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DRussellKraftFirstPaper 10 - 02 Mar 2010 - Main.GloverWright
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Just Punishment? | | |
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- I wonder if there might also be a broader cultural point to make about theological justification? -- GloverWright - 02 Mar 2010
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- Your paragraph on retributivism seems to suggest it makes our punishments harsher. From my, admittedly cynical, viewpoint - it's really a limiting factor. From what I've read, Lex Talionis and its variations were a way to say 'You can't kill for this, you can only inflict so much harm.' When we used to kill, now we only jail. It does give moral justification for the harm, but it also attempts to reign in our baser instinct to just kill anyone who fucks with us. Maybe that's your point too, but the paragraph seems to be riding the middle. -- StephenSevero - 28 Feb 2010
- Stephen - What I'm trying to say is exactly what you suggest: Retributivism certainly has a built-in limiter in the requirement for guilt. To address your criticism, I'm not sure how to get that point as well as the Retributivism's justification of the infliction of suffering by outsiders without some amount of "riding the middle." Do you have suggestions on how I could make it more clear? Cheers. -- DRussellKraft - 28 Feb 2010
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DRussellKraftFirstPaper 9 - 28 Feb 2010 - Main.DRussellKraft
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Just Punishment? | |
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| | | Retributivism | |
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< | Beyond the idea that punishment might reduce crime (the causal relationship that is at least pseudo-scientific about deterrence and incapacitation), retribution rests on what I call a "moral" theory: that crime justifies (demonstrates to be right) punishment. This theory also justifies (declares free of blame, absolves) the infliction of suffering by third parties. I believe it has its roots in our law in the Bible, which famously offered "an eye for an eye" as equitable retribution. | >
> | Beyond the idea that punishment might reduce crime (the causal relationship that is at least pseudo-scientific about deterrence and incapacitation), retribution rests on what I call a "moral" theory: that crime justifies (demonstrates to be right) punishment. This theory also justifies (declares free of blame, absolves) the infliction of suffering by third parties. I believe it has its roots in our law in the Bible, which famously offered "an eye for an eye" as equitable retribution. | | | The Democratic Limiting Principle of Kantian Retributivism | | | Remedies Not Adapted to the Malady | |
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< | While utilitarianism at least posits a cause for crime (rational choice by criminals), retributivism focuses solely on its consequences. Modern statistics, however, show evidence that there are more deterministic factors that actually correlate (and plausibly cause) crime. | >
> | While utilitarianism at least posits a cause for crime (rational choice by criminals), retributivism focuses solely on its consequences. Modern statistics, however, show evidence that there are more deterministic factors that actually correlate to (and plausibly cause) crime. | | | A simple plotting of the overall crime rate and the incarceration rate (as a percentage of the US population) will show you that what we're doing just isn't working.
The Availability of Other Means to Reduce Crime | |
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< | In the face of mounting evidence that our system of criminal punishment is not just (fair), but rather just (only) punishment, perhaps we can abandon the effort to prove the validity (or value) of both utilitarianism and retributivism. While some argue that rehabilitation is both more efficient and more just than the aforementioned theories, it is prevention, through education and economic empowerment, which will provide us the most efficient (and most justifiable) path to stability. By replacing the underlying drivers of crime with the drivers of economic expansion, we will no doubt move doubly quickly towards our aristocratic goals of wealth and stability. | >
> | In the face of mounting evidence that our system of criminal punishment is not just (fair), but rather just (only) punishment, perhaps we can abandon the effort to prove the validity (or value) of both utilitarianism and retributivism. While some argue that rehabilitation is both more efficient and more just than the aforementioned theories, it is prevention, through education and economic empowerment, which will provide us the most efficient (and most justifiable) path to stability. By replacing the underlying drivers of crime with the drivers of economic expansion and social cohesion, we might move doubly quickly towards our "aristocratic" goals of wealth and stability. | | |
-- By DRussellKraft - 28 Feb 2010 | | |
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- Stephen - What I'm trying to say is exactly what you suggest: Retributivism certainly has a built-in limiter in the requirement for guilt. To address your criticism, I'm not sure how to get that point as well as the Retributivism's justification of the infliction of suffering by outsiders without some amount of "riding the middle." Do you have suggestions on how I could make it more clear? Cheers. -- DRussellKraft - 28 Feb 2010
* My concern isn't so much with thinking both thoughts, but more about making both explicit. The space limitation makes it difficult, but I think a simple sentence might help clarify the point. Maybe something along the lines "While it restricts the vengeance of the harmed, it also justifies, even requires, a certain state response." I agree with your reference to the bible, and I think a link would help support the point. There's a lot you could use, but I think Deuteronomy 19 would work nicely. -- StephenSevero - 28 Feb 2010 | |
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- I've tossed in a link as you suggest, but I think my first sentence under Kant says essentially that, no? Maybe I'm just unclear (/unable to get quite outside of my own writing yet), and something better might still come to me. -- DRussellKraft - 28 Feb 2010
- I also realize now that my conclusion sounds mighty flippant, and that there are much better reasons to suggest what I suggest. Starting from a modified premise might help the next revision of this. -- DRussellKraft - 28 Feb 2010
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DRussellKraftFirstPaper 8 - 28 Feb 2010 - Main.StephenSevero
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Just Punishment? | | |
- Your paragraph on retributivism seems to suggest it makes our punishments harsher. From my, admittedly cynical, viewpoint - it's really a limiting factor. From what I've read, Lex Talionis and its variations were a way to say 'You can't kill for this, you can only inflict so much harm.' When we used to kill, now we only jail. It does give moral justification for the harm, but it also attempts to reign in our baser instinct to just kill anyone who fucks with us. Maybe that's your point too, but the paragraph seems to be riding the middle. -- StephenSevero - 28 Feb 2010
- Stephen - What I'm trying to say is exactly what you suggest: Retributivism certainly has a built-in limiter in the requirement for guilt. To address your criticism, I'm not sure how to get that point as well as the Retributivism's justification of the infliction of suffering by outsiders without some amount of "riding the middle." Do you have suggestions on how I could make it more clear? Cheers. -- DRussellKraft - 28 Feb 2010
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> | * My concern isn't so much with thinking both thoughts, but more about making both explicit. The space limitation makes it difficult, but I think a simple sentence might help clarify the point. Maybe something along the lines "While it restricts the vengeance of the harmed, it also justifies, even requires, a certain state response." I agree with your reference to the bible, and I think a link would help support the point. There's a lot you could use, but I think Deuteronomy 19 would work nicely. -- StephenSevero - 28 Feb 2010 | | |
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DRussellKraftFirstPaper 7 - 28 Feb 2010 - Main.DRussellKraft
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Just Punishment? | | |
- Your paragraph on retributivism seems to suggest it makes our punishments harsher. From my, admittedly cynical, viewpoint - it's really a limiting factor. From what I've read, Lex Talionis and its variations were a way to say 'You can't kill for this, you can only inflict so much harm.' When we used to kill, now we only jail. It does give moral justification for the harm, but it also attempts to reign in our baser instinct to just kill anyone who fucks with us. Maybe that's your point too, but the paragraph seems to be riding the middle. -- StephenSevero - 28 Feb 2010
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- Stephen - What I'm trying to say is exactly what you suggest: Retributivism certainly has a built-in limiter in the requirement for guilt. To address your criticism, I'm not sure how to get that point as well as the Retributivism's justification of the infliction of suffering by outsiders without some amount of "riding the middle." Do you have suggestions on how I could make it more clear? Cheers. -- DRussellKraft - 28 Feb 2010
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DRussellKraftFirstPaper 6 - 28 Feb 2010 - Main.StephenSevero
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Just Punishment? | | |
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- Your paragraph on retributivism seems to suggest it makes our punishments harsher. From my, admittedly cynical, viewpoint - it's really a limiting factor. From what I've read, Lex Talionis and its variations were a way to say 'You can't kill for this, you can only inflict so much harm.' When we used to kill, now we only jail. It does give moral justification for the harm, but it also attempts to reign in our baser instinct to just kill anyone who fucks with us. Maybe that's your point too, but the paragraph seems to be riding the middle. -- StephenSevero - 28 Feb 2010
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