Law in Contemporary Society

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GregJohnsonFirstPaper 3 - 17 Apr 2009 - Main.GregJohnson
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<		In which I try to flesh out what it means to harness social forces and be a "fox" like F.D.R. or Clinton, and in which I argue that the script metaphor for social forces is too limited because it describes a mere special case of taking action on the basis of rules of thumb that happen to be poorly suited to a situation.
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>		In which I try to flesh out what it might mean to harness social forces and be a "fox" like F.D.R. or Clinton, and in which I argue that the script metaphor for social forces is too limited because it describes a mere special case of taking action on the basis of rules of thumb that happen to be poorly suited to a situation.
 
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 Staying on script can of course often be beneficial, if the particular heuristics are conducive to a beneficial outcome. But where a script is wrong and the system is off track, it’s because of some assumption that in the instant case isn’t applicable—and that can be identified and subjected to actual consideration. Exposing the faulty heuristic is an option available to “foxes” who notice that heuristics are indeed what underlie the script.
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In conclusion: the conception of action laid out herein is hypothetical but is not particularly unusual.

It is not my purpose to prove the truth of my assumptions about the role of heuristics, although I suspect there is some truth to them. I intend these assumptions primarily to demonstrate the possibility of reconciling predictability with choice. Moreover, the basic idea—general rules, in-built or learned, that are strongly guiding but can be deliberately overridden—sounds strongly in conventional crowd psychology. For example, it can be analogized to Jung’s collective unconscious or directly to Freud’s super-ego, each of which exerts influence on one’s actions in a well-defined way but each of which is potentially subject to rational overriding by the self or the ego, respectively.

Comments on first draft:

 
  • This is well put together. You adduce some evidence in support of details in your theory of decision-making but no evidence for the overall structure or the stages and

Revision 3r3 - 17 Apr 2009 - 11:33:03 - GregJohnson
Revision 2r2 - 26 Mar 2009 - 22:16:37 - IanSullivan
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