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JustinColannino-SecondPaper 32 - 18 May 2008 - Main.JustinColannino
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UNDER REVISION. To see the paper as submitted, including all of Eben's comments, click here.
To see my responses to Eben's comments, including my goals in revision, click here. | | | Why has our punishment become harsh? The outrage dynamic and moral panic.
To answer this question it is useful to examine the mechanisms that make criminal laws in a democratic society. The outrage dynamic, proposed by Oliver MacDonagh [8] and applied to the creation of criminal laws by Philip Pettit [10] identifies a cycle by which behavior becomes criminal, and punishments become harsher. First, an example or examples of the 'evil' behavior is reported. Second, moral outrage is shown by groups in the population. Third, the authorities react to the pressure applied by the groups and “legislate the evil out of existence“ [8]. The fourth stage is a report that the 'evil' has not been eradicated by the legislation, leading to outrage which which begins the process anew, leading to steeper penalties. | |
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< | This understanding of how criminal laws are made is confirmed by Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda who discuss a similar cycle in their book Moral Panics. Moral panics, coined by Stanley Cohen [1], are a societal drama which follow a similar script to the outrage dynamic, with media reports, population, political authorities and 'evil' playing similar roles. Goode and Ben-Yehuda explore a number of moral panics that lead to criminalizing of behavior or heightened punishment for the behavior, including marijuana use and the sexual psychopath laws of the 1930's to 1950's [5]. A modern example is the California three strikes law, which drastically increased penalties for recidivist criminals. The law was passed after a child was kidnapped murdered by a repeat offender [16], but efforts to lessen the harshness for non-violent crimes were defeated using advertising that sparked outrage[17]. | >
> | This understanding of how criminal laws are made is confirmed by Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda who discuss a similar cycle in their book Moral Panics. Moral panics, coined by Stanley Cohen [1], are a societal drama which follow a similar script to the outrage dynamic, with media reports, population, political authorities and 'evil' playing similar roles. Goode and Ben-Yehuda explore a number of moral panics that lead to criminalizing of behavior or heightened punishment for the behavior, including marijuana use and the sexual psychopath laws of the 1930's to 1950's [5]. A modern example is the California three strikes law, which drastically increased penalties for recidivist criminals. The law was passed after a child was kidnapped murdered by a repeat offender [16], but efforts to lessen the harshness of the law for non-violent crimes were defeated using advertising that sparked outrage [17]. | | | These models illustrate a problem with how criminal laws are made. Social events easily shift the harshness of penalties upwards, but there is little at work to mobilize the population to diminish penalties. | | | Why the 8th amendment does not protect us.
Proportionality is at once a difficult and easy concept to define. Proportionality feels intuitive. We would all agree that a two-hundred dollar fine for murder is too lenient or that a sentence of five years for jaywalking is disproportionate to the point where it offends our sense of justice. However, when we attempt to circumscribe exactly what the term 'proportional' means definition alludes us. | |
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< | Part of the problem is answering the question of what ends the proportionality serves. According to the United States Sentencing Commission the purposes of punishment are "just punishment [retributivism], deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation" [14]. In current jurisprudence on non capital cases concerning the 8th Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments the supreme court has understood proportionality to be satisfied so long as one of the ends of punishment are addressed [7][15]. Commentators have noted that this interpretation serves little purpose because there is no cap to the pain that may be inflicted under a deterrent justification [3] [7]. There is also a branch of the court that interprets the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment as providing no guarantee of proportionality between the crime and the punishment. | >
> | Part of the problem is answering the question of what ends the proportionality serves. According to the United States Sentencing Commission the purposes of punishment are "just punishment [retributivism], deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation" [14]. In current jurisprudence on non capital cases concerning the 8th Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments the supreme court has understood proportionality to be satisfied so long as one of the ends of punishment are addressed [7][15]. Commentators have noted that this interpretation serves little purpose because there is no cap to the pain that may be inflicted under a deterrent justification [3] [7]. | | | What this means is that under our current system legislatures may impose harsh jail time for any offense they deem to be serious, such as repeated nonviolent thefts [15]. This concept of proportionality does not protect the minority against penalty escalation, and leaves the decision of how much punishment is too much up to a majority easily influenced by outrage and moral panics. |
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