HelenZhuFirstPaper 2 - 11 Apr 2012 - Main.IanSullivan
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
| | Reality is subject to human perception
Justice Holmes said, “certainty generally is illusion and repose is not the destiny of man.” However, let us broaden this phrase. Suppose we begin with the (hardly novel) premise that reality is subjective to our perception. Casting aside the irony of using objective, scientific proof to show all is subjective to our mind’s construction, neurologists have shown that one way humans experience the world is through memory. This is particularly vivid in time perception, where during moments of intense trauma or concentration, we experience time more slowly as a result of more memories. Although our minds reconstruct the recent past using sensory stimuli very quickly, this process nonetheless means that even seemingly innocuous facts such as time become subjective. | |
> > | "Innocuous" is not the word you wanted.
I don't understand the claim here. Are you denying that time and
space exist "out there," independent of our perception of them? Does
the world become more yellow and less blue when I put on my yellow
lenses before going outside? If the perception of someone inside a
car that is crashing experiences slower time, has time also slowed
down for the pedestrian who is watching the accident from a safe
distance? | | Is our perception subjective, or are facts themselves subjective? | |
< < | If subjective perception matters, does it affect only our view of facts or can they affect the facts themselves? In the Asch Conformity Experiments, psychologists have shown that the vast majority of college students in their study sample chose to conform to a wrong answer at least once during their series of experiments. The tests were factual, such as which of three lines most matched the length of a given line. The control experiment showed that very few people actually got the question wrong; however, when everyone else in the study had the same different answer, the students overwhelmingly chose to go with the group. At least one troubling result of the study is that some students were able to identify the correct answer and yet chose to give the wrong one. If there was a dissenting minority, then the proportion of students choosing to give the wrong answer decreased dramatically. However, perhaps even more troubling than choosing a wrong choice on purpose is the lack of awareness of how one's choice came to be: Some subjects who answered incorrectly exhibited cognitive dissonance, citing that they had simply mistaken the answer or had poor vision. If they chose the incorrect answer without knowing their rationale, did some students truly believe that they had chosen the correct answer? Did they think that they had found the correct facts? Would they have continued thinking they were correct had the researchers not informed them of their wrong answer? | > > | If subjective perception matters, does it affect only our view of facts or can they affect the facts themselves? In the Asch Conformity Experiments, psychologists have shown that the vast majority of college students in their study sample chose to conform to a wrong answer at least once during their series of experiments. The tests were factual, such as which of three lines most matched the length of a given line. The control experiment showed that very few people actually got the question wrong; however, when everyone else in the study had the same different answer, the students overwhelmingly chose to go with the group.
This doesn't show that
any facts have changed, right? Opinions have changed, not facts.
At least one troubling result of the study is that some students were able to identify the correct answer and yet chose to give the wrong one. If there was a dissenting minority, then the proportion of students choosing to give the wrong answer decreased dramatically. However, perhaps even more troubling than choosing a wrong choice on purpose is the lack of awareness of how one's choice came to be: Some subjects who answered incorrectly exhibited cognitive dissonance, citing that they had simply mistaken the answer or had poor vision. If they chose the incorrect answer without knowing their rationale, did some students truly believe that they had chosen the correct answer? Did they think that they had found the correct facts? Would they have continued thinking they were correct had the researchers not informed them of their wrong answer? | | Problems with legal uniformity | |
< < | If our sense of “fact” is thus unreliable, the implication of law by unanimous decision becomes extremely troublesome. Under modern criminal and civil law, American society accepts guilt if a purportedly representative group of citizens agrees unanimously. So why is consensus so important to legal legitimacy? And why choose a system which accepts some doubt into its standard of guilt, but deflects discomfort by using unanimous jury verdicts? This desire for conformity – while imposed onto juries by the legal system – seems to have some grounds in social behavior, as demonstrated by the Asch Experiment. Practically however, this creates problems because perception of fact - as a recent study into the Scott v. Harris case has found - depends on your background, your views as shaped by social forces, and more. While Scalia claimed that the videotape of the high-speed chase was dispositive that the plaintiff was a danger to others on the road, the experimental subjects were not unanimous on the issue. If this were a jury scenario, and almost everyone chose to give one particular answer, would the others be pressured enough into finding a fact that either they did not believe in or that they were unaware they were choosing? Unfortunately, Asch does not explore further the dynamics of getting a group to a unanimous decision. However, it seems that the jury system, in its pursuit of a unanimous decision on findings of facts, seeks to impose a sort of homogeneity of opinion upon its members. If the jury members cannot agree, this is not taken as a sign that there is reasonable doubt. Instead, that twelve persons selected by the two opposing counsels hold two conflicting, unwavering opinions is merely a sign that the jury malfunctioned in a way, and the trial must be conducted again, so that another group may make a unanimous and correct verdict. Why is this disagreement not taken as doubt? | > > | If our sense of “fact” is thus unreliable, the implication of law by unanimous decision becomes extremely troublesome. Under modern criminal and civil law, American society accepts guilt if a purportedly representative group of citizens agrees unanimously. | | | |
< < | It seems that the American legal system has a wider systemic obsession with consistency and homogenous application. However, there is a logical oddity. Courts value homogeneity of application enforced by hierarchy regarding questions of federal law: all courts must follow binding Supreme Court precedent. All courts must follow superior courts' and their own previous decisions as binding. What does this consistency achieve and why are inconsistent results not acceptable? While there is certainly a strong argument for administrability and equal treatment, there is at least an equally strong argument for justice in the individual case. Is this sort of flexibility so dangerous for the legal system to tolerate? For example, what would happen if each court, regardless of where it sat on the hierarchy, were allowed its own opinions? Certainly, Holmes's conception of legal study as prediction would fall apart since it would be nearly impossible to predict given no guidelines. Would injustice result in the individual case if courts were allowed to decide without external imposition? The idea that all parties would flock to one particularly beneficial place seems to implicate that that forum (or everyone else) is somehow engaged in contrary practice. And if the discomfort comes from contrary practice, then the underlying desire must be one of consistency rather than individual justice. An obvious cure for this fear is to impose strict liability for all acts which offend statutory or common law schemes. Surely by giving everyone the same exact punishment regardless of circumstances, you are ensuring maximum consistency and efficiency. However, courts are reluctant to do this either. This contradiction of seeking consistency and then rejecting it seems baffling at best. | > > | Unanimity is not always
required in civil adjudication. | | | |
< < | -- By HelenZhu
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.
To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" character on the next two lines: | > > | So why is consensus so important to legal legitimacy? | | | |
< < | | > > | Consensus is not
necessarily important to legitimacy. ("Legal legitimacy" is not
sensible usage.) The State cannot impose criminal punishment and
degradation without a consensus of citizens. That began as a
principle of fact-finding: the jury were witnesses who knew. Now, as
a result of the process by which the jury became factually naive and
politically entitled to acquit against the weight of the evidence, it
has become part of the system of constitutional protectiveness for
individual liberty, a procedure for the vindication of rights from
oppression, not a statement about fact-finding.
And why choose a system which accepts some doubt into its standard of guilt, but deflects discomfort by using unanimous jury verdicts?
Both the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the requirement of jury unanimity
coexisting with power to acquit against the weight of the evidence
are protections for individual liberty. Eighteenth-century Americans
had plenty of experience with the power of the jury to nullify laws
held to be unconstitutional and repugnant by the mass of the
locality. So did twentieth-century ones, for good as well as ill.
The generation that framed our constitutional arrangements had
particular confidence in the reliance on juries to protect liberty
against despotism. Subsequent generations of lawyers have varied in
their degree of belief in the value of these institutions, but no
generation of American lawyers has lived and died without witnessing
sterling examples of their value. Far more than these powers are
exercised, they are considered by prosecutors and other wielders of
the public force.
This desire for conformity – while imposed onto juries by the legal system – seems to have some grounds in social behavior, as demonstrated by the Asch Experiment. Practically however, this creates problems because perception of fact - as a recent study into the Scott v. Harris case has found - depends on your background, your views as shaped by social forces, and more. While Scalia claimed that the videotape of the high-speed chase was dispositive that the plaintiff was a danger to others on the road, the experimental subjects were not unanimous on the issue. If this were a jury scenario, and almost everyone chose to give one particular answer, would the others be pressured enough into finding a fact that either they did not believe in or that they were unaware they were choosing? Unfortunately, Asch does not explore further the dynamics of getting a group to a unanimous decision. However, it seems that the jury system, in its pursuit of a unanimous decision on findings of facts, seeks to impose a sort of homogeneity of opinion upon its members. If the jury members cannot agree, this is not taken as a sign that there is reasonable doubt. Instead, that twelve persons selected by the two opposing counsels hold two conflicting, unwavering opinions is merely a sign that the jury malfunctioned in a way, and the trial must be conducted again, so that another group may make a unanimous and correct verdict. Why is this disagreement not taken as doubt?
If it were doubt, the
jurors would agree that it was doubt, and that would bring the
matter to an end. It is failure of deliberation, which is something
else.
It seems that the American legal system has a wider systemic obsession with consistency and homogenous application. However, there is a logical oddity. Courts value homogeneity of application enforced by hierarchy regarding questions of federal law: all courts must follow binding Supreme Court precedent. All courts must follow superior courts' and their own previous decisions as binding. What does this consistency achieve and why are inconsistent results not acceptable? While there is certainly a strong argument for administrability and equal treatment, there is at least an equally strong argument for justice in the individual case. Is this sort of flexibility so dangerous for the legal system to tolerate?
What's the logical oddity?
For example, what would happen if each court, regardless of where it sat on the hierarchy, were allowed its own opinions? Certainly, Holmes's conception of legal study as prediction would fall apart since it would be nearly impossible to predict given no guidelines. Would injustice result in the individual case if courts were allowed to decide without external imposition? The idea that all parties would flock to one particularly beneficial place seems to implicate that that forum (or everyone else) is somehow engaged in contrary practice. And if the discomfort comes from contrary practice, then the underlying desire must be one of consistency rather than individual justice.
This argument makes no
sense to me as written. Individual justice involves application of
principles to facts. Because multiple sets of principles must be
applied, in different procedural contexts, a trial court has many
opportunities in most cases to make decisions intended to further
justice in the specific situation, without implicating any threat to
legal uniformity. Why uniformity of the exceedingly general kind
achievable through a hierarchy in which the Supreme Court determines
on argument and opinion in a Justice's lifetime less than the number
of cases decided in a busy judicial district in a year is supposed to
prevent efforts to do justice in individual cases I do not
understand. Is it your impression that a trial judge is likely to
feel continually, or even frequently, that injustice is done in her
courtroom because she cannot reverse decisions made by the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court?
An obvious cure for this fear is to impose strict liability for all acts which offend statutory or common law schemes. Surely by giving everyone the same exact punishment regardless of circumstances, you are ensuring maximum consistency and efficiency.
I don't understand what
this means. Only a small part of the law is penal, and "strict
liability" doesn't mean what you seem to want it to
mean.
However, courts are reluctant to do this either.
Do what? Rewrite laws?
This contradiction of seeking consistency and then rejecting it seems baffling at best.
The route to the
improvement of this essay is to edit the outline very carefully. You
need to determine clearly what the central idea is that you're trying
to get across to the reader. That idea needs to be stated,
succinctly, at the outset. Then illustrations, arguments,
explanations, depictions of context should flesh out the idea for the
reader in succeeding linked points, until a conclusion can show the
reader a direction of further thinking—implications,
possibilities, routes to overcome difficulties—disclosed to her
by the laying out of your idea. | | | |
< < | Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules for preference declarations. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of these lines. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated ALLOWTOPICVIEW list. | > > | -- By HelenZhu | | \ No newline at end of file |
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HelenZhuFirstPaper 1 - 16 Feb 2012 - Main.HelenZhu
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
The Comfort of Homogeneity
Reality is subject to human perception
Justice Holmes said, “certainty generally is illusion and repose is not the destiny of man.” However, let us broaden this phrase. Suppose we begin with the (hardly novel) premise that reality is subjective to our perception. Casting aside the irony of using objective, scientific proof to show all is subjective to our mind’s construction, neurologists have shown that one way humans experience the world is through memory. This is particularly vivid in time perception, where during moments of intense trauma or concentration, we experience time more slowly as a result of more memories. Although our minds reconstruct the recent past using sensory stimuli very quickly, this process nonetheless means that even seemingly innocuous facts such as time become subjective.
Is our perception subjective, or are facts themselves subjective?
If subjective perception matters, does it affect only our view of facts or can they affect the facts themselves? In the Asch Conformity Experiments, psychologists have shown that the vast majority of college students in their study sample chose to conform to a wrong answer at least once during their series of experiments. The tests were factual, such as which of three lines most matched the length of a given line. The control experiment showed that very few people actually got the question wrong; however, when everyone else in the study had the same different answer, the students overwhelmingly chose to go with the group. At least one troubling result of the study is that some students were able to identify the correct answer and yet chose to give the wrong one. If there was a dissenting minority, then the proportion of students choosing to give the wrong answer decreased dramatically. However, perhaps even more troubling than choosing a wrong choice on purpose is the lack of awareness of how one's choice came to be: Some subjects who answered incorrectly exhibited cognitive dissonance, citing that they had simply mistaken the answer or had poor vision. If they chose the incorrect answer without knowing their rationale, did some students truly believe that they had chosen the correct answer? Did they think that they had found the correct facts? Would they have continued thinking they were correct had the researchers not informed them of their wrong answer?
Problems with legal uniformity
If our sense of “fact” is thus unreliable, the implication of law by unanimous decision becomes extremely troublesome. Under modern criminal and civil law, American society accepts guilt if a purportedly representative group of citizens agrees unanimously. So why is consensus so important to legal legitimacy? And why choose a system which accepts some doubt into its standard of guilt, but deflects discomfort by using unanimous jury verdicts? This desire for conformity – while imposed onto juries by the legal system – seems to have some grounds in social behavior, as demonstrated by the Asch Experiment. Practically however, this creates problems because perception of fact - as a recent study into the Scott v. Harris case has found - depends on your background, your views as shaped by social forces, and more. While Scalia claimed that the videotape of the high-speed chase was dispositive that the plaintiff was a danger to others on the road, the experimental subjects were not unanimous on the issue. If this were a jury scenario, and almost everyone chose to give one particular answer, would the others be pressured enough into finding a fact that either they did not believe in or that they were unaware they were choosing? Unfortunately, Asch does not explore further the dynamics of getting a group to a unanimous decision. However, it seems that the jury system, in its pursuit of a unanimous decision on findings of facts, seeks to impose a sort of homogeneity of opinion upon its members. If the jury members cannot agree, this is not taken as a sign that there is reasonable doubt. Instead, that twelve persons selected by the two opposing counsels hold two conflicting, unwavering opinions is merely a sign that the jury malfunctioned in a way, and the trial must be conducted again, so that another group may make a unanimous and correct verdict. Why is this disagreement not taken as doubt?
It seems that the American legal system has a wider systemic obsession with consistency and homogenous application. However, there is a logical oddity. Courts value homogeneity of application enforced by hierarchy regarding questions of federal law: all courts must follow binding Supreme Court precedent. All courts must follow superior courts' and their own previous decisions as binding. What does this consistency achieve and why are inconsistent results not acceptable? While there is certainly a strong argument for administrability and equal treatment, there is at least an equally strong argument for justice in the individual case. Is this sort of flexibility so dangerous for the legal system to tolerate? For example, what would happen if each court, regardless of where it sat on the hierarchy, were allowed its own opinions? Certainly, Holmes's conception of legal study as prediction would fall apart since it would be nearly impossible to predict given no guidelines. Would injustice result in the individual case if courts were allowed to decide without external imposition? The idea that all parties would flock to one particularly beneficial place seems to implicate that that forum (or everyone else) is somehow engaged in contrary practice. And if the discomfort comes from contrary practice, then the underlying desire must be one of consistency rather than individual justice. An obvious cure for this fear is to impose strict liability for all acts which offend statutory or common law schemes. Surely by giving everyone the same exact punishment regardless of circumstances, you are ensuring maximum consistency and efficiency. However, courts are reluctant to do this either. This contradiction of seeking consistency and then rejecting it seems baffling at best.
-- By HelenZhu
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.
To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" character on the next two lines:
Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules for preference declarations. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of these lines. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated ALLOWTOPICVIEW list. |
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