• I'm not sure how it is tautological, but I meant that the justice does not exist independent of our mind as we might say the property red or the property wet does

• By this I mean that the notions seem true to me a priori, and after lengthy discussions with those astute in ethical theory, I have yet to understand how necessary moral truths, which include principles of justice, can exist when their denial is intelligible. For instance, a four sided triangle is unintelligible as is 2+2=7. Thus, "all triangles have three sides" and "2+2=4" are necessary truths and as such the truths exist in all possible worlds. Now let's take a commonly accepted necessary moral truth related to the law. "It is wrong to break promises." From this the law applies contingent truths. For example, Jones borrowed $1,000 promising to pay it back in 30 days. He has not; therefore,the judge says,"It is unjust for Jones to borrow $1,000 and refuse to pay it back, justice requires him to pay it and he must, it is so ordered." The statement "justice requires him to pay it back" is a contingent truth based upon the previous necessary truth "it is wrong to break a promise." But the converse of that statement is intelligible. I, a rational agent, can conceive of a world where "it is right to break promises" (even setting aside situations of unconsionability). Fittingly, I conclude that it is not a necessary truth and no contingent truths can follow from it. I believe this to be the case for all other moral principles of which our law is based on.
• Admittedly, saying that there are no necessary moral truths is of course subtly distinct from my assertion that moral statements do not contain a truth value. I have come to that conclusion for two basic reasons: 1. The metaphysical conundrum created by saying an act is wrong or right. 2. The epistemological issue of how we even have access to knowing whether something is right. When we say "the stop sign is red" we are saying that "there exist a stop sign such that it instantiates the property red." This is fine. I know the property red and I have epistemic access to it. When we say "killing for pleasure is wrong" we are saying that killing instantiates the property of wrongness. This is where the metaphysical and epistemological dilemma for me arises. I am not sure what justifies the belief that there exists a property wrongness or justice or goodness. The difficulty in justifying these properties leads me to the conclusion that they do not exist, or in the very least that the onus is on those purporting its existence.

• I would say that it is a personal conception held by many people, but the aggregation of a belief does not entail its existence. 100 years ago you might have found that a majority of people had a personal conception that miscegeny was an injustice to society. Today, a majority of people believe that animals which have proven themselves to be self aware creatures (such as elephants, dolphins, and primates) don't deserve the same rights as humans. Such speciesism may find itself in the minority of society within the next 100 years, for it is my hope that this will be the case. But we should not conclude that because a majority of society intuitively believes something is wrong there exists a property of wrongness without first justifying the existence of the property.

• I'm not sure how it is tautological, but I meant that the property of justice does not exist independent of our mind as we might say the property of red or wet does

• I'm afraid I don't understand why this problem exists. I assumed, though maybe without justification, that the main concern a client has about his or her lawyer is whether the lawyer can win.

AndrewCase 29 Jan 2009

• By "cannot rid" do you mean "cannot try to rid" or "don't understand why other people at least as smart as I am don't agree with me" or "am not listening to anything said about"?

• If a large number of people agree on, for example, the injustice of racial segregation, is that still only a personal conception of justice?

• What is the significance of the apparently tautological statement that justice cannot exist independent of "the world"?

• It seems important to observe, then, as a thing we have learned about your opinions and intentions, that law firm employment wouldn't be consistent with them.

• But doesn't it have a decisive effect on your ability to represent a client who considers it incompatible with her values? That you answered the question only from your own perspective, rather than also from that of the client suggests a junction where your pose becomes untenable.

Question 2: I did not mean to distinguish having an individual client from working for an employer, but you are right, that implication does follow.

Question 3: I don't think that complex philosophical positions on justice necessarily affect my potential relationship with a client who seeks justice. I certainly have a normative sense of justice. For instance, the Israeli response to petty rocket launches strikes me as unjust, but I believe moral statements such as this are not actual propositions (i.e. they do not contain truth values). The expression then is akin to saying "go jets" or "boo giants." While this non-cognitivist perspective makes certain discussions difficult, it has little effect on how I live.

• Do you believe lawyering is not about producing justice? Or do you believe there is nothing more venerable about justice than plumbing?

We have made indoor plumbing, electricity, and vehicular transportation such an integrated part of our lives that the absence of technicians capable of sustaining these functions would have as much of a disruptive effect as the absence of people capable of lawyering.

• The clear implication is that you mean to have clients in the same direct sense that a car mechanic does. Most of the people who go to school here don't have individual human clients. Did you mean to distinguish your intentions in this way?

• How would you explain your position to a client who expected you to produce justice? Would you deny that justice exists, call it a pretension, or would you urge the client to retain a different lawyer?

-- JonathanGuerra - 29 Jan 2009

-- JonathanGuerra - 29 Jan 2009

Plumbers apprentice so that they may become well trained and certified master plumbers. I am in law school so that I may gain the qualifications and certification necessary to be a lawyer and attain a job as one. To me, the function of law school is to provide training for a trade: the trade of lawyering. I do not believe that there is anything that makes the law and the trade of lawyering any more venerable than other trades such as plumbing, electrical work, and vehicle repair. We have made indoor plumbing, electricity, and vehicular transportation such an integrated part of our lives that the absence of technicians capable of sustaining these functions would have as much of a disruptive effect as the absence of people capable of lawyering. I have no pretension about what I am doing. I am in law school to become a tradesman and render my services to those who seek it.