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I think I'm going to discuss how abortion rights as granted by the court are an example of transcendental nonsense; by supporting the law with meaningless law talk, the court created a woman's right to abortion but left it on tenuous grounds. The reasons given for the law don't really add up to the court's conclusion, and the decision (and the right it provides) are open to attack. Lawyering is about changing the world with your words; the majority could not easily do that in regards to abortion, but they could use their power to invent a right and justify it with law talk. I've been thinking about this topic all weekend and I'm just starting to flush out how it will go, so take this as a very rough statement of what I'm looking to do. Also, I intend to stay away from analyzing Roe v Wade or other court decisions since the point of the class is not to read cases like we do in other boring classes. I'm focusing more on how/why the court's language and reasoning don't actually address justifications for women to have a choice, and the problems this creates.
I uploaded an outline I made on Word... I'm more comfortable with Word's format, but I'll try to keep a step by step update on the wiki. | | | Transcendental Nonsense: The Creation and Disintegration of Abortion Rights
-- By JaredBaumgart - 11 Feb 2008 | |
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> | This paper isn't yet ready to be re-read | | | Introduction
Transcendental nonsense in Roe v Wade suggests that women have the right to an abortion. More accurately, state legislatures cannot ban abortion, subject to certain restrictions. Because they are guaranteed in legal talk rather than functional language, abortion rights are tenuous. These rights illustrate Cohen’s contention that “traditional language of argument and opinion neither explains nor justifies court decisions” because it “forgets the social forces which mold the law and the social ideals by which the law is to be judged”. (Cohen, 40/812)
The Law Talk Problem | |
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< | Blackmun’s opinion classifies abortion as a female privacy issue because he can then justify Roe’s outcome in law talk: the 14th Amendment guarantees the right to privacy, therefore States cannot prohibit abortion. Blackmun’s opinion may be correct under formal logic, in that his premises as defined lead to his conclusion. But it does not matter because logic can argue the same premises to the opposite conclusion. Blackmun’s logic cannot explain why we should have the right to abortion; it does not exist because the Constitution says so, and reaching that conclusion through law talk misses the true social and ethical justifications. The opinion is unconvincing because abortion is a complex issue with many facets beyond legal analysis, and to understand why abortion deserves legal protection requires inquiries into these other fields.
- To say that you are not discussing opinions because it is boring and you want to concentrate on something else gives you no license to misrepresent what opinions say. Are you sure you have read Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe?
Meaningful abortion rights must be rooted in life’s realities, supported by empiricism. Few people advocate pro-choice because of the Constitution; other arguments are more compelling. Sociologically, communities benefit by reducing unwanted pregnancies, unwanted children, overcrowding, and resource depletion. Preserving individual liberty is an end in itself. Psychologically, unwanted pregnancies create substantial mental distress. Economically, abortion reduces financial burdens on poor families. Biologically, if a fetus is not a life then it holds no rights over its mother. Historically, some cultures allowed abortions. These functional arguments demonstrate the empirical value in abortion rights, but the rights still exist only through meaningless legal logic.
- What did this passage mean? It sounds impressive, but it is not at all clear what you have said.
Holmes stresses that understanding the law requires understanding what it does and how it works. Roe limits States’ power to bar abortions; it functions by striking down legislation prohibiting abortion. Roe does not create an affirmative right to abortion, it only limits States’ powers. This distinction is important, because an affirmative right is difficult to take away. Roe only implies a right, which is more easily attacked. The right is only implied because superficial legal logic cannot establish a meaningful law; without reality-based support for the law it will not do anything. The law exists in writing but exerts little effect, and when five justices no longer accept Roe’s language it will no longer be true.
- There are two arguments conflated here. One, about the difference between negative and positive rights, and the other, about defeasibility. Neither of the two arguments you are making is self-evident, and by confusing them you went nowhere with both.
Making Pro-Choice Functional
The legal opinion presents only a legal reason to allow abortion; it doesnot change moral opinions, advance the utility, or change the stigma surrounding abortion. If abortion rights were created by normative values instead of legal language, the functional justifications would guarantee the right in a meaningful context that actually protects access to abortion. Though difficult, pro-choicers can achieve this end. | >
> | Abortion is not discussed expressly in the Constitution. Blackmun’s opinion justifies abortion by expanding on a progeny of cases discussing the right to privacy: precedents have interpreted the 14th Amendment to establish a right to privacy, such privacy includes bodily privacy and decisional autonomy, states denying abortion infringe on those privacies, and therefore states cannot prohibit abortion absent a compelling interest narrowly tailored to their purpose. Blackmun’s opinion may be correct under formal logic, in that his premises as defined lead to his conclusion. But it does not matter because logic can argue the same premises to the opposite conclusion; the dissent’s law talk is also convincing. If states cannot restrict abortion pre-viability, then it is not because the Constitution can be read to say so. To make abortion rights meaningful, they should be rooted deeper than the law. The law reflects the social consensus at the time; abortion rights should be established in the social and moral undertones which the law reflects. Laws that don’t reflect the values of society will always be vulnerable. What we need is a reason why social and ethical reasons support reading abortion rights into the Constitution rather than the opposite reading. | | | | |
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> | Few people are pro-choice because Supreme Court precedents read the Constitution to support that position. Those who fight for abortion rights find more compelling reasons that involve practical concerns, not legal theory. Sociologically, communities benefit by reducing unwanted pregnancies, unwanted children, overcrowding, and resource depletion. Preserving individual liberty is an end in itself. Psychologically, unwanted pregnancies create substantial mental distress. Economically, abortion reduces financial burdens on poor families. Biologically, if a fetus is not a life then it holds no rights over its mother. Historically, some cultures allowed abortions. Despite the number of functional arguments for allowing abortions, these concerns have not been used to bolster the right. The right still stands on law talk about the 14th Amendment. | | | | |
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> | Holmes stresses that understanding the law requires understanding what it does and how it works. What Roe does is limit states’ power to bar abortions pre-viability; it functions by declaring any such legislation as unconstitutional. Roe’s holding did more to limit states’ power and less to actually create abortion rights. States still had considerable abilities to limit abortion. In Maher v Roe, the Court allowed states to encourage childbirth over abortion by limiting Medicaid benefits to only medically necessary abortions. Three years later, Harris v McRae? held that states were not required to dispense Medicaid benefits even for abortions that were medically necessary. The practical affect was that abortion was still unavailable to many women. http://www.feminist.com/resources/ourbodies/abortion.html. Without disturbing Roe’s holding, its practical affect had been greatly diminished. | | | | |
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- This appears to mean that law is not a substitute for other forms of social control necessary in order to eliminate religiously-based opposition to abortion. Though almost certainly true, it isn't clear why that's a relevant argument here.
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> | Continued Deterioration | | | | |
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> | Abortion rights have continued to teeter on legal language, with current access to abortions limited and future access not guaranteed. The disintegration is not imminent; it is happening. Several cases have broadened states’ rights to restrict when and how women can have abortions. Casey v Planned Parenthood demonstrated the precariousness of abortion rights only twenty years after they were created. Roe narrowly escaped being overturned, and the plurality indicates Roe’s law talk was not convincing. That Court could only justify keeping Roe’s central holding that pre-viability abortions cannot be unduly restricted; the pro-choice justices could no longer justify the trimester scheme Roe had established, and they could not overrule several of the burdens Pennsylvania had placed on abortions. The laws declared constitutional, particularly the 24 hour waiting period, deny women access to abortion. The Court did not have the ability preserve practical access to abortion; they could only protect the right with law talk, and that protection extended only so far. | | | | |
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> | In Stenberg v Carhart (2000), a state law prohibiting partial-birth abortion was ruled unconstitutional because it did not include a medical health exception. Seven years later, Gonzales v Carhart “ “adhered to precedent” ” while banning partial-birth abortion without providing a medical health exception. Ginsburg’s dissent charged that the majority “refuses to take Casey and Stenberg seriously” and “tolerates, indeed applauds, federal intervention to ban nationwide a procedure found necessary and proper in certain cases”. I agree with Justice Ginsburg that the difference in the two rulings, just seven years apart, is substantial. The jurisprudence has shifted away from concern for women’s autonomy towards a battle between the justices’ politics, and if precedents can just be circumvented then women can place no faith in the future of their right to abortion. Perhaps most telling, and troubling, is the latest addition to the Court. Justice Alito was on the Third Circuit when it decided Casey, and he filed a separate opinion which would have upheld all the laws at issue. He believed there was no undue burden if the law affected only a small percentage of women. Of course, that small percentage of women affected were likely the most powerless in the most desperate situations; they were the ones who would most need legal protection of their rights. | | | | |
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< | They have to convince religious pro-lifers that abortion does not offend spiritual beliefs, or that religion should not determine American politics. Religious institutions are highly influential and efforts to separate religious and secular morals would meet substantial resistance. Still, a difficult endeavor is doable. Religions adapt to their surrounding societies when pushed, and already some religious institutions are pro-choice. | >
> | These cases demonstrate that there’s a divergence between what is protected in legal theory, and what is protected in practice. It does not matter that abortions are legal; even with Roe many people that need an abortion are denied for lack of means. A powerful pro-life movement is strongly motivated to change abortion rights. With the right case, Court, and social atmosphere, the legal reasoning supporting abortion can be overturned. Abortion will then have no legs to stand on, since functional language was not used to secure the right. | | | | |
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> | The effort required to change abortion rights through functional laws, and not through judicial law talk, is substantial. Arnold would not question pro-choice leaders establishing abortion rights through the Court. They did what they could and gained what could realistically be gained. Had they not acted then the pro-lifers viewpoint would have prevailed instead. Nevertheless, the consequence of transcendental nonsense exists. It may be impossible to fix these problems in the near future; but long-term, rooting abortion rights in institutions besides legal institutions is an achievable goal. Rights that are secured only through law talk, without the underlying support from a moral and social consensus, will always be vulnerable to the votes of the Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court can always go against public consensus, building a pro-choice consensus would create a formidable barrier to such actions. | | | | |
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- This is so blunt it risks being perceived as self-satire. Surely you don't seriously mean this?
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< | Political opposition is formidable. Arnold’s political discussion indicates politicians will try to eliminate abortion because doing so can win elections. Claiming that the 14th Amendment guarantees the right to abortion will not appease political opposition; explaining the problem in functional terms might, because changing voters’ views affects which ends politicians pursue. By spurring action through the Court, the pro-choice movement did not effect political change which could have more concrete results.
Finally, creating a legal right does not address the problem’s roots. Abortion is one solution to society’s sexual and socioeconomic problems; we require abortion because we do not know how to fix social structures to prevent unwanted pregnancies in the first place. An alternative to converting pro-lifers is to instead cure the causes of abortions. Abortion may currently be too controversial to enact change, but by remedying the root causes and minimizing the problem, a pro-choice advocate would face a lower burden in persuading others.
Lawyering is the ability to induce change with words. The effort required to change abortion rights through functional words, not through judicial nonsense, is substantial. But it is not impossible. Arnold would not question pro-choice leaders establishing abortion rights through the Court. They did what they could and gained what could realistically be gained. Had they not acted then pro-lifers would have acted instead. Nevertheless, the consequence of transcendental nonsense exists.
- It seems likely that you have no idea of the history you are talking about. If you didn't read opinions, what did you read?
The Consequences: The End of Abortion Rights
The consequence is an abortion right teetering on legal language. In practice this means that women’s current access to abortions is limited, and future access is not guaranteed. It does not matter that abortions are legal; even with Roe many people that need an abortion are denied for lack of means. A powerful pro-life movement is strongly motivated to change abortion rights. With the right case, Court, and social atmosphere, the legal reasoning supporting abortion can be overturned. Abortion will then have no legs to stand on, since functional language was not used to secure the right.
The disintegration is not imminent; it is happening. Several cases have broadened States’ rights to restrict when and how women can have abortions. Casey v Planned Parenthood demonstrates the precariousness of abortion rights only twenty years after they were created. Roe narrowly escaped being overturned, and the plurality indicates Roe’s law talk was not convincing. In 2007, Gonzales v Carhart “adhered to precedent” by ignoring prior holdings and banning Partial-Birth abortion. Regardless of one’s stance on the issue, it is distressing that a previously held right can be taken away when five judges stop using certain law talk.
- Um, what? What can five votes on the Supreme Court not do?
975 words
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (U.S. 1973)
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (U.S. 1994)
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (U.S. 2007)
- The process of improving this piece is the process of replacing under-informed arrogant near-speculation by a more historically-aware account of what happened and why. I think David Garrow's book should suffice.
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I think the middle part of my first paper didn't work at all; it came across as an Obama "Yes We Can" speech which didn't give much substance. So, I removed that part and tried to narrow the focus a bit. I'm wondering if discussion of substantive due process as a concept would help, or if it would be too broad for the purposes of this paper. | | | # * Set ALLOWTOPICVIEW = TWikiAdminGroup, JaredBaumgart
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