a central funding source for corporate initiatives. But dispensing equity yields shareholders who also have a say in a company's priorities. This shareholder activism is an increasingly popular tactic to move corporations in a particular strategic direction. Activism that targets ESG--Environmental, Social, and Governance--concerns usually take this form. Climate-conscious operations is a highly visible, and growing, cause for shareholder activists. For example, when ExxonMobil? did not commit to a net-zero status goal like its peers BP and Shell, an ESG-activist hedge fund initiated a proxy contest against the company. After receiving institutional investor support, the successful proxy challenge led to the removal and addition of hand-picked directors on Exxon's board. The new board is now exploring avenues for climate-friendlier operations. | >
> | For public companies, the equity markets are a central funding source for corporate initiatives. But dispensing equity yields shareholders who also have a say in a company's priorities. This shareholder activism is an increasingly popular tactic to move corporations in a particular strategic direction. Activism that targets ESG--Environmental, Social, and Governance--concerns usually take this form. Climate-conscious operations are a highly visible, and growing, cause for shareholder activists. For example, when ExxonMobil? did not commit to a net-zero status goal like its peers BP and Shell, an ESG-activist hedge fund initiated a proxy contest against the company. After receiving institutional investor support, the successful proxy challenge led to the removal and addition of hand-picked directors on Exxon's board. The new board is now exploring avenues for climate-friendlier operations. | | | | |
<
< | ESG challenges are not limited to climate issues and they are not only brought by investors with large equity stakes. Given ESG's expansiveness, the home “diversity” seemingly has under "social" in ESG, and the general corporate preference to allow the markets to dictate outcomes, shareholder activism may seem like the obvious argument for how to move the needle on corporate diversity attainment. Even the Financial Times noted companies and boards must be prepared for investors of varying shareholder interests attacking even “squishy matters where blunt profit maximi[z]ation is not the issue.” | >
> | Shareholder activism may seem like an obvious argument for corporate diversity given the home “diversity” seemingly has under "social" in ESG and the general corporate preference for market-dictated outcomes. Even the Financial Times noted companies and boards must be prepared for investors of varying shareholder interests attacking even “squishy matters where blunt profit maximi[z]ation is not the issue.” | | | | |
<
< | Shareholder activism are the more obvious avenues to pressure corporations to pursue genuine workforce diversity, these strategies require continuous engagement, proxy coordination, and motivated shareholders. Further, these strategies are generally limited to public companies and do not solve the important issues of time and expediency. | >
> | But shareholder activism is limited. Its strategies require motivated shareholders, continuous engagement, proxy coordination amongst investors, and significant advisory resources (e.g. legal, activist, and financial advisors). The strategies, like board overhauls, are also antagonistic to the business and can be met with resistance that further delays realized progress. And importantly, these strategies are generally limited to public companies, which only represent a minority of US firms. | | | The Proposal: Bank Financing
In their paper “Corporate Carbon Reduction Pledges: Beyond Greenwashing,” co-authors John Armour, Luca Enriques, and Thom Wetzer present their “green pill” solution to pressure corporations into green compliance. The solution requires corporate borrowers to meet agreed environmental goals. The interest rate on their bank credit is indirectly tied to their environmental goal attainment: the greater the attainment, the lower the interest rate. |
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BrandonHoltFirstEssay 5 - 06 Jun 2022 - Main.BrandonHolt
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstEssay" |
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| | | Multiple industries at all levels of seniority remain inaccessible to diverse employees. Demands to diversify need to be attached to an incentive structure that compel corporate change. Morality––or the market shame that results from lack of adherence to a moral position––is an unmoving, or at best slow yielding, corporate incentive. Conversely, financial stipulations that impact a corporation’s bottom-line necessarily dictate a corporation's strategy. | |
<
< | Capital limits all corporations. Corporations routinely fund general corporate initiatives through debt finance, where they borrow money from a syndicate of banks. The credit agreements that set a borrower's and lender's obligations are based in private contract law, meaning the parties bargain for the terms by which they are bound. This includes important terms like at what interest rate a loan is repaid to lenders and what advisory fees a borrower owes to legal and financial advisors. Could corporate diversity materially and expediently improve if these rates and fees were attached to diversity attainment over the course of the loan? | >
> | Capital limits all corporations. Corporations routinely fund general corporate initiatives through equity and debt finance. In equity markets, corporations dilute their ownership with investors who can directly challenge a company’s strategic direction. Could corporate diversity attainment improve with the activism of prominent shareholders? In debt finance, the credit agreements that set a borrower's and lender's obligations are based in contract law, where parties bargain for the terms by which they are bound. This includes important terms like at what interest rate a loan is repaid to lenders and what advisory fees a borrower owes to legal and financial advisors. Could corporate diversity materially and expediently improve if these rates and fees were attached to diversity attainment over the course of the loan? | | | ESG and Shareholder Activism | |
<
< | For public companies, the equity markets are a central funding source for corporate initiatives. But dispensing equity yields shareholders who, with enough amassed equity, also have a say in the company's priorities. This shareholder activism is an increasingly popular tactic to move corporations in a particular strategic direction. Activism that targets ESG--Environmental, Social, and Governance--concerns usually take this form. Climate-conscious operations is a highly visible, and growing, cause for shareholder activists. For example, when ExxonMobil? did not commit to a net-zero status goal like its peers BP and Shell, an ESG-activist hedge fund initiated a proxy contest against the company. After receiving institutional investor support, the successful proxy challenge led to the removal and addition of hand-picked directors on Exxon's board. The new board is now exploring avenues for climate-friendlier operations. | >
> | For public companies, the equity markets are a central funding source for corporate initiatives. But dispensing equity yields shareholders who also have a say in a company's priorities. This shareholder activism is an increasingly popular tactic to move corporations in a particular strategic direction. Activism that targets ESG--Environmental, Social, and Governance--concerns usually take this form. Climate-conscious operations is a highly visible, and growing, cause for shareholder activists. For example, when ExxonMobil? did not commit to a net-zero status goal like its peers BP and Shell, an ESG-activist hedge fund initiated a proxy contest against the company. After receiving institutional investor support, the successful proxy challenge led to the removal and addition of hand-picked directors on Exxon's board. The new board is now exploring avenues for climate-friendlier operations. | | | | |
<
< | The rise in ESG attacks are expansive and not limited to climate issues or challenges by single investors with large equity stakes. Carl Ichan, famous for his serial activism, recently launched a board challenge at McDonald? ’s over animal rights abuse even though his ownership interests are only worth around $50,000. As the Financial Times noted, given the rise in ESG, companies and boards must now be prepared for investors of varying shareholder interests attacking even “squishy matters where blunt profit maximi[z]ation is not the issue.” | >
> | ESG challenges are not limited to climate issues and they are not only brought by investors with large equity stakes. Given ESG's expansiveness, the home “diversity” seemingly has under "social" in ESG, and the general corporate preference to allow the markets to dictate outcomes, shareholder activism may seem like the obvious argument for how to move the needle on corporate diversity attainment. Even the Financial Times noted companies and boards must be prepared for investors of varying shareholder interests attacking even “squishy matters where blunt profit maximi[z]ation is not the issue.” | | | | |
<
< | Given ESG's expansiveness, the obvious home diversity seemingly has under the "social" umbrella, and the general preference to allow the markets to dictate outcomes, shareholder activism .
While shareholder activism and ESG-based challenges are the more obvious avenues to pressure corporations to pursue genuine workforce diversity, these strategies require continuous engagement, proxy coordination, and motivated shareholders. Further, these strategies are generally limited to public companies and do not solve the important issues of time and expediency. | >
> | Shareholder activism are the more obvious avenues to pressure corporations to pursue genuine workforce diversity, these strategies require continuous engagement, proxy coordination, and motivated shareholders. Further, these strategies are generally limited to public companies and do not solve the important issues of time and expediency. | | | The Proposal: Bank Financing
In their paper “Corporate Carbon Reduction Pledges: Beyond Greenwashing,” co-authors John Armour, Luca Enriques, and Thom Wetzer present their “green pill” solution to pressure corporations into green compliance. The solution requires corporate borrowers to meet agreed environmental goals. The interest rate on their bank credit is indirectly tied to their environmental goal attainment: the greater the attainment, the lower the interest rate. |
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BrandonHoltFirstEssay 4 - 05 Jun 2022 - Main.BrandonHolt
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstEssay" |
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| | | Multiple industries at all levels of seniority remain inaccessible to diverse employees. Demands to diversify need to be attached to an incentive structure that compel corporate change. Morality––or the market shame that results from lack of adherence to a moral position––is an unmoving, or at best slow yielding, corporate incentive. Conversely, financial stipulations that impact a corporation’s bottom-line necessarily dictate a corporation's strategy. | |
<
< | Access to capital limits all corporations. Corporations routinely fund general corporate initiatives through debt finance, where they borrow money from a syndicate of banks. The credit agreements that set a borrower's and lender's obligations are based in private contract law, meaning the parties bargain for the terms by which they are bound. This includes important terms like at what interest rate a loan is repaid to lenders and what advisory fees a borrower owes to legal and financial advisors. Could corporate diversity materially and expediently improve if these rates and fees were attached to diversity attainment over the course of the loan? | >
> | Capital limits all corporations. Corporations routinely fund general corporate initiatives through debt finance, where they borrow money from a syndicate of banks. The credit agreements that set a borrower's and lender's obligations are based in private contract law, meaning the parties bargain for the terms by which they are bound. This includes important terms like at what interest rate a loan is repaid to lenders and what advisory fees a borrower owes to legal and financial advisors. Could corporate diversity materially and expediently improve if these rates and fees were attached to diversity attainment over the course of the loan? | | | ESG and Shareholder Activism | |
<
< | Through due diligence, acquirers evaluate the risk profile of a target and balance those risks against their own risk appetite. An increasingly popular risk analysis is in ESG, Environmental, Social, and Governance. Climate-conscious investing is on the rise and is one of the most popular operational impacts to scrutinize through ESG. For example, when ExxonMobil? did not commit to a net-zero status goal like its peers BP and Shell, an ESG-activist hedge fund initiated a proxy contest against the company, which received institutional investor support and ultimately led to a shake up on the board of directors. The board is now exploring avenues for climate-friendlier operations. | >
> | For public companies, the equity markets are a central funding source for corporate initiatives. But dispensing equity yields shareholders who, with enough amassed equity, also have a say in the company's priorities. This shareholder activism is an increasingly popular tactic to move corporations in a particular strategic direction. Activism that targets ESG--Environmental, Social, and Governance--concerns usually take this form. Climate-conscious operations is a highly visible, and growing, cause for shareholder activists. For example, when ExxonMobil? did not commit to a net-zero status goal like its peers BP and Shell, an ESG-activist hedge fund initiated a proxy contest against the company. After receiving institutional investor support, the successful proxy challenge led to the removal and addition of hand-picked directors on Exxon's board. The new board is now exploring avenues for climate-friendlier operations. | | | | |
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< | The rise in ESG based attacks of corporate strategy are expansive and not limited to climate issues or challenges by large investors. Carl Ichan, famous for his serial activism, recently launched a board challenge at McDonald? ’s over animal rights abuse even though his ownership interests are only worth around $50,000. As the Financial Times noted, given the rise in ESG, companies and boards must now be prepared for investors of varying shareholder interests attacking even “squishy matters where blunt profit maximi[z]ation is not the issue.” | >
> | The rise in ESG attacks are expansive and not limited to climate issues or challenges by single investors with large equity stakes. Carl Ichan, famous for his serial activism, recently launched a board challenge at McDonald? ’s over animal rights abuse even though his ownership interests are only worth around $50,000. As the Financial Times noted, given the rise in ESG, companies and boards must now be prepared for investors of varying shareholder interests attacking even “squishy matters where blunt profit maximi[z]ation is not the issue.”
Given ESG's expansiveness, the obvious home diversity seemingly has under the "social" umbrella, and the general preference to allow the markets to dictate outcomes, shareholder activism . | | | While shareholder activism and ESG-based challenges are the more obvious avenues to pressure corporations to pursue genuine workforce diversity, these strategies require continuous engagement, proxy coordination, and motivated shareholders. Further, these strategies are generally limited to public companies and do not solve the important issues of time and expediency. |
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BrandonHoltFirstEssay 3 - 05 Jun 2022 - Main.BrandonHolt
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< | Incentivizing Corporate Diversity through Commercial Transactions | >
> | Incentivizing Corporate Diversity through Debt Finance | | | -- By BrandonHolt - 13 Mar 2022
Introduction | |
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< | When the video of Derek Chauvin murdering George Floyd commanded the attention of the world in May 2020, many corporations, particularly in the United States, released statements decrying police brutality, anti-Black racism, and their organization’s systemic failure at employee diversity. Corporations publicly revealed their employee demographic data, which exposed an abysmal lack of diversity attainment across Black, Latinx, queer, and women employee populations. The general sentiment of these data releases and public statements was, “We need to do better. We will do better.” This left a longing question of when those changes would be realized. | >
> | When the video of Derek Chauvin murdering George Floyd commanded the attention of the world in May 2020, many United States corporations released statements decrying anti-Black racism and their own systemic failure at employee diversity. Corporations disclosed their demographic data, exposing the lack of diversity attainment across Black, Latinx, queer, and women employee populations. The general sentiment of these disclosures was, “We need to and will do better.” | | | | |
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< | Fast forward two years and there is still the same want of diversity. While challenges to a corporation’s lack of diversity are more acceptable in corporate talk, actions that produce meaningful diversity attainment are sparse or do not produce expedient results. This introduces the question to be explored here: how can corporations be incentivized or compelled to expediently diversify their workforce? | >
> | Now, two years later, there is still the same want of corporate diversity. While challenges to a corporation’s lack of diversity are more acceptable in corporate talk, actions that produce meaningful diversity attainment are sparse or do not produce expedient results. This introduces the question to be explored here: how can corporations be incentivized to expediently diversify their workforces? | | | | |
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< | Expedience is an important component of this inquiry because demands for diverse workforces by marginalized employees were not new to May 2020. In general, these demands were, and are, met with requests for patience, which punted any meaningful efforts to diversify. | >
> | Multiple industries at all levels of seniority remain inaccessible to diverse employees. Demands to diversify need to be attached to an incentive structure that compel corporate change. Morality––or the market shame that results from lack of adherence to a moral position––is an unmoving, or at best slow yielding, corporate incentive. Conversely, financial stipulations that impact a corporation’s bottom-line necessarily dictate a corporation's strategy. | | | | |
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< | Multiple industries at all levels of seniority continue to be inaccessible to diverse employees. Should demands to diversify be serious, they have to be attached to an incentive structure that compels corporate change. Morality––or the market shame that results from lack of adherence to a moral position––is an unmoving, or at best slow yielding, corporate incentive. Alternatively, financial stipulations that impact a corporation’s strategic ability is more demanding. | >
> | Access to capital limits all corporations. Corporations routinely fund general corporate initiatives through debt finance, where they borrow money from a syndicate of banks. The credit agreements that set a borrower's and lender's obligations are based in private contract law, meaning the parties bargain for the terms by which they are bound. This includes important terms like at what interest rate a loan is repaid to lenders and what advisory fees a borrower owes to legal and financial advisors. Could corporate diversity materially and expediently improve if these rates and fees were attached to diversity attainment over the course of the loan? | | | | |
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< | A merger, acquisition, or strategic joint venture allows corporations to generate synergies that improve valuation and drive value for various stakeholders. These transactions share common stages, including due diligence, credit and financing, and shareholder and board approvals. What would it mean to incorporate diversity standards in these elements such that transactions could not proceed without adherence?
Due Diligence, ESG, and Shareholder Activism | >
> | ESG and Shareholder Activism | | | Through due diligence, acquirers evaluate the risk profile of a target and balance those risks against their own risk appetite. An increasingly popular risk analysis is in ESG, Environmental, Social, and Governance. Climate-conscious investing is on the rise and is one of the most popular operational impacts to scrutinize through ESG. For example, when ExxonMobil? did not commit to a net-zero status goal like its peers BP and Shell, an ESG-activist hedge fund initiated a proxy contest against the company, which received institutional investor support and ultimately led to a shake up on the board of directors. The board is now exploring avenues for climate-friendlier operations. |
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BrandonHoltFirstEssay 2 - 26 Mar 2022 - Main.EbenMoglen
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Incentivizing Corporate Diversity through Commercial Transactions | | | Attaching diversity metrics to financing in this way will importantly drive expediency. Interest rates, particularly in the context of an acquisition or joint venture play an important role in how a target company is valued. If a valuation can become more favorable to an acquirer and borrower over time, multiple corporate parties, from senior leadership to boards and shareholders are motivated to realize the best rate which would be a direct result of diverse hiring and retention practices. | |
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An excellent start, We need to make room for some further analysis, so the first step is an edit to make that room. We need the words that aren't pulling weight to go. Sentences can be shortened and simplified, and a few can be removed altogether. We need about 250-300 words back, which is eminently feasible.
With that recovered space the next draft needs to explain why banks will agree to perform this regulatory function. What legal regime sets interest rates, and determines the structure of these investment transactions, or in some other fashion motivates parties to consider interests other than their own in making their investment and lending decisions? This is also an issue in the global heating context on which you draw, where current efforts to use private financial interests to decarbonize the global economy, relying primarily on moral suasion, show the nature of the problem.
Your idea is also a potent illustration of David Graeber's point in his history of debt, that at the peak of debt cycles the position of creditors eclipses that of the State. The ability of the State to deliver social objectives has declined to the point that those seeking progress in social policy on which the State is blocked attempt to use private financial power to achieve their aims instead. But if they need the power of the State to compel or encourage private financial power to perform as desired?
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BrandonHoltFirstEssay 1 - 13 Mar 2022 - Main.BrandonHolt
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Incentivizing Corporate Diversity through Commercial Transactions
-- By BrandonHolt - 13 Mar 2022
Introduction
When the video of Derek Chauvin murdering George Floyd commanded the attention of the world in May 2020, many corporations, particularly in the United States, released statements decrying police brutality, anti-Black racism, and their organization’s systemic failure at employee diversity. Corporations publicly revealed their employee demographic data, which exposed an abysmal lack of diversity attainment across Black, Latinx, queer, and women employee populations. The general sentiment of these data releases and public statements was, “We need to do better. We will do better.” This left a longing question of when those changes would be realized.
Fast forward two years and there is still the same want of diversity. While challenges to a corporation’s lack of diversity are more acceptable in corporate talk, actions that produce meaningful diversity attainment are sparse or do not produce expedient results. This introduces the question to be explored here: how can corporations be incentivized or compelled to expediently diversify their workforce?
Expedience is an important component of this inquiry because demands for diverse workforces by marginalized employees were not new to May 2020. In general, these demands were, and are, met with requests for patience, which punted any meaningful efforts to diversify.
Multiple industries at all levels of seniority continue to be inaccessible to diverse employees. Should demands to diversify be serious, they have to be attached to an incentive structure that compels corporate change. Morality––or the market shame that results from lack of adherence to a moral position––is an unmoving, or at best slow yielding, corporate incentive. Alternatively, financial stipulations that impact a corporation’s strategic ability is more demanding.
A merger, acquisition, or strategic joint venture allows corporations to generate synergies that improve valuation and drive value for various stakeholders. These transactions share common stages, including due diligence, credit and financing, and shareholder and board approvals. What would it mean to incorporate diversity standards in these elements such that transactions could not proceed without adherence?
Due Diligence, ESG, and Shareholder Activism
Through due diligence, acquirers evaluate the risk profile of a target and balance those risks against their own risk appetite. An increasingly popular risk analysis is in ESG, Environmental, Social, and Governance. Climate-conscious investing is on the rise and is one of the most popular operational impacts to scrutinize through ESG. For example, when ExxonMobil? did not commit to a net-zero status goal like its peers BP and Shell, an ESG-activist hedge fund initiated a proxy contest against the company, which received institutional investor support and ultimately led to a shake up on the board of directors. The board is now exploring avenues for climate-friendlier operations.
The rise in ESG based attacks of corporate strategy are expansive and not limited to climate issues or challenges by large investors. Carl Ichan, famous for his serial activism, recently launched a board challenge at McDonald? ’s over animal rights abuse even though his ownership interests are only worth around $50,000. As the Financial Times noted, given the rise in ESG, companies and boards must now be prepared for investors of varying shareholder interests attacking even “squishy matters where blunt profit maximi[z]ation is not the issue.”
While shareholder activism and ESG-based challenges are the more obvious avenues to pressure corporations to pursue genuine workforce diversity, these strategies require continuous engagement, proxy coordination, and motivated shareholders. Further, these strategies are generally limited to public companies and do not solve the important issues of time and expediency.
The Proposal: Bank Financing
In their paper “Corporate Carbon Reduction Pledges: Beyond Greenwashing,” co-authors John Armour, Luca Enriques, and Thom Wetzer present their “green pill” solution to pressure corporations into green compliance. The solution requires corporate borrowers to meet agreed environmental goals. The interest rate on their bank credit is indirectly tied to their environmental goal attainment: the greater the attainment, the lower the interest rate.
A similar idea has been applied in the racial justice context. Napoleon Wallace’s firm, Activest, rates municipalities’ credit worthiness by incorporating police brutality prevalence into traditional municipal credit ratings. When occurrence of police brutality is high and the frequency and amount of lawsuit settlements are also high, the riskier the rating Activest assigns.
This proposal leverages both of the aforementioned concepts to make diversity attainment a measure of access to financing. The lower a company’s employee diversity, the higher the interest rate assigned at the start of the bank credit arrangement. In this way, a company’s existing employee diversity is a metric of its creditworthiness. As an incentive to improve diversity over the course of its term loan, a company’s interest rate improves as the firm’s employee diversity improves in keeping with the Armour, Enriques, and Wetzer model.
In order to glamorize their diversity metrics, companies often overstate their gender diversity at the expense of racial diversity or obfuscate their racial diversity through people of color metrics while specific racial groups remain underrepresented. For this financing model, employee diversity should be defined with specificity (i.e. identifying goals for particular marginalized groups) and the rate-based goal tiers should be ambitious in order to encourage material diversity.
Attaching diversity metrics to financing in this way will importantly drive expediency. Interest rates, particularly in the context of an acquisition or joint venture play an important role in how a target company is valued. If a valuation can become more favorable to an acquirer and borrower over time, multiple corporate parties, from senior leadership to boards and shareholders are motivated to realize the best rate which would be a direct result of diverse hiring and retention practices.
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