| | |
|
DoingWrongByNotDoing 13 - 14 Apr 2010 - Main.EricaSelig
|
| | I keep thinking back to something Eben brought up in class last week (Tuesday)- namely, the idea that if you see a problem, or something that you don’t think is OK, you should be doing something about it. I think Eben’s comments resonated with me because they struck a chord with a sort of guilty feeling I’ve often had. The guilt doesn’t come from actively doing anything wrong, but from not actively doing anything that seems particularly right. I’ve often felt uncomfortable with the idea that my life could be considered a moral life when I don’t really think I do anything to correct problems that I see around me. I think the issue boils down to a question of inaction as a morally culpable offense. I do think there is a moral imperative to act when we see something that we think is wrong. I think this idea leads to guilt because I don’t think that I do enough to act, and it’s something that I hope to change if I can figure out how. It made me start thinking about ideas that I’ve struggled with before- for instance, what difference is there between letting someone die before your eyes and not giving them (for example’s sake) the five dollars in your pocket that could save them by buying them food, and not sending food or support somewhere when you can spare it and where it could have a similar lifesaving impact? When does not doing something become as wrong as doing something positively wrong? It’s hard for me to figure out the difference- maybe this is because there isn’t a meaningful one.
I’m wondering what other people think about this. If a person sees something wrong in the world and doesn’t do anything about it, is he or she more culpable than someone who simply doesn’t see the wrong, by choice or by chance? It sort of reminds me also of the philosophical question- is a person brave who isn’t scared in the face of danger, or is a person truly brave who is scared and proceeds anyway? I can’t really articulate how these are connected, but I think it has something to do with making active choices and being aware of situations and choosing to overcome them (as opposed to not facing those choices whatsoever). | | | There's obviously nothing revolutionary about this "out of sight, out of mind" observation. It was just a response to your post expressing guilt for not allowing a homeless man to sleep in your apartment. I still feel very comfortable stating that to let a homeless man sleep in your apartment would have been extremely irresponsible, not to mention that the next day he would still be homeless. That then brought me to my point that some of the most pressing social issues are those that we allow ourselves not to feel guilty about because they aren't sleeping in our foyer. Even within the cause of homelessness, there are more effective ways to be “kinder and more generous,” namely through organizations like the one in the article you linked to. You could make fairly modest sacrifices in your life (and to be clear, this 100% applies to me as well) and direct that extra time and money toward a plethora of social causes, including some much more dire than homelessness in New York. Yet the guilt you felt compelled to mention was the example who you are forced to consider when he literally shows up at your doorstep.
-- DanKarmel - 11 Apr 2010 | |
>
> | Dan, I wasn't arguing a policy position or suggesting that local housing rights should be placed atop a hierarchy of things we care about. Just relating a personal experience that left me frustrated with the current state of what I feel is unfair resource distribution.
As an aside, this particular issue may very well become "out of sight, out of mind" as Bloomberg appears to be constructively forcing many inhabitants of homeless shelters out of the city. Although I tend to think it's "out of sight" because many of us (me included) tune out the problem.
-- EricaSelig - 14 Apr 2010 |
|
|
|
|
This site is powered by the TWiki collaboration platform.
All material on this collaboration platform is the property of the contributing authors.
All material marked as authored by Eben Moglen is available under the license terms CC-BY-SA version 4.
|
|
| | |