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JustineHongFirstEssay 8 - 07 Jun 2022 - Main.JustineHong
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Introduction | |
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< | Oliver Wendell Holmes underscores that the law does not reflect morality, but instead studies ways to predict court decisions. Philosophers like Arendt and Unger, therefore, provide moral and philosophical context which may complement a law student's studies and assist the development of a theory of social action. For instance, Arendt’s account of stateless people provides a philosophical context for my interest in international human rights and refugee law. Moreover, Unger presents a historical progression among liberal societies in which morality becomes estranged from the rule of law, resulting in the widespread sense that societal inequality is arbitrary. His work thus calls on lawyers to address unjust societal inequalities by expanding access to intellectual capital. Ultimately, the works of both Arendt and Unger urge lawyers to look beyond legal doctrine and toward the social interests and public policy which shape law in contemporary society. | >
> | Holmes underscores that the law does not reflect morality, but instead constitutes a study of predicting court decisions. While one may believe, therefore, that philosophers have little role in developing a lawyer’s theory of social action, Hannah Arendt and Roberto Unger’s theories, while expressing a moral purpose, also reflect the socio-historical realities of the modern era. Because they are grounded in such realities, their moral and ethical principles are relevant in guiding lawyers in their practice. For instance, Arendt’s principle in Origins of Totalitarianism that a state or community must recognize fundamental rights in order for them to exist motivated me to develop my interest in human rights and international law. Also, Unger’s principle in Law in Modern Society that the solution to today’s unjust social inequalities is an expansion of access to intellectual capital motivates my own goal of expanding educational opportunities for others. Ultimately, the works of both Arendt and Unger urge lawyers to look beyond legal doctrine and toward the social interests and public policy which shape law in contemporary society. | | | Arendt: State Recognition of Fundamental Rights | |
<
< | Origins of Totalitarianism argues that human rights, far from being “natural,” require state recognition to exist. In particular, the “calamity of the rightless . . . is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them . . . We become aware of a right to have rights” (Arendt 295-7). In other words, unless a person belongs in a community like a state, he or she cannot not have “fundamental” rights like life, liberty, or equal protection before the law. | >
> | Origins of Totalitarianism expresses the key principle that human rights, far from being “natural,” require state recognition to exist. In particular, the “calamity of the rightless . . . is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them . . . We become aware of a right to have rights” (Arendt 295-7). In other words, unless a person belongs in a community like a state, he or she cannot not have “fundamental” rights like life, liberty, or equal protection before the law. | | | | |
<
< | In terms of its relevance to a lawyer’s theory of social action, Origins of Totalitarianism forces students to think beyond black-letter doctrine and to ensure that people outside state recognition have legal representation. Thus, a theory of social action requires extending protection beyond the law itself. In Lawrence Joseph’s Lawyerland, Robinson represents criminals, who are considered to be most deprived of rights in society. But Arendt indicates that even criminals, unlike stateless people, are still recognized by the state. “[Stateless people’s] freedom of movement, if they have it at all, gives them no right to residence which even the jailed criminal enjoys” (Arendt 296). Therefore, stateless people require even more fundamental protection than criminals.
Her account reminds me of the former ‘comfort women’ of WWII. I first learned about the women when, as a high schooler at an international school in South Korea, I visited the House of Sharing, a museum and refuge for the former ‘comfort women.’ Inspired by the exhibits, I volunteered as an English tour guide and oral translator for the women’s testimonies. Their experience attests to the horrors of war and the consequences of statelessness. Almost a century later, litigation for recognition and compensation for this human rights violation is still ongoing. Therefore, I hope to develop my interest in international human rights law to represent stateless people or other similarly vulnerable communities and prevent such atrocities from recurring. | >
> | Arendt’s account, in addition to contextualizing my prior exposure to human rights, motivated my decision to explore international law. Before reading Arendt, in high school I had volunteered as an English oral translator at the House of Sharing, a museum and refuge in South Korea for the former ‘comfort women’ of WWII. Arendt's account made me realize that their plight illustrated the extreme experiences of stateless people. Believing such atrocities should never recur, I developed my interest in international law as an undergraduate, conducting independent study of the Nuremberg Trials and spending a summer abroad with EU institutions. An underlying motivation throughout these experiences was that no one should struggle to have the right to have rights. In law school, I will continue to consider international legal issues with Arendt’s principle in mind. | | |
Unger: Modern Estrangement of Morality from Law | |
<
< | Like Arendt, Unger emphasizes the estrangement of morality from law and from the modern social order. He argues in Law in Modern Society that the historical trend in which the rule of law becomes devoid of moral justification results in a widespread modern perception that societal inequality is arbitrary. Additionally, in modern liberal societies, people tend to view social consensus as a product of the interests of dominant groups (Unger 169). Therefore, Unger emphasizes that in order to defeat inequality, society must foster greater confidence among people as “expressions of a shared human nature” (240). One way to achieve this greater confidence is to restore a kind of universal consensus about social life, where social practices represent an “immanent order” rather than arbitrary choices (240). | >
> | Like Arendt, Unger emphasizes the estrangement of morality from law and from the modern social order. Upon showing the historical trend in which the rule of law became devoid of moral justification in liberal societies, Law in Modern Society articulates the resulting principle that for many people today, the pursuit of the good fails to align with the pursuit of profit. This principle is the consequence of the widespread perception that social inequality is arbitrary, and that social consensus is merely the product of dominant interest groups, rather than any inherent justice (Unger 169). | | |
The Knowledge Economy as a Solution | |
<
< | Another solution for such unjust inequalities, presented in Unger’s more recent work The Knowledge Economy, is the expansion of the knowledge economy. Unger argues that the knowledge economy is the most innovative way to organize economic activity, but it remains trapped in small segments of society. On the one hand, the knowledge economy represents a freedom from hierarchy because successful knowledge production requires collaboration and open exchange of ideas. It also involves a freedom from machine-like routine embodied by industrial mass production, instead operating on creativity and spontaneity. Expanding the knowledge economy would require a reorganization of capital and other means of production, such as alternative forms to the standard corporation, more collaborative relations among workers and superiors, and educational reform. | >
> | According to Unger, a solution for such arbitrary inequalities is the expansion of the “knowledge economy," a system of consumption and production based on intellectual capital, such as the value of its workers' knowledge or intellectual property. Although it is the most innovative way to organize economic activity, the knowledge economy remains trapped in small segments of the population. Ways to expand it include a reorganization of capital and other means of production, more collaborative relations among workers and superiors, and educational reform. | | | | |
<
< | Such concrete measures articulated in The Knowledge Economy provide guideposts for a lawyer’s theory of social action. Having the propositions regarding modern injustice and arbitrariness demonstrated in Law in Modern Society as its philosophic basis, the lawyer’s theory could implement governmental advocacy, workers’ rights, labor law, pro bono educational campaigns, and expansion of access to legal counsel. These measures would help expand the knowledge economy and address the problems outlined in Law in Modern Society. As a first-generation law student, second-generation college graduate, and a first-generation immigrant, I have benefited significantly from the knowledge economy and look forward to giving back to communities from which I have benefited. Although Unger’s solutions are much easier said than done, a coherent framework of the legal issues arising from inequalities and isolation is indispensable for assisting underserved communities. | >
> | Unger’s account of the knowledge economy motivates my desire to contribute to its expansion. As a first-generation law student and American, I attribute my current status in large part to my access to intellectual capital. Furthermore, my parents transcended class through education; they are both first-generation college students who grew up under South Korea’s military dictatorship lasting until 1988. About a decade later, they were able to move to the US for a job opportunity. Therefore, as part of a family which transcended class and national barriers largely thanks to education, I am sensitive to the need to expand the knowledge economy. | | | | |
>
> | However, I am also aware of potential difficulties. Because there are no lawyers in my family, I lack a professional network in either Korea or the US, apart from fellow law students and several non-lawyer family friends. Hence, I fear that no one would be able to provide assistance if I were to establish my own practice. Prior to law school, I was excited to forge my own path; indeed, I was motivated to apply primarily because no one encouraged me to do so and no one around me was a lawyer. But, after 1L year, I am more hesitant to establish my own practice, at least immediately after graduation, because of the overwhelming 1L curriculum and the administration’s clear division between Big Law and public interest, with nothing in between. My goal is that with the infantilizing 1L year over, I will develop a more coherent idea about my future. Above all, given my own background, Unger’s account reinforces my belief that lawyers should give back to their communities by facilitating access to intellectual capital. | | | Conclusion | |
<
< | Arendt and Unger present alternative philosophic bases for a lawyer’s theory of social action. Arendt’s argument that human rights are meaningless without the recognition of a state underscores the plight of stateless people who lack the basic legal status even accorded to criminals. Unger’s argument, on the other hand, highlights the estrangement of morality from the rule of law and the consequent arbitrariness pervading modern society. His framework draws attention to the need for a universal consensus or for a solution to unjust inequalities, such as the knowledge economy. Although both theorists are primarily concerned with philosophy rather than social science, their theories still provide a critical foundation upon which to construct a theory of social action. | >
> | Arendt and Unger present alternative philosophic principles to guide a law student’s future practice. Arendt’s argument that human rights are meaningless without the recognition of a state contextualized my own experience with human rights victims and motivated my interest in international law. On the other hand, Unger’s argument highlighting the estrangement of morality from the rule of law, the consequent social inequality, and the expansion of the knowledge economy as a solution to these issues motivates my goal of contributing to such a solution in my practice, even if that means diverging from the majority path. Overall, although both theorists are primarily concerned with philosophy rather than social science, their theories still provide guideposts with which to forge a legal practice. | | | |
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JustineHongFirstEssay 6 - 06 Jun 2022 - Main.JustineHong
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< | Hannah Arendt, Roberto Unger, and A Lawyer’s Philosophic Theory of Action | >
> | Hannah Arendt, Roberto Unger, and A Law Student's Philosophic Theory of Action | | | -- By JustineHong - 11 Mar 2022
Introduction | |
<
< | Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism and Roberto Unger’s Law in Modern Society provide different philosophic bases for developing a lawyer’s theory of social action. Arendt, by underscoring that fundamental rights, far from being “natural” or “innate,” must instead be recognized by a community to exist, calls on lawyers to provide representation to stateless people. On the other hand, Unger presents a historical progression among liberal societies in which morality becomes estranged from the rule of law, resulting in the widespread sense that societal inequality is arbitrary and unjustified. His work thus calls on lawyers to address unjust societal inequalities by expanding access to intellectual capital. Ultimately, the works of both Arendt and Unger urge lawyers to look beyond legal doctrine and toward the social interests and public policy which shape law in contemporary society. | >
> | Oliver Wendell Holmes underscores that the law does not reflect morality, but instead studies ways to predict court decisions. Philosophers like Arendt and Unger, therefore, provide moral and philosophical context which may complement a law student's studies and assist the development of a theory of social action. For instance, Arendt’s account of stateless people provides a philosophical context for my interest in international human rights and refugee law. Moreover, Unger presents a historical progression among liberal societies in which morality becomes estranged from the rule of law, resulting in the widespread sense that societal inequality is arbitrary. His work thus calls on lawyers to address unjust societal inequalities by expanding access to intellectual capital. Ultimately, the works of both Arendt and Unger urge lawyers to look beyond legal doctrine and toward the social interests and public policy which shape law in contemporary society. | | | | |
>
> | Arendt: State Recognition of Fundamental Rights
Origins of Totalitarianism argues that human rights, far from being “natural,” require state recognition to exist. In particular, the “calamity of the rightless . . . is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them . . . We become aware of a right to have rights” (Arendt 295-7). In other words, unless a person belongs in a community like a state, he or she cannot not have “fundamental” rights like life, liberty, or equal protection before the law. | | | | |
<
< | Arendt: The Need for State Recognition of Fundamental Rights
A central argument of Origins of Totalitarianism is that human rights, far from being “natural” or “inalienable,” require state recognition in order to exist. In particular, Arendt states: “The calamity of the rightless . . . is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them . . . We become aware of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions)” (Arendt 295-7). In other words, unless a person belongs in a community like a state, he or she cannot not have “fundamental” rights like life, liberty, or equal protection before the law. State or community recognition is necessary for fundamental rights to exist. The text thus corresponds to the legal realist trend, which first emerged at the time, that law derives from social interests and public policy, rather than from “natural law” (Cohen). | >
> | In terms of its relevance to a lawyer’s theory of social action, Origins of Totalitarianism forces students to think beyond black-letter doctrine and to ensure that people outside state recognition have legal representation. Thus, a theory of social action requires extending protection beyond the law itself. In Lawrence Joseph’s Lawyerland, Robinson represents criminals, who are considered to be most deprived of rights in society. But Arendt indicates that even criminals, unlike stateless people, are still recognized by the state. “[Stateless people’s] freedom of movement, if they have it at all, gives them no right to residence which even the jailed criminal enjoys” (Arendt 296). Therefore, stateless people require even more fundamental protection than criminals. | | | | |
<
< | In terms of its relevance to a lawyer’s theory of social action, Origins of Totalitarianism forces lawyers to think beyond black-letter doctrine and seek to ensure that people outside state recognition have the legal representation they need. Thus, a lawyer’s theory of social action requires extending protection beyond the law itself. In Lawrence Joseph’s Lawyerland, Robinson represents criminals, who are considered to be most deprived of rights in society. But Arendt indicates that even criminals, unlike stateless people, are still recognized by the state. “[Stateless people’s] freedom of movement, if they have it at all, gives them no right to residence which even the jailed criminal enjoys as a matter of course” (Arendt 296). Today, refugee crises remain common around the world, a particular example being the current situation in Europe where Roma refugees are forced to camp at train stations throughout Europe because they, unlike other Ukrainians, have been denied visas. A theory of social action with Arendt's work as its basis would involve providing legal assistance to refugees who want to be recognized by state law so they can exercise their fundamental rights like the right to a home and the right to work. | >
> | Her account reminds me of the former ‘comfort women’ of WWII. I first learned about the women when, as a high schooler at an international school in South Korea, I visited the House of Sharing, a museum and refuge for the former ‘comfort women.’ Inspired by the exhibits, I volunteered as an English tour guide and oral translator for the women’s testimonies. Their experience attests to the horrors of war and the consequences of statelessness. Almost a century later, litigation for recognition and compensation for this human rights violation is still ongoing. Therefore, I hope to develop my interest in international human rights law to represent stateless people or other similarly vulnerable communities and prevent such atrocities from recurring. | | | | |
<
< | Unger: Modern Estrangement of Morality from the Rule of Law
Like Arendt, Unger emphasizes the estrangement of morality from law and from the modern social order, but his theory presents a different philosophic basis from which to develop a lawyer’s theory of social action. Unger argues that the historical trend in which the rule of law becomes devoid of moral justification results in a widespread modern perception that societal inequality is arbitrary and unjustified. Additionally, in modern liberal societies, people tend to view social consensus as a product of the interests of dominant groups (Unger 169). Therefore, Unger emphasizes that in order to defeat inequality, society must foster greater confidence among people as “expressions of a shared human nature” (240). One way to achieve this greater confidence is to restore a kind of universal consensus about social life, where social practices represent an “immanent order” rather than arbitrary choices (240). But it is uncertain how a lawyer may contribute to achieving this change. | | | | |
>
> | Unger: Modern Estrangement of Morality from Law
Like Arendt, Unger emphasizes the estrangement of morality from law and from the modern social order. He argues in Law in Modern Society that the historical trend in which the rule of law becomes devoid of moral justification results in a widespread modern perception that societal inequality is arbitrary. Additionally, in modern liberal societies, people tend to view social consensus as a product of the interests of dominant groups (Unger 169). Therefore, Unger emphasizes that in order to defeat inequality, society must foster greater confidence among people as “expressions of a shared human nature” (240). One way to achieve this greater confidence is to restore a kind of universal consensus about social life, where social practices represent an “immanent order” rather than arbitrary choices (240). | | | | |
<
< | The Knowledge Economy as a Solution to Unjust Inequalities
Another solution, presented in Unger’s more recent work The Knowledge Economy, is to address the unjust inequality itself by expanding the knowledge economy. Unger argues that the knowledge economy is the most innovative way to organize economic activity, but it remains trapped in small segments of society. On the one hand, the knowledge economy represents a freedom from hierarchy because successful knowledge production requires collaboration, autonomy, and open exchange of ideas. It also involves a freedom from machine-like routine embodied by industrial mass production, instead operating on creativity and spontaneity. Expanding the knowledge economy would require a reorganization of capital and other means of production, such as alternative forms to the standard corporation, more collaborative relations among workers and superiors, and educational reform. | | | | |
<
< | Such concrete measures articulated in The Knowledge Economy provide guideposts for a lawyer’s theory of social action. Having the propositions regarding modern injustice and arbitrariness demonstrated in Law in Modern Society as its philosophic basis, the lawyer’s theory could implement governmental advocacy, workers’ rights, labor law, pro bono educational campaigns, and expansion of access to legal counsel. These measures would help expand the knowledge economy and address the problems outlined in Law in Modern Society. Granted, these solutions are much easier said than done, but a coherent framework of the legal issues arising from inequalities and isolation is indispensable for forging a legal career. | >
> | The Knowledge Economy as a Solution
Another solution for such unjust inequalities, presented in Unger’s more recent work The Knowledge Economy, is the expansion of the knowledge economy. Unger argues that the knowledge economy is the most innovative way to organize economic activity, but it remains trapped in small segments of society. On the one hand, the knowledge economy represents a freedom from hierarchy because successful knowledge production requires collaboration and open exchange of ideas. It also involves a freedom from machine-like routine embodied by industrial mass production, instead operating on creativity and spontaneity. Expanding the knowledge economy would require a reorganization of capital and other means of production, such as alternative forms to the standard corporation, more collaborative relations among workers and superiors, and educational reform. | | | | |
>
> | Such concrete measures articulated in The Knowledge Economy provide guideposts for a lawyer’s theory of social action. Having the propositions regarding modern injustice and arbitrariness demonstrated in Law in Modern Society as its philosophic basis, the lawyer’s theory could implement governmental advocacy, workers’ rights, labor law, pro bono educational campaigns, and expansion of access to legal counsel. These measures would help expand the knowledge economy and address the problems outlined in Law in Modern Society. As a first-generation law student, second-generation college graduate, and a first-generation immigrant, I have benefited significantly from the knowledge economy and look forward to giving back to communities from which I have benefited. Although Unger’s solutions are much easier said than done, a coherent framework of the legal issues arising from inequalities and isolation is indispensable for assisting underserved communities. | | | | |
<
< | Conclusion
Arendt and Unger present alternative philosophic bases for a lawyer’s theory of social action. Arendt’s argument that human rights are meaningless without the recognition of a state underscores to the plight of stateless people who lack the basic legal status even accorded to criminals. Unger’s argument, on the other hand, highlights the estrangement of morality from the rule of law and the consequent arbitrariness pervading modern society. His framework draws attention to the need for a universal consensus or for a solution to unjust inequalities, such as the knowledge economy. Although both theorists are primarily concerned with philosophy rather than social science, because of their legal realism, their theories still provide a critical foundation upon which to construct a theory of social action.
Works Cited
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011. | | | | |
<
< | Cohen, Felix S. “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach.” Columbia Law Review, vol. 35, no. 6, June 1935, p. 809.
Sandbu, Martin. “The Knowledge Economy by Roberto Mangabeira Unger.” Financial Times, Financial Times, 29 Apr. 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/5394bc12-6765-11e9-a79d-04f350474d62.
Tait, Robert. “'They Won't Accept Us': Roma Refugees Forced to Camp at Prague Train Station.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 25 May 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/may/25/they-wont-accept-us-roma-refugees-forced-to-camp-at-prague-train-station.
Unger, Roberto Mangabeira. Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory. The Free Press, 1977. | >
> | Conclusion
Arendt and Unger present alternative philosophic bases for a lawyer’s theory of social action. Arendt’s argument that human rights are meaningless without the recognition of a state underscores the plight of stateless people who lack the basic legal status even accorded to criminals. Unger’s argument, on the other hand, highlights the estrangement of morality from the rule of law and the consequent arbitrariness pervading modern society. His framework draws attention to the need for a universal consensus or for a solution to unjust inequalities, such as the knowledge economy. Although both theorists are primarily concerned with philosophy rather than social science, their theories still provide a critical foundation upon which to construct a theory of social action. | | | | |
<
< | Unger, Roberto Mangabeira. The Knowledge Economy. Verso Books, 2022. | | | | |
<
< |
Displaced from its original context, this draft doesn't give the reader a reason to read. Substantively, the text amounts to "Nietzsche and Arendt agree on something abstract and not particularly striking." The reader has not been shown why she should care. Stylistically, the book-report language adds to th problem; it conveys no feeling, which means no motivation for a reader to engage. We don't want to read like a tour guide for undergraduates being frog-marched through material. | | | | |
<
< | So the key to improvement is to add depth and context. To what question are these particular ideas attributed to Arendt and Nietzsche among the answers and why would it matter to anyone? Despite the publication dates of the reprints you mention these are not recent thinkers, nor is the conversation in which you are juxtaposing them one in which they are preeminent voices. So what is the larger discussion about? How is it relevant to what lawyers concerned with "human rights" do? I suppose the canonical compass points of entry are Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin and Unger. But for present purposes I think Roberto Unger's Law in Modern Society is probably the place to start.
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JustineHongFirstEssay 5 - 27 May 2022 - Main.JustineHong
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Introduction | |
<
< | Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism and Roberto Unger’s Law in Modern Society provide different philosophic bases for developing a lawyer’s theory of social action. Arendt, by underscoring that fundamental rights, far from being “natural” or “innate,” must instead be recognized by a community to exist, calls on lawyers to provide representation to stateless people. On the other hand, Unger presents a historical progression among liberal societies in which morality becomes estranged from the rule of law, resulting in the widespread sense that societal inequality is arbitrary and unjustified. His work thus calls on lawyers to address unjust societal inequalities by expanding access to intellectual capital. Ultimately, however, the works of both Arendt and Unger urge lawyers to look beyond legal doctrine and toward the social interests and public policy which shape law in contemporary society. | >
> | Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism and Roberto Unger’s Law in Modern Society provide different philosophic bases for developing a lawyer’s theory of social action. Arendt, by underscoring that fundamental rights, far from being “natural” or “innate,” must instead be recognized by a community to exist, calls on lawyers to provide representation to stateless people. On the other hand, Unger presents a historical progression among liberal societies in which morality becomes estranged from the rule of law, resulting in the widespread sense that societal inequality is arbitrary and unjustified. His work thus calls on lawyers to address unjust societal inequalities by expanding access to intellectual capital. Ultimately, the works of both Arendt and Unger urge lawyers to look beyond legal doctrine and toward the social interests and public policy which shape law in contemporary society. | | |
Arendt: The Need for State Recognition of Fundamental Rights | |
<
< | A central argument of Origins of Totalitarianism is that human rights, far from being “natural” or “inalienable,” require state recognition in order to exist. In particular, Arendt states: “The calamity of the rightless . . . is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them . . . We become aware of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions)” (Arendt 295-7). In other words, unless a person belongs in a community like a state, he or she cannot not have “fundamental” rights like life, liberty, or equal protection before the law. State or community recognition is necessary for fundamental rights to exist. The text thus corresponds to the legal realist trend emerging at the time that law derives from social interests and public policy, rather than from “natural law” (Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach).
In terms of its relevance to a lawyer’s theory of social action, Origins of Totalitarianism forces lawyers to think beyond black-letter doctrine and seek to ensure that people outside state recognition have the legal representation they need. Thus, a lawyer’s theory of social action may extend even beyond the law itself. Such social action contrasts with that of a lawyer like Robinson from Joseph’s Lawyerland. Robinson represents criminals, who are considered to be most deprived of rights in society. But Arendt indicates that even criminals, unlike stateless people, are still recognized by the state. “[Stateless people’s] freedom of movement, if they have it at all, gives them no right to residence which even the jailed criminal enjoys as a matter of course” (Arendt 296). Today, refugee crises remain common, a particular example being the current situation in Europe where Roma refugees are forced to camp at train stations throughout Europe because they, unlike other Ukrainians, have been denied visas. Lawyers should assist refugees who want to be recognized by the law so they can exercise their fundamental rights like the right to a home and the right to work. | >
> | A central argument of Origins of Totalitarianism is that human rights, far from being “natural” or “inalienable,” require state recognition in order to exist. In particular, Arendt states: “The calamity of the rightless . . . is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them . . . We become aware of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions)” (Arendt 295-7). In other words, unless a person belongs in a community like a state, he or she cannot not have “fundamental” rights like life, liberty, or equal protection before the law. State or community recognition is necessary for fundamental rights to exist. The text thus corresponds to the legal realist trend, which first emerged at the time, that law derives from social interests and public policy, rather than from “natural law” (Cohen).
In terms of its relevance to a lawyer’s theory of social action, Origins of Totalitarianism forces lawyers to think beyond black-letter doctrine and seek to ensure that people outside state recognition have the legal representation they need. Thus, a lawyer’s theory of social action requires extending protection beyond the law itself. In Lawrence Joseph’s Lawyerland, Robinson represents criminals, who are considered to be most deprived of rights in society. But Arendt indicates that even criminals, unlike stateless people, are still recognized by the state. “[Stateless people’s] freedom of movement, if they have it at all, gives them no right to residence which even the jailed criminal enjoys as a matter of course” (Arendt 296). Today, refugee crises remain common around the world, a particular example being the current situation in Europe where Roma refugees are forced to camp at train stations throughout Europe because they, unlike other Ukrainians, have been denied visas. A theory of social action with Arendt's work as its basis would involve providing legal assistance to refugees who want to be recognized by state law so they can exercise their fundamental rights like the right to a home and the right to work. | | |
Unger: Modern Estrangement of Morality from the Rule of Law | |
<
< | Like Arendt, Unger represents the legal realist trend in emphasizing the estrangement of morality from law and from the modern social order, but his theory presents a different philosophic basis from which to develop a lawyer’s theory of social action. Unger argues that the historical trend in which the rule of law becomes devoid of moral justification results in a widespread modern perception that societal inequality is arbitrary and unjustified. Additionally, in modern liberal societies, people tend to view social consensus as a product of the interests of dominant groups (Unger 169). Therefore, Unger emphasizes that in order to defeat inequality, society must foster greater confidence among people as “expressions of a shared human nature” (240). One way to achieve this greater confidence is to restore a kind of universal consensus about social life, where social practices represent an “immanent order” rather than arbitrary choices (240). | >
> | Like Arendt, Unger emphasizes the estrangement of morality from law and from the modern social order, but his theory presents a different philosophic basis from which to develop a lawyer’s theory of social action. Unger argues that the historical trend in which the rule of law becomes devoid of moral justification results in a widespread modern perception that societal inequality is arbitrary and unjustified. Additionally, in modern liberal societies, people tend to view social consensus as a product of the interests of dominant groups (Unger 169). Therefore, Unger emphasizes that in order to defeat inequality, society must foster greater confidence among people as “expressions of a shared human nature” (240). One way to achieve this greater confidence is to restore a kind of universal consensus about social life, where social practices represent an “immanent order” rather than arbitrary choices (240). But it is uncertain how a lawyer may contribute to achieving this change. | | |
The Knowledge Economy as a Solution to Unjust Inequalities | |
<
< | Another solution, presented in Unger’s more recent work The Knowledge Economy, is to address the inequality itself by expanding the knowledge economy. Unger argues that the knowledge economy is the most innovative way to organize economic activity, but it remains trapped in small segments of society. On the one hand, the knowledge economy represents a freedom from hierarchy because successful knowledge production requires collaboration, autonomy, and open exchange of ideas. It also involves a freedom from machine-like routine embodied by industrial mass production, instead operating on creativity and spontaneity. Expanding the knowledge economy “would require a reorganization of how capital and other means of production are allocated [such as alternative organizational forms to the standard corporation]; more collaborative relations of workers to colleagues and superiors; and education reform” (FT).
A lawyer’s theory of social action would correspond to such concrete measures articulated by Unger. Having the propositions from Law in Modern Society as its philosophic basis, the theory of social action could implement governmental advocacy, workers’ rights, labor law, pro bono campaigns, and an expansion of access to legal counsel. Such legal measures could help expand the knowledge economy and address the widespread sense of arbitrariness and injustice in modern society. | >
> | Another solution, presented in Unger’s more recent work The Knowledge Economy, is to address the unjust inequality itself by expanding the knowledge economy. Unger argues that the knowledge economy is the most innovative way to organize economic activity, but it remains trapped in small segments of society. On the one hand, the knowledge economy represents a freedom from hierarchy because successful knowledge production requires collaboration, autonomy, and open exchange of ideas. It also involves a freedom from machine-like routine embodied by industrial mass production, instead operating on creativity and spontaneity. Expanding the knowledge economy would require a reorganization of capital and other means of production, such as alternative forms to the standard corporation, more collaborative relations among workers and superiors, and educational reform.
Such concrete measures articulated in The Knowledge Economy provide guideposts for a lawyer’s theory of social action. Having the propositions regarding modern injustice and arbitrariness demonstrated in Law in Modern Society as its philosophic basis, the lawyer’s theory could implement governmental advocacy, workers’ rights, labor law, pro bono educational campaigns, and expansion of access to legal counsel. These measures would help expand the knowledge economy and address the problems outlined in Law in Modern Society. Granted, these solutions are much easier said than done, but a coherent framework of the legal issues arising from inequalities and isolation is indispensable for forging a legal career. | | |
Conclusion
Arendt and Unger present alternative philosophic bases for a lawyer’s theory of social action. Arendt’s argument that human rights are meaningless without the recognition of a state underscores to the plight of stateless people who lack the basic legal status even accorded to criminals. Unger’s argument, on the other hand, highlights the estrangement of morality from the rule of law and the consequent arbitrariness pervading modern society. His framework draws attention to the need for a universal consensus or for a solution to unjust inequalities, such as the knowledge economy. Although both theorists are primarily concerned with philosophy rather than social science, because of their legal realism, their theories still provide a critical foundation upon which to construct a theory of social action. | |
<
< | Works Cited | >
> | Works Cited | | | Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011. | |
>
> | Cohen, Felix S. “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach.” Columbia Law Review, vol. 35, no. 6, June 1935, p. 809.
Sandbu, Martin. “The Knowledge Economy by Roberto Mangabeira Unger.” Financial Times, Financial Times, 29 Apr. 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/5394bc12-6765-11e9-a79d-04f350474d62.
Tait, Robert. “'They Won't Accept Us': Roma Refugees Forced to Camp at Prague Train Station.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 25 May 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/may/25/they-wont-accept-us-roma-refugees-forced-to-camp-at-prague-train-station. | | | Unger, Roberto Mangabeira. Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory. The Free Press, 1977. | |
>
> | Unger, Roberto Mangabeira. The Knowledge Economy. Verso Books, 2022. | | |
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JustineHongFirstEssay 4 - 27 May 2022 - Main.JustineHong
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< | The Potential Contingency of Inherent Rights: How Arendt and Nietzsche Describe Community, Law, and Human Rights | >
> | Hannah Arendt, Roberto Unger, and A Lawyer’s Philosophic Theory of Action | | | -- By JustineHong - 11 Mar 2022 | |
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< | Introduction
Hannah Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism and Robert Unger's Law in Modern Society trace the deprivation of morality from law throughout history. First, Arendt demonstrates that the ideal of “human rights” has become meaningless for stateless people who have no nation which recognizes their rights. Similarly, Unger argues that a key characteristic of modern liberal society is the “estrangement of ideals from actuality,” in which the pursuit of self-interest becomes estranged from the pursuit of the good, resulting in arbitrariness in daily life and universal “despair.” While neither philosopher presents a solution, both emphasize the need to avoid modern loneliness and isolation and instead reach a collective moral consensus (Arendt 478; Unger 239-40). | >
> | Introduction
Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism and Roberto Unger’s Law in Modern Society provide different philosophic bases for developing a lawyer’s theory of social action. Arendt, by underscoring that fundamental rights, far from being “natural” or “innate,” must instead be recognized by a community to exist, calls on lawyers to provide representation to stateless people. On the other hand, Unger presents a historical progression among liberal societies in which morality becomes estranged from the rule of law, resulting in the widespread sense that societal inequality is arbitrary and unjustified. His work thus calls on lawyers to address unjust societal inequalities by expanding access to intellectual capital. Ultimately, however, the works of both Arendt and Unger urge lawyers to look beyond legal doctrine and toward the social interests and public policy which shape law in contemporary society. | | | | |
<
< | Arendt: Contingency and the "Right to Have Rights"
Arendt states, “We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community” (296-7). To explain this “right to have rights,” Arendt connects human rights with the ability to have opinions and actions that matter in society: “The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested . . . in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective” (296). In other words, when people become deprived of a community in which their opinions and actions matter, they become deprived of their human rights. Moreover, these rights, namely the “right to action” and the “right to opinion” (296), are “more fundamental than freedom and justice, which are rights of citizens” (296). Indeed, without these fundamental rights, the rights of citizens become insignificant: “Their freedom of opinion is a fool’s freedom, for nothing they think matters anyhow” (296). In sum, Arendt argues that people must have the right to action and the right to opinion, which are human rights but must be acknowledged by a community in order to be effective. | >
> | Arendt: The Need for State Recognition of Fundamental Rights
A central argument of Origins of Totalitarianism is that human rights, far from being “natural” or “inalienable,” require state recognition in order to exist. In particular, Arendt states: “The calamity of the rightless . . . is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them . . . We become aware of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions)” (Arendt 295-7). In other words, unless a person belongs in a community like a state, he or she cannot not have “fundamental” rights like life, liberty, or equal protection before the law. State or community recognition is necessary for fundamental rights to exist. The text thus corresponds to the legal realist trend emerging at the time that law derives from social interests and public policy, rather than from “natural law” (Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach).
In terms of its relevance to a lawyer’s theory of social action, Origins of Totalitarianism forces lawyers to think beyond black-letter doctrine and seek to ensure that people outside state recognition have the legal representation they need. Thus, a lawyer’s theory of social action may extend even beyond the law itself. Such social action contrasts with that of a lawyer like Robinson from Joseph’s Lawyerland. Robinson represents criminals, who are considered to be most deprived of rights in society. But Arendt indicates that even criminals, unlike stateless people, are still recognized by the state. “[Stateless people’s] freedom of movement, if they have it at all, gives them no right to residence which even the jailed criminal enjoys as a matter of course” (Arendt 296). Today, refugee crises remain common, a particular example being the current situation in Europe where Roma refugees are forced to camp at train stations throughout Europe because they, unlike other Ukrainians, have been denied visas. Lawyers should assist refugees who want to be recognized by the law so they can exercise their fundamental rights like the right to a home and the right to work. | | | | |
<
< | Nietzsche: Ruling Power and the Sovereign Conscience
Like Arendt, Nietzsche underscores the role of the community in determining the deprivation of rights. He states that the ruling institution determines justice: “‘Just’ and ‘unjust’ exist, accordingly, only after the institution of the law . . . To speak of just or unjust in itself is quite senseless” (Nietzsche 512). This passage indicates that the significance of one’s actions depends on other people. Rather than human rights, however, Nietzsche considers justice as determined by the law, which is then determined by the ruling power: “The most decisive act . . . that the supreme power performs . . . is the institution of law” (512). Here, therefore, Nietzsche agrees with Arendt’s idea that the community defines normative values and determines the significance of one’s actions. | | | | |
<
< | Moreover, Nietzsche agrees with Arendt’s notion that the law does not apply equally for all: “Legal conditions can never be other than exceptional conditions, since they constitute a partial restriction of the will of life, which is bent upon power” (512). One could apply this general statement to Arendt’s case. “Legal conditions” would apply to citizens, who have human rights as well as citizens’ rights. However, these conditions are exceptional because they do not apply to stateless people. Nietzsche would argue that this situation arises because the ruling power has a “will of life, which is bent upon power,” and thus seeks to retain power for its own nation and citizens while excluding others. Hence, while Nietzsche would agree with Arendt that the law does not apply universally, he also suggests that the limits of the law result from people’s desire for power. | >
> | Unger: Modern Estrangement of Morality from the Rule of Law
Like Arendt, Unger represents the legal realist trend in emphasizing the estrangement of morality from law and from the modern social order, but his theory presents a different philosophic basis from which to develop a lawyer’s theory of social action. Unger argues that the historical trend in which the rule of law becomes devoid of moral justification results in a widespread modern perception that societal inequality is arbitrary and unjustified. Additionally, in modern liberal societies, people tend to view social consensus as a product of the interests of dominant groups (Unger 169). Therefore, Unger emphasizes that in order to defeat inequality, society must foster greater confidence among people as “expressions of a shared human nature” (240). One way to achieve this greater confidence is to restore a kind of universal consensus about social life, where social practices represent an “immanent order” rather than arbitrary choices (240). | | | | |
<
< | Finally, though Nietzsche affirms Arendt regarding the community’s influence and the law’s limits, he would argue that individuals have rights in themselves, regardless of the surrounding community: “The sovereign individual . . . liberated again from morality of custom, autonomous and supramoral . . . the man who has . . . the right to make promises . . . The proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility . . . has . . . become . . . his conscience” (495-6). In tracing the origin of the conscience, Nietzsche argues that humanity developed the sovereign individual, who is independent of society’s morals and has a “right to make promises,” that is, the right to promise something for the future (494). This promise then becomes a responsibility, which becomes the conscience. By calling the ability to make promises a right and indicating that the individuals who possess this right are free from society’s constraints, Nietzsche logically implies that certain rights exist regardless of the surrounding community. The right to make promises is a faculty humanity has acquired and developed throughout history. However, Nietzsche’s argument may be unpersuasive in light of Arendt’s idea that any right is meaningless in practice if no one else acknowledges it. | | | | |
>
> | The Knowledge Economy as a Solution to Unjust Inequalities
Another solution, presented in Unger’s more recent work The Knowledge Economy, is to address the inequality itself by expanding the knowledge economy. Unger argues that the knowledge economy is the most innovative way to organize economic activity, but it remains trapped in small segments of society. On the one hand, the knowledge economy represents a freedom from hierarchy because successful knowledge production requires collaboration, autonomy, and open exchange of ideas. It also involves a freedom from machine-like routine embodied by industrial mass production, instead operating on creativity and spontaneity. Expanding the knowledge economy “would require a reorganization of how capital and other means of production are allocated [such as alternative organizational forms to the standard corporation]; more collaborative relations of workers to colleagues and superiors; and education reform” (FT).
A lawyer’s theory of social action would correspond to such concrete measures articulated by Unger. Having the propositions from Law in Modern Society as its philosophic basis, the theory of social action could implement governmental advocacy, workers’ rights, labor law, pro bono campaigns, and an expansion of access to legal counsel. Such legal measures could help expand the knowledge economy and address the widespread sense of arbitrariness and injustice in modern society. | | | | |
<
< | Conclusion | | | | |
<
< | Both Arendt and Nietzsche consider the influence of the community and the law on the individual, as well as the question of human rights. In presenting the notion of a “right to have rights,” Arendt emphasizes that the community determines the enforcement of human rights. Nietzsche places a similar emphasis on the community by arguing that power determines justice and can limit the scope of the law to retain or enhance its power. However, Nietzsche may dispute Arendt’s claim that the community determines one’s rights; he argues that the sovereign individual has a right independent of society, namely the right to make promises. But Nietzsche’s argument may not hold in light of Arendt’s claim that ‘inherent’ rights are meaningless if they are unenforceable. Still, rather than weakening Nietzsche’s argument, this contrast highlights a nuance of Arendt’s central claim and demonstrates the value of considering political theorists with different aims. Arendt does not dispute the objective existence of human rights; rather, she calls for a greater acknowledgment of them, as well as the actions and opinions of stateless people, so nations can manifest in practice rights which philosophers like Nietzsche affirm in theory. | >
> | Conclusion
Arendt and Unger present alternative philosophic bases for a lawyer’s theory of social action. Arendt’s argument that human rights are meaningless without the recognition of a state underscores to the plight of stateless people who lack the basic legal status even accorded to criminals. Unger’s argument, on the other hand, highlights the estrangement of morality from the rule of law and the consequent arbitrariness pervading modern society. His framework draws attention to the need for a universal consensus or for a solution to unjust inequalities, such as the knowledge economy. Although both theorists are primarily concerned with philosophy rather than social science, because of their legal realism, their theories still provide a critical foundation upon which to construct a theory of social action. | | | | |
<
< |
(997 words)
| | | Works Cited
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011. | |
<
< | Nietzsche, Friedrich. Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Translated by Walter Kaufmann, Modern Library, 2000. | >
> | Unger, Roberto Mangabeira. Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory. The Free Press, 1977. | | |
Displaced from its original context, this draft doesn't give the reader a reason to read. Substantively, the text amounts to "Nietzsche and Arendt agree on something abstract and not particularly striking." The reader has not been shown why she should care. Stylistically, the book-report language adds to th problem; it conveys no feeling, which means no motivation for a reader to engage. We don't want to read like a tour guide for undergraduates being frog-marched through material. |
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JustineHongFirstEssay 3 - 15 Apr 2022 - Main.JustineHong
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Introduction | |
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< | Origins of Totalitarianism is concerned with the protection of human rights in practice. By the “right to have rights,” Arendt means a community must first acknowledge human rights, which include the “right to action” and the “right to opinion,” in order to ensure the rights of citizens, which include “freedom [to do something] and justice” (Arendt 296). On the other hand, Genealogy of Morals seeks to trace the historical development of morality and conscience. In response to Arendt, Nietzsche would agree with her on the influence of the community in determining the significance of one’s actions, and on the unequal treatment of the law, but would add that individuals have an inherent right, namely the right to make promises, which is not contingent on the community. | >
> | Hannah Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism and Robert Unger's Law in Modern Society trace the deprivation of morality from law throughout history. First, Arendt demonstrates that the ideal of “human rights” has become meaningless for stateless people who have no nation which recognizes their rights. Similarly, Unger argues that a key characteristic of modern liberal society is the “estrangement of ideals from actuality,” in which the pursuit of self-interest becomes estranged from the pursuit of the good, resulting in arbitrariness in daily life and universal “despair.” While neither philosopher presents a solution, both emphasize the need to avoid modern loneliness and isolation and instead reach a collective moral consensus (Arendt 478; Unger 239-40). | | |
Arendt: Contingency and the "Right to Have Rights" |
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JustineHongFirstEssay 2 - 20 Mar 2022 - Main.EbenMoglen
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| | | Nietzsche, Friedrich. Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Translated by Walter Kaufmann, Modern Library, 2000. | |
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> |
Displaced from its original context, this draft doesn't give the reader a reason to read. Substantively, the text amounts to "Nietzsche and Arendt agree on something abstract and not particularly striking." The reader has not been shown why she should care. Stylistically, the book-report language adds to th problem; it conveys no feeling, which means no motivation for a reader to engage. We don't want to read like a tour guide for undergraduates being frog-marched through material.
So the key to improvement is to add depth and context. To what question are these particular ideas attributed to Arendt and Nietzsche among the answers and why would it matter to anyone? Despite the publication dates of the reprints you mention these are not recent thinkers, nor is the conversation in which you are juxtaposing them one in which they are preeminent voices. So what is the larger discussion about? How is it relevant to what lawyers concerned with "human rights" do? I suppose the canonical compass points of entry are Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin and Unger. But for present purposes I think Roberto Unger's Law in Modern Society is probably the place to start.
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You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. |
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JustineHongFirstEssay 1 - 11 Mar 2022 - Main.JustineHong
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The Potential Contingency of Inherent Rights: How Arendt and Nietzsche Describe Community, Law, and Human Rights
-- By JustineHong - 11 Mar 2022
Introduction
Origins of Totalitarianism is concerned with the protection of human rights in practice. By the “right to have rights,” Arendt means a community must first acknowledge human rights, which include the “right to action” and the “right to opinion,” in order to ensure the rights of citizens, which include “freedom [to do something] and justice” (Arendt 296). On the other hand, Genealogy of Morals seeks to trace the historical development of morality and conscience. In response to Arendt, Nietzsche would agree with her on the influence of the community in determining the significance of one’s actions, and on the unequal treatment of the law, but would add that individuals have an inherent right, namely the right to make promises, which is not contingent on the community.
Arendt: Contingency and the "Right to Have Rights"
Arendt states, “We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community” (296-7). To explain this “right to have rights,” Arendt connects human rights with the ability to have opinions and actions that matter in society: “The fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested . . . in the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective” (296). In other words, when people become deprived of a community in which their opinions and actions matter, they become deprived of their human rights. Moreover, these rights, namely the “right to action” and the “right to opinion” (296), are “more fundamental than freedom and justice, which are rights of citizens” (296). Indeed, without these fundamental rights, the rights of citizens become insignificant: “Their freedom of opinion is a fool’s freedom, for nothing they think matters anyhow” (296). In sum, Arendt argues that people must have the right to action and the right to opinion, which are human rights but must be acknowledged by a community in order to be effective.
Nietzsche: Ruling Power and the Sovereign Conscience
Like Arendt, Nietzsche underscores the role of the community in determining the deprivation of rights. He states that the ruling institution determines justice: “‘Just’ and ‘unjust’ exist, accordingly, only after the institution of the law . . . To speak of just or unjust in itself is quite senseless” (Nietzsche 512). This passage indicates that the significance of one’s actions depends on other people. Rather than human rights, however, Nietzsche considers justice as determined by the law, which is then determined by the ruling power: “The most decisive act . . . that the supreme power performs . . . is the institution of law” (512). Here, therefore, Nietzsche agrees with Arendt’s idea that the community defines normative values and determines the significance of one’s actions.
Moreover, Nietzsche agrees with Arendt’s notion that the law does not apply equally for all: “Legal conditions can never be other than exceptional conditions, since they constitute a partial restriction of the will of life, which is bent upon power” (512). One could apply this general statement to Arendt’s case. “Legal conditions” would apply to citizens, who have human rights as well as citizens’ rights. However, these conditions are exceptional because they do not apply to stateless people. Nietzsche would argue that this situation arises because the ruling power has a “will of life, which is bent upon power,” and thus seeks to retain power for its own nation and citizens while excluding others. Hence, while Nietzsche would agree with Arendt that the law does not apply universally, he also suggests that the limits of the law result from people’s desire for power.
Finally, though Nietzsche affirms Arendt regarding the community’s influence and the law’s limits, he would argue that individuals have rights in themselves, regardless of the surrounding community: “The sovereign individual . . . liberated again from morality of custom, autonomous and supramoral . . . the man who has . . . the right to make promises . . . The proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility . . . has . . . become . . . his conscience” (495-6). In tracing the origin of the conscience, Nietzsche argues that humanity developed the sovereign individual, who is independent of society’s morals and has a “right to make promises,” that is, the right to promise something for the future (494). This promise then becomes a responsibility, which becomes the conscience. By calling the ability to make promises a right and indicating that the individuals who possess this right are free from society’s constraints, Nietzsche logically implies that certain rights exist regardless of the surrounding community. The right to make promises is a faculty humanity has acquired and developed throughout history. However, Nietzsche’s argument may be unpersuasive in light of Arendt’s idea that any right is meaningless in practice if no one else acknowledges it.
Conclusion
Both Arendt and Nietzsche consider the influence of the community and the law on the individual, as well as the question of human rights. In presenting the notion of a “right to have rights,” Arendt emphasizes that the community determines the enforcement of human rights. Nietzsche places a similar emphasis on the community by arguing that power determines justice and can limit the scope of the law to retain or enhance its power. However, Nietzsche may dispute Arendt’s claim that the community determines one’s rights; he argues that the sovereign individual has a right independent of society, namely the right to make promises. But Nietzsche’s argument may not hold in light of Arendt’s claim that ‘inherent’ rights are meaningless if they are unenforceable. Still, rather than weakening Nietzsche’s argument, this contrast highlights a nuance of Arendt’s central claim and demonstrates the value of considering political theorists with different aims. Arendt does not dispute the objective existence of human rights; rather, she calls for a greater acknowledgment of them, as well as the actions and opinions of stateless people, so nations can manifest in practice rights which philosophers like Nietzsche affirm in theory.
(997 words)
Works Cited
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Translated by Walter Kaufmann, Modern Library, 2000.
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