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DevinMcDougallFirstPaper 13 - 27 Mar 2010 - Main.EbenMoglen
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
Climate Change, Lawyers and the Creed of Expertise | | As Arnold might observe, a sign of the vitality and flexibility of the creed of expertise is that its invocation can serve both as a rationale for deference to agency decisions, as in Chevron, or as a rationale for judicial intervention to police politicization of agency work, as in MA v. EPA.
The decision of how to regulate greenhouse gases profoundly affects who gets what, when, and how, and therefore, to paraphrase Harold Lasswell, is essentially political. However, framing the issue as a technical one, and formulating an appeal before the judiciary that draws on the tropes of the creed of expertise can sometimes provide a means of intervening into the policymaking process of the other political branches. Whether the Court will continue to be sympathetic to these expertise-based appeals for judicial intervention in the future is uncertain. However, any addition to the quiver of those seeking stronger policies may be welcomed. | |
> > | In my view, the basic
problem here is that the essay says a great deal less than it seems
to say:
- Global warming is a serious problem we should do something about;
- Experts will be tend to be persuasive;
- Courts may or may not defer to expert opinion, but everything that tends to persuade courts sometimes is useful.
I admit that #3 sounds especially jejune and pitiful, but it's the
actual conclusion expressed in the last two sentences of your essay,
after all the Arnoldian windup. Quoting my brother is cute, but that
does nothing to counteract the "less here than meets the eye" problem,
because the statement you quote is nothing but lobbyist boilerplate,
as you point out yourself. In the end, it's just another appeal to
"the thinking man," who—as Arnold would say—listens to the
scientists, not to the politicians.
You push the "Chevron deference" point much too far.
Chevron stands for a narrower but still highly important principle,
that the agencies are the parties best positioned to understand in
context the Congressional intention embodied in the statutes whose
provisions they administer. It is understood to mean that when the
Securities and Exchange Commission interprets the Securities Exchange
Act or the National Labor Relations Board the NLRA, for example, the
courts ought not lightly to disturb their readings. This may well
lead to the conclusion that the Environmental Protection Agency is
entitled to deference concerning its conclusion that carbon dioxide is
an "air pollutant" within the meaning of the Clean Air Act. But it
doesn't imply that the EPA is entitled to deferential review of all
the other sorts of decisions it makes in the course of its business
that don't involve statutory interpretation. (Hence the
non-deferential view the Court takes on the other critical point
involved in the case you discuss, which is whether the agency's
conclusion that there exists substantial scientific uncertainty is in
itself a sufficient rationale for refusal to regulate.)
There are Arnoldian things to say about the politics of global
warming, to be sure. I feel quite sure that you can find some that
will result in an interesting essay. But this draft takes too easy a
road, and returns with too little to show for the trip.
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