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LukeReillyFirstEssay 9 - 06 Apr 2015 - Main.AlexWeiss
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| | Building off what others have said, the one point I'm stuck on the fact that, despite what Judge Day would say, there really is no neutrality when a judge interprets case law. Just as a judge looking at statutory text might go to legislative history, a judge trying to interpret the applicability of case law to a given set of facts will inquire into the normative policy motivations of the cases and then figure out what matches her own motivations. A more practical note, how do you see this theory playing out in constitutional interpretation? This has the feeling of more of a Scala-like approach to statutory interpretation regime. If so, is there an alternative way to find the constitutional support for many of the rights we as a society consider fundamental today even though they do not appear in the text?
-- NicoGurian - 03 Apr 2015 | |
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"If so, is there an alternative way to find the constitutional support for many of the rights we as a society consider fundamental today even though they do not appear in the text?"
I think a judge can justify many of the rights we have without resorting to legislative intent -- the framers of the 14th amendment likely didn't intend that the equal protection clause would preclude school segregation (granted, that's not statutory -- but my point is that I think you can reconcile our modern conceptions of rights with the idea that we should cease searching for and considering author's intent, even if those rights aren't explicit in the text).
Having said that, I would agree with Shay that there's something undemocratic about having 5 lawyers usurp the legislature's (likely) "intentions" and the executive's administration of a law. Otherwise, you get 5 lawyers denying millions health coverage due to a poorly worded statute. I guess on the flipside, one can still uphold the ACA as it has been administered without resorting to legislative intent/context -- if you're good enough, I'd say any logical argument can be utilized to justify any political disposition. As such, it's all just word play, and legislative intent is yet another tool in the tool box to justify a political leaning either way. But it's not necessarily an indispensable tool.
In short, I don't really think it will make a difference either way.
-- AlexWeiss - 06 Apr 2015 | |
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