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Suspect Classes |
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< < | Introduction
In light of Perry v. Brown and the handful of DOMA challenges pending in various stages of court, it’s pertinent to consider the level of scrutiny applied to government discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Courts will also consider whether various framings of a "right to marry" are "fundamental", but that’s not my focus. |
| Defining Suspect Classes
The characteristics of suspect classes |
| The Court has been unwilling to expand the realm of suspect classification beyond those initially suggested three-quarters of a century ago (race, national origin, and religion). Two of the classifications find strong Constitutional support for suspect status. Considering the historical context of the 14th Amendment, race-based distinctions are obviously inherently suspect in equal protection jurisprudence. Discomfort with religious classifications has a foundation in the 1st Amendment (and thus the 14th Amendment). National origin may have a weaker Constitutional basis for special protection, but likely reflects contemporary tensions resulting from the wave of immigration in the decades preceding Carolene Products. |
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< < | Later cases have labeled sex, parental marital status, and parental legal immigration status as quasi-suspect classifications subject to intermediate scrutiny.
Some classifications found not suspect include age, physical and mental disability, and poverty.
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> > | Later cases have labeled sex, parental marital status, and parental legal immigration status as quasi-suspect classifications subject to intermediate scrutiny, while some classifications found not suspect include age, physical and mental disability, and poverty. |
| The classification of sexual orientation, actual and potential: |
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< < | What the Court has said |
| The only majority Supreme Court opinion to consider sexual orientation within an equal protection framework is Romer v. Evans. The Court applied rationality review, implicitly refusing to recognize orientation as a suspect classification. |
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< < | Could sexual orientation be a suspect classification?
Because of the Court’s longstanding refusal to expand the list of suspect classes, arguing that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect class may be more productive. The uncertainty regarding what renders a class suspect versus quasi-suspect means most arguments in favor of one standard are largely applicable to the other.
Could sexual orientation be rendered a suspect classification by the challenged action?
“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities” may hinder “political processes ordinarily…relied upon to protect minorities.” Even if sexual orientation isn’t a suspect classification in a theoretical vacuum, state action that places a badge of inferiority on homosexuality arguably creates a suspect class.
Could sexual orientation at least be a quasi-suspect classification, based on the standards outlined above?
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> > | Could sexual orientation be a suspect classification? I certainly think so, but the Court seems unwilling to expand the list of formally suspect classes. It's unclear what renders a class suspect versus quasi-suspect, so I'll argue that sexual orientation could at least be defined as a quasi-suspect classification. Furthermore, since "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” may hinder “political processes ordinarily…relied upon to protect minorities,” sexual orientation may be rendered a suspect class by state action that places a badge of inferiority on non-heterosexuals (even if they aren't a suspect class in a "vacuum"). |
| A history of purposeful unequal treatment |
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< < | The Rodriguez majority, including Justice Rehnquist, called this a “traditional indicia of suspectness.” This is curious because the opinions Rehnquist joined in Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence all cited longstanding discrimination against homosexuals as clear evidence that such treatment was within the realm of legitimate state power. The characterization of a class as deviant colors this analysis: a history of discrimination against deviant groups is expected, while such a history regarding acceptable groups merits stricter scrutiny to determine whether current state action is based on legitimate concerns or entrenched bias. |
> > | The Rodriguez majority, including Justice Rehnquist, called this a “traditional indicia of suspectness.” Curiously, the opinions Rehnquist joined in Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence all cited longstanding discrimination against homosexuals as clear evidence that such treatment was within the realm of legitimate state power. The characterization of a class as deviant colors this analysis: a history of discrimination against deviants is expected, while such history regarding non-deviants merits stricter scrutiny. |
| Political powerlessness [requiring] protection from the majoritarian political process |
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< < | Justice Brennan has argued that the “severe opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals once so identified publicly” rendered the group “particularly powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political arena,” while Justice Scalia in Romer called homosexuals a “politically powerful minority.” If non-heterosexuality is considered deviant, then perhaps any move towards greater protection suggests political power. I disagree. Romer was decided in May 1996, three weeks after DOMA was introduced in the House. Homosexual sex was only decriminalized nationwide in 2003, and not through the political process. Today, only six states authorize same-sex marriage. This suggests a minority that is more discrete and insular than politically powerful.
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> > | Justice Brennan has argued that the “severe opprobrium often manifested against homosexuals once so identified publicly” rendered the group “particularly powerless to pursue their rights openly in the political arena,” while Justice Scalia in Romer called homosexuals a “politically powerful minority.” If non-heterosexuality is considered deviant, then perhaps any move towards greater protection suggests political power. I disagree. Romer was decided in May 1996, three weeks after DOMA was introduced in the House. Homosexual sex was only decriminalized nationwide in 2003, and not through the political process. Today, only six states authorize same-sex marriage. To me this suggests a minority that is more discrete and insular than politically powerful. |
| An immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth |
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< < | The rule may or may not apply to sexual orientation, but it’s problematic regardless. The Court’s reasoning that “legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility” subtly endorses discrimination. If a group is truly equal, then questions of responsibility are misplaced.
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> > | The rule may or may not apply to sexual orientation, but it’s problematic regardless. The Court’s reasoning that “legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility” subtly endorses discrimination. If the characteristic that delineates a class is irrelevant, then questions of responsibility seem to me to be misplaced. |
| Does the purported level of scrutiny even matter?
Is the Court being honest? |
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< < | The Romer majority claimed to use rationality review, but rejected three state justifications for Amendment 2. I’m happy with the decision, but it doesn’t follow the extremely deferential floor set in other cases (namely, economic ones): rationality review doesn’t delve into the “wisdom, fairness, or logic” of proposed rationales, nor even require that the state “actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.” It’s hard to determine the difference between Romer’s rational basis “with bite” and intermediate scrutiny; would any justices change their decision in any case based on the other standard being applied?
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> > | The Romer majority claimed to use rationality review, yet rejected three state justifications for Amendment 2. I’m happy with the decision, but it doesn’t follow the extremely deferential floor set in other cases (economic ones): rationality review doesn’t delve into the “wisdom, fairness, or logic” of proposed rationales, nor even require that the state “actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.” It’s hard to determine the difference between Romer’s rational basis “with bite” and intermediate scrutiny; would any Justices change their decision in any case based on the other standard being applied? |
| What is a rational basis for discrimination?
So seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy. |
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< < | This is another standard used to define a suspect class, but I put it here because it’s the heart of the issue. When is sexual orientation relevant to a legitimate state interest? The only practical difference between heterosexuals and others relates to procreation and carries significant caveats. While circumstances beyond my imagination may justify state discrimination, the difference in situation seems to implicate few, if any, legitimate state interests. State power shouldn’t be wielded at the "moral" whim of the majority to discriminate against disapproved groups.
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> > | This is another standard used to define a suspect class, and it’s the heart of the issue. When is sexual orientation relevant to a legitimate state interest? The only practical difference between heterosexuals and others relates to procreation and carries significant caveats. While circumstances beyond my imagination may justify state discrimination, the difference in situation seems to implicate few, if any, legitimate state interests. State power shouldn’t be wielded at the "moral" whim of the majority to discriminate against disapproved groups. |
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< < | I don't agree with any justification I've seen for denying sexual orientation quasi-suspect status. At the same time, I think any honest application of rationality review would strike down government discrimination based on orientation. |
> > | I don't agree with any justification I've seen for denying sexual orientation quasi-suspect status. I also think any honest application of rationality review should strike down government discrimination based on orientation. This is an area of Supreme Court jurisprudence where the opinions (whether framed as equal protection analysis or due process / fundamental right analysis) elicit heavy cynicism from me. I have to remind myself, again, that law is a weak form of social control. Polling seems to show a steady increase in acceptance of homosexuality in a variety of ways, and public opinion in this area must be more important than the opinion of nine (or five) Justices. |