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MatthewZornFirstPaper 7 - 29 Apr 2010 - Main.MatthewZorn
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
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<
< | Preserving Legal Corpus Callosa | >
> | Always a Work In Progress | | | | |
<
< | Introduction | >
> | Introduction of the Past | | | Meet Stanley. He is the winner of the 2005 Defense Advance Research Projects Agency's Grand Challenge (DARPA), a 212 km off-road obstacle course in the Mojave Desert. It was not close. Out of 23 finalists, only Stanley finished the race in under seven hours. What is Stanley's secret? | | | Constrasting Stanley and Kat-5 may be instructive for approaching law. The DARPA contest suggests that there is an advantage to using human, evaluative processes over mechanical, logical ones in navigating one's way through future, unforeseeable obstacles. Kat-5, or any robot, cannot tell the difference between a speed bump and a pedestrian who falls in the street—unless the human programmer foresees this problem ahead of time. In Jerome Frank's words, “no one can foresee all the future permutations and combinations of events.” So, are human balancing tests preferrable? Do we have ways of determining when to use balancing tests and when to use bright line rules? | |
<
< | Unask the question | >
> | Unask the Question | | | The hitch here is that these two modes are not distinct. The human creation of a bright line rule is an inherently non-robotic, evaluative process. And, the human application of bright line rules elicits other human, illogical right-brained processes that may be far more disturbing than what was eaten for breakfast. On the other hand, balancing tests seem to always incorporate robotic subroutines. “Undue burdens” and “substantial effects,” are really lists of robotic subprocesses, such as determining whether certain factors are absent or present. The two processes are inseparable to the point that previous questions have the zen equivalent of a mu value. | |
<
< | This is one of the
places where you begin to suffer from complete dependence on a single
extended metaphor. "Undue" burden may not be a robotic routine at
all, but rather a symbol standing for a holistic human judgment by,
say, Justice O'Connor. Or what at first begins that way, if
sufficient doctrinal stability results in its continuance, develops
by common-law case presentation into a more formalized
system.
Then, the real difference between “right-brained” Stanley and “left brained” Kat-5 is not straightforward. The programs of Stanley and Kat-5 both involve left and right brain processes. Since all robots have initial human programming, the logical robot rules have an inherent hybrid right-left process imbued in their code. But, beyond this, they all follow a discrete set of rules and procedures. Except Stanley. He refines his initial ruleset using adaptive “open to interpretation” left-brained programming and refines the rules based on subsequent hybrid processes. Stanley's first real advantage over Kat-5 and the rest of the DARPA field is that his right and left brains are more frequent communicators; he has a more robust corpus callosum. Second, he has better debugging software programmed into his brain. He still operates within rules and procedures but his rules have been refined through many iterations of integrated left-right brained processes.
Stanley's software operates like U.S. statutory and constitutional law should operate. The legislature creates initial principles needed to govern, reflecting a set of desireable societal goals. The principles are tested out in the course of everyday life and flaws inevitably arise from their rigid application to circumstances unforeseen by the intial programmers. So, the judiciary steps in, applies law to fact, and refines the intial rules to better serve positive goals. After numerous iterations of applyng law to fact, precedent develops that helps the system navigate through similar future obstacles. Each iteration is a debugging exercise that uses previous errors to avoid future ones.
Initial Takeaways
First, mushiness in law is fine, if not desirable, so long as there are adequate procedures built into the system to hone and polish the law later. This process of error correction or "debugging" in the legal system will be expounded upon in another essay.
Fine for whom?
Second, no system functions optimally on extreme principles. In the present metaphor, the best qualified robot was the robot that struck a balance between the formalistic extreme and the adaptive extreme. A similar argument against "extreme operation" can and will be made about other systems.
And will undoubtedly be right about some systems. But how will an argument show that no system functions optimally on "extreme" principles? Won't it have some adverse evidence to contend with, not to say explain away?
Third, courts should restrain from judicial restraint. The essential tenet of judicial restraint is that “the legislature is supreme.”
No. That doesn't
follow. To say that the most important thing the Supreme Court does
is not doing, as Brandeis did, by no means implies legislative
supremacy. It's hard to see how any Supreme Court justice could
believe in restraint if that were its content. By not doing, in the
Brandeisian conception, the Court allows dialogue to continue among
other voices, which means a richer record of the human responses to
the situation, embodied in legislative as well as extra-legal
sources, as well as more formal rulings, all of which will (in
theory) enable a more just eventual judgment in the Supreme Court, if
the issue ultimately requires one.
There may be positive value in conservatism, knowing that the law will be the same every day. Nevertheless, increased judicial restraint moves us closer toward the maladaptive behavior of a Kat-5. It threatens to divorce communication between the left and right hemispheres of the legal system. Here, I agree with Justice Stevens—rational basis review “is tantamount to no review at all.”
That's a technical
comment abstracted into a general principle beyond its scope. And
now, by attaching the metaphor so tightly to the situation that the
courts are the left brain and the legislature the right, you pretty
much assure that the correspondence will break
down.
The reality is that judicial restraint and its dopplegangers function less as judicial posture and more as a legally acceptable presentations for everyday life—stomachable alternatives to human commitments to unjust outcomes. Even so, the theater has tangible effects. The audience starts to frame arguments and painfully unfunny jokes in legal terms completely void of any substantive meaning.
This is interesting
language, not very precise or at least not very precisely explained.
But it doesn't seem to have anything to do with what went before, and
this:
And, through grotesque osmosis, we enter robotic states of mind that threatens to shut down our corpus callosa. In time, we start to lose the main advantage that we have over even the most adaptives of Stanleys.
doesn't make it any clearer.
This is a very
interesting and creative essay. Revising it, in my view, means
backing the metaphor away from its metaphrand just a little more, so
that the correspondences don't become so overtightened that the frame
cracks. You need to be a little more tentative in your
neuropsychology, because we're not so simple as all that, which means
that Stanley, like all the computers that have ever existed, is a
really degenerate embodiment of a small fraction of what at the
moment of its design we think we know about the brain and its
relation to the mind.
Reading Duncan Kennedy on rules and standards would, I think, go far
to convince you that you've reinvented one of the classic dichotomies
in legal theory and expressed it, in true 21st century style, as a
problem of hemispheric lateralization in robotics software design. I
don't know that this approach is an improvement, but it's interesting
and it's fun, so long as you don't take the metaphor too seriously,
which the essay wants to do. | >
> | Perhaps Stanley's software operates like U.S. statutory and constitutional law should operate. The legislature creates initial principles needed to govern, reflecting a set of desireable societal goals. The principles are tested out in the course of everyday life and flaws inevitably arise from their rigid application to circumstances unforeseen by the intial programmers. So, the judiciary steps in, applies law to fact, and refines the intial rules to better serve positive goals. After numerous iterations of applyng law to fact, precedent develops that helps the system navigate through similar future obstacles. Each iteration is a debugging exercise that uses previous errors to avoid future ones. | | | | |
<
< | | >
> | A Twist and a Turn into the Present
Over the past few weeks, I have marinated and pored over the original unedited prose of the past above. I choose to preserve the thought in its original manifestation (less a misguided paragraph)--not out of laziness, but rather a desire to preserve the idea that I now build upon. I want the idea in its original art. In building upon this essay, I have been as productive as my disposition allows. I spent time absorbing my "editor's" comments and also spent time reading. I consulted texts on particle physics, Eastern philosophy, and class readings. I repeatedly write, trash, and rewrite these words that follow. Paper crumples the floor. The more I read, the more I become aware of a hidden yet pervasive truth: I have not reinvented the wheel. Neither did Duncan Kennedy. My idea is not only unoriginal--it is thoroughly unoriginal.
The R-L hemisphere problem is what my "editor" said it was: a reincarnation. But of what? I see the recitation of a fundamental idea of existence, a duality in life, that transcends disciplinary labels. Quantum physicists see a wave-particle duality. In Chinese philosophy it is yin yang. Kennedy finds it in rules and standards. Pirsig tries to tackle it with Quality. I see it in a dichotomy between discreteness continuity. Veblen's theory opposite conventional economic theory. Tiers of scrutiny against a spectrum. Formalism versus realism. Substance or style. Right brain:left brain. Split-selves. Diametrically opposed poles that are different in perceptions of the same thing. States that logically and illogically exist and do not exist as binaries and non-binaries at the same time. I call them dual-paradoxes, for lack of a better term: dualities that both are and are not, the essence of mu.
All current ideas are in past ideas and all future ideas sprout from current ideas. In terms of substance and style, if one creates the distinction, the R-L hemisphere framework as applied to law is original in style not substance. Regardless, the thought is original to me and helped me get to a place I needed to go that other ways might not have. Appropriately, that is the essence behind dual-paradoxes. Even if Veblen's theory is only a different style (perception), not substance (reality), the process can hasten a conclusion, inspire "new" ideas, and create new personal understandings. Thus, it is different in substance. And yet it isn't. This is a paradox I can live with. | | |
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MatthewZornFirstPaper 6 - 04 Apr 2010 - Main.EbenMoglen
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
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| | | The hitch here is that these two modes are not distinct. The human creation of a bright line rule is an inherently non-robotic, evaluative process. And, the human application of bright line rules elicits other human, illogical right-brained processes that may be far more disturbing than what was eaten for breakfast. On the other hand, balancing tests seem to always incorporate robotic subroutines. “Undue burdens” and “substantial effects,” are really lists of robotic subprocesses, such as determining whether certain factors are absent or present. The two processes are inseparable to the point that previous questions have the zen equivalent of a mu value. | |
>
> | This is one of the
places where you begin to suffer from complete dependence on a single
extended metaphor. "Undue" burden may not be a robotic routine at
all, but rather a symbol standing for a holistic human judgment by,
say, Justice O'Connor. Or what at first begins that way, if
sufficient doctrinal stability results in its continuance, develops
by common-law case presentation into a more formalized
system. | | | Then, the real difference between “right-brained” Stanley and “left brained” Kat-5 is not straightforward. The programs of Stanley and Kat-5 both involve left and right brain processes. Since all robots have initial human programming, the logical robot rules have an inherent hybrid right-left process imbued in their code. But, beyond this, they all follow a discrete set of rules and procedures. Except Stanley. He refines his initial ruleset using adaptive “open to interpretation” left-brained programming and refines the rules based on subsequent hybrid processes. Stanley's first real advantage over Kat-5 and the rest of the DARPA field is that his right and left brains are more frequent communicators; he has a more robust corpus callosum. Second, he has better debugging software programmed into his brain. He still operates within rules and procedures but his rules have been refined through many iterations of integrated left-right brained processes.
Stanley's software operates like U.S. statutory and constitutional law should operate. The legislature creates initial principles needed to govern, reflecting a set of desireable societal goals. The principles are tested out in the course of everyday life and flaws inevitably arise from their rigid application to circumstances unforeseen by the intial programmers. So, the judiciary steps in, applies law to fact, and refines the intial rules to better serve positive goals. After numerous iterations of applyng law to fact, precedent develops that helps the system navigate through similar future obstacles. Each iteration is a debugging exercise that uses previous errors to avoid future ones. | | | First, mushiness in law is fine, if not desirable, so long as there are adequate procedures built into the system to hone and polish the law later. This process of error correction or "debugging" in the legal system will be expounded upon in another essay. | |
>
> | Fine for whom?
| | | Second, no system functions optimally on extreme principles. In the present metaphor, the best qualified robot was the robot that struck a balance between the formalistic extreme and the adaptive extreme. A similar argument against "extreme operation" can and will be made about other systems. | |
<
< | Third, courts should restrain from judicial restraint. The essential tenet of judicial restraint is that “the legislature is supreme.” There may be positive value in conservatism, knowing that the law will be the same every day. Nevertheless, increased judicial restraint moves us closer toward the maladaptive behavior of a Kat-5. It threatens to divorce communication between the left and right hemispheres of the legal system. Here, I agree with Justice Stevens—rational basis review “is tantamount to no review at all.” | >
> | And will undoubtedly be right about some systems. But how will an argument show that no system functions optimally on "extreme" principles? Won't it have some adverse evidence to contend with, not to say explain away?
Third, courts should restrain from judicial restraint. The essential tenet of judicial restraint is that “the legislature is supreme.”
No. That doesn't
follow. To say that the most important thing the Supreme Court does
is not doing, as Brandeis did, by no means implies legislative
supremacy. It's hard to see how any Supreme Court justice could
believe in restraint if that were its content. By not doing, in the
Brandeisian conception, the Court allows dialogue to continue among
other voices, which means a richer record of the human responses to
the situation, embodied in legislative as well as extra-legal
sources, as well as more formal rulings, all of which will (in
theory) enable a more just eventual judgment in the Supreme Court, if
the issue ultimately requires one.
There may be positive value in conservatism, knowing that the law will be the same every day. Nevertheless, increased judicial restraint moves us closer toward the maladaptive behavior of a Kat-5. It threatens to divorce communication between the left and right hemispheres of the legal system. Here, I agree with Justice Stevens—rational basis review “is tantamount to no review at all.”
That's a technical
comment abstracted into a general principle beyond its scope. And
now, by attaching the metaphor so tightly to the situation that the
courts are the left brain and the legislature the right, you pretty
much assure that the correspondence will break
down.
The reality is that judicial restraint and its dopplegangers function less as judicial posture and more as a legally acceptable presentations for everyday life—stomachable alternatives to human commitments to unjust outcomes. Even so, the theater has tangible effects. The audience starts to frame arguments and painfully unfunny jokes in legal terms completely void of any substantive meaning.
This is interesting
language, not very precise or at least not very precisely explained.
But it doesn't seem to have anything to do with what went before, and
this:
And, through grotesque osmosis, we enter robotic states of mind that threatens to shut down our corpus callosa. In time, we start to lose the main advantage that we have over even the most adaptives of Stanleys.
doesn't make it any clearer.
This is a very
interesting and creative essay. Revising it, in my view, means
backing the metaphor away from its metaphrand just a little more, so
that the correspondences don't become so overtightened that the frame
cracks. You need to be a little more tentative in your
neuropsychology, because we're not so simple as all that, which means
that Stanley, like all the computers that have ever existed, is a
really degenerate embodiment of a small fraction of what at the
moment of its design we think we know about the brain and its
relation to the mind.
Reading Duncan Kennedy on rules and standards would, I think, go far
to convince you that you've reinvented one of the classic dichotomies
in legal theory and expressed it, in true 21st century style, as a
problem of hemispheric lateralization in robotics software design. I
don't know that this approach is an improvement, but it's interesting
and it's fun, so long as you don't take the metaphor too seriously,
which the essay wants to do. | | | | |
<
< | The reality is that judicial restraint and its dopplegangers function less as judicial posture and more as a legally acceptable presentations for everyday life—stomachable alternatives to human commitments to unjust outcomes. Even so, the theater has tangible effects. The audience starts to frame arguments and painfully unfunny jokes in legal terms completely void of any substantive meaning. And, through grotesque osmosis, we enter robotic states of mind that threatens to shut down our corpus callosa. In time, we start to lose the main advantage that we have over even the most adaptives of Stanleys. | >
> | | | |
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MatthewZornFirstPaper 5 - 23 Mar 2010 - Main.MatthewZorn
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
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| | | Initial Takeaways | |
<
< | First, mushiness in law is fine, if not desirable, so long as there are adequate procedures built into the system to hone and polish the law later. This process of error correction or "debugging" in the legal system will be expounded upon in my next essay. | >
> | First, mushiness in law is fine, if not desirable, so long as there are adequate procedures built into the system to hone and polish the law later. This process of error correction or "debugging" in the legal system will be expounded upon in another essay. | | | Second, no system functions optimally on extreme principles. In the present metaphor, the best qualified robot was the robot that struck a balance between the formalistic extreme and the adaptive extreme. A similar argument against "extreme operation" can and will be made about other systems. |
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MatthewZornFirstPaper 4 - 22 Mar 2010 - Main.MatthewZorn
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
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| | | Right and Left Brains | |
<
< | Of all the other autonomous (driverless) vehicles in the competition, Stanley appears to be the most “right-brained.” The right brain is responsible for imagination, intuition, and holistic thinking while the left brain is responsible factual analysis, detail, ordering. Generally, the right brain drives creativity while the left manages logical functions. The two are connected by another brain structure, the corpus callosum.. Some tasks are better served by one hemisphere over the other, but all complex tasks require some degree of cooperation between the two. The amount of cooperation needed may be overlooked. I would postulate that Wiles' proof of Fermat's last theorem required just as much creativity as Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata. | >
> | Of all the other autonomous (driverless) vehicles in the competition, Stanley appears to be the most “right-brained.” The right brain is responsible for imagination, intuition, and holistic thinking while the left brain is responsible factual analysis, detail, and ordering. Generally, the right brain drives creativity while the left manages logical functions. The two are connected by another brain structure, the corpus callosum. Some tasks are better served by one hemisphere over the other, but all complex tasks require some degree of cooperation between the two. The amount of cooperation needed may be overlooked. I would postulate that Wiles' proof of Fermat's last theorem required just as much creativity as Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata. | | | | |
<
< | All of the vehicles in the competition, such as Kat-5, had a relatively common driving algorithm: external sensors fed low-level modules that controlled the vehicle's speed, direction and decision making. Each robot had a predetermined set of instructions and made logical choices based on the environment. Stanley operated similarly, but also had an adaptive, holistic learning program that kept a log of "human reactions and decisions" when a human drove the vehicle in test runs. In this respect, Stanley did not operate on a discrete set of rules, since, his rules could adapt. Stanley succeeded because he was the most human. | >
> | All of the vehicles in the competition, such as Kat-5, had a relatively common driving algorithm: external sensors fed low-level modules that controlled the vehicle's speed, direction and decision making. Each robot had a predetermined set of instructions and made logical choices based on the environment. Stanley operated similarly, but also had an adaptive, holistic learning program that kept a log of "human reactions and decisions" when a human drove the vehicle in test runs. In this respect, Stanley did not operate on a discrete set of rules since his rules could adapt. Stanley succeeded because he was the most human. | | | | |
<
< | Constrasting Stanley and Kat-5 may be instructive for approaching law. The DARPA contest suggests that there is an advantage to using human, evaluative processes over mechanical, logical ones in navigating one's way through future, unforeseeable obstacles. Kat-5, or any robot, will not be able to tell the difference between a speed bump and a pedestrian who falls in the street—unless the human programmer foresees this problem ahead of time. In Jerome Frank's words, “no one can foresee all the future permutations and combinations of events.” So, are human balancing tests preferrable? Do we have ways of determining when to use balancing tests and when to use bright line rules? | >
> | Constrasting Stanley and Kat-5 may be instructive for approaching law. The DARPA contest suggests that there is an advantage to using human, evaluative processes over mechanical, logical ones in navigating one's way through future, unforeseeable obstacles. Kat-5, or any robot, cannot tell the difference between a speed bump and a pedestrian who falls in the street—unless the human programmer foresees this problem ahead of time. In Jerome Frank's words, “no one can foresee all the future permutations and combinations of events.” So, are human balancing tests preferrable? Do we have ways of determining when to use balancing tests and when to use bright line rules? | | | Unask the question | |
<
< | The problem is that these modes are not distinct. The human creation of a bright line rule is an inherently non-robotic, evaluative process. And, the human application of bright line rules elicits other human, illogical right-brained processes that may be far more disturbing than what was eaten for breakfast. On the other hand, balancing tests seem to always incorporate robotic subroutines. “Undue burdens” and “substantial effects,” what we are really a lists of robotic subprocesses, such as determining whether certain factors are absent or present. The two processes are inseparable to the point that previous questions are nonsense and have the zen equivalent of a mu value. | >
> | The hitch here is that these two modes are not distinct. The human creation of a bright line rule is an inherently non-robotic, evaluative process. And, the human application of bright line rules elicits other human, illogical right-brained processes that may be far more disturbing than what was eaten for breakfast. On the other hand, balancing tests seem to always incorporate robotic subroutines. “Undue burdens” and “substantial effects,” are really lists of robotic subprocesses, such as determining whether certain factors are absent or present. The two processes are inseparable to the point that previous questions have the zen equivalent of a mu value. | | | | |
<
< | Then, the real difference between “right-brained” Stanley and “left brained” Kat-5 is not straightforward. The programs of Stanley and Kat-5 both involve left and right brain processes. Since all robots are intially programmed by humans, the logical robot rules have an inherent hybrid right-left process imbued in their code. But, beyond this, they all follow a discrete set of rules and procedures. Except Stanley. He refines his initial ruleset using adaptive “open to interpretation” left-brained programming and refines the rules based on subsequent hybrid processes. Stanley's real advantage over Kat-5 and the rest of the DARPA field is that his right and left brains are more frequent communicators; he has a more robust corpus callosum. Plus, he has better debugging software programmed into his brain. He still operates within rules and procedures but his rules have been refined through many iterations of integrated left-right brained processes. | >
> | Then, the real difference between “right-brained” Stanley and “left brained” Kat-5 is not straightforward. The programs of Stanley and Kat-5 both involve left and right brain processes. Since all robots have initial human programming, the logical robot rules have an inherent hybrid right-left process imbued in their code. But, beyond this, they all follow a discrete set of rules and procedures. Except Stanley. He refines his initial ruleset using adaptive “open to interpretation” left-brained programming and refines the rules based on subsequent hybrid processes. Stanley's first real advantage over Kat-5 and the rest of the DARPA field is that his right and left brains are more frequent communicators; he has a more robust corpus callosum. Second, he has better debugging software programmed into his brain. He still operates within rules and procedures but his rules have been refined through many iterations of integrated left-right brained processes. | | | Stanley's software operates like U.S. statutory and constitutional law should operate. The legislature creates initial principles needed to govern, reflecting a set of desireable societal goals. The principles are tested out in the course of everyday life and flaws inevitably arise from their rigid application to circumstances unforeseen by the intial programmers. So, the judiciary steps in, applies law to fact, and refines the intial rules to better serve positive goals. After numerous iterations of applyng law to fact, precedent develops that helps the system navigate through similar future obstacles. Each iteration is a debugging exercise that uses previous errors to avoid future ones. | | | First, mushiness in law is fine, if not desirable, so long as there are adequate procedures built into the system to hone and polish the law later. This process of error correction or "debugging" in the legal system will be expounded upon in my next essay. | |
<
< | Second, courts should restrain from judicial restraint. The essential tenet of judicial restraint is that “the legislature is supreme.” There may be positive value in conservatism, knowing that the law will be the same every day. Nevertheless, increased judicial restraint moves us closer toward the maladaptive behavior of a Kat-5. It threatens to divorce communication between the left and right hemispheres of the legal system. Here, I agree with Justice Stevens—rational basis review “is tantamount to no review at all.” | >
> | Second, no system functions optimally on extreme principles. In the present metaphor, the best qualified robot was the robot that struck a balance between the formalistic extreme and the adaptive extreme. A similar argument against "extreme operation" can and will be made about other systems. | | | | |
<
< | Third, originalism is complete and utter garbage. Whole essays have been written on the subject that I do not have the knowledge or space to rehash here. Nevertheless, it is worth considering briefly within the extended metaphor. Had any DARPA robots been placed in the middle of New York City, instead of the Mojave desert, they would miserably fail. The framers of Kat-5 programmed it to specifically succeed in an obstacle course in the desert. The notion that the quill and ink U.S. Constitution is clairvoyant is absurd in the same manner. | >
> | Third, courts should restrain from judicial restraint. The essential tenet of judicial restraint is that “the legislature is supreme.” There may be positive value in conservatism, knowing that the law will be the same every day. Nevertheless, increased judicial restraint moves us closer toward the maladaptive behavior of a Kat-5. It threatens to divorce communication between the left and right hemispheres of the legal system. Here, I agree with Justice Stevens—rational basis review “is tantamount to no review at all.” | | | The reality is that judicial restraint and its dopplegangers function less as judicial posture and more as a legally acceptable presentations for everyday life—stomachable alternatives to human commitments to unjust outcomes. Even so, the theater has tangible effects. The audience starts to frame arguments and painfully unfunny jokes in legal terms completely void of any substantive meaning. And, through grotesque osmosis, we enter robotic states of mind that threatens to shut down our corpus callosa. In time, we start to lose the main advantage that we have over even the most adaptives of Stanleys. |
|
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MatthewZornFirstPaper 3 - 01 Mar 2010 - Main.MatthewZorn
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
|---|
| | | Stanley's Secret | |
<
< | Right and Left Brains. | >
> | Right and Left Brains | | | Of all the other autonomous (driverless) vehicles in the competition, Stanley appears to be the most “right-brained.” The right brain is responsible for imagination, intuition, and holistic thinking while the left brain is responsible factual analysis, detail, ordering. Generally, the right brain drives creativity while the left manages logical functions. The two are connected by another brain structure, the corpus callosum.. Some tasks are better served by one hemisphere over the other, but all complex tasks require some degree of cooperation between the two. The amount of cooperation needed may be overlooked. I would postulate that Wiles' proof of Fermat's last theorem required just as much creativity as Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata. | | | Unask the question | |
<
< | The problem is that these modes are not distinct. The human creation of a bright line rule is an inherently non-robotic, evaluative process. And, the human application of bright line rules elicits other human, illogical right-brained processes that may be far more disturbing than what was for breakfast. On the other hand, balancing tests always incorporate robotic subroutines. When we speak of “undue burdens” or “substantial effects,” what we are really referring to is an extensive list of robotic subprocesses, such as determining whether certain factors are absent or present. The two processes are inseparable to the point that previous questions are nonsense and have have a zen mu value. | >
> | The problem is that these modes are not distinct. The human creation of a bright line rule is an inherently non-robotic, evaluative process. And, the human application of bright line rules elicits other human, illogical right-brained processes that may be far more disturbing than what was eaten for breakfast. On the other hand, balancing tests seem to always incorporate robotic subroutines. “Undue burdens” and “substantial effects,” what we are really a lists of robotic subprocesses, such as determining whether certain factors are absent or present. The two processes are inseparable to the point that previous questions are nonsense and have the zen equivalent of a mu value. | | | | |
<
< | The real difference between “right-brained” Stanley and “left brained” Kat-5 is not straightforward. The programs of Stanley and Kat-5 both involve left and right brain processes. Since all robots are intially programmed by humans, the logical robot rules have an inherent hybrid right-left process imbued in their code. Beyond this, they all follow a discrete set of rules and procedures. Except Stanley. He refines his initial ruleset using adaptive “open to interpretation” left-brained programming and refines the rules based on subsequent hybrid processes. Stanley's real advantage over Kat-5 and the rest of the DARPA field is that his right and left brains are more frequent communicators—he has a more robust corpus callosum. He still operates within rules and procedures but his rules have been refined through many iterations of integrated left-right brained processes. | >
> | Then, the real difference between “right-brained” Stanley and “left brained” Kat-5 is not straightforward. The programs of Stanley and Kat-5 both involve left and right brain processes. Since all robots are intially programmed by humans, the logical robot rules have an inherent hybrid right-left process imbued in their code. But, beyond this, they all follow a discrete set of rules and procedures. Except Stanley. He refines his initial ruleset using adaptive “open to interpretation” left-brained programming and refines the rules based on subsequent hybrid processes. Stanley's real advantage over Kat-5 and the rest of the DARPA field is that his right and left brains are more frequent communicators; he has a more robust corpus callosum. Plus, he has better debugging software programmed into his brain. He still operates within rules and procedures but his rules have been refined through many iterations of integrated left-right brained processes. | | | | |
<
< | Stanley's software operates like U.S. statutory and constitutional law should operate. The legislature creates initial principles needed to govern, reflecting a set of desireable societal goals. The principles are tested out in the course of everyday life and flaws inevitably arise from their rigid application to circumstances unforeseen by the intial programmers. So, the judiciary steps in, applies law to fact, and refines the intial rules to better serve positive goals. After numerous iterations of applyng law to fact, precedent develops that helps the system navigate through similar future obstacles. | >
> | Stanley's software operates like U.S. statutory and constitutional law should operate. The legislature creates initial principles needed to govern, reflecting a set of desireable societal goals. The principles are tested out in the course of everyday life and flaws inevitably arise from their rigid application to circumstances unforeseen by the intial programmers. So, the judiciary steps in, applies law to fact, and refines the intial rules to better serve positive goals. After numerous iterations of applyng law to fact, precedent develops that helps the system navigate through similar future obstacles. Each iteration is a debugging exercise that uses previous errors to avoid future ones. | | | | |
<
< | Takeaways | >
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< | First, mushiness in law is fine, if not desirable, as long as there are adequate procedures built into the system to hone and polish the law later. | >
> | First, mushiness in law is fine, if not desirable, so long as there are adequate procedures built into the system to hone and polish the law later. This process of error correction or "debugging" in the legal system will be expounded upon in my next essay. | | | Second, courts should restrain from judicial restraint. The essential tenet of judicial restraint is that “the legislature is supreme.” There may be positive value in conservatism, knowing that the law will be the same every day. Nevertheless, increased judicial restraint moves us closer toward the maladaptive behavior of a Kat-5. It threatens to divorce communication between the left and right hemispheres of the legal system. Here, I agree with Justice Stevens—rational basis review “is tantamount to no review at all.”
Third, originalism is complete and utter garbage. Whole essays have been written on the subject that I do not have the knowledge or space to rehash here. Nevertheless, it is worth considering briefly within the extended metaphor. Had any DARPA robots been placed in the middle of New York City, instead of the Mojave desert, they would miserably fail. The framers of Kat-5 programmed it to specifically succeed in an obstacle course in the desert. The notion that the quill and ink U.S. Constitution is clairvoyant is absurd in the same manner. | |
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< | The reality is that judicial restraint and its dopplegangers function less as judicial posture and more as a legally acceptable presentations for everyday life—stomachable alternatives to human “adaptive” commitments to unjust outcomes. Even so, the theater has tangible effects. The audience starts to frame arguments and painfully unfunny jokes with legal terms completely void of any substantive meaning. And, through grotesque osmosis, we enter robotic states of mind that threatens to shut down the corpus callosum. In time, we start to lose the main advantage that we have over even the most adaptives of Stanleys. | >
> | The reality is that judicial restraint and its dopplegangers function less as judicial posture and more as a legally acceptable presentations for everyday life—stomachable alternatives to human commitments to unjust outcomes. Even so, the theater has tangible effects. The audience starts to frame arguments and painfully unfunny jokes in legal terms completely void of any substantive meaning. And, through grotesque osmosis, we enter robotic states of mind that threatens to shut down our corpus callosa. In time, we start to lose the main advantage that we have over even the most adaptives of Stanleys. | | | |
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MatthewZornFirstPaper 2 - 28 Feb 2010 - Main.MatthewZorn
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< | It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.
Paper Title
-- By MatthewZorn - 09 Feb 2010 | | | | |
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> | Preserving Legal Corpus Callosa | | | | |
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> | Meet Stanley. He is the winner of the 2005 Defense Advance Research Projects Agency's Grand Challenge (DARPA), a 212 km off-road obstacle course in the Mojave Desert. It was not close. Out of 23 finalists, only Stanley finished the race in under seven hours. What is Stanley's secret? | | | | |
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> | Right and Left Brains. | | | | |
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> | Of all the other autonomous (driverless) vehicles in the competition, Stanley appears to be the most “right-brained.” The right brain is responsible for imagination, intuition, and holistic thinking while the left brain is responsible factual analysis, detail, ordering. Generally, the right brain drives creativity while the left manages logical functions. The two are connected by another brain structure, the corpus callosum.. Some tasks are better served by one hemisphere over the other, but all complex tasks require some degree of cooperation between the two. The amount of cooperation needed may be overlooked. I would postulate that Wiles' proof of Fermat's last theorem required just as much creativity as Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata. | | | | |
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> | All of the vehicles in the competition, such as Kat-5, had a relatively common driving algorithm: external sensors fed low-level modules that controlled the vehicle's speed, direction and decision making. Each robot had a predetermined set of instructions and made logical choices based on the environment. Stanley operated similarly, but also had an adaptive, holistic learning program that kept a log of "human reactions and decisions" when a human drove the vehicle in test runs. In this respect, Stanley did not operate on a discrete set of rules, since, his rules could adapt. Stanley succeeded because he was the most human. | | | | |
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> | Constrasting Stanley and Kat-5 may be instructive for approaching law. The DARPA contest suggests that there is an advantage to using human, evaluative processes over mechanical, logical ones in navigating one's way through future, unforeseeable obstacles. Kat-5, or any robot, will not be able to tell the difference between a speed bump and a pedestrian who falls in the street—unless the human programmer foresees this problem ahead of time. In Jerome Frank's words, “no one can foresee all the future permutations and combinations of events.” So, are human balancing tests preferrable? Do we have ways of determining when to use balancing tests and when to use bright line rules? | | | | |
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> | Unask the question | | | | |
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> | The problem is that these modes are not distinct. The human creation of a bright line rule is an inherently non-robotic, evaluative process. And, the human application of bright line rules elicits other human, illogical right-brained processes that may be far more disturbing than what was for breakfast. On the other hand, balancing tests always incorporate robotic subroutines. When we speak of “undue burdens” or “substantial effects,” what we are really referring to is an extensive list of robotic subprocesses, such as determining whether certain factors are absent or present. The two processes are inseparable to the point that previous questions are nonsense and have have a zen mu value. | | | | |
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> | The real difference between “right-brained” Stanley and “left brained” Kat-5 is not straightforward. The programs of Stanley and Kat-5 both involve left and right brain processes. Since all robots are intially programmed by humans, the logical robot rules have an inherent hybrid right-left process imbued in their code. Beyond this, they all follow a discrete set of rules and procedures. Except Stanley. He refines his initial ruleset using adaptive “open to interpretation” left-brained programming and refines the rules based on subsequent hybrid processes. Stanley's real advantage over Kat-5 and the rest of the DARPA field is that his right and left brains are more frequent communicators—he has a more robust corpus callosum. He still operates within rules and procedures but his rules have been refined through many iterations of integrated left-right brained processes. | | | | |
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> | Stanley's software operates like U.S. statutory and constitutional law should operate. The legislature creates initial principles needed to govern, reflecting a set of desireable societal goals. The principles are tested out in the course of everyday life and flaws inevitably arise from their rigid application to circumstances unforeseen by the intial programmers. So, the judiciary steps in, applies law to fact, and refines the intial rules to better serve positive goals. After numerous iterations of applyng law to fact, precedent develops that helps the system navigate through similar future obstacles. | | | | |
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> | First, mushiness in law is fine, if not desirable, as long as there are adequate procedures built into the system to hone and polish the law later. | | | | |
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> | Second, courts should restrain from judicial restraint. The essential tenet of judicial restraint is that “the legislature is supreme.” There may be positive value in conservatism, knowing that the law will be the same every day. Nevertheless, increased judicial restraint moves us closer toward the maladaptive behavior of a Kat-5. It threatens to divorce communication between the left and right hemispheres of the legal system. Here, I agree with Justice Stevens—rational basis review “is tantamount to no review at all.” | | | | |
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You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.
To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" on the next line: | >
> | Third, originalism is complete and utter garbage. Whole essays have been written on the subject that I do not have the knowledge or space to rehash here. Nevertheless, it is worth considering briefly within the extended metaphor. Had any DARPA robots been placed in the middle of New York City, instead of the Mojave desert, they would miserably fail. The framers of Kat-5 programmed it to specifically succeed in an obstacle course in the desert. The notion that the quill and ink U.S. Constitution is clairvoyant is absurd in the same manner. | | | | |
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< | # * Set ALLOWTOPICVIEW = TWikiAdminGroup, MatthewZorn | >
> | The reality is that judicial restraint and its dopplegangers function less as judicial posture and more as a legally acceptable presentations for everyday life—stomachable alternatives to human “adaptive” commitments to unjust outcomes. Even so, the theater has tangible effects. The audience starts to frame arguments and painfully unfunny jokes with legal terms completely void of any substantive meaning. And, through grotesque osmosis, we enter robotic states of mind that threatens to shut down the corpus callosum. In time, we start to lose the main advantage that we have over even the most adaptives of Stanleys. | | | | |
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< | Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of that line. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated list | | | \ No newline at end of file | |
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MatthewZornFirstPaper 1 - 09 Feb 2010 - Main.MatthewZorn
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.
Paper Title
-- By MatthewZorn - 09 Feb 2010
Section I
Subsection A
Subsub 1
Subsection B
Subsub 1
Subsub 2
Section II
Subsection A
Subsection B
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.
To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" on the next line:
# * Set ALLOWTOPICVIEW = TWikiAdminGroup, MatthewZorn
Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of that line. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated list |
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