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DoingWrongByNotDoing 18 - 27 Apr 2010 - Main.NovikaIshar
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I keep thinking back to something Eben brought up in class last week (Tuesday)- namely, the idea that if you see a problem, or something that you don’t think is OK, you should be doing something about it. I think Eben’s comments resonated with me because they struck a chord with a sort of guilty feeling I’ve often had. The guilt doesn’t come from actively doing anything wrong, but from not actively doing anything that seems particularly right. I’ve often felt uncomfortable with the idea that my life could be considered a moral life when I don’t really think I do anything to correct problems that I see around me. I think the issue boils down to a question of inaction as a morally culpable offense. I do think there is a moral imperative to act when we see something that we think is wrong. I think this idea leads to guilt because I don’t think that I do enough to act, and it’s something that I hope to change if I can figure out how. It made me start thinking about ideas that I’ve struggled with before- for instance, what difference is there between letting someone die before your eyes and not giving them (for example’s sake) the five dollars in your pocket that could save them by buying them food, and not sending food or support somewhere when you can spare it and where it could have a similar lifesaving impact? When does not doing something become as wrong as doing something positively wrong? It’s hard for me to figure out the difference- maybe this is because there isn’t a meaningful one. | | | An update which discusses a few more of the issues.
-- DavidGoldin 26 Apr 2010
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This reminds me of the drowning child hypothetical, which was investigated by Peter Singer. Most people would say there is a moral obligation to save a child who appears to be drowning, but in doing so, individuals often instinctively do a cost benefit analysis-i.e. is there anyone else with a clear duty, what happens if I urgently need to be somewhere and my clothes get what, etc. Nevertheless, there seems to be a consensus on some sort of obligation-although American tort law on bystander liability seems to go against this notion.
This cost-benefit analysis shifts as distance is factored in- is there an obligation to save a child you know is drowning in a pond in the next town or country if possible (or a starving child)? The answer becomes more tenuous, shedding light on the debate about privilege and global wealth disparity.
There are a lot of psychological factors that serve to justify the lack of response to long-distance strife. In The Life You Can Save, Singer posits some very controversial theories, but among the criticisms he has received is that he is a privileged Princeton professor writing from his ivory tower (though he donates approximately 20% of his income to charity).
This reminds me of Eben's point that many of the professors teaching us law and policy do not have field knowledge. It goes back to a discussion we had about the lack of preparation we receive for being real-world advocates. I know my favorite classes so far have been those that weave in social policy justifications and consequences with legal doctrines, but I wish this type of teaching and discussion were more prevalent.
-- NovikaIshar - 27 Apr 2010
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