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JamieGottliebFirstPaper 4 - 26 Mar 2009 - Main.IanSullivan
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The Estate Tax and Incentives for Charitable Giving
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<
< | The estate tax is a tool that combats the dynastic concentration of wealth among a small subset of society while raising revenues that fund important government social services. It will in all probability never be levied upon the majority of estates in the United States. However, the majority of Americans support the repeal of the so-called “death tax”,http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleId=7754, in effect acting to thwart their own economic self-interest. | >
> | The estate tax is a tool that combats the dynastic concentration of
wealth among a small subset of society while raising revenues that
fund important government social services. It will in all probability
never be levied upon the majority of estates in the United States.
However, the majority of Americans support the repeal of the so-called
“death tax”,
in effect acting to thwart their own economic self-interest. | | | In The Folklore of Capitalism, Arnold proposes that people act in ways that are counter to their own self interest “out of pure mystical idealism” that is “divorced from practical issues”. In the context of Arnold’s theory, one plausible explanation for the paradox of majority support for the repeal of the estate tax is the myth of the American Dream. The idea of America as a pure meritocracy where hard work allows individuals entry into the upper classes is deeply entrenched within our communal psyche. This emphasis upon aspirations towards upward class mobility provides a possible account for why people so overwhelmingly disfavor the estate tax, i.e. that they support its present repeal in the hope and expectation that either they or their children will one day have an estate large enough to be affected by it. | |
<
< | The rhetoric utilized by opponents of the estate tax frames it as tax upon dying instead of a tax upon the transfer of wealth. One aspect of this rhetoric is that it contributes to perceptions of the estate tax that are not aligned with reality - renaming it as the “death tax” alters people’s point of view without altering the reality of the tax itself.
Indeed, the gap between perception and reality plays a role in other ways. For instance, in analyzing data from a 2003 opinion survey, Larry Bartels found that half of the respondents thought that most families would have to pay the estate tax, while another 18% did not know whether the federal estate tax applies generally or just to a few families http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleId=7754. People overestimate the actual scope of the estate tax by miscalculating their place in the wealth hierarchy as well as through placing faith in a statistically unlikely rise into a higher class: “[n]ineteen percent of Americans say they are in the richest 1 percent and a further 20 percent expect to be someday.”http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B01EED61F3EF931A25752C0A9659C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1 | >
> | The rhetoric utilized by opponents of the estate tax frames it
as tax upon dying instead of a tax upon the transfer of wealth. One
aspect of this rhetoric is that it contributes to perceptions of the
estate tax that are not aligned with reality - renaming it as the
“death tax” alters people’s point of view without
altering the reality of the tax itself. Indeed, the gap between
perception and reality plays a role in other ways. For instance, in
analyzing data from a 2003 opinion survey, Larry Bartels found that
half of the respondents thought that most families would have to pay
the estate tax, while another 18% did not know whether the federal
estate tax applies generally or just to a few families. [[http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B01EED61F3EF931A25752C0A9659C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1][People
overestimate the actual scope]] of the estate tax by miscalculating
their place in the wealth hierarchy as well as through placing faith
in a statistically unlikely rise into a higher class:
“ nineteen percent of Americans say they are in the richest 1
percent and a further 20 percent expect to be
someday.” | | | | |
<
< | However, placing complete responsibility for the widespread irrational behavior towards the estate tax at the feet of the myth of the American Dream is an oversimplification. While it is clear that there is a gap between how people visualize the estate tax and its actual impact, decreasing the knowledge gap does not necessarily effectively combat distaste for the estate tax. In analyzing data from the 2002 National Election Study survey, Larry Bartels found that even people who are well-informed about politics and are much more aware of growing class stratification (and more likely to view economic inequality negatively) are “no less likely than less-informed citizens to support repealing the estate tax.”http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleId=7754 Thus, people who understand the mythological aspects of the American Dream are just as likely to oppose the estate tax as those who place their faith in the fiction of a permeable class barrier. | >
> | However, placing complete responsibility for the widespread irrational behavior towards the estate tax at the feet of the myth of the American Dream is an oversimplification. While it is clear that there is a gap between how people visualize the estate tax and its actual impact, decreasing the knowledge gap does not necessarily effectively combat distaste for the estate tax. In analyzing data from the 2002 National Election Study survey, Larry Bartels found that even people who are well-informed about politics and are much more aware of growing class stratification (and more likely to view economic inequality negatively) are “no less likely than less-informed citizens to support repealing the estate tax.” Thus, people who understand the mythological aspects of the American Dream are just as likely to oppose the estate tax as those who place their faith in the fiction of a permeable class barrier. | | | | |
<
< | One factor may be an alternative mythology that pushes issues of class distinctions and barriers, whether permeable or not, to the side. As noted by David Brooks, Americans resist thinking about wealth redistribution because they prefer not to focus upon the existence of wealth stratification and or upon divisions along lines of class.http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B01EED61F3EF931A25752C0A9659C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2 Instead of thinking about American society through the lens of hierarchy, they prefer to use the lens of community. Thus, Brooks hypothesizes that the political landscape is “incredibly inhospitable to class-based politics” which are seen as “combative rather than unifying.”http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B01EED61F3EF931A25752C0A9659C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2 | >
> | One factor may be an alternative mythology that pushes issues of class distinctions and barriers, whether permeable or not, to the side. As noted by David Brooks, Americans resist thinking about wealth redistribution because they prefer not to focus upon the existence of wealth stratification and or upon divisions along lines of class. Instead of thinking about American society through the lens of hierarchy, they prefer to use the lens of community. Thus, Brooks hypothesizes that the political landscape is “incredibly inhospitable to class-based politics” which are seen as “combative rather than unifying.” | | | | |
<
< | Brooks’ theory is useful when placed alongside data from Larry Bartels’ article Unenlightened Self-Interest. Bartels notes that people who feel as if they pay too much in federal income taxes are substantially more likely to support a repeal of the estate tax.http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleId=7754 Individuals who feel that their own taxes are a burden may feel a sense of empathy towards those affected by the estate tax. Although this could be attributed to lack of information, since at least in some cases it appears that misinformation does not sufficiently account for lack of support for the estate tax, it is useful to return to Brooks’ theory of a preference towards a community-oriented vision of society. | >
> | Brooks’ theory is useful when placed alongside data from Larry Bartels’ article Unenlightened Self-Interest. Bartels notes that people who feel as if they pay too much in federal income taxes are substantially more likely to support a repeal of the estate tax. Individuals who feel that their own taxes are a burden may feel a sense of empathy towards those affected by the estate tax. Although this could be attributed to lack of information, since at least in some cases it appears that misinformation does not sufficiently account for lack of support for the estate tax, it is useful to return to Brooks’ theory of a preference towards a community-oriented vision of society. | | | | |
<
< | Given a preference for the myth of a community that is not divided by class, one possible way to advocate for the estate tax is to frame supporting it as a decision that strengthen the bonds of community, not just as an effort to fight inequality between members of society. One possible way to do this would be to emphasize that the estate tax incentivizes people to give to charity both during their lifetimes and within their wills, and to point out evidence that repealing the estate tax causes a decline in charitable giving.http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/56xx/doc5650/07-15-CharitableGiving.pdf Charitable giving is not just about redistributing wealth – it strengthens communal ties and allows for cultural, scientific and technological growth and innovation. | >
> | Given a preference for the myth of a community that is not divided by class, one possible way to advocate for the estate tax is to frame supporting it as a decision that strengthen the bonds of community, not just as an effort to fight inequality between members of society. One possible way to do this would be to emphasize that the estate tax incentivizes people to give to charity both during their lifetimes and within their wills, and to point out evidence that repealing the estate tax causes a decline in charitable giving. Charitable giving is not just about redistributing wealth – it strengthens communal ties and allows for cultural, scientific and technological growth and innovation. | | | Framing the estate tax not only as an attempt to prevent the solidification of the vast concentration of wealth among a small subset of society, but also as an effort to incentivize behavior that strengthens communal bonds may decrease support for its repeal even among those who are uninformed about the actual impact of the estate tax and who are uninformed about the increasingly limited possibilities of upward social mobility. | |
>
> |
- I cleaned up your citations. Please study the raw version of this page in order to see how to use the link aid in the topic editor.
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<
< | Works Cited
1. Larry M. Bartels, Unenlightened Self-Interest: The strange appeal of estate-tax repeal, The American Prospect, May 17, 2004.
2. David Brooks, The Triumph of Hope Over Self-Interest, N.Y. Times, January 12, 2003.
3. Congressional Budget Office, Congress of the United States, The Estate Tax and Charitable Giving (July 2004). | >
> |
- This could be much compressed. You say this is an issue in which framing has made a major difference. You are hardly the first to observe this, and it can be said in a sentence. You think pointing to the value of charitable giving would help with reframing. No doubt you are right, and that too can be said in a paragraph. Further thought will convince that this reframing can be no more than subsidiary: people have never been convinced to impose a tax on the basis of the good works that will flow from the attempt to find a deduction. This can be no more than a secondary argument in support of retaining a tax that has been otherwise justified. So the nature of the primary reframing has gone unsuggested in this draft, and to that end radical compression would permit some further explication. Surely contemporary events suggest a number of possible approaches.
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JamieGottliebFirstPaper 3 - 27 Feb 2009 - Main.IanSullivan
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| | | The Estate Tax and Incentives for Charitable Giving
| | | 1. Larry M. Bartels, Unenlightened Self-Interest: The strange appeal of estate-tax repeal, The American Prospect, May 17, 2004.
2. David Brooks, The Triumph of Hope Over Self-Interest, N.Y. Times, January 12, 2003.
3. Congressional Budget Office, Congress of the United States, The Estate Tax and Charitable Giving (July 2004). | |
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JamieGottliebFirstPaper 2 - 27 Feb 2009 - Main.JamieGottlieb
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> | The Estate Tax and Incentives for Charitable Giving | | | | |
>
> | The estate tax is a tool that combats the dynastic concentration of wealth among a small subset of society while raising revenues that fund important government social services. It will in all probability never be levied upon the majority of estates in the United States. However, the majority of Americans support the repeal of the so-called “death tax”,http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleId=7754, in effect acting to thwart their own economic self-interest. | | | | |
<
< | -- MichelleChun - 27 Feb 2009 | >
> | In The Folklore of Capitalism, Arnold proposes that people act in ways that are counter to their own self interest “out of pure mystical idealism” that is “divorced from practical issues”. In the context of Arnold’s theory, one plausible explanation for the paradox of majority support for the repeal of the estate tax is the myth of the American Dream. The idea of America as a pure meritocracy where hard work allows individuals entry into the upper classes is deeply entrenched within our communal psyche. This emphasis upon aspirations towards upward class mobility provides a possible account for why people so overwhelmingly disfavor the estate tax, i.e. that they support its present repeal in the hope and expectation that either they or their children will one day have an estate large enough to be affected by it. | | | | |
<
< | Last Thursday on Lincoln’s birthday, I had a dream of Honest Abe himself sitting at a picnic table in a friend’s backyard, wearing nothing but a threadbare undershirt. We talked about deliberative democracy. I was nervous but secretly hoping he’d stick around long enough to take a photo with me so I could post it on facebook (which would surely beat a $2500 pic with an un-minted, living presidential candidate). | >
> | The rhetoric utilized by opponents of the estate tax frames it as tax upon dying instead of a tax upon the transfer of wealth. One aspect of this rhetoric is that it contributes to perceptions of the estate tax that are not aligned with reality - renaming it as the “death tax” alters people’s point of view without altering the reality of the tax itself.
Indeed, the gap between perception and reality plays a role in other ways. For instance, in analyzing data from a 2003 opinion survey, Larry Bartels found that half of the respondents thought that most families would have to pay the estate tax, while another 18% did not know whether the federal estate tax applies generally or just to a few families http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleId=7754. People overestimate the actual scope of the estate tax by miscalculating their place in the wealth hierarchy as well as through placing faith in a statistically unlikely rise into a higher class: “[n]ineteen percent of Americans say they are in the richest 1 percent and a further 20 percent expect to be someday.”http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B01EED61F3EF931A25752C0A9659C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1 | | | | |
<
< | My friend, incidentally, dreamt of Obama that same night – not playing Scrabble with the rest of Judith Warner’s unfulfilled coterie of freshly-self-discovered-as-mediocre friends – but dictating notes for her to type, as he hovered obnoxiously, demandingly, perfectly presidential. She was annoyed. | >
> | However, placing complete responsibility for the widespread irrational behavior towards the estate tax at the feet of the myth of the American Dream is an oversimplification. While it is clear that there is a gap between how people visualize the estate tax and its actual impact, decreasing the knowledge gap does not necessarily effectively combat distaste for the estate tax. In analyzing data from the 2002 National Election Study survey, Larry Bartels found that even people who are well-informed about politics and are much more aware of growing class stratification (and more likely to view economic inequality negatively) are “no less likely than less-informed citizens to support repealing the estate tax.”http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleId=7754 Thus, people who understand the mythological aspects of the American Dream are just as likely to oppose the estate tax as those who place their faith in the fiction of a permeable class barrier. | | | | |
<
< | I offered her this trenchant analysis of her dream: your Obama isn’t a reflection of all we could have been, but the “dictator” (yes) of dreams we’re supposed to inscribe into our twenty-something earnest yes-we-can overachieving lives. Obama was the lawyer to her scrivener and her response, as Herman Melville’s Bartleby would put it: “Mr. President, I would prefer not to.” | >
> | One factor may be an alternative mythology that pushes issues of class distinctions and barriers, whether permeable or not, to the side. As noted by David Brooks, Americans resist thinking about wealth redistribution because they prefer not to focus upon the existence of wealth stratification and or upon divisions along lines of class.http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B01EED61F3EF931A25752C0A9659C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2 Instead of thinking about American society through the lens of hierarchy, they prefer to use the lens of community. Thus, Brooks hypothesizes that the political landscape is “incredibly inhospitable to class-based politics” which are seen as “combative rather than unifying.”http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B01EED61F3EF931A25752C0A9659C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2 | | | | |
<
< | I bring up Bartleby because, like Obama, he easily reflects whatever preferred worldviews we project onto him. He’s an absurdist precursor to Holmesian jurisprudence: he states his preferences (he’s got only one) and gets the job done (or not done) with one phrase. If he’s a parody of Thoreau disobeying civil-ly, he’s equally a friend to Cohen without a trace of transcendental nonsense behind his reasoning, or for that matter, his life of quiet desperation. He makes a mockery of the thinking man, embodied by the respectable and moderate narrator with a well-deserved income – whose reaction to Bartleby flip-flops between pity, panic, and self-righteousness. | >
> | Brooks’ theory is useful when placed alongside data from Larry Bartels’ article Unenlightened Self-Interest. Bartels notes that people who feel as if they pay too much in federal income taxes are substantially more likely to support a repeal of the estate tax.http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleId=7754 Individuals who feel that their own taxes are a burden may feel a sense of empathy towards those affected by the estate tax. Although this could be attributed to lack of information, since at least in some cases it appears that misinformation does not sufficiently account for lack of support for the estate tax, it is useful to return to Brooks’ theory of a preference towards a community-oriented vision of society. | | | | |
<
< | But is it fair to compare Obama to the uptight Wall Street lawyer whom Melville disdained? | >
> | Given a preference for the myth of a community that is not divided by class, one possible way to advocate for the estate tax is to frame supporting it as a decision that strengthen the bonds of community, not just as an effort to fight inequality between members of society. One possible way to do this would be to emphasize that the estate tax incentivizes people to give to charity both during their lifetimes and within their wills, and to point out evidence that repealing the estate tax causes a decline in charitable giving.http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/56xx/doc5650/07-15-CharitableGiving.pdf Charitable giving is not just about redistributing wealth – it strengthens communal ties and allows for cultural, scientific and technological growth and innovation. | | | | |
<
< | To me, the question pivots on what being a lawyer means, if that’s defined as using words to make changes in society. As Arnold seems to say, the codification of creeds into our language of justifying existing social organizations turns words into catchphrases and observation into mythology. We’re a society based on words, which just points us back to the fact our Constitution is a codification of our mythologies. We’re faced then with how we very problematically evoke logic, through nicely worded arguments, to float around cold hard facts and social realities and preferences. But this is where I get stuck. As simplistically as I understand it – and tried to explain to President Lincoln – that Habermasian notion of meaningful democratic deliberation or rational discourse towards achieving shared ends treads on people sharing a linguistic realm. And in the vein of Arnold, beyond Habermas, or Stanley Fish, or whoever, our language is a byproduct of external social forces and is its own social organization. So where do we place the myth of the thinking man into this linguistic organization? If the antecedent to being a writer or a lawyer is being enmeshed in a linguistic organization that we would be fools to believe can be controlled by a rational thinking man through his self-determined words, then how different really is a risk-adverse scrivener from any law student attempting to use words to make changes in society? | >
> | Framing the estate tax not only as an attempt to prevent the solidification of the vast concentration of wealth among a small subset of society, but also as an effort to incentivize behavior that strengthens communal bonds may decrease support for its repeal even among those who are uninformed about the actual impact of the estate tax and who are uninformed about the increasingly limited possibilities of upward social mobility. | | | | |
<
< | So invoking the thinking man to ridicule the notion that we make choices of our own free will implicates the very way we choose our words – or don’t really choose them after all. Whether we choose Obama or a Wall Street lawyer as our literary apostle, we’re still just inscribing the dictates of broader social forces and passing them off as our own. Maybe that leaves us with only a sliver of agency in declaring whether we’d prefer not to take part in this exercise at all. | | | | |
<
< | There’s probably a gap (or several) in logic here – that being part of a determinate linguistic-social organization doesn’t mean we can’t change how or what we say. Just as the present moment seems to offer tantalizing potential to change the social organizations we’ve clung to for decades, maybe we can also find a way to insert bogeyman terms like “socialism” or “justice” into our popular discourse. But this is where I don’t follow Arnold (though I’m pretty sure I lost his point much earlier). It seems like words themselves, even if we judge them on the basis of what they do, not the niceties of their logical construction, aren’t going to get us out of this situation. Whether we call it “socialism” or a “bail-out” or ditch our “Yes We Can” incantations, how do we know the words we use are our own – part of our own personal reflections and decisions on the changes we want to make in society? | | | | |
<
< | Arnold uses the analogy of the thinking rational man as a flattering self-portrait we hang on our walls, which is a useless prop to show a doctor if you want him to diagnose an illness plaguing your actual, factual body. And it seems only fair to turn to diagnose my own Lincoln dream and question the unwritten subtext of that conversation. Maybe my own ambition of being an honest participant in some political conversation is plagued by factors beyond my control. Maybe deep down I would like to sit with Lincoln, stripped down –literally – from his lofty American hero perch, talk about the facts of democracy without the incantations of the Emancipation Proclamation: then we'd be facebook buddies, in our pajamas, and play board games with Obama too! I could then post the notes of our meeting on this wiki and get a good grade from my professor! But maybe this isn’t about me or Lincoln, but justice! humanity! Bartleby! Or maybe my ambition is just to understand where to draw some baseline of responsibility and agency behind the jumble of words I’m offering here and to figure out what to do with a potentially self-defeating interpretation of other people’s dreams. | >
> | Works Cited
1. Larry M. Bartels, Unenlightened Self-Interest: The strange appeal of estate-tax repeal, The American Prospect, May 17, 2004.
2. David Brooks, The Triumph of Hope Over Self-Interest, N.Y. Times, January 12, 2003.
3. Congressional Budget Office, Congress of the United States, The Estate Tax and Charitable Giving (July 2004). |
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JamieGottliebFirstPaper 1 - 27 Feb 2009 - Main.MichelleChun
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-- MichelleChun - 27 Feb 2009
Last Thursday on Lincoln’s birthday, I had a dream of Honest Abe himself sitting at a picnic table in a friend’s backyard, wearing nothing but a threadbare undershirt. We talked about deliberative democracy. I was nervous but secretly hoping he’d stick around long enough to take a photo with me so I could post it on facebook (which would surely beat a $2500 pic with an un-minted, living presidential candidate).
My friend, incidentally, dreamt of Obama that same night – not playing Scrabble with the rest of Judith Warner’s unfulfilled coterie of freshly-self-discovered-as-mediocre friends – but dictating notes for her to type, as he hovered obnoxiously, demandingly, perfectly presidential. She was annoyed.
I offered her this trenchant analysis of her dream: your Obama isn’t a reflection of all we could have been, but the “dictator” (yes) of dreams we’re supposed to inscribe into our twenty-something earnest yes-we-can overachieving lives. Obama was the lawyer to her scrivener and her response, as Herman Melville’s Bartleby would put it: “Mr. President, I would prefer not to.”
I bring up Bartleby because, like Obama, he easily reflects whatever preferred worldviews we project onto him. He’s an absurdist precursor to Holmesian jurisprudence: he states his preferences (he’s got only one) and gets the job done (or not done) with one phrase. If he’s a parody of Thoreau disobeying civil-ly, he’s equally a friend to Cohen without a trace of transcendental nonsense behind his reasoning, or for that matter, his life of quiet desperation. He makes a mockery of the thinking man, embodied by the respectable and moderate narrator with a well-deserved income – whose reaction to Bartleby flip-flops between pity, panic, and self-righteousness.
But is it fair to compare Obama to the uptight Wall Street lawyer whom Melville disdained?
To me, the question pivots on what being a lawyer means, if that’s defined as using words to make changes in society. As Arnold seems to say, the codification of creeds into our language of justifying existing social organizations turns words into catchphrases and observation into mythology. We’re a society based on words, which just points us back to the fact our Constitution is a codification of our mythologies. We’re faced then with how we very problematically evoke logic, through nicely worded arguments, to float around cold hard facts and social realities and preferences. But this is where I get stuck. As simplistically as I understand it – and tried to explain to President Lincoln – that Habermasian notion of meaningful democratic deliberation or rational discourse towards achieving shared ends treads on people sharing a linguistic realm. And in the vein of Arnold, beyond Habermas, or Stanley Fish, or whoever, our language is a byproduct of external social forces and is its own social organization. So where do we place the myth of the thinking man into this linguistic organization? If the antecedent to being a writer or a lawyer is being enmeshed in a linguistic organization that we would be fools to believe can be controlled by a rational thinking man through his self-determined words, then how different really is a risk-adverse scrivener from any law student attempting to use words to make changes in society?
So invoking the thinking man to ridicule the notion that we make choices of our own free will implicates the very way we choose our words – or don’t really choose them after all. Whether we choose Obama or a Wall Street lawyer as our literary apostle, we’re still just inscribing the dictates of broader social forces and passing them off as our own. Maybe that leaves us with only a sliver of agency in declaring whether we’d prefer not to take part in this exercise at all.
There’s probably a gap (or several) in logic here – that being part of a determinate linguistic-social organization doesn’t mean we can’t change how or what we say. Just as the present moment seems to offer tantalizing potential to change the social organizations we’ve clung to for decades, maybe we can also find a way to insert bogeyman terms like “socialism” or “justice” into our popular discourse. But this is where I don’t follow Arnold (though I’m pretty sure I lost his point much earlier). It seems like words themselves, even if we judge them on the basis of what they do, not the niceties of their logical construction, aren’t going to get us out of this situation. Whether we call it “socialism” or a “bail-out” or ditch our “Yes We Can” incantations, how do we know the words we use are our own – part of our own personal reflections and decisions on the changes we want to make in society?
Arnold uses the analogy of the thinking rational man as a flattering self-portrait we hang on our walls, which is a useless prop to show a doctor if you want him to diagnose an illness plaguing your actual, factual body. And it seems only fair to turn to diagnose my own Lincoln dream and question the unwritten subtext of that conversation. Maybe my own ambition of being an honest participant in some political conversation is plagued by factors beyond my control. Maybe deep down I would like to sit with Lincoln, stripped down –literally – from his lofty American hero perch, talk about the facts of democracy without the incantations of the Emancipation Proclamation: then we'd be facebook buddies, in our pajamas, and play board games with Obama too! I could then post the notes of our meeting on this wiki and get a good grade from my professor! But maybe this isn’t about me or Lincoln, but justice! humanity! Bartleby! Or maybe my ambition is just to understand where to draw some baseline of responsibility and agency behind the jumble of words I’m offering here and to figure out what to do with a potentially self-defeating interpretation of other people’s dreams. |
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