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What about the really bad man?
-- By CameronLewis - 16 Feb 2012 | |
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< | -- Revised - 20 July 2012 | >
> | -- Revised - 1 August 2012 | | |
The Really Bad Man | |
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< | "Will I be executed for what I have done?" asked Anders Breivik just after surrendering to police for the mass murder of 77 people in Norway this past July. Holmes writes, by way of introduction to the space between law and morality, that to understand law alone one must adopt the perspective of the bad man. The bad man cares only for the material consequences of his actions, his behavior guided by the risk of state punishment through fines, imprisonment, or execution. But what about those individuals who go far beyond that threshold? What about those who disregard not only moral codes, but legal ones as well in pursuit of their goals? | | | | |
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< | The really bad man, like the bad man, cares not at all for individual or societal morality. Unlike the bad man, however, he denies the state its punitive power and refuses to be cowed by the legal consequences of his actions. This denial can take the form of a symbolic act, a violent tragedy, declaring to the world that it has no power over him and culminating in suicide or arrest. | >
> | "Will I be executed for what I have done?" asked Anders Breivik just after surrendering to police for the mass murder of 77 people in Norway this past July. Oliver W. Holmes writes in distinguishing law and morality that to understand the operation of law alone one must adopt the perspective of the bad man. The bad man cares only for the material consequences of his actions; his behavior guided by the risk of state punishment through fines, imprisonment, or execution. But what about those individuals who go far beyond that threshold? What about those who disregard legal codes as well in an effort to reject society? | | | | |
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< | In the aftermath, it is inevitably settled that the really bad man’s final act emerged from some kind of extreme desperation or mental illness. How else can their actions be explained? Behavior so far outside human norms is plausibly mental illness in itself, especially when the only evidence is the end result. When the really bad man has a history of mental health issues, it is easy to end the inquiry there and accept insanity as the underlying cause. Regardless, the aggregate societal response is an attempt to cope with the loss, to adequately reconcile the illusion of order with its apparent failure. | >
> | The really bad man, like the bad man, cares not at all for individual or societal morality. Unlike the bad man, however, he denies the state its punitive power and acts in spite of the legal consequences. This denial can take the form of a symbolic act, an inexplicably violent tragedy as act of power inevitably culminating in suicide or arrest. In the aftermath, it is inevitably settled that the really bad man’s final act emerged from some kind of extreme state of mind or mental illness. How else can this violence be explained? Behavior so far outside human norms is plausibly mental illness in itself, more so when the only evidence is the outcome. When the really bad man has a history of mental health issues, it is easier to accept that explanation and end the inquiry there. | | | The Societal Response | |
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< | The resulting storm of speculation and scrutiny is a process of collective rationalization that serves to apportion responsibility among all involved. The need for answers drives the societal goal of finding someone or something blameworthy, thereby relieving the shared burden and reducing any nagging hint of complicity. Such is what happened at Virginia Tech on April 16th, 2007, when Cho Seung-hui killed 32 students and then himself. Within hours, the nonstop media coverage featured innumerable analysts filling the void of actual information with righteous and provocative demands on the administration, the police, and the ‘system’. Powerlessness against the actor drives a search for other targets, but the person ultimately responsible remains the one who pulled the trigger. | >
> | The resulting storm of speculation and scrutiny is a collective rationalization that apportions responsibility among all involved. The need for answers drives the social goal of finding someone or something blameworthy, thereby relieving the shared burden and reducing any nagging hint of complicity. Such is what happened at Virginia Tech on April 16th, 2007, when Cho Seung-hui killed 32 students and then himself. Within hours, the nonstop media coverage featured innumerable analysts filling the void of actual information with righteous and provocative demands on the administration, the police, and the ‘system’. Powerlessness against the wrongdoer drives a search for other targets, even though the person ultimately responsible remains the one who pulled the trigger. | | | | |
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< | Their underlying insanity—whether established through medical diagnosis, past behavior, or ex post facto—serves as explanation and possible excuse. A successful defense on grounds of insanity may mitigate the legal consequences, or provide for indefinite treatment in a state mental health facility, but it does nothing for the sense of loss and antipathy felt by society at large. | >
> | A diagnosis of insanity—established through medical examination, treatment history or past behavior serves as explanation and possible excuse. A successful insanity defense may lessen the legal consequences of criminal acts or lead to indefinite treatment in a state mental health facility, but it does nothing for the sense of loss and antipathy felt by society at large. To salve that wound, the storm continues. Throughout media coverage of each successive tragedy, the marginal roles of countless bystanders are weighed and measured to determine their blameworthiness. | | | | |
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< | To salve that wound, the storm continues. So it was with the legal system, when a judge who was powerless to compel Cho let him slip through the cracks. So it was with the police, when they mistakenly assumed that the first victim's volatile boyfriend was the right suspect. And so it was with the administration, when their failure to inform students of the first shooting or cancel classes quickly enough preceded the second shooting. Never mind the benefit of hindsight; the altar of public opinion requires a lamb. | >
> | Of course there were crucial lapses or failures that played a role in the tragedy and responsibility should rightly fall to those with the power to prevent recurrences. The progress of building the walls higher and preventing those same cracks from future exploitation is often achieved, but considering the presumption of personal liberty in our society these efforts can hardly prevent the next determined really bad man. | | | | |
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< | Of course there were crucial lapses or failures that played a role in the outcome, and responsibility should rightly fall to those with the power to prevent recurrences. Progress is often achieved, building the walls higher and preventing those same weaknesses from future exploitation. But considering the presumption of personal liberty in our society, these efforts can hardly prevent the next determined really bad man. | >
> | Whatever deterrence value institutionalized power has over the rest of us is lost against he who seeks to prove himself above state authority. Their effort usually concludes by either taking their own lives in defiance or, like Breivik, basking in the revilement and seeking execution by the state as final retroactive validation of their tortured worldview. For the egomaniacal Breivik, the prospect of mental illness is a slanderous attempt to delegitimize his convictions and distort the true nobility of his cause. Ultimately, it is a repudiation of his grand ambition, forced to realize that he will not die worshiped as a hero but alone: discredited, reviled, and insane. However, it is not all that simple. The recent tragedy in Aurora, CO and the subsequent media coverage has focused on the inexplicability of that shooter's motivations, a narrative focus that mirrors the Virginia Tech tragedy in 2007. | | | | |
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< | Whatever deterrence value institutionalized power has over the rest of us is lost against he who seeks to prove himself above state authority. Either they end their own lives in a final act of defiance or, like Breivik, they bask in the revilement and attention, seeking execution by the state as final retroactive validation of their tortured worldview. Society's labeling of the really bad man as insane undercuts their delusions of grandeur and righteousness. For Breivik, such a label is slander, an attempt to delegitimize his convictions and distort the true nobility of his cause. Ultimately, it is a repudiation of his grand ambition, forced to realize that he will not die worshiped as a hero but alone: discredited, reviled, and insane. | | | What is the Solution? | |
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< | The steps required for progress are identifiable, and much of the value in recovery is in identifying those concrete ways that our safety and security can be improved. The public consensus eventually settles on those who should be held responsible. Across the country, a relatively inexpensive fix: universities and other institutions have installed notification systems able to inform students immediately of any emergency. But the broader problems persist. Enforcement and extension of existing gun control regulations is zealously resisted through a Revolutionary interpretation of the Second Amendment, and an overhaul of the mental health system remains far down any politician's list of priorities. Those obvious answers are unattainable in the short term, and beyond that it becomes more difficult to realize progress. | >
> | The path forward often seems clear, and much of the value in recovery is in identifying those concrete ways that our safety and security can be improved. Across the country, a relatively inexpensive fix: universities and other institutions have installed notification systems able to inform students immediately of any emergency. But the broader problems persist. Enforcement and extension of existing gun control regulations is zealously resisted through a Revolutionary interpretation of the Second Amendment, and an overhaul of the mental health system remains far down any politician's list of priorities. The brief arc of media coverage covering the recent tragedy in Auror, CO demonstrates that problem. With a consensus that further gun regulation would not be pursued by either party, the emphasis shifted to the mental health system. Once reform is dismissed as untenable in an election year, a slow fade in media coverage makes way for the next headline. | | | | |
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< | The beauty of our idealized system of government rests in the underlying virtues of liberty and personal freedom despite constant encroachment. In the face of that freedom, a really bad man, mentally ill or sane, will always be able to find the means and opportunity to orchestrate their final act. The inadequacy of the legal system in the face of such individuals is mirrored by that same failure in all other forms of social control. In the end, the really bad man is not one who has rejected only the legal system, but society entirely. Once that alienation is complete, he identifies as a true outsider, observing the workings of a society that has rejected him and plotting a grand revenge. | >
> | The virtue of our system of government rests in the liberty and personal freedom established by right despite constant encroachment. In the face of that freedom, a really bad man--mentally ill or sane--will always be able to find the means and opportunity to orchestrate a final act. The inadequacy of the legal system in the face of these individuals matches the failure of other forms of social control. In the end, the really bad man has rejected not only the legal system, but society entirely. Once that alienation is complete, he identifies as a true outsider, observing the workings of a society that has rejected him and plotting a grand revenge. | | | |
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