Fannie Mae: The Con that Conned Itself?

-- By CarolineElkin - 27 Feb 2009

Section I: A Risky Business Example

Subsection A: Introduction

Government policies, like those carried out at Fannie Mae, were partially responsible for the mortgage crisis, contributing in no small way to the current economic downturn. And yet, Fannie Mae was created in the wake of the Great Depression to perform a public good, by increasing liquidity in the mortgage market and thereby enabling low income families to purchase homes. Later, it became a publicly traded company with a governmental mandate to serve the public. So the question arises: why would Fannie Mae participate in the dangerous subprime mortgage market and jeopardize the economy?

Subsection B: The Business Model, or the Fannie Mae Con

Leff says that the homo economicus requires that a con appear rational. Indeed, the lending model that (the government-sponsored) Fannie Mae operates seems a rational one: the mortgage lenders (let’s use Countrywide for this example) grant loans to families to buy houses. Depending on a family’s financial situation, there is more or less of a chance that they will default on the loan. Countrywide, not wanting to take that risk, sells the loan to Fannie Mae, who buys it at a discount for assuming the risk. This is profitable for Fannie Mae, Countrywide gets more money to lend, and other families can receive loans.

This is a similar script to the one in which Leff describes negotiable promissory notes. Nadir Notions buys its widgets from Acme Widgets and promises to pay later. Acme, wanting its money now, then sells Nadir’s promissory note to the bank. According to Leff, “[t]he bank takes over only one risk – insolvency of the borrower – and thus has no duty to learn anything about the honesty of those with whom their borrowers deal, or the quality of the things they sell” (p. 93). Fannie Mae’s profit depended on both its lender customers, as well as on the customers of the lenders, the families themselves. If Fannie Mae could examine the financial situations of the families whose mortgages it was securitizing, then presumably it could control its risk exposure.

Subsection C: Perpetuating the Risk to Serve the Public

In Fannie Mae’s case, it had a duty to learn about the risk involved in dealing with the lenders and new homeowners. As a government sponsored enterprise, it is articulated in Fannie Mae's charter that it must provide a certain number of loans to lower income (and higher risk) families as a service to the public. In 1999, the government urged Fannie Mae to securitize more loans for subprime (riskier) borrowers. Under pressure to more actively serve the public per their charter, Fannie Mae increased its subprime mortgage business. It was noted then that this practice may be safe during times of economic stability, but might not be so should there be an economic downturn. Unfortunately, that prediction came true.

Thus by abiding by its charter, Fannie Mae securitized loans that it knew would default. Like the Seller Misfortunes of forced bargaining that Leff discusses (p. 130), Fannie Mae operated a portion of intentionally unprofitable business. Like the misfortunate seller, however, this move also enhanced their profitability, since it came with the benefit of government sponsorship. So then in securitizing more loans certain to default, did the conman become a mark? If it was the mark, then was the government the conman?

Section II: Mark or Conman?

The answer to each question above is likely, no. However, thinking about Fannie Mae as a mark, and not only a conman, may help to show the potential vulnerability of a conman in such a scheme. While Fannie Mae was certainly motivated by the opportunity to make a profit like any conman, it also ran the risks it did in order to serve a higher purpose of public good. In that way, it bought into the scheme much like a mark would.

Subsection A: A Greater Good

We discussed in class that cons work because the conman makes its mark want to be a part of something larger. This con consisted of securitizing loans for low income families who would almost certainly not be able to meet the conditions their mortgages. But done in the light of making housing more affordable, it appealed to a sense of public good. It checked out for the homo economicus as well, in its rationally profitable operational scheme described above. I do not mean to portray Fannie Mae as a victim of its own script, I only seek to point out the ambiguity of the roles it played for our social and governmental system.

Subsection B: Consequences

The Leff reading shows us that there is no real way to know if something is a con or an honest business. If you cannot tell if you are playing the role of con or mark, then how do you know if you are fooling yourself into creating a new greater good to justify your choices? In Fannie Mae’s case, we as a society favored fueling the housing boom with risky investments, and as a result the con failed with widespread damaging consequences for our economy. It is troubling to me to think that our society did not foresee the harm that ensued to prevent it. What does this mean about our potential to repeat our past mistakes? Personally, we can attempt to avoid the cons through self-awareness and vigilance, but how can we organize our society to do the same? Frustratingly, I do not think we have an answer.

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