One need only look to the American legal system to find ceremonial excesses at work. Since time immemorial, men have believed that their own freedoms are intertwined with the freedom of industrial organizations from despotic restraint and yet that has not prevented corporate officials from imposing despotic regimes over their employees. The courts, under the mantle of the Constitution, have continued to disguise the sordid practices of huge corporations using abstract concepts such as freedom of contract, which are emotionally satisfying to the vast majority of us. Arnold's general project here is to reconcile the study of law in action with law in the books (Law Enforcement – An Attempt at Social Dissection). In other words, he wants to bridge the gap between what is preached by the courts and what is practiced, ushering a legal framework that is not preoccupied simply with the production of politically informed concepts and abstract principles but rather one that is relevant to the realities that reside in the knowable world. From there, Arnold's discourse takes a decidedly morose turn as he acknowledges the impossibility of people disregarding the charade. In this paper, I will assert that Arnold's work amounts to a cynical exercise; it encourages recognition of the folklore but recommends that we operate within it in order to accomplish functional goals.

As creatures of habit, men are bound by loyalties and enthusiasms to existing organizations. If they are successful in obtaining prestige and security from these organizations, they come to regard them as the ultimate in spiritual and moral perfection” (The Folklore of Capitalism, 10). These organizations are the dominant political culture that structure political discourse and inform every societal institution, including the courts. And so the cynicism begins. Since the gap between real and ideal is a natural consequence of organizational psychology, one cannot simply advocate for institutions to live up to their ideals. It is also not enough to simply "actualize" yourself by realizing that the gap is a contradiction that disarms progression. Rather, the alleviation of institution restraint can only be accomplished by working within the institutional schematic, manipulating the ceremony to promote a functional project (which, for Arnold, would be a more productive use of resources).

Thurman Arnold was appointed head of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department in 1938; during his tenure there, he espoused a number of economic policies that would feature in the New Deal. The problem was that, like any political package, it was also imbued with ceremonial traits, which Arnold acknowledges. The New Deal was markedly and inevitably inconsistent. Indeed, the very notion of the political system achieving functionalism by commandeering the economic system in a certain way is ludicrous because both institutions are riddled with ceremony. As Arnold writes, "too much efficiency in government, too much disregard for ceremony, eats out the cement which binds human institutions together." This assertion presents more questions that answers. Would Arnold argue that the French Revolution, which represented a total renovation of the societal framework, still contained the vestiges of ceremony? Since organizational psychology is always in flux and new ceremonies, rituals, etc emerge in response to the environment, must we accept that a functionalistic scheme in our generation will necessarily be undergirded by a ceremonialized one for the next?