KatySkaggsFirstPaper 7 - 22 Jan 2013 - Main.IanSullivan
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As I can now see clearly, the first draft of this paper was an exercise in attempting to meet a conclusion I already held as truth. For obvious reasons, that failed. But the conclusion, that religiously-founded arguments have no place in the context of the United States’ governmental policy, has become no less true to me, despite my inability to find evidence that the “founding fathers” shared this conviction. I’ve come to realize that my desire to prove this idea is very connected to one of the important reasons I ended up at law school. My dad, whose temperament I increasingly seem to have inherited, resides, ideologically, in the camp of the enemy. He gets his news from Fox and listens to Rush Limbaugh daily; one summer he even offered to pay me California’s hourly minimum wage to tune into Rush daily. That didn’t work out. |
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KatySkaggsFirstPaper 6 - 14 Aug 2012 - Main.EbenMoglen
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| | The funny thing is, politically, my dad’s principles indeed seem subsumed. But I’ve realized they’re expressed in everything else he does. An unspoken principle of his seems to be the determination to be beyond reproach in all of his work. He’s always expected something similar from me. . Leaving on a light in an empty room, a open window open when the air conditioning is running, needing a reminder to feed the animals—these weren’t minor mistakes (though they also weren’t punishable mistakes, I should note). They were evidence that I wasn’t being observant, careful and thorough enough. And they mattered to him because the habits they represent—thriftiness, awareness of my environment, and personal responsibility as the essential counter to personal freedom—are so crucial to professional success and, I suppose, success as a citizen. I’m at law school because of my dad’s principles, but I’ve let go of the idea that things I learn here can alter his politics. What they can do is provide common ground outside of politics, I hope.
995 words.
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> > |
I think the reflective nature of this draft was precisely the right
step. You've seen why "proving" a constitutional proposition on an
originalist premise, whether tendentiously or not, isn't much of a
contribution to the political conversation with your father. This
led you to a deeper conclusion, partly emotional and partly
intellectual, wholly correct, that political conversation with your
father deprives you of connection rather than contributing to it.
Both of these are valuable steps, in differently important
directions.
I don't know whether you care to continue on this line. If so, I
think the next draft would deal not with the substance of your
political differences, and not even with the underlying similarities
in commitment to what you call "principle" in daily life (what on the
basis of your examples I think Veblen would have called "instinct of
workmanship). It is rather the different roles that thinking about
politics plays in your two lives that would be the additional subject.
Your father has accepted an invitation offered by forms of mass media
that grew up after the demise of the Fairness Doctrine: he has made
politics the domain of team confrontation. He brings to the
interpretation of politics around him the same unmeasured emotional
investment, the same external projection of visceral motivations,
that twentieth-century American men largely invested in spectator
sports. This is not a characterization he would accept: he is, after
all, The Thinking Man. That he is manipulated, in his role of
Republican-rooting Thinking Man, into supporting governments and
policies that are not only bad for him but bad for you, is what he
must not allow himself to see. This is achieved via the process
Arnold described. Creed, which defines the boundary between inside
and outside social organizations, is redefined to put "outside"
anyone who would challenge the thinking man's "conclusions." The
"libs" become not merely people with different ideas, but people
trying to destroy what can only be kept safe by not thinking too
hard.
Your emotional structure for thinking about politics is different. I
leave you to characterize it for yourself, if you're so inclined.
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KatySkaggsFirstPaper 5 - 15 May 2012 - Main.KatySkaggs
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< < | Why Is American Government Based on the Weakest Form of Social Control? | > > | As I can now see clearly, the first draft of this paper was an exercise in attempting to meet a conclusion I already held as truth. For obvious reasons, that failed. But the conclusion, that religiously-founded arguments have no place in the context of the United States’ governmental policy, has become no less true to me, despite my inability to find evidence that the “founding fathers” shared this conviction. I’ve come to realize that my desire to prove this idea is very connected to one of the important reasons I ended up at law school. My dad, whose temperament I increasingly seem to have inherited, resides, ideologically, in the camp of the enemy. He gets his news from Fox and listens to Rush Limbaugh daily; one summer he even offered to pay me California’s hourly minimum wage to tune into Rush daily. That didn’t work out. | | | |
< < | -- By KatySkaggs - 16 Feb 2012 | > > | When I registered to vote senior year of high school, I joined the Green party, had a Nader button on my backpack, and suddenly couldn’t sit through dinner at the table without getting into a fight with my dad about politics. I was woefully uninformed, beautifully idealistic, and he smugly told me I’d get smart and get Republican when I grew up. So ever since, I’ve been attempting to elevate the debate. I used to try to win our arguments, but once I left for college, and realized how little time I’d probably spend with my parents, comparatively, from that point on, it became about finding common ground, and if not, avoiding the subject altogether. After a post-Thanksgiving screaming match on the subject of Sarah Palin (he flabbergasted me with that one), he’s started to realize just how much some of his views upset me, and he’ll mostly consent not to engage | | | |
> > | What we do have in common that’s relevant to our arguments, so far as I know, is a total lack of religious affiliation. I think the term ‘atheist’ is probably the ideological equivalent of ‘communist’ to him, but I’ve never once heard him mention God. He scoffed along with me the few times my mother tried to get us to go to church on Easter. So my conclusion about religion in government was meant to serve as common ground for discussing things like gay marriage, reproductive rights, and other areas where I think Republicans are hardly the classic definition of conservative. In my view, once they’ve exhausted the (ir)relevant bible passages, and the question-begging “thousand years of tradition,” there are no other rational arguments for restricting access to marriage, contraception or scientifically accurate sex education. And I thought that if I framed the issues just so, my dad might acknowledge that my positions had legitimacy. | | | |
< < | Law is the Weakest Form of Social Control
Of the few things that seem to be in basic agreement among and between our class and professor, the most fundamental seems to be that we must question most things that seem given, because humans and human systems are, to varying degrees, all full of—let’s say mostly unconscious rationalizations; another idea that doesn’t stir up too much protest is that law is the weakest form of social control. | > > | This course has tended to make me think that my campaign to get my dad to respect my opinion in matters of politics and policy is, while futile, a valid exercise in and of itself. I’m not likely to convert him on any issue of even the smallest relevance to party platforms, though I can get him to laugh a bit at the expense of easy targets on the right (except Palin, sadly). But it’s been valuable to consider issues in terms of the factors that my dad, and other conservatives, hold as important. For example, when talking to him about the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act, I would cite personal responsibility for unexpected costs that the uninsured currently shift to tax payers, the mandate passed in the earliest years of the American government that all males of legal age must purchase a musket for the common defense of the citizenry, and the fact that it actually facilitates personal freedom in that people no longer have to depend on their employers for affordable healthcare—they have more mobility because they can leave a job without worrying about the difficulty of obtaining permanent replacement coverage; it lowers the risk for those who want to work freelance or start a business (entrepreneurship being a key tenet in the right-wing case for helping the wealthy become more wealthy through government policy). | | | |
< < | You think? It's always
a tough sell to law students, who are ego-invested in the strength of
"LAW" now that they have paid all the tuition. But I can't remember
a bunch more troubled by the reality than this
one.
Structurally, that defines all other forms of social control as more effective. Of these, religion was one of the most effective and widely used for thousands of years; its effectiveness was found in utilization of the threat and promise of theological salvation by a higher spiritual authority, enforced by a temporal earthly authority, and backed up by the social approbation or approval of our social peer group, who long-ago, were generally clustered geographically with others of the same faith.
Religion is a stronger
form of social control, indeed, than law. But there are many forms
of social control, and religion too is a form of control operating at
the symbolic layer, where human beings have located more and more of
their social activity over the last several thousand years. But
human sociality is much older than homo sapiens, let alone older than
writing or the form of religion you are depicting. And it cohered
then and coheres now for reasons deeper than religion and more
powerful still.
And, especially before the American Revolution, governments embodied the principle cujus region, ejus religio (“whose realm, his religion”); essentially, tying governmental law to the stronger social control of religious authority enhanced overall social control.
Who told you that 18th
century British North America was like 16th-century Europe after the
Peace of Augsburg? It's nonsense. I'm surprised you didn't make any
effort to check. Now the rest of what you build on this substrate
will necessarily be untrue.
Functionalism Guided the Exclusion of Religion from the New Government of the United States
In considering their assignment to fix the Articles of Confederation, the Framers considered how the colonies had been formed, the kinds of people that inhabited them, how state governments had been operating before and after the Revolution, and how other governments had historically operated. They were thinking, thus, functionally (though without the surveys, statistics and data-mining that we’d today consider thorough investigation).
Is this the conclusion
you formed by reading Madison's Notes, or Yates, or someone's
description of the Convention? One could rearrange the speeches
under these heads, to be sure, and create a checklist of "things
considered" that would have these categories boxed. But I don't
think it would put forward a historically-sensitive account of the
Convention. For this, and the nature of the religious structure and politics of post-Revolutionary America as they affected the making of the Constitution, the best single-volume introduction would be Richard Morris's Forging of the Union.
Why Did the Framers Turn to Functionalism?
In the Federalist No. 10, Madison argued that factionalism would be the greatest danger to a unified state. His purpose was to argue that the government would be most representative of equal citizens as a republic rather than a pure democracy; the reasons he cites for this help to articulate why the authors of the Constitution diverged from the Declaration of Independence’s by excluding references to a “Creator” or “Natural God.” The colonies were first populated by those fleeing religious persecution, but this eventually included many different faith groups (though basically all Christians), and led to certain colonies being characterized and governed according to the faith of its founders or majority population. The religious oppression these groups had fled was to be eliminated from the new American government; strong views held even by the majority of citizens should, in Madison’s opinion, be controlled by structuring government so that certain “inalienable” rights could not be denied even to minority groups.
What the Framers Rejected
Basically, the Framers were confronting the problem of creating a government that had legitimacy to most, or ideally all, of its citizens. They recognized that, given citizens of many different faiths, religious tenets could not form the basis of a common government because those tenets were objects of intransigent disagreement. So they rejected a system, theocracy, that would be unsatisfactory and realized they must articulate some other system of values that the citizenry could hold in common.
This is not factually
inaccurate. But it's interpretively wrong-headed. The "Framers"
didn't reject theocracy, anymore than they rejected Buddhism or
antigravity. They never for an instant considered it. There wasn't
a debate about the question. They were making a government that they
did not for an instant conceive would have any religious policy, or
any effect on the religious policies of the States. They made clear
there would be no religious tests for office under the Federal
Government, and they made sure that no oath of office for the
Presidency would be drawn that would exclude a Quaker from being
President (a step necessary to prevent the failure of ratification in
Pennsylvania). With the exception of the members of the House, all
federal officeholders were mediated by the state legislatures, which
appointed the Senate and controlled the Electoral College. Of the
House elections, the rules of election and control of the franchise
rested with the state legislatures. Religious issues in state
politics would no doubt affect state legislative elections: they
regularly did so in some States, and occasionally did so in others.
But the parties who wrote the 1787 Constitution in Philadelphia spent
no significant time talking about religion in politics, and I can't
think of a single moment in debate that could be characterized as
about "rejecting theocracy," let alone arguing about whether to
reject "theocracy."
I don't know what to do with the problem of historical inaccuracy
here. I don't know what's left of the draft's main idea if its
reconstruction of American constitutional history is (as it must be)
reconsidered.
How to Gain Legitimacy Without Theocratic Authority
As Kurt Gödel asserted, no self-contained system can be wholly logical.
I'm not sure that's fair
summary of the proposition. Do you need to this point at all?
But the Framers had to come up with a system that a geographically and theologically diverse group of people would all submit to.
Once again, this is a
very strange formulation. In the first instance, the Philadelphia
Convention was commissioned to do no more than report to Congress.
The decision to break with their charter, and to present a plan of
federation directly to state ratifying conventions was extra-legal.
But even in doing so, I don't think it would in any way convey the
nature of the sources to say that ratification was presented as
"submission" to a new government. Your reading of the _Federalist
Papers_ varies substantially from that usually given if you find
their language advocates or even describes submitting the citizens of
the States to the Federal Government in any way at all. I don't see
how one could spend any time with the records of the state ratifying
conventions or the memorials submitted to them that would suggest
that the most ardent Federalists thought they were submitting State
citizens to a new national government. I don't know what the content
of Jeffersonianism is in your reconstruction, any more than I
understand your Federalism.
Holmes, in “The Path of the Law,” recognized that “the bad man” will not be guided by morals, only by what the law actually does.
He's not a sociological
description; he's a pedagogical device. What's he doing here?
So the Framers articulated principles, and eventually (by popular demand) a Bill of Rights, premised not on religious morality but on the idea that we (now everyone and not just white males) are endowed with certain rights that cannot be nullified or abrogated by the rights or actions of others.
Now you're having them
invent the constitutional development of England from 1215 to the
Glorious Revolution.
Performing a contemporary functionalist investigation of whether humans are actually equally endowed with certain inalienable rights generally reveals instead that society best functions when we all enjoy rough parameters of equality. So now we could justify the endowment (or recognition) of these rights by utilitarianism.
I don't know how you established that proposition. All I could see was an assertion. If you need to make this point, you need to show something in its support.
The Framers would have had no access to data that would reveal such justifications; they relied instead on their educations and common sense. In other words, they relied on a bit of transcendental nonsense to convince each citizen that certain rights were naturally inherent in each of them as well as in each of their countrymen, and if they wanted their own rights to be protected, they had to ensure everyone else’s were too.
This attributes to the
makers of the Federal Constitution the creation of the long-developing
18th century British North American view of natural and political
rights. Here one would want to consult, for an accurate view, Garry
Wills' wonderful book on the intellectual background of the
Declaration of Independence, Inventing America, and the first volume
of John Phillip Reid's Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights.
Why We Need to Keep Some of the Framer's Nonsense
I’d like to argue that this use of transcendental nonsense, premised on a great deal of essentially functionalist contemplation and debate by the Framers, was essential to eliminating the more harmful transcendental nonsense (or Jerome Frank’s definition of magical thinking) of theocratic governments. The old form of social control was too oppressive for the new, idealistic country, but for a more religiously-neutral system of laws to have any effective social control, it had to gain strength by legitimacy, and creating a nonsense of rights gave every citizen the feeling that government dealt with them as it dealt with every other citizen. As we’ve discussed extensively in class, many more layers of transcendental nonsense and legal magic have been laid successively on top of this original, functionally designed “inalienable rights” nonsense. While we correctly attempt, in our class and hopefully in our larger lives, to work at tearing down the nonsense that has resulted, to varying degrees, in the perversion of the Framers intent and the unadvised strengthening of particular groups (who gain power using wealth, political power, demagoguery, or that old religious magic), I’m afraid we’ll tear out that nonsense that was essential to us coming together as a united country. There may never be anything we can all agree on as “truth,” and our inherent and intractable subjectivity may keep us divided as to many different aspects of our lives, but the Framers’ nonsense about inalienable rights was functionally derived, can be justified through utilitarianism, and is essential as the basis for a functioning society. Flawed as we are, I think we must accept even that scant common ground.
As I say, you can't save
the conclusion once it rests on so much historical inaccuracy.
The editorial mystery for me is why you didn't see the requirement to
consult sources on the historical claims you were making.
Let's back up and figure out what the central idea was behind this
draft. It wasn't, I think, a constitutional history proposition.
The draft wandered there, it seems to me, and acquired difficulties
it didn't need to suffer. Clear statement of the real underlying
theme, and a development which either doesn't require American
constitutional history at all, or is compatible with something
interpretively recognizable, can then follow. | > > | The thing is, outside the context of the Obama-branded ACA, all of these principles would be supported by my father as sacredly American. But partisan polarization, among other things, has ensured that principles are subsumed by politics. Common ground is now filled, if at all, by those unfortunate ousted politicians who weren’t quite quick enough to catch on to the fact that it’s now just fine to publicly elevate politics over principles (a policy made brazenly explicit by Senator Mitch McConnell? ). The right’s skepticism of intellectuals also reflects this; it’s not enough to say that statistics and findings about climate change are inconclusive or biased—the scientists themselves are liberal elitist socialists who want to destroy economic growth, kill industry, and unacceptably apologize for human behavior. My dad will tell you these things, even if you didn’t ask. | | | |
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> > | The funny thing is, politically, my dad’s principles indeed seem subsumed. But I’ve realized they’re expressed in everything else he does. An unspoken principle of his seems to be the determination to be beyond reproach in all of his work. He’s always expected something similar from me. . Leaving on a light in an empty room, a open window open when the air conditioning is running, needing a reminder to feed the animals—these weren’t minor mistakes (though they also weren’t punishable mistakes, I should note). They were evidence that I wasn’t being observant, careful and thorough enough. And they mattered to him because the habits they represent—thriftiness, awareness of my environment, and personal responsibility as the essential counter to personal freedom—are so crucial to professional success and, I suppose, success as a citizen. I’m at law school because of my dad’s principles, but I’ve let go of the idea that things I learn here can alter his politics. What they can do is provide common ground outside of politics, I hope.
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KatySkaggsFirstPaper 4 - 15 Apr 2012 - Main.EbenMoglen
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Law is the Weakest Form of Social Control | |
< < | Of the few things that seem to be in basic agreement among and between our class and professor, the most fundamental seems to be that we must question most things that seem given, because humans and human systems are, to varying degrees, all full of—let’s say mostly unconscious rationalizations; another idea that doesn’t stir up too much protest is that law is the weakest form of social control. Structurally, that defines all other forms of social control as more effective. Of these, religion was one of the most effective and widely used for thousands of years; its effectiveness was found in utilization of the threat and promise of theological salvation by a higher spiritual authority, enforced by a temporal earthly authority, and backed up by the social approbation or approval of our social peer group, who long-ago, were generally clustered geographically with others of the same faith. And, especially before the American Revolution, governments embodied the principle cujus region, ejus religio (“whose realm, his religion”); essentially, tying governmental law to the stronger social control of religious authority enhanced overall social control. | > > | Of the few things that seem to be in basic agreement among and between our class and professor, the most fundamental seems to be that we must question most things that seem given, because humans and human systems are, to varying degrees, all full of—let’s say mostly unconscious rationalizations; another idea that doesn’t stir up too much protest is that law is the weakest form of social control.
You think? It's always
a tough sell to law students, who are ego-invested in the strength of
"LAW" now that they have paid all the tuition. But I can't remember
a bunch more troubled by the reality than this
one.
Structurally, that defines all other forms of social control as more effective. Of these, religion was one of the most effective and widely used for thousands of years; its effectiveness was found in utilization of the threat and promise of theological salvation by a higher spiritual authority, enforced by a temporal earthly authority, and backed up by the social approbation or approval of our social peer group, who long-ago, were generally clustered geographically with others of the same faith.
Religion is a stronger
form of social control, indeed, than law. But there are many forms
of social control, and religion too is a form of control operating at
the symbolic layer, where human beings have located more and more of
their social activity over the last several thousand years. But
human sociality is much older than homo sapiens, let alone older than
writing or the form of religion you are depicting. And it cohered
then and coheres now for reasons deeper than religion and more
powerful still.
And, especially before the American Revolution, governments embodied the principle cujus region, ejus religio (“whose realm, his religion”); essentially, tying governmental law to the stronger social control of religious authority enhanced overall social control.
Who told you that 18th
century British North America was like 16th-century Europe after the
Peace of Augsburg? It's nonsense. I'm surprised you didn't make any
effort to check. Now the rest of what you build on this substrate
will necessarily be untrue. | | Functionalism Guided the Exclusion of Religion from the New Government of the United States | |
> > | | | In considering their assignment to fix the Articles of Confederation, the Framers considered how the colonies had been formed, the kinds of people that inhabited them, how state governments had been operating before and after the Revolution, and how other governments had historically operated. They were thinking, thus, functionally (though without the surveys, statistics and data-mining that we’d today consider thorough investigation). | |
> > | Is this the conclusion
you formed by reading Madison's Notes, or Yates, or someone's
description of the Convention? One could rearrange the speeches
under these heads, to be sure, and create a checklist of "things
considered" that would have these categories boxed. But I don't
think it would put forward a historically-sensitive account of the
Convention. For this, and the nature of the religious structure and politics of post-Revolutionary America as they affected the making of the Constitution, the best single-volume introduction would be Richard Morris's Forging of the Union. | | Why Did the Framers Turn to Functionalism?
In the Federalist No. 10, Madison argued that factionalism would be the greatest danger to a unified state. His purpose was to argue that the government would be most representative of equal citizens as a republic rather than a pure democracy; the reasons he cites for this help to articulate why the authors of the Constitution diverged from the Declaration of Independence’s by excluding references to a “Creator” or “Natural God.” The colonies were first populated by those fleeing religious persecution, but this eventually included many different faith groups (though basically all Christians), and led to certain colonies being characterized and governed according to the faith of its founders or majority population. The religious oppression these groups had fled was to be eliminated from the new American government; strong views held even by the majority of citizens should, in Madison’s opinion, be controlled by structuring government so that certain “inalienable” rights could not be denied even to minority groups.
What the Framers Rejected
Basically, the Framers were confronting the problem of creating a government that had legitimacy to most, or ideally all, of its citizens. They recognized that, given citizens of many different faiths, religious tenets could not form the basis of a common government because those tenets were objects of intransigent disagreement. So they rejected a system, theocracy, that would be unsatisfactory and realized they must articulate some other system of values that the citizenry could hold in common. | |
> > | This is not factually
inaccurate. But it's interpretively wrong-headed. The "Framers"
didn't reject theocracy, anymore than they rejected Buddhism or
antigravity. They never for an instant considered it. There wasn't
a debate about the question. They were making a government that they
did not for an instant conceive would have any religious policy, or
any effect on the religious policies of the States. They made clear
there would be no religious tests for office under the Federal
Government, and they made sure that no oath of office for the
Presidency would be drawn that would exclude a Quaker from being
President (a step necessary to prevent the failure of ratification in
Pennsylvania). With the exception of the members of the House, all
federal officeholders were mediated by the state legislatures, which
appointed the Senate and controlled the Electoral College. Of the
House elections, the rules of election and control of the franchise
rested with the state legislatures. Religious issues in state
politics would no doubt affect state legislative elections: they
regularly did so in some States, and occasionally did so in others.
But the parties who wrote the 1787 Constitution in Philadelphia spent
no significant time talking about religion in politics, and I can't
think of a single moment in debate that could be characterized as
about "rejecting theocracy," let alone arguing about whether to
reject "theocracy."
I don't know what to do with the problem of historical inaccuracy
here. I don't know what's left of the draft's main idea if its
reconstruction of American constitutional history is (as it must be)
reconsidered.
| | How to Gain Legitimacy Without Theocratic Authority | |
< < | As Kurt Gödel asserted, no self-contained system can be wholly logical. But the Framers had to come up with a system that a geographically and theologically diverse group of people would all submit to. Holmes, in “The Path of the Law,” recognized that “the bad man” will not be guided by morals, only by what the law actually does. So the Framers articulated principles, and eventually (by popular demand) a Bill of Rights, premised not on religious morality but on the idea that we (now everyone and not just white males) are endowed with certain rights that cannot be nullified or abrogated by the rights or actions of others. Performing a contemporary functionalist investigation of whether humans are actually equally endowed with certain inalienable rights generally reveals instead that society best functions when we all enjoy rough parameters of equality. So now we could justify the endowment (or recognition) of these rights by utilitarianism. The Framers would have had no access to data that would reveal such justifications; they relied instead on their educations and common sense. In other words, they relied on a bit of transcendental nonsense to convince each citizen that certain rights were naturally inherent in each of them as well as in each of their countrymen, and if they wanted their own rights to be protected, they had to ensure everyone else’s were too. | > > | As Kurt Gödel asserted, no self-contained system can be wholly logical.
I'm not sure that's fair
summary of the proposition. Do you need to this point at all?
But the Framers had to come up with a system that a geographically and theologically diverse group of people would all submit to.
Once again, this is a
very strange formulation. In the first instance, the Philadelphia
Convention was commissioned to do no more than report to Congress.
The decision to break with their charter, and to present a plan of
federation directly to state ratifying conventions was extra-legal.
But even in doing so, I don't think it would in any way convey the
nature of the sources to say that ratification was presented as
"submission" to a new government. Your reading of the _Federalist
Papers_ varies substantially from that usually given if you find
their language advocates or even describes submitting the citizens of
the States to the Federal Government in any way at all. I don't see
how one could spend any time with the records of the state ratifying
conventions or the memorials submitted to them that would suggest
that the most ardent Federalists thought they were submitting State
citizens to a new national government. I don't know what the content
of Jeffersonianism is in your reconstruction, any more than I
understand your Federalism.
Holmes, in “The Path of the Law,” recognized that “the bad man” will not be guided by morals, only by what the law actually does.
He's not a sociological
description; he's a pedagogical device. What's he doing here?
So the Framers articulated principles, and eventually (by popular demand) a Bill of Rights, premised not on religious morality but on the idea that we (now everyone and not just white males) are endowed with certain rights that cannot be nullified or abrogated by the rights or actions of others.
Now you're having them
invent the constitutional development of England from 1215 to the
Glorious Revolution.
Performing a contemporary functionalist investigation of whether humans are actually equally endowed with certain inalienable rights generally reveals instead that society best functions when we all enjoy rough parameters of equality. So now we could justify the endowment (or recognition) of these rights by utilitarianism.
I don't know how you established that proposition. All I could see was an assertion. If you need to make this point, you need to show something in its support.
The Framers would have had no access to data that would reveal such justifications; they relied instead on their educations and common sense. In other words, they relied on a bit of transcendental nonsense to convince each citizen that certain rights were naturally inherent in each of them as well as in each of their countrymen, and if they wanted their own rights to be protected, they had to ensure everyone else’s were too.
This attributes to the
makers of the Federal Constitution the creation of the long-developing
18th century British North American view of natural and political
rights. Here one would want to consult, for an accurate view, Garry
Wills' wonderful book on the intellectual background of the
Declaration of Independence, Inventing America, and the first volume
of John Phillip Reid's Constitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights. | | Why We Need to Keep Some of the Framer's Nonsense
I’d like to argue that this use of transcendental nonsense, premised on a great deal of essentially functionalist contemplation and debate by the Framers, was essential to eliminating the more harmful transcendental nonsense (or Jerome Frank’s definition of magical thinking) of theocratic governments. The old form of social control was too oppressive for the new, idealistic country, but for a more religiously-neutral system of laws to have any effective social control, it had to gain strength by legitimacy, and creating a nonsense of rights gave every citizen the feeling that government dealt with them as it dealt with every other citizen. As we’ve discussed extensively in class, many more layers of transcendental nonsense and legal magic have been laid successively on top of this original, functionally designed “inalienable rights” nonsense. While we correctly attempt, in our class and hopefully in our larger lives, to work at tearing down the nonsense that has resulted, to varying degrees, in the perversion of the Framers intent and the unadvised strengthening of particular groups (who gain power using wealth, political power, demagoguery, or that old religious magic), I’m afraid we’ll tear out that nonsense that was essential to us coming together as a united country. There may never be anything we can all agree on as “truth,” and our inherent and intractable subjectivity may keep us divided as to many different aspects of our lives, but the Framers’ nonsense about inalienable rights was functionally derived, can be justified through utilitarianism, and is essential as the basis for a functioning society. Flawed as we are, I think we must accept even that scant common ground. | |
< < | (978 words, not including headings)
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.
To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" character on the next two lines: | > > | As I say, you can't save
the conclusion once it rests on so much historical inaccuracy.
The editorial mystery for me is why you didn't see the requirement to
consult sources on the historical claims you were making. | | | |
< < | | > > | Let's back up and figure out what the central idea was behind this
draft. It wasn't, I think, a constitutional history proposition.
The draft wandered there, it seems to me, and acquired difficulties
it didn't need to suffer. Clear statement of the real underlying
theme, and a development which either doesn't require American
constitutional history at all, or is compatible with something
interpretively recognizable, can then follow. | | | |
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KatySkaggsFirstPaper 3 - 12 Apr 2012 - Main.KatySkaggs
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| | As Kurt Gödel asserted, no self-contained system can be wholly logical. But the Framers had to come up with a system that a geographically and theologically diverse group of people would all submit to. Holmes, in “The Path of the Law,” recognized that “the bad man” will not be guided by morals, only by what the law actually does. So the Framers articulated principles, and eventually (by popular demand) a Bill of Rights, premised not on religious morality but on the idea that we (now everyone and not just white males) are endowed with certain rights that cannot be nullified or abrogated by the rights or actions of others. Performing a contemporary functionalist investigation of whether humans are actually equally endowed with certain inalienable rights generally reveals instead that society best functions when we all enjoy rough parameters of equality. So now we could justify the endowment (or recognition) of these rights by utilitarianism. The Framers would have had no access to data that would reveal such justifications; they relied instead on their educations and common sense. In other words, they relied on a bit of transcendental nonsense to convince each citizen that certain rights were naturally inherent in each of them as well as in each of their countrymen, and if they wanted their own rights to be protected, they had to ensure everyone else’s were too.
Why We Need to Keep Some of the Framer's Nonsense | |
< < | I’d like to argue that this use of transcendental nonsense, premised on a great deal of essentially functionalist contemplation and debate by the Framers, was essential to eliminating the more harmful transcendental nonsense (or Jerome Frank’s definition of magical thinking) of theocratic governments. The old form of social control was too oppressive for the new, idealistic country, but for a more religiously-neutral system of laws to have any effective social control, it had to gain strength by legitimacy, and creating a nonsense of rights gave every citizen the feeling that government dealt with them as it dealt with every other system. As we’ve discussed extensively in class, many more layers of transcendental nonsense and legal magic have been laid successively on top of this original, functionally designed “inalienable rights” nonsense. While we correctly attempt, in our class and hopefully in our larger lives, to work at tearing down the nonsense that has resulted, to varying degrees, in the perversion of the Framers intent and the unadvised strengthening of particular groups (who gain power using wealth, political power, demagoguery, or that old religious magic), I’m afraid we’ll tear out that nonsense that was essential to us coming together as a united country. There may never be anything we can all agree on as “truth,” and our inherent and intractable subjectivity may keep us divided as to many different aspects of our lives, but the Framers’ nonsense about inalienable rights was functionally derived, can be justified through utilitarianism, and is essential as the basis for a functioning society. Flawed as we are, I think we must accept even that scant common ground. | > > | I’d like to argue that this use of transcendental nonsense, premised on a great deal of essentially functionalist contemplation and debate by the Framers, was essential to eliminating the more harmful transcendental nonsense (or Jerome Frank’s definition of magical thinking) of theocratic governments. The old form of social control was too oppressive for the new, idealistic country, but for a more religiously-neutral system of laws to have any effective social control, it had to gain strength by legitimacy, and creating a nonsense of rights gave every citizen the feeling that government dealt with them as it dealt with every other citizen. As we’ve discussed extensively in class, many more layers of transcendental nonsense and legal magic have been laid successively on top of this original, functionally designed “inalienable rights” nonsense. While we correctly attempt, in our class and hopefully in our larger lives, to work at tearing down the nonsense that has resulted, to varying degrees, in the perversion of the Framers intent and the unadvised strengthening of particular groups (who gain power using wealth, political power, demagoguery, or that old religious magic), I’m afraid we’ll tear out that nonsense that was essential to us coming together as a united country. There may never be anything we can all agree on as “truth,” and our inherent and intractable subjectivity may keep us divided as to many different aspects of our lives, but the Framers’ nonsense about inalienable rights was functionally derived, can be justified through utilitarianism, and is essential as the basis for a functioning society. Flawed as we are, I think we must accept even that scant common ground. | | (978 words, not including headings)
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KatySkaggsFirstPaper 2 - 17 Feb 2012 - Main.KatySkaggs
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< < | It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | | Why Is American Government Based on the Weakest Form of Social Control? |
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KatySkaggsFirstPaper 1 - 16 Feb 2012 - Main.KatySkaggs
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.
Why Is American Government Based on the Weakest Form of Social Control?
-- By KatySkaggs - 16 Feb 2012
Law is the Weakest Form of Social Control
Of the few things that seem to be in basic agreement among and between our class and professor, the most fundamental seems to be that we must question most things that seem given, because humans and human systems are, to varying degrees, all full of—let’s say mostly unconscious rationalizations; another idea that doesn’t stir up too much protest is that law is the weakest form of social control. Structurally, that defines all other forms of social control as more effective. Of these, religion was one of the most effective and widely used for thousands of years; its effectiveness was found in utilization of the threat and promise of theological salvation by a higher spiritual authority, enforced by a temporal earthly authority, and backed up by the social approbation or approval of our social peer group, who long-ago, were generally clustered geographically with others of the same faith. And, especially before the American Revolution, governments embodied the principle cujus region, ejus religio (“whose realm, his religion”); essentially, tying governmental law to the stronger social control of religious authority enhanced overall social control.
Functionalism Guided the Exclusion of Religion from the New Government of the United States
In considering their assignment to fix the Articles of Confederation, the Framers considered how the colonies had been formed, the kinds of people that inhabited them, how state governments had been operating before and after the Revolution, and how other governments had historically operated. They were thinking, thus, functionally (though without the surveys, statistics and data-mining that we’d today consider thorough investigation).
Why Did the Framers Turn to Functionalism?
In the Federalist No. 10, Madison argued that factionalism would be the greatest danger to a unified state. His purpose was to argue that the government would be most representative of equal citizens as a republic rather than a pure democracy; the reasons he cites for this help to articulate why the authors of the Constitution diverged from the Declaration of Independence’s by excluding references to a “Creator” or “Natural God.” The colonies were first populated by those fleeing religious persecution, but this eventually included many different faith groups (though basically all Christians), and led to certain colonies being characterized and governed according to the faith of its founders or majority population. The religious oppression these groups had fled was to be eliminated from the new American government; strong views held even by the majority of citizens should, in Madison’s opinion, be controlled by structuring government so that certain “inalienable” rights could not be denied even to minority groups.
What the Framers Rejected
Basically, the Framers were confronting the problem of creating a government that had legitimacy to most, or ideally all, of its citizens. They recognized that, given citizens of many different faiths, religious tenets could not form the basis of a common government because those tenets were objects of intransigent disagreement. So they rejected a system, theocracy, that would be unsatisfactory and realized they must articulate some other system of values that the citizenry could hold in common.
How to Gain Legitimacy Without Theocratic Authority
As Kurt Gödel asserted, no self-contained system can be wholly logical. But the Framers had to come up with a system that a geographically and theologically diverse group of people would all submit to. Holmes, in “The Path of the Law,” recognized that “the bad man” will not be guided by morals, only by what the law actually does. So the Framers articulated principles, and eventually (by popular demand) a Bill of Rights, premised not on religious morality but on the idea that we (now everyone and not just white males) are endowed with certain rights that cannot be nullified or abrogated by the rights or actions of others. Performing a contemporary functionalist investigation of whether humans are actually equally endowed with certain inalienable rights generally reveals instead that society best functions when we all enjoy rough parameters of equality. So now we could justify the endowment (or recognition) of these rights by utilitarianism. The Framers would have had no access to data that would reveal such justifications; they relied instead on their educations and common sense. In other words, they relied on a bit of transcendental nonsense to convince each citizen that certain rights were naturally inherent in each of them as well as in each of their countrymen, and if they wanted their own rights to be protected, they had to ensure everyone else’s were too.
Why We Need to Keep Some of the Framer's Nonsense
I’d like to argue that this use of transcendental nonsense, premised on a great deal of essentially functionalist contemplation and debate by the Framers, was essential to eliminating the more harmful transcendental nonsense (or Jerome Frank’s definition of magical thinking) of theocratic governments. The old form of social control was too oppressive for the new, idealistic country, but for a more religiously-neutral system of laws to have any effective social control, it had to gain strength by legitimacy, and creating a nonsense of rights gave every citizen the feeling that government dealt with them as it dealt with every other system. As we’ve discussed extensively in class, many more layers of transcendental nonsense and legal magic have been laid successively on top of this original, functionally designed “inalienable rights” nonsense. While we correctly attempt, in our class and hopefully in our larger lives, to work at tearing down the nonsense that has resulted, to varying degrees, in the perversion of the Framers intent and the unadvised strengthening of particular groups (who gain power using wealth, political power, demagoguery, or that old religious magic), I’m afraid we’ll tear out that nonsense that was essential to us coming together as a united country. There may never be anything we can all agree on as “truth,” and our inherent and intractable subjectivity may keep us divided as to many different aspects of our lives, but the Framers’ nonsense about inalienable rights was functionally derived, can be justified through utilitarianism, and is essential as the basis for a functioning society. Flawed as we are, I think we must accept even that scant common ground.
(978 words, not including headings)
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.
To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" character on the next two lines:
Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules for preference declarations. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of these lines. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated ALLOWTOPICVIEW list. |
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