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HarryParmenterFirstEssay 6 - 16 Jun 2015 - Main.EbenMoglen
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Excepting Expulsion of the SAE Students at the University of Oklahoma | | | Conclusion
I think it is possible to protect free speech while disciplining discriminatory speech on school campuses. In fact, I think drawing a distinction between free speech and discriminatory speech on school campuses might even serve the interests of the former, for indeed, our language itself is structurally unfair. It arms those in power with words that by their utterance can inflame, silence and intimidate. By disallowing the use of such words in the presence of developing minds, we can allow those students who are most at risk of forever being hardened and silenced by such speech to think and speak as freely as those who are determined to keep them suppressed.
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Yes, this revision makes the argument much better. I do not think it is sustainable myself, but you've now done a respectable job with it, warts and all.
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HarryParmenterFirstEssay 5 - 18 May 2015 - Main.HarryParmenter
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Excepting Expulsion of the SAE Students at the University of Oklahoma | | | In Healy, the Court noted that a college’s refusal to acknowledge a student group because of its speech-related activities could be justified if the group did not comply with “reasonable regulations with respect to the time, place and manner in which student groups conduct their speech-related activities,” Id., at 192-3. | |
<
< | What counts as a reasonable campus regulation appears to be left fairly open in Healy, but it would be hard to imagine that a court would find the University of Oklahoma’s policies against abusive conduct and mental harassment unreasonable. What is left then is a determination of whether the time, place and manner was inappropriate for such speech. This is an issue addressed by Papish, in which a student was expelled for distributing a campus newspaper containing indecent speech, which included the phrase “M—f—“ and illustrations of a policeman raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice. The court noted that “in the absence of any disruption of campus order or interference with the rights of others, the sole issue was whether a state university could proscribe this form of expression,” Id., at 670. Indeed, the student’s speech posed no threat to the rights of others in Papish, and the Court ruled in her favor. However, one could construe the speech of the SAE students differently. It was performed at a student organization’s event, targeting a vulnerable class of people with the intent of exclusion, using abusive and harassing language. Further, it was performed as a chorus; it was rehearsed, indicating its pervasive nature at the fraternity. If the University of Oklahoma can show that the students it expelled participated in the promulgation of such abusive language, they could try to make the case that such speech interferes with the rights of black students by creating a culture of exclusion from a campus group. What is left then, however, is the not insignificant hurdle of framing the promulgation of a hostile culture as an interference with students' rights. The university's best bet would probably be an equal protection argument if it can show that the expulsion of the students was done in the interest of protecting some fundamental right of black students--perhaps their equal access to public education. Such an argument would likely have to fall onto the ears of a highly sympathetic court, though when taking into context the precedent of Healy and Papish, such a thing might not seem completely out of reach. | >
> | What counts as a reasonable campus regulation appears to be left fairly open in Healy, but it would be hard to imagine that a court would find the University of Oklahoma’s policies against abusive conduct and mental harassment unreasonable. What is left then is a determination of whether the time, place and manner was inappropriate for such speech. This is an issue addressed by Papish, in which a student was expelled for distributing a campus newspaper containing indecent speech, which included the phrase “M—f—“ and illustrations of a policeman raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice. The court noted that “in the absence of any disruption of campus order or interference with the rights of others, the sole issue was whether a state university could proscribe this form of expression,” Id., at 670. Indeed, the student’s speech posed no threat to the rights of others in Papish, and the Court ruled in her favor. However, one could construe the speech of the SAE students differently. It was performed at a student organization’s event, targeting a vulnerable class of people with the intent of exclusion, using abusive and harassing language. Further, it was performed as a chorus; it was rehearsed, indicating its pervasive nature at the fraternity. If the University of Oklahoma can show that the students it expelled participated in the promulgation of such abusive language, they could try to make the case that such speech interferes with the rights of black students by creating a culture of exclusion from a campus group. However, this leaves the not insignificant hurdle of framing the promulgation of a hostile culture as an interference with students' rights. The university's best bet would probably be an equal protection argument if it can show that the expulsion of the students was done in the interest of protecting some fundamental right of black students--perhaps their equal access to public education. Such an argument would likely have to fall onto the ears of a highly sympathetic court, though when taking into context the precedent of Healy and Papish, such a thing might not seem completely out of reach. | | | A Contextual Approach | |
<
< | Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Healy, laments the latent conservatism behind the school’s decision not to recognize the SDS, citing the then-recent effects of McCarthyism? , noting, “If we are to become an integrated, adult society, rather than a stubborn status quo…students and faculties should have communal interests in which each age learns from the other. Without ferment…a college…becomes a useless appendage to a society which traditionally has reflected the spirit of rebellion,” Id., at 197. Speech like that of the SAE students’ could hardly be thought to be the kind of speech he spoke of then, and a court taking this into consideration might be more sympathetic to the arguments of the university. | >
> | Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Healy, laments the latent conservatism behind the school’s decision not to recognize the SDS, citing the then-recent effects of McCarthyism? , noting, “If we are to become an integrated, adult society, rather than a stubborn status quo…students and faculties should have communal interests in which each age learns from the other. Without ferment…a college…becomes a useless appendage to a society which traditionally has reflected the spirit of rebellion,” Id., at 197. Speech like that of the SAE students’ could hardly be thought to be the kind of speech he spoke of then, and a court taking this into consideration might be more sympathetic to the arguments of the university and willing to deviate from a hard-line application of Healy. | | | It is also worth noting that there was a rather tenuous connection between the standards set by cases dealing with the imposition of criminal sanctions for speech and school sanctions before Healy, as Justice Rehnquist notes in his concurring opinion: “There can be a constitutional distinction between the infliction of criminal punishment, on the one hand, and the imposition of milder administrative or disciplinary sanctions, on the other,” Id., at 203. Though this is merely a concurring opinion, such an argument has not gone unrecognized, and thus could perhaps be persuasive at court.
Conclusion | |
<
< | I think it is possible to protect free speech while disciplining discriminatory speech on school campuses. In fact, I think drawing a distinction between free speech and discriminatory speech on school campuses might even serve the interests of the former, for indeed, our language itself is structurally unfair. It arms those in power with words that by their utterance can inflame, silence and intimidate. By disallowing the use of such words in the presence of developing minds, we can allow those students who are most at risk of forever being hardened and silenced by such speech to think and speak as freely as those who are determined to keep them pressed under their heels. | >
> | I think it is possible to protect free speech while disciplining discriminatory speech on school campuses. In fact, I think drawing a distinction between free speech and discriminatory speech on school campuses might even serve the interests of the former, for indeed, our language itself is structurally unfair. It arms those in power with words that by their utterance can inflame, silence and intimidate. By disallowing the use of such words in the presence of developing minds, we can allow those students who are most at risk of forever being hardened and silenced by such speech to think and speak as freely as those who are determined to keep them suppressed. | | | \ No newline at end of file |
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HarryParmenterFirstEssay 4 - 16 May 2015 - Main.HarryParmenter
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Excepting Expulsion of the SAE Students at the University of Oklahoma | | | In Healy, the Court noted that a college’s refusal to acknowledge a student group because of its speech-related activities could be justified if the group did not comply with “reasonable regulations with respect to the time, place and manner in which student groups conduct their speech-related activities,” Id., at 192-3. | |
<
< | What counts as a reasonable campus regulation appears to be left fairly open in Healy, but it would be hard to imagine that a court would find the University of Oklahoma’s policies against abusive conduct and mental harassment unreasonable. What is left then is a determination of whether the time, place and manner was inappropriate for such speech. This is an issue addressed by Papish, in which a student was expelled for distributing a campus newspaper containing indecent speech, which included the phrase “M—f—“ and illustrations of a policeman raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice. The court noted that “in the absence of any disruption of campus order or interference with the rights of others, the sole issue was whether a state university could proscribe this form of expression,” Id., at 670. Indeed, the student’s speech posed no threat to the rights of others in Papish, and the Court ruled in her favor. However, I would argue that the speech of the SAE students is different—it does indeed interfere with the rights of others. It was performed at a student organization’s event, targeting a vulnerable class of people with the intent of exclusion, using abusive and harassing language. Further, it was performed as a chorus; it was rehearsed, indicating its pervasive nature and if, through discovery, the University of Oklahoma can show that the students it expelled participated in the promulgation of such abusive language, which interferes with the rights of black students by creating a culture of exclusion from a campus group, they may have a case for themselves that conforms to standards set by Healy and Papish. | >
> | What counts as a reasonable campus regulation appears to be left fairly open in Healy, but it would be hard to imagine that a court would find the University of Oklahoma’s policies against abusive conduct and mental harassment unreasonable. What is left then is a determination of whether the time, place and manner was inappropriate for such speech. This is an issue addressed by Papish, in which a student was expelled for distributing a campus newspaper containing indecent speech, which included the phrase “M—f—“ and illustrations of a policeman raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice. The court noted that “in the absence of any disruption of campus order or interference with the rights of others, the sole issue was whether a state university could proscribe this form of expression,” Id., at 670. Indeed, the student’s speech posed no threat to the rights of others in Papish, and the Court ruled in her favor. However, one could construe the speech of the SAE students differently. It was performed at a student organization’s event, targeting a vulnerable class of people with the intent of exclusion, using abusive and harassing language. Further, it was performed as a chorus; it was rehearsed, indicating its pervasive nature at the fraternity. If the University of Oklahoma can show that the students it expelled participated in the promulgation of such abusive language, they could try to make the case that such speech interferes with the rights of black students by creating a culture of exclusion from a campus group. What is left then, however, is the not insignificant hurdle of framing the promulgation of a hostile culture as an interference with students' rights. The university's best bet would probably be an equal protection argument if it can show that the expulsion of the students was done in the interest of protecting some fundamental right of black students--perhaps their equal access to public education. Such an argument would likely have to fall onto the ears of a highly sympathetic court, though when taking into context the precedent of Healy and Papish, such a thing might not seem completely out of reach. | | | A Contextual Approach | |
<
< | In Healy, a state college denied official recognition of a campus group called Students for a Democratic Society (SDS); the president of the college refused acknowledgement of the organization based on his belief that they were affiliated with the National SDS and would thus participate in activities that were antithetical to school policies (the National SDS was a radical left student organization that led acts civil disobedience on some campuses). The Court noted that the administration failed to meet its burden of justifying its nonrecognition of the group because 1) the group denied affiliation with the National SDS and 2) even if there were an affiliation, the president could not deny recognition merely because its philosophies were “counter to the official policy of the college,” Id., at 187. | >
> | Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Healy, laments the latent conservatism behind the school’s decision not to recognize the SDS, citing the then-recent effects of McCarthyism? , noting, “If we are to become an integrated, adult society, rather than a stubborn status quo…students and faculties should have communal interests in which each age learns from the other. Without ferment…a college…becomes a useless appendage to a society which traditionally has reflected the spirit of rebellion,” Id., at 197. Speech like that of the SAE students’ could hardly be thought to be the kind of speech he spoke of then, and a court taking this into consideration might be more sympathetic to the arguments of the university. | | | | |
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< | Chief Justice Burger recognized in his concurring opinion in Healy that “student organizations seeking…campus recognition must be willing to abide by valid rules of the institution,” and further, that he remanded because he was “troubled by the lack of a comprehensive procedural scheme that would inform students of…[how] to secure recognized standing,” Id., at 195. This notion is echoed in Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion (in which Burger and Blackmun joined) in Papish, in which he distinguishes that case from Healy on the grounds that the latter case was one in which the university had “not afforded adequate notice and hearing of the action it proposed,” Id., at 673. Thus, more than one justice in Healy went out of his way to emphasize the procedural nature of that case and the deference to be given to the rules of the institution.
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Healy, laments the latent conservatism behind the school’s decision not to recognize the SDS, citing the then-recent effects of McCarthyism? , noting, “If we are to become an integrated, adult society, rather than a stubborn status quo…students and faculties should have communal interests in which each age learns from the other. Without ferment…a college…becomes a useless appendage to a society which traditionally has reflected the spirit of rebellion,” Id., at 197. Speech like that of the SAE students’ could hardly be thought to be the kind of speech he spoke of then. | >
> | It is also worth noting that there was a rather tenuous connection between the standards set by cases dealing with the imposition of criminal sanctions for speech and school sanctions before Healy, as Justice Rehnquist notes in his concurring opinion: “There can be a constitutional distinction between the infliction of criminal punishment, on the one hand, and the imposition of milder administrative or disciplinary sanctions, on the other,” Id., at 203. Though this is merely a concurring opinion, such an argument has not gone unrecognized, and thus could perhaps be persuasive at court. | | | Conclusion | |
<
< | We need not fear that upholding the University of Oklahoma’s decision to expel two students for their flagrantly abusive speech that targeted a protected class will result in a slippery slope downward into a university being able to discipline students for any speech it finds offensive. We can and should be able to delineate the forms of speech on campuses that interfere with the rights of others and seek to reel back social progress. Perhaps an elaboration of the standards for reasonable campus rules will be necessary, but I think it is in keeping with the spirit of Healy that the interest in maintaining a learning environment that is safe for everyone at public schools1 outweighs any interest in preserving the cruel and privileged speech of the few.
1. I think it is also important to keep in mind the rather tenuous connection between the standards set by cases dealing with the imposition of criminal sanctions for speech and school sanctions, as Justice Rehnquist notes in his concurring opinion to Healy: “There can be a constitutional distinction between the infliction of criminal punishment, on the one hand, and the imposition of milder administrative or disciplinary sanctions, on the other,” Id., at 203.
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> | I think it is possible to protect free speech while disciplining discriminatory speech on school campuses. In fact, I think drawing a distinction between free speech and discriminatory speech on school campuses might even serve the interests of the former, for indeed, our language itself is structurally unfair. It arms those in power with words that by their utterance can inflame, silence and intimidate. By disallowing the use of such words in the presence of developing minds, we can allow those students who are most at risk of forever being hardened and silenced by such speech to think and speak as freely as those who are determined to keep them pressed under their heels. |
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HarryParmenterFirstEssay 3 - 04 May 2015 - Main.HarryParmenter
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> | Excepting Expulsion of the SAE Students at the University of Oklahoma | | | | |
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< | Background | >
> | Background | | | | |
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< | On Tuesday this week, | >
> | On March 10, 2015, two members of the University of Oklahoma chapter of the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity were expelled after being caught on video on their way to a fraternity event leading the following chant, set to the tune of “If You’re Happy and You Know It:” | | | | |
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A less relative date would be sensible unless you mean the draft never to be read past some Friday.
two members of the University of Oklahoma chapter of the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity were expelled after being caught on video on their way to a fraternity event leading the following chant, set to the tune of “If You’re Happy and You Know It:”
There will never be a n----r in SAE
There will never be a n----r in SAE
You can hang him from a tree
But he'll never sign with me | | | There will never be a n----r in SAE | |
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Why should you not write out an offensive word? Do you think that in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court should not have permitted the "Fuck" in "Fuck the Draft" to be written or spoken?
David Boren, president of the university, addressed the expelled students in a press release, noting, “You will be expelled because of your leadership role in leading a racist and exclusionary chant which has created a hostile educational environment for others.”
Almost immediately following the students’ expulsion came a chorus of legal experts sounding Boren’s violation of the students’ First Amendment rights. Says UCLA’s Eugene Volokh, “Racist speech is constitutionally protected…That has been the unanimous view of courts that have considered campus speech.” Robert Nelon, a local media law attorney, adds, “The university would be better in tune with the Constitution if they took to the public forum…and met speech with speech.”
Could we have links or cites, please, so that we can check the quotes and see the context? That's important and easy to do when you are writing for the Web.
I am unsatisfied with the knee-jerk response of these legal pundits regarding Boren’s decision
I don't know whether they were "knee-jerk" responses, which implies that these particular people didn't think about what they were saying, but said it by reflex. Otherwise, it's just an epithet expressive of your disagreement. In any event, the speakers you quote are expressing views that are probably correct, not very difficult to arrive at, and accurately reflect the condition of the law in the United States Supreme Court.
. To be sure, there are exceptions to our First Amendment rights, depending by turns on the content and context of our speech; I wish to review two of the most applicable exceptions to the speech at hand that might vindicate the actions of the university.
You are trying to find out why the law might something or other. Why not begin by asking what the law is concerning the power to expel students from state universities based on the offensive content of their speech. If you discover, as you have been told by parties you may not trust, that this is clearly constitutionally protected conduct, you can skip the speculating.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Taking a look at Boren’s reasoning for expelling the students reveals that it was not the speech itself that led to his decision, but the creation of “a hostile educational environment for others.” Under federal anti-discrimination law, namely Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, public universities have a duty to guarantee students an educational environment free of hostility toward their race or sex. So the students were not expelled for expressing their opinions per se, but because their speech was form of conduct creating a hostile environment for black students. Expelling the students who were inculcating the fraternity members with a hostile attitude was thus done with the aim of removing agents from the school who are responsible for creating a hostile educational environment. It is the job of the university to balance the goals of academic freedom and the maintenance of a civil educational environment, and it should be within its right to interpret the First Amendment to find that balance for themselves.
No. The First Amendment rights of the students are what they are, regardless of the University's obligations under the Civil Rights Act or any other statute. If the government lacks the power to expel students from a state university on the basis of the content of their speech for First Amendment reasons, it is obvious that no federal statute could have endowed them with power Congress didn't have. The conclusion would be no more than that the university cannot meet its statutory obligations by violating the First Amendment, but must find another way.
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> | There will never be a n----r in SAE | | | | |
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< | Incitement | >
> | You can hang him from a tree | | | | |
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< | The Supreme Court has held that advocating the use of force is speech unprotected by the First Amendment when it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and is “likely to incite or produce such action,” Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969). There is little doubt the chant advocates violence, as it explicitly condones lynching, but did it constitute speech that is intended to incite lawless action? Perhaps. | >
> | But he'll never sign with me | | | | |
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Not if you read the case you have cited, which you didn't link to as you should. Brandenburg reaffirms "the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 395 U.S. at 447. Incitement requires the possibility of immediate action in fulfillment. Only if there were a crowd potentially engaged in a lynching under circumstances making the crime imminently possible could a speaker be capable of incitement. That has nothing whatever to do with the situation on that bus, or in that fraternity, or on that university campus.
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> | There will never be a n----r in SAE | | | | |
>
> | Almost immediately following the students’ expulsion came a chorus of legal experts sounding Boren’s violation of the students’ First Amendment rights. Indeed, the case law seems to weigh in the students’ favor. In Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), the Supreme Court declared that “state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment,” Id., at 180, and upheld this notion a year later in Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973). However, the Court designated a few forms of speech to be within a university’s power to discipline, one of which being that student activities “need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education,” Healy, at 189. In light of this exception, along with a contextual reading of the holding cases regarding university student speech, Healy and Papish, I propose, in spite of what appears to be an oppositional precedent, that the University of Oklahoma might be able to justify the expulsion of two of its students. | | | | |
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< | Though no violence was incited as a result of this particular chant, courts have nonetheless viewed similar speech in context and interpreted it as such. In Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District (2014), white American students at a public school wore t-shirts bearing American flags on Cinco de Mayo, a Mexican holiday. Based on a prior history of racial conflict at the school, the Court upheld the school’s decision to force the white American students to wear their t-shirts inside out to avoid retaliation by Mexican students. | >
> | The Healy Exception | | | | |
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Link to the case. You will not claim, I should think, that you have any legal authority for suggesting that the school district could instead have expelled the students for wearing the shirts. Do you not see why the citation of a single district court case not relevant to the legal argument you are making weakens rather than strengthens your argument.
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> | In Healy, the Court noted that a college’s refusal to acknowledge a student group because of its speech-related activities could be justified if the group did not comply with “reasonable regulations with respect to the time, place and manner in which student groups conduct their speech-related activities,” Id., at 192-3. | | | | |
>
> | What counts as a reasonable campus regulation appears to be left fairly open in Healy, but it would be hard to imagine that a court would find the University of Oklahoma’s policies against abusive conduct and mental harassment unreasonable. What is left then is a determination of whether the time, place and manner was inappropriate for such speech. This is an issue addressed by Papish, in which a student was expelled for distributing a campus newspaper containing indecent speech, which included the phrase “M—f—“ and illustrations of a policeman raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice. The court noted that “in the absence of any disruption of campus order or interference with the rights of others, the sole issue was whether a state university could proscribe this form of expression,” Id., at 670. Indeed, the student’s speech posed no threat to the rights of others in Papish, and the Court ruled in her favor. However, I would argue that the speech of the SAE students is different—it does indeed interfere with the rights of others. It was performed at a student organization’s event, targeting a vulnerable class of people with the intent of exclusion, using abusive and harassing language. Further, it was performed as a chorus; it was rehearsed, indicating its pervasive nature and if, through discovery, the University of Oklahoma can show that the students it expelled participated in the promulgation of such abusive language, which interferes with the rights of black students by creating a culture of exclusion from a campus group, they may have a case for themselves that conforms to standards set by Healy and Papish. | | | | |
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< | Context matters in SAE’s case as well. America’s Black Holocaust Museum has recorded a long tradition of lynchings in Oklahoma, spanning from 1892 to as recently as 1998, at least one of which was reported to have occurred in Norman, the resident city of the university. On a national scale, racial tensions have been intensifying, especially with the recent unearthing by the Department of Justice of the extremely racist treatment of black residents in Ferguson, Missouri by their local police. Such reports have had an impact on local communities, including universities. Indeed, Cornell University’s Sigma Pi fraternity was found to have thrown liquor bottles off a balcony at black passerby, shouting slurs and calling them by the name “Trayvon,” a reference to the first of a string of black teenage homicide victims whose story has recently been taken on by national media. Arizona State University’s Tau Kappa Epsilon was expelled just last night after hosting a party in which partygoers were encouraged to dress according to black stereotypes. This was after the fraternity was on probation for sending twenty of its members to attack a black fraternity member of Delta Kappa Epsilon in his home in 2012. Further, Shaun King, in his article for the Daily Kos, “A Deeper Examination of the Sheer Joy of Oklahoma Students Chanting about Hanging N*gg*rs from Trees,” notes the “giddy happiness, by whites, at black pain,” demonstrated by the fraternity members, which he notes is an essential part of lynch mob culture. Though no violence ensued as a result of the chant, it is hard to ignore the tradition behind it and its very real potential to incite violence. | >
> | A Contextual Approach | | | | |
>
> | In Healy, a state college denied official recognition of a campus group called Students for a Democratic Society (SDS); the president of the college refused acknowledgement of the organization based on his belief that they were affiliated with the National SDS and would thus participate in activities that were antithetical to school policies (the National SDS was a radical left student organization that led acts civil disobedience on some campuses). The Court noted that the administration failed to meet its burden of justifying its nonrecognition of the group because 1) the group denied affiliation with the National SDS and 2) even if there were an affiliation, the president could not deny recognition merely because its philosophies were “counter to the official policy of the college,” Id., at 187. | | | | |
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What legal authority explains to you that the First Amendment rights of these students in any way depend on the material you are offering here?
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> | Chief Justice Burger recognized in his concurring opinion in Healy that “student organizations seeking…campus recognition must be willing to abide by valid rules of the institution,” and further, that he remanded because he was “troubled by the lack of a comprehensive procedural scheme that would inform students of…[how] to secure recognized standing,” Id., at 195. This notion is echoed in Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion (in which Burger and Blackmun joined) in Papish, in which he distinguishes that case from Healy on the grounds that the latter case was one in which the university had “not afforded adequate notice and hearing of the action it proposed,” Id., at 673. Thus, more than one justice in Healy went out of his way to emphasize the procedural nature of that case and the deference to be given to the rules of the institution. | | | | |
>
> | Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Healy, laments the latent conservatism behind the school’s decision not to recognize the SDS, citing the then-recent effects of McCarthyism? , noting, “If we are to become an integrated, adult society, rather than a stubborn status quo…students and faculties should have communal interests in which each age learns from the other. Without ferment…a college…becomes a useless appendage to a society which traditionally has reflected the spirit of rebellion,” Id., at 197. Speech like that of the SAE students’ could hardly be thought to be the kind of speech he spoke of then. | | | Conclusion | |
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< | One could construe the University of Oklahoma’s actions to have been necessary to meet other goals besides punishing racist speech. Indeed, it would be difficult to call the fraternity chant “pure speech,” words limited to in form to what is necessary to convey an idea, which would be entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment.
Where did this doctrine come from? I think you just made it up.
There are real and violent implications in the content and context of the chant, and the university may indeed have been justified in expelling students who advocate such speech that might interfere with the university’s Title VI goal of fostering a non-hostile educational environment and the prevention of racial violence.
The arguments offered
in this draft do not work. There are other arguments to offer, not very strong either, but better. The important first step, however, is to look at the case on the other side. Because you started purely in opposition to a conclusion you dislike, you don't have a grasp of the cases that support it. For this reason, your blows are struck randomly. When you have a difficult case to support, you read the cases on the other side more rather than less carefully. You are trying to find weak places, not throw a random thunderbolt.
You cannot, I think, ultimately save the expulsions. You may not like what is being said on the other side, but it has the overwhelming weight of existing constitutional doctrine behind it. That doctrine is tied tightly to core First Amendment principles; you will not unpick it easily, nor should you be able to. But if you want to argue in favor of the expulsions, you will have to fit inside the arguments of the cases you haven't found or read yet. Start with Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) and Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). | >
> | We need not fear that upholding the University of Oklahoma’s decision to expel two students for their flagrantly abusive speech that targeted a protected class will result in a slippery slope downward into a university being able to discipline students for any speech it finds offensive. We can and should be able to delineate the forms of speech on campuses that interfere with the rights of others and seek to reel back social progress. Perhaps an elaboration of the standards for reasonable campus rules will be necessary, but I think it is in keeping with the spirit of Healy that the interest in maintaining a learning environment that is safe for everyone at public schools1 outweighs any interest in preserving the cruel and privileged speech of the few. | | | | |
<
< | | >
> | 1. I think it is also important to keep in mind the rather tenuous connection between the standards set by cases dealing with the imposition of criminal sanctions for speech and school sanctions, as Justice Rehnquist notes in his concurring opinion to Healy: “There can be a constitutional distinction between the infliction of criminal punishment, on the one hand, and the imposition of milder administrative or disciplinary sanctions, on the other,” Id., at 203. | | | |
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HarryParmenterFirstEssay 2 - 13 Apr 2015 - Main.EbenMoglen
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< | On Tuesday this week, two members of the University of Oklahoma chapter of the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity were expelled after being caught on video on their way to a fraternity event leading the following chant, set to the tune of “If You’re Happy and You Know It:” | >
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A less relative date would be sensible unless you mean the draft never to be read past some Friday.
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< | There will never be a n——r in SAE | >
> | two members of the University of Oklahoma chapter of the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity were expelled after being caught on video on their way to a fraternity event leading the following chant, set to the tune of “If You’re Happy and You Know It:” | | | | |
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There will never be a n----r in SAE
There will never be a n----r in SAE | | | You can hang him from a tree | |
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> | But he'll never sign with me
There will never be a n----r in SAE
Why should you not write out an offensive word? Do you think that in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court should not have permitted the "Fuck" in "Fuck the Draft" to be written or spoken?
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< | But he’ll never sign with me
There will never be a n——r in SAE | | | David Boren, president of the university, addressed the expelled students in a press release, noting, “You will be expelled because of your leadership role in leading a racist and exclusionary chant which has created a hostile educational environment for others.” | |
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< | Almost immediately following the students’ expulsion came a chorus of legal experts sounding Boren’s violation of the students’ First Amendment rights. Says UCLA’s Eugene Volokh, “Racist speech is constitutionally protected…That has been the unanimous view of courts that have considered campus speech.” Robert Nelon, a local media law attorney, adds, “The university would be better in tune with the Constitution if they took to the public forum…and met speech with speech.” | >
> | Almost immediately following the students’ expulsion came a chorus of legal experts sounding Boren’s violation of the students’ First Amendment rights. Says UCLA’s Eugene Volokh, “Racist speech is constitutionally protected…That has been the unanimous view of courts that have considered campus speech.” Robert Nelon, a local media law attorney, adds, “The university would be better in tune with the Constitution if they took to the public forum…and met speech with speech.”
Could we have links or cites, please, so that we can check the quotes and see the context? That's important and easy to do when you are writing for the Web.
I am unsatisfied with the knee-jerk response of these legal pundits regarding Boren’s decision
I don't know whether they were "knee-jerk" responses, which implies that these particular people didn't think about what they were saying, but said it by reflex. Otherwise, it's just an epithet expressive of your disagreement. In any event, the speakers you quote are expressing views that are probably correct, not very difficult to arrive at, and accurately reflect the condition of the law in the United States Supreme Court.
. To be sure, there are exceptions to our First Amendment rights, depending by turns on the content and context of our speech; I wish to review two of the most applicable exceptions to the speech at hand that might vindicate the actions of the university. | | | | |
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< | I am unsatisfied with the knee-jerk response of these legal pundits regarding Boren’s decision. To be sure, there are exceptions to our First Amendment rights, depending by turns on the content and context of our speech; I wish to review two of the most applicable exceptions to the speech at hand that might vindicate the actions of the university. | >
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You are trying to find out why the law might something or other. Why not begin by asking what the law is concerning the power to expel students from state universities based on the offensive content of their speech. If you discover, as you have been told by parties you may not trust, that this is clearly constitutionally protected conduct, you can skip the speculating.
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< | Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 | >
> | Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 | | | Taking a look at Boren’s reasoning for expelling the students reveals that it was not the speech itself that led to his decision, but the creation of “a hostile educational environment for others.” Under federal anti-discrimination law, namely Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, public universities have a duty to guarantee students an educational environment free of hostility toward their race or sex. So the students were not expelled for expressing their opinions per se, but because their speech was form of conduct creating a hostile environment for black students. Expelling the students who were inculcating the fraternity members with a hostile attitude was thus done with the aim of removing agents from the school who are responsible for creating a hostile educational environment. It is the job of the university to balance the goals of academic freedom and the maintenance of a civil educational environment, and it should be within its right to interpret the First Amendment to find that balance for themselves. | |
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No. The First Amendment rights of the students are what they are, regardless of the University's obligations under the Civil Rights Act or any other statute. If the government lacks the power to expel students from a state university on the basis of the content of their speech for First Amendment reasons, it is obvious that no federal statute could have endowed them with power Congress didn't have. The conclusion would be no more than that the university cannot meet its statutory obligations by violating the First Amendment, but must find another way.
Incitement
The Supreme Court has held that advocating the use of force is speech unprotected by the First Amendment when it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and is “likely to incite or produce such action,” Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969). There is little doubt the chant advocates violence, as it explicitly condones lynching, but did it constitute speech that is intended to incite lawless action? Perhaps.
Not if you read the case you have cited, which you didn't link to as you should. Brandenburg reaffirms "the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 395 U.S. at 447. Incitement requires the possibility of immediate action in fulfillment. Only if there were a crowd potentially engaged in a lynching under circumstances making the crime imminently possible could a speaker be capable of incitement. That has nothing whatever to do with the situation on that bus, or in that fraternity, or on that university campus.
Though no violence was incited as a result of this particular chant, courts have nonetheless viewed similar speech in context and interpreted it as such. In Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District (2014), white American students at a public school wore t-shirts bearing American flags on Cinco de Mayo, a Mexican holiday. Based on a prior history of racial conflict at the school, the Court upheld the school’s decision to force the white American students to wear their t-shirts inside out to avoid retaliation by Mexican students.
Link to the case. You will not claim, I should think, that you have any legal authority for suggesting that the school district could instead have expelled the students for wearing the shirts. Do you not see why the citation of a single district court case not relevant to the legal argument you are making weakens rather than strengthens your argument.
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< | The Supreme Court has held that advocating the use of force is speech unprotected by the First Amendment when it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and is “likely to incite or produce such action,” Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969). There is little doubt the chant advocates violence, as it explicitly condones lynching, but did it constitute speech that is intended to incite lawless action? Perhaps. Though no violence was incited as a result of this particular chant, courts have nonetheless viewed similar speech in context and interpreted it as such. In Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District (2014), white American students at a public school wore t-shirts bearing American flags on Cinco de Mayo, a Mexican holiday. Based on a prior history of racial conflict at the school, the Court upheld the school’s decision to force the white American students to wear their t-shirts inside out to avoid retaliation by Mexican students. | | | Context matters in SAE’s case as well. America’s Black Holocaust Museum has recorded a long tradition of lynchings in Oklahoma, spanning from 1892 to as recently as 1998, at least one of which was reported to have occurred in Norman, the resident city of the university. On a national scale, racial tensions have been intensifying, especially with the recent unearthing by the Department of Justice of the extremely racist treatment of black residents in Ferguson, Missouri by their local police. Such reports have had an impact on local communities, including universities. Indeed, Cornell University’s Sigma Pi fraternity was found to have thrown liquor bottles off a balcony at black passerby, shouting slurs and calling them by the name “Trayvon,” a reference to the first of a string of black teenage homicide victims whose story has recently been taken on by national media. Arizona State University’s Tau Kappa Epsilon was expelled just last night after hosting a party in which partygoers were encouraged to dress according to black stereotypes. This was after the fraternity was on probation for sending twenty of its members to attack a black fraternity member of Delta Kappa Epsilon in his home in 2012. Further, Shaun King, in his article for the Daily Kos, “A Deeper Examination of the Sheer Joy of Oklahoma Students Chanting about Hanging N*gg*rs from Trees,” notes the “giddy happiness, by whites, at black pain,” demonstrated by the fraternity members, which he notes is an essential part of lynch mob culture. Though no violence ensued as a result of the chant, it is hard to ignore the tradition behind it and its very real potential to incite violence. | |
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What legal authority explains to you that the First Amendment rights of these students in any way depend on the material you are offering here?
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< | One could construe the University of Oklahoma’s actions to have been necessary to meet other goals besides punishing racist speech. Indeed, it would be difficult to call the fraternity chant “pure speech,” words limited to in form to what is necessary to convey an idea, which would be entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment. There are real and violent implications in the content and context of the chant, and the university may indeed have been justified in expelling students who advocate such speech that might interfere with the university’s Title VI goal of fostering a non-hostile educational environment and the prevention of racial violence. | >
> | One could construe the University of Oklahoma’s actions to have been necessary to meet other goals besides punishing racist speech. Indeed, it would be difficult to call the fraternity chant “pure speech,” words limited to in form to what is necessary to convey an idea, which would be entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment.
Where did this doctrine come from? I think you just made it up.
There are real and violent implications in the content and context of the chant, and the university may indeed have been justified in expelling students who advocate such speech that might interfere with the university’s Title VI goal of fostering a non-hostile educational environment and the prevention of racial violence.
The arguments offered
in this draft do not work. There are other arguments to offer, not very strong either, but better. The important first step, however, is to look at the case on the other side. Because you started purely in opposition to a conclusion you dislike, you don't have a grasp of the cases that support it. For this reason, your blows are struck randomly. When you have a difficult case to support, you read the cases on the other side more rather than less carefully. You are trying to find weak places, not throw a random thunderbolt.
You cannot, I think, ultimately save the expulsions. You may not like what is being said on the other side, but it has the overwhelming weight of existing constitutional doctrine behind it. That doctrine is tied tightly to core First Amendment principles; you will not unpick it easily, nor should you be able to. But if you want to argue in favor of the expulsions, you will have to fit inside the arguments of the cases you haven't found or read yet. Start with Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) and Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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HarryParmenterFirstEssay 1 - 13 Mar 2015 - Main.HarryParmenter
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Excepting Expulsion of the SAE Students in the Face of the First Amendment
Background
On Tuesday this week, two members of the University of Oklahoma chapter of the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity were expelled after being caught on video on their way to a fraternity event leading the following chant, set to the tune of “If You’re Happy and You Know It:”
There will never be a n——r in SAE
There will never be a n——r in SAE
You can hang him from a tree
But he’ll never sign with me
There will never be a n——r in SAE
David Boren, president of the university, addressed the expelled students in a press release, noting, “You will be expelled because of your leadership role in leading a racist and exclusionary chant which has created a hostile educational environment for others.”
Almost immediately following the students’ expulsion came a chorus of legal experts sounding Boren’s violation of the students’ First Amendment rights. Says UCLA’s Eugene Volokh, “Racist speech is constitutionally protected…That has been the unanimous view of courts that have considered campus speech.” Robert Nelon, a local media law attorney, adds, “The university would be better in tune with the Constitution if they took to the public forum…and met speech with speech.”
I am unsatisfied with the knee-jerk response of these legal pundits regarding Boren’s decision. To be sure, there are exceptions to our First Amendment rights, depending by turns on the content and context of our speech; I wish to review two of the most applicable exceptions to the speech at hand that might vindicate the actions of the university.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Taking a look at Boren’s reasoning for expelling the students reveals that it was not the speech itself that led to his decision, but the creation of “a hostile educational environment for others.” Under federal anti-discrimination law, namely Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, public universities have a duty to guarantee students an educational environment free of hostility toward their race or sex. So the students were not expelled for expressing their opinions per se, but because their speech was form of conduct creating a hostile environment for black students. Expelling the students who were inculcating the fraternity members with a hostile attitude was thus done with the aim of removing agents from the school who are responsible for creating a hostile educational environment. It is the job of the university to balance the goals of academic freedom and the maintenance of a civil educational environment, and it should be within its right to interpret the First Amendment to find that balance for themselves.
Incitement
The Supreme Court has held that advocating the use of force is speech unprotected by the First Amendment when it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and is “likely to incite or produce such action,” Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969). There is little doubt the chant advocates violence, as it explicitly condones lynching, but did it constitute speech that is intended to incite lawless action? Perhaps. Though no violence was incited as a result of this particular chant, courts have nonetheless viewed similar speech in context and interpreted it as such. In Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District (2014), white American students at a public school wore t-shirts bearing American flags on Cinco de Mayo, a Mexican holiday. Based on a prior history of racial conflict at the school, the Court upheld the school’s decision to force the white American students to wear their t-shirts inside out to avoid retaliation by Mexican students.
Context matters in SAE’s case as well. America’s Black Holocaust Museum has recorded a long tradition of lynchings in Oklahoma, spanning from 1892 to as recently as 1998, at least one of which was reported to have occurred in Norman, the resident city of the university. On a national scale, racial tensions have been intensifying, especially with the recent unearthing by the Department of Justice of the extremely racist treatment of black residents in Ferguson, Missouri by their local police. Such reports have had an impact on local communities, including universities. Indeed, Cornell University’s Sigma Pi fraternity was found to have thrown liquor bottles off a balcony at black passerby, shouting slurs and calling them by the name “Trayvon,” a reference to the first of a string of black teenage homicide victims whose story has recently been taken on by national media. Arizona State University’s Tau Kappa Epsilon was expelled just last night after hosting a party in which partygoers were encouraged to dress according to black stereotypes. This was after the fraternity was on probation for sending twenty of its members to attack a black fraternity member of Delta Kappa Epsilon in his home in 2012. Further, Shaun King, in his article for the Daily Kos, “A Deeper Examination of the Sheer Joy of Oklahoma Students Chanting about Hanging N*gg*rs from Trees,” notes the “giddy happiness, by whites, at black pain,” demonstrated by the fraternity members, which he notes is an essential part of lynch mob culture. Though no violence ensued as a result of the chant, it is hard to ignore the tradition behind it and its very real potential to incite violence.
Conclusion
One could construe the University of Oklahoma’s actions to have been necessary to meet other goals besides punishing racist speech. Indeed, it would be difficult to call the fraternity chant “pure speech,” words limited to in form to what is necessary to convey an idea, which would be entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment. There are real and violent implications in the content and context of the chant, and the university may indeed have been justified in expelling students who advocate such speech that might interfere with the university’s Title VI goal of fostering a non-hostile educational environment and the prevention of racial violence. |
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