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< | Climate Change and the Importance of Creeds-End Fit
The Challenge of Coordination
To deal effectively with climate change, there must be a measure of policy coordination across countries. (1)If the United States adopts a climate law which imposes carbon emissions limits, and production simply migrates to countries with less stringerstringent? limits, global emissions will remain unchanged. This is referred to as the problem of leakage. (2)What this means is that even if activists are successful in pushing for a strong climate law in their own country, if other countries do not cooperate, they will fail to solve the global problem of climate change.
Sentences 1 and 2 do not seem significantly different to me.
For this reason, among others, Richard Lazarus has referred to climate change as a "super wicked problem." I don't understand how this reference furthers your argument.
Fair point! Feel free to omit sentence 2 or 1 as you like.
"super wicked problem" is a term of art referring to problems that are very difficult solve. It's just an expression, basically.
Thurman Arnold writes that successful organizations have creeds that provide a sense of cohesion to members and coordinate their actions. An important challenge with respect to climate change is organizing people to press for needfulneeded/necessary? I understand needful is a word, but it seems odd to me. changes to climate policies in a broad range of countries. In seeking to develop such a coordinated movement, attention to the organizational implications of the creeds used to support the movement is essential. Put another way, there needs to be an assessment of creeds-end fit, and creeds which do not help sustain the type of internationally coordinated work described above should be de-emphasized.
Arnold's Theory of Organizational Psychology
Arnold argues that creeds are “elements common to all social organizations, large and small, whatever their purpose.” 24. The reason for the ubiquity of creeds is that humans require them in order to sustain complex patterns of interaction over time. "Creeds are ubiquitous because..." As he writes, “Society functions like an anthill. If we were compelled to plan each day how to get food into New York City and waste out of it, we would be lost and people would starve.” 26.
Most of his discussion of creeds seems to have the character of an iconoclast loose in the temple. He compares "the Yale Law School" to a Laramie social club, and American political discourse to medieval theological debates about humors.
But Arnold also backs away from his "ant-hill" analogy at various points in the text. He invokes his identity as a lawyer, as opposed to social scientist, and claims he wishes to avoid "the vice of definition." Arnold seems more preoccupied with the ways in which the American creed of capitalism forecloses understanding of how American society actually works and less with the details of how creeds operate.
You're deploying Arnold as a way to think about creeds in a movement. I don't think it's necessary to spend so much time characterizing his argumentation in a paper of this length. Why not just pull out what you think is useful and move on?
Part of my project here is to help correct what I think is an incorrect interpretation of Arnold. Arnold is often characterized as as someone with an overly deterministic view of how institutions think. I'm trying to complicate that view and to defend my more (I think) subtle take on his argument. But, if you think it's a distraction from the central argument, feel to excise.
However, at one point, he discusses creeds in a light indicating a certain recognition of human capability for self-reflexivity and agency. He writes of Riverside Church's famous former pastor:
With the recognition of the fact that church creeds are not searches for universal truth, we can understand better the function of churches in society. Preachers like Harry Emerson Fosdick preach realistically and effectively about the place that the Church can and should take in the community. Fosdick realizes that the creed is important only as a symbol of unity - and that the effectiveness of the Church must be judged by different standards from those of its theology.
This passage points to an interesting way of thinking about the usefulness of creeds in organizing for justice work. I guess justice work includes climate change, but why not just say climate change since that's the focus of this paper. Creeds here are things that can be reflected on and "preached" in ways that unify, but avoid becoming totalizing ideologies that disconnect from the factual world.
Ethics and Incentives
An important "creedal" issue for climate change activists is how to frame their message in a way that appeals to and motivates a broad array of audiences. As discussed above, the complexity of climate change requires the cooperation of people in many disciplines and in many countries over a long time period. In the United States, there has been a tendency to shy away from explicit discussion of justice issues with respect to climate change and to focus rather on near-term incentives of interest to Americans. For example, energy security, or clean energy jobs, or avoiding an influx of climate refugees.
I'm confused. Who are the creeds for? For the activists or to recruit more to the cause? I feel like most people significantly involved in movements like this already base their commitment around notions of "justice." Are there really environmental activists whose creeds are limited to the short term? I feel like you are equivocating the creeds of the movement with the rhetoric that surrounds environmental policy change. One is the organizing principle of the movement and the other is what the movement projects out in order to achieve its ends. Have I misunderstood?
This could usefully be clarified. The creeds are for both activists and new recruits. Part of my point is that people end up absorbing ideologies, even if they think they are only using them for short term political purposes. We become our political poses. Part of my argument is that a justice creed will help everyone keep their eye on the ball and will appeal to people as recruits as well.
Such an incentives-based creed is perhaps good politics in the short term, but assessed as a creed capable of undergirding a social movement seeking global change, it falls short. For the end of dealing effectively with climate change, it is a poor fit. Many countries will suffer much more from climate change than the United States, and in different ways, and the United States will become reluctant to pay to help them. Energy security is not a panacea because America is the Saudia Arabia of coal. Effective action will require sacrifice now for the benefits of people later, whose interests rarely factor into contemporary calculations. | >
> | There's room to expand, subtract, etc. as you think appropriate. Basically, I tried to spell out all the assumptions and reasons I thought were floating around in the background to make the message (or what I thought the message was) as clear as possible. | | | | |
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< | It may seem a truism that good politics is not good policy. But one thing Arnold can teach us here is that since we are not all fully rational Thinking Persons, we are all prey to the allure of creeds. They are comforting because they simplify a complex and anxious modernity, and for that reason they are seductive. We do not always rationally select our political tactics to serve our policy goals. Creeds sometimes choose people, not the reverse. Once creeds gel into an organizational psychology, they become difficult to change, even in the face of persistent facts.
However, like Fosdick, we can seek to leverage what partial agency we can muster to develop creeds that invoke, to borrow a phrase, "the better angels of our nature." Emphasizing an ethical frame that expresses its goal as seeking justice, rather than optimizing incentives, may not be good near-term politics but at least provides a means of motivating action when individual incentives run out.
Why presume short-term incentives will run out? In the end, isn't this just political rhetoric crafted to drum up support for initiatives that we hope will have broader impact. Indeed, isn't that why these things always come down to factual contests between those opposed and those for? I don't see why we can't just keep inventing short-term goals until all the initiatives we want to pass have passed.
I think they will run out, and they arguably already have. When push comes to shove, there will need to be hard sacrifices and hard work done. A catch-phrase like energy independence is not going to be able to generate political support for the scale of work that has to be done.
According to contemporary economists, people do not act in ways that do not maximize their utility. But history offer examples of people who have dedicated themselves to working for justice. In American history, John Brown and Martin Luther King Jr. come to mind. Another interesting example is Richard Stallman, who has steadfastly resisted the replacement of the free software movement's justice creed with the incentives creed of open source. These types of examples, of humans struggling for justice rather than for their own gain, can serve as the basis of a justice-based creed to organize a climate movement.
Right. Heroes are cut from a different mold and such movements build up around achieving larger goals. Is it any different with the movement we're discussing at present?
I'm not totally sure what this comment means.
An incentives-based creed will not be to deal with the long, complex, and demanding task of supporting a global approach to climate change.
Devin,
As you know climate change is not a hot topic for me [no pun intended I'm sure], so I come to this with little knowledge of the shape of the movement. Against that backdrop, I raise the following three points:
1) I had trouble following your argument the first time around. Your transitions, both paragraph-to-paragraph and sentence-to-sentence, are choppy, so the argument meanders rather than flows naturally from one point to the next.
[Any specific suggestions on this front?]
2) Again, the lens of your analysis is squarely on the movement itself, but I really question if that's where it should be. I feel like the argument speaks more to the problem of coordinating policy change in countries where accepted policy rationales differ. In other words, isn't it just the rhetoric of policy reform that differs country to country rather than the motives of the movement as a whole? I thought the overall goal of the movement was "save the planet"--not "we're running out of coal/oil/whatever."
[My overall argument is that for the movement in the US to sustain itself and make progress on the issue, the justice frame is important - so it is about the planet, not about dwindling coal, or peak oil, etc. I don't really see justice and incentives as interchangeable rationales for identical policies. I think they're almost different worldviews that lead to different policies and differing levels of commitment to achieve those policies against fierce opposition.]
3) Also consider that the timeline on which capitalism approaches problems is necessarily shorter than that of other organizing principles. Because America and many other countries are capitalist, doesn’t that mean that the public will (and by extension, power) in those countries can only be swayed by arguments that discuss problems in terms of their short-term consequences? In that case, perhaps the only way of passing needed regulations at all is by coaching policy rationale in short-term incentives. If it’s this or nothing, won't changing it work against the larger goal? Ultimately, I find the argument unpersuasive because I assume that environmental initiatives won't be ratified AT ALL unless we appeal to short-term incentives. I guess I don't see why we'd be better off trying to get capitalism to recognize a kind of logic that doesn't speak to what capitalism wants.
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Climate Change and the Importance of Creeds-End Fit | | | | |
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< | [The question of capitalism is a big one. It may be that this ordering principle is inherently antithetical to dealing with long-term externalities problems like climate change. However, I think it's not necessarily incompatible. | >
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< | The argument from political pragmatism does have appeal. The old saying is that half a loaf is better than no loaf. The problem I am raising with it here is that with this issue, the quarter of a loaf we can get from an incentives creed tailored for maximum political appeal will literally do nothing to solve the problem. It is as bad as no loaf, and worse, because it wastes energy (no pun intended) that could be spent on the kinds of things that might actually be helpful, though they are unlikely.] | >
> | Creeds and the challenge of coordination | | | | |
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> | Thurman Arnold argues that creeds are “elements common to all social organizations, large and small, whatever their purpose.” 24. Creeds are ubiquitous because humans require them in order to sustain complex patterns of interaction over time. As he writes,” Society functions like an anthill. If we were compelled to plan each day how to get food into New York City and waste out of it, we would be lost and people would starve.” 26. For Arnold, then, successful organizations and movements necessarily have creeds that provide both a sense of cohesion to their members and a stage for coordinated action. | | | | |
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< | Leakage is a hole in the strategy, but does it utterly cause you lose the war? Why can't we have the same policy objectives and just tailor the rationale to what will appeal to the largest political base country to country? Is there still a coordination problem that way? I feel like countries inevitably adopt environmental policy at different rates, so you can't get away from leakage--you're left just dealing with it the best you can. That becomes Phase 2, if you will. | >
> | With respect to dealing with climate change, however, this requirement is complicated by the fact that the movement must sustain coordinated action across many disciplines and in many countries. Because those most responsible for climate change will not likely suffer strict regulation unless they must, there is real danger of production simply migrating to other countries if just a few nations impose, for example, limits on carbon emissions. Should that happen, global emissions will remain unchanged and we will have failed to deal effectively with climate change. Special attention must therefore be paid to the implications of environmental activists organizing themselves around one set of principles versus another. Creeds that do not help sustain the international coordination needed to solve the global problem of climate change must be de-emphasized. | | | | |
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> | A creed of short-term incentives can’t support a movement to resolve a long-term problem | | | | |
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> | This point becomes especially important as activists consider how to frame their message in a way that appeals to and motivates a broad array of audiences. In the United States, for example, there has been a tendency to shy away from appealing broadly to the people’s sense of justice. Instead, activists have chosen primarily to focus on incentives of immediate interest to Americans: energy security, clean energy jobs, avoiding an influx of climate refugees, etc. Such an incentives-based approach is perhaps good politics in the short term, but, assessed as a creed capable of undergirding a social movement necessarily seeking global change, it falls short. | | | | |
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< | [Leakage will cause the loss of this war. There's not time for Phase 2. Also there's a prisoner's dilemma - no one wants to be the first to act because everyone's afraid of everyone else free riding and everyone knows that unless everyone acts soon there is no point to anyone acting.] | >
> | It takes our eye off the ball
The idea that good politics is not good policy may seem like a truism, but one thing Arnold can teach us here is that environmental activists risk compromising their ultimate goal—building a sustainable future—if they even pretend to ground the movement in short-term incentives. Movements expand based on the message they project, and as they grow, the character of the movement will naturally change to reflect the motivations of its recruits. Thus, even against the better judgment of its leadership, the movement to prevent climate change is liable to become its poses. And, once creeds gel into an organizational psychology, they become difficult to change, even in the face of facts that obviously indicate a need for a different approach. | | | | |
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> | It goes without saying that activists risk compromising themselves as well. We are not purely rational beings, and creeds are comforting and seductive; they simplify a complex and anxious modernity. Whatever their best intentions may be, activists are every bit as likely as the rest to absorb--and be transformed by--a creed of short-term incentives. | | | | |
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< | Still, I think the strategy/coordination/creed issue has broad implications for other global initiatives. I look forward to see how you develop it further. | >
> | It makes international mobilization more difficult
In this case, by adopting such a creed, the spirit of the movement is channeled nationally inwards. This potential transformation is dangerous because it undermines the goal of international cooperation as a matter of course. Many countries will suffer from climate change in more and different ways than the United States. When the impetus for policy change is historically selfish, the United States may become reluctant to pay for problems it doesn’t see as its own. Thus, even if we are able to shortcut national policy changes, mounting substantive, international initiatives—i.e., the changes that can actually make a difference—will become more difficult. At this point, the situation is too dire to suffer additional problems of mobilization. | | | | |
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[If you want to take a crack at rewrite, for clarity and structure (don't do any research, obviously), I'd be interested to see what you do.] | >
> | It saps time and energy we could be spending more productively
Moreover, short-term incentives can fuel the movement only so long. For example, energy security can be no panacea because America is the Saudi Arabia of coal. This leaves activists continuously inventing new, more pressing reasons for changes to existing environmental policy, which in turn makes the movement more vulnerable to attack by its opposition. Instead of pursuing effective climate policy, the game becomes, as we have seen, a contest about the factual circumstances behind one short-term incentive or another. Emphasizing an ethical frame that expresses its goal as seeking justice, rather than optimizing incentives, may not be good near-term politics but at least it provides a means of motivating action when individual incentives run out. | | | | |
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> | The goal should be environmental justice | | | | |
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> | In the end, effective action requires sacrificing now for the benefits of people later—people whose interests rarely factor into contemporary calculations. According to contemporary economists, however, people do not act in ways that do not maximize their utility. Be that as it may, history offers examples of people who have selflessly dedicated themselves to pursuing justice. In American history, John Brown and Martin Luther King, Jr. come to mind. Another interesting example is Richard Stallman, who has steadfastly resisted the replacement of the free software movement's justice creed with the incentives creed of open source. These people who have struggled for justice rather than for their own gain can serve as examples for a climate movement organized around a justice-based creed. | | | \ No newline at end of file |
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