Law in Contemporary Society

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MeronWerknehFirstEssay 4 - 09 Jun 2016 - Main.EbenMoglen
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  Hopefully, during this absence, your gaze—once glued to the flashing lights—will turn inward and yield a truly intensive introspection where you emerge feeling like your actually know yourself (and maybe even like yourself). Knowing who you are is inseparable from knowing what you want, necessary in the process of giving genuine consent. Without this, you will not be able to distinguish actual rights from illusory rights. The right to have, from the right to chase. Making conscious choices requires consciousness, which is bound with reflection and genuine self-awareness. To surrender this would be to surrender your agency, which is, whether conscious of it or not, an indispensable part of what makes us not only individuals, but human.
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This is clearer, and more closely reasoned, thereby much improved. But the draft still feels to me much of process and little of performance. Is the conclusion really that "making conscious choices requires consciousness" or that this is "bound with ... genuine self-awareness"? It seems like rather more mechanism than the outcome required.

 

MeronWerknehFirstEssay 3 - 24 Apr 2016 - Main.MeronWerkneh
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 -- By MeronWerkneh - 19 Feb 2016
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I: How did we get in?
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I: The Seduction

 “Culture [is]…a mere training to act as a machine…Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property…”
-Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto
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Social theorists and philosophers have devoted much of their careers to identifying the factors that influence society. Karl Marx asserted that the economic structure of society—controlled by the ruling class—provides the base from which society’s moral and cultural values are born. Additionally, in distinguishing class from status, Max Weber contended that it is a group’s status—their common “style of life”—that gives them authority and cultural influence (Smith & Riley, 2009). The two perspectives intersect at the following point: a group creates culture, and society reflects that culture. The alternative theory is that culture reflects society, and it is possible that, to a certain extent, the process is a reciprocal interaction. Nonetheless, the contention that society reflects culture is the infinitely more accurate theory.

But why would anybody thinking about this subject be compelled to choose one of these two partial perspectives? A secondary source has been inserted between us and Max Weber, for no reason I can discern, but neither Weber nor the other fellow—who believes like Hegel in dialectic, as I recall—would sign up for this unnecessary dichotomy. And why would a lawyer's theory of social action—drawing on anthropology, sociology and social psychology unapologetically—start apologizing for eclecticism?

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Social theorists and philosophers have devoted much of their careers to identifying the factors that influence society. Karl Marx asserted that the economic structure of society—controlled by the ruling class—provides the base from which society’s moral and cultural values are born. Additionally, in distinguishing class from status, Max Weber specified that although status can rest on class position, “it is not solely determined by it.” Rather, it is a group’s status—their “class situation,” defined by a common “style of life”—that gives them authority and cultural influence (Weber, 1978). The two theories overlap at the following point: a group creates culture, and society reflects that culture. The process can and does occur reciprocally (with culture reflecting the values and trends of society at a given moment), but the piece will focus on the “society reflects culture” formulation.
 
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In The Folklore of Capitalism, Thurman Arnold discusses some of the commonalities of social organizations. The third element, of particular importance, is a set of “institutional habits” that allows men to work together “without any process of conscious choice” (Arnold, 1937). This could have been broken into two separate factors, listing both the presence of “institutional habits” and the absence of “conscious choice,” but their amensalistic relationship joins them enough to be listed together. “Institutional habits,” then, suggest that the actual patterns of practices prevalent in society are not that of society, but of the “institution.” This is done through a repeated process of “habit and acceptance,” where the habit is created, acceptance is covertly compelled, and dissent is ostracized (Arnold, 1937).
 
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The phrase “conscious choice” is also laden with immense implications. Foremost, Arnold suggests that these institutional habits become normalized without the knowledge or admission of man—that much is clear. Even more curious, however, is the very construction of the phrase “conscious choice.” It seems redundant, because it is expected that any choice that is made will be made consciously. Are unconscious or subconscious choices, choices at all?
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In The Folklore of Capitalism, Thurman Arnold discusses some of the commonalities of social organizations. The third element, of particular importance, is a set of “institutional habits” that allows men to work together “without any process of conscious choice” (Arnold, 1937). This could have been broken into two separate factors, listing both the presence of “institutional habits” and the absence of “conscious choice,” but their amensalistic relationship joins them enough to be listed together. “Institutional habits,” then, suggest that the actual patterns of practices prevalent in society are not that of society, but of the “institution.” This is done through a repeated process of “habit and acceptance,” where the habit is created, acceptance is covertly compelled, and dissent is ostracized (Arnold, 1937). In this, Arnold illuminates the concept of the illusion of free will. This ‘illusion’ is the hazy and hazardous area that separates and distinguishes the right to “the pursuit happiness” from the right to “happiness”; that separates the right of having a voice from the right of being heard; that suggests that, at the very core, man need not have an active choice, but be able to believe that he does.
 
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Is this a word game, whether to call decisions made unconsciously something other than decisions? Or are you asking whether unconscious mental activity causes behavior to occur? The former isn't worthy of time or argument. The latter, I would have thought, is not really open to much contradiction. The center of the idea we call Freud, like that of the idea we call Darwin, is for all human purposes well-established.
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Arnold suggests that these institutional habits become normalized without the knowledge or admission of man—that much is clear. But what exactly is the process through which this occurs? How is it that values become acculturated, embraced, and eventually pursued without the public’s involvement or assent? This is where culture makes its re-entry; the ruling collective uses culture to lubricate the process of forcing consent, adorning the invasive procedure enough to make the choice seem deliberate and more appealing.
 
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Central to this conditioning is the process of manufacturing consent. Noam Chomsky expands on the modes and mechanisms of this process in his book, stating that it was “clear that the media serve the ends of a dominant elite” (Chomsky, 1992). Today, media has become interchangeable with culture, particularly with the ubiquity of electronics that facilitate the process of social validation (think: Twitter [where to become an instant-activist] or CNN [where to find the ‘news’]). So, in pushing an agenda, the process is less of a force-feed and more like an airplane spoon (which puts the public somewhere in between a prisoner and an infant). Culture is a necessary component to the process because it reinforces feelings of group identity and belonging—which provides a sense of security—and caters to the ever-present human ego.
 
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In constructing this paradox, Arnold illuminates the concept of the illusion of free will. This ‘illusion’ is the hazy and hazardous area that separates and distinguishes the right to “the pursuit happiness” from the right to “happiness”; that separates the right of having a voice from the right of being heard; that suggests that, at the very core, man need not have an active choice, but be able to believe that he does. That much, we are entitled to. That much, we are guaranteed.
 
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This all leaves us in a pretty bleak place. We are trapped in an institution we did not create, perpetuating beliefs that are not our own, robbed of any genuine opportunity to be active, and are completely unaware of it all. The question that follows, then, is self-evident.
 
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No. That didn't, and doesn't, follow. It's as though from an attempt to grasp the idea we call Freud we had immediately passed to a completely different idea, that had no value in assisting human liberation. But that appears more to be a result of not learning enough rather than one brought about by having learned too much. Those who attempted to make new ideas based on both the ideas we call Marx and Freud, in the late 20th century, found no bleakness at all, but rather a fairly clear and hopeful call to (different) action. Norman O. Brown, Paul Goodman, Herbert Marcuse were all in their ways quite undepressed thinkers. So is Angela Davis, whose thought-projects sometimes intersected with theirs. Meeting them would be good for you.

II: How do we get out?

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II: Denouement
 “A hibernation is a covert preparation for a more overt action.”
-Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man
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Visibility, in regards to agency and action, is not a binary condition. It is not restricted to either being visible and active, or absent and inactive. Visibility occurs on a spectrum with varying and uncorrelated degrees of agency. At any given moment, one could be invisible and unseen (Ellison), hyper-visible and exposed (the ‘eccentric’), or pseudo-visible with an expertly crafted mask (The Spook Who Sat by the Door). The condition most relevant here is invisibility (or the parts of pseudo-visibility that focus on a degree of absence). In short, in order to recognize and reclaim your individual agency, you must, at some point, be absent.
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In order to recognize and reclaim your individual agency, you must, at some point, be absent. This absence—or period of decreased visibility/invisibility—is necessary because it engenders an increasing self-awareness that will eventually allow you to distinguish between manufactured consent, and genuine consent. Invisibility allows you to forge out a space either psychically or physically (or in many cases, both) where you are able to reintroduce yourself to your own mind, beliefs, and your own visceral and essential needs free from the contamination of “institutional habits” and cultures. The conclusion is paradoxical but quite simple: in order to see yourself, you must become invisible.
 
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‘Individual liberty,’ ‘individual sovereignty,’ and ‘individual freedom’ all have a single word in common: individual. The dictionary defines ‘individual’ as distinctive, lone, or singular (dictionary.com). In order to assert yourself as an individual, you must act like an individual; in order to act like an individual, you must think as an individual; and in order to be able to think as an individual, you must learn to be alone. To be invisible. To forge out a space either mentally or physically (or in many cases, both) where you are able to reintroduce yourself to your own mind, beliefs, and your own visceral and essential needs free from the contamination of “institutional habits” and cultures. The conclusion is paradoxical but quite simple: in order to see yourself, you must become invisible.
 
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This appears to be two word games, one about "individual" and one about "invisible," but I don't know what the prize is for which the games are played. The theme of the essay isn't visible, at any rate, and it needs to be.
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Hopefully, during this absence, your gaze—once glued to the flashing lights—will turn inward and yield a truly intensive introspection where you emerge feeling like your actually know yourself (and maybe even like yourself). Knowing who you are is inseparable from knowing what you want, necessary in the process of giving genuine consent. Without this, you will not be able to distinguish actual rights from illusory rights. The right to have, from the right to chase. Making conscious choices requires consciousness, which is bound with reflection and genuine self-awareness. To surrender this would be to surrender your agency, which is, whether conscious of it or not, an indispensable part of what makes us not only individuals, but human.
 
Deleted:
<
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Without this space or time, you will not be able to distinguish actual rights from illusory rights. The right to have, from the right to chase. Making a ‘conscious choice’ requires consciousness, which is bound with reflection and genuine self-awareness. To surrender this would be to surrender your agency, which is, whether conscious of it or not, an indispensable part of what makes us not only individuals, but human.
 
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 Ellison, R. (1995). Invisible man. New York: Vintage International.
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Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (1988). Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media. New York: Pantheon Books.
 
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Greenlee, S. (2002). The spook who sat by the door: A novel. Chicago, IL: Lushena Books.

individual. 2016. In dictionary.com. Retrieved February 18, 2016, from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/individual?s=t

You have access to the Oxford English Dictionary online, the greatest monument of ongoing descriptive historical lexicography on Earth, as a Columbia student. Don't use the paltry, low-quality substitutes: you lose immeasurably an opportunity to learn deeply about your language each time you don't consult the OED.

Marx, K., & Rjazanov, D. B. (1930). The Communist Manifesto.

Why can't we use the original English translation by Engels in its public domain copies?

Smith, P., & Riley, A. (2009). Cultural theory: An introduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Why make a source list in web writing? Link to texts that will help the reader confirm as well as understand what you are saying, and find other ideas that help to illuminate yours.


This is a good draft for clearing the ground so you can build strongly next time. I've tried to mark a series of particular places where I believe rethinking can make a stronger draft. These have mostly to do with the relations between you and your sources, however: editorially, the question at those junctures is mostly about the extent to which the ideas on which you seem to depend are carrying the weight you have assigned to them in your construction.

About that construction, however, it's harder to speak now, because its outline is still too indistinct. What is the theme of the essay? At some points, it appears to be that we are "trapped" in social organizations that are built around appeals to non-conscious mental activities that have evolved as part of the human toolkit for sociality. But that is to say that we are trapped in being human, which at other points in the essay is the supposed route of liberation from the supposed trap. We are social animals with consciousness, in other words. Those are only partly consistent attributes, as you see. But the consequence of the inconsistency is not a nightmare from which we can through any means awake. Hence the less coherent second part of the essay, which—as a requirement of the too-dark and not-deep-enough analysis in the first part—attempts to deliver what cannot be manufactured. Reconsideration here is what the great improvement in the second draft will flow from.

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Marx, K., & Rjazanov, D. B. (1930). The Communist Manifesto.
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Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society. Berkeley: Univ. of California Pr.

MeronWerknehFirstEssay 2 - 06 Mar 2016 - Main.EbenMoglen
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.
 

Ghost Writer

Line: 17 to 16
  Social theorists and philosophers have devoted much of their careers to identifying the factors that influence society. Karl Marx asserted that the economic structure of society—controlled by the ruling class—provides the base from which society’s moral and cultural values are born. Additionally, in distinguishing class from status, Max Weber contended that it is a group’s status—their common “style of life”—that gives them authority and cultural influence (Smith & Riley, 2009). The two perspectives intersect at the following point: a group creates culture, and society reflects that culture. The alternative theory is that culture reflects society, and it is possible that, to a certain extent, the process is a reciprocal interaction. Nonetheless, the contention that society reflects culture is the infinitely more accurate theory.
Added:
>
>

But why would anybody thinking about this subject be compelled to choose one of these two partial perspectives? A secondary source has been inserted between us and Max Weber, for no reason I can discern, but neither Weber nor the other fellow—who believes like Hegel in dialectic, as I recall—would sign up for this unnecessary dichotomy. And why would a lawyer's theory of social action—drawing on anthropology, sociology and social psychology unapologetically—start apologizing for eclecticism?

  In The Folklore of Capitalism, Thurman Arnold discusses some of the commonalities of social organizations. The third element, of particular importance, is a set of “institutional habits” that allows men to work together “without any process of conscious choice” (Arnold, 1937). This could have been broken into two separate factors, listing both the presence of “institutional habits” and the absence of “conscious choice,” but their amensalistic relationship joins them enough to be listed together. “Institutional habits,” then, suggest that the actual patterns of practices prevalent in society are not that of society, but of the “institution.” This is done through a repeated process of “habit and acceptance,” where the habit is created, acceptance is covertly compelled, and dissent is ostracized (Arnold, 1937).
Changed:
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The phrase “conscious choice” is also laden with immense implications. Foremost, Arnold suggests that these institutional habits become normalized without the knowledge or admission of man—that much is clear. Even more curious, however, is the very construction of the phrase “conscious choice.” It seems redundant, because it is expected that any choice that is made will be made consciously. Are unconscious or subconscious choices, choices at all? In constructing this paradox, Arnold illuminates the concept of the illusion of free will. This ‘illusion’ is the hazy and hazardous area that separates and distinguishes the right to “the pursuit happiness” from the right to “happiness”; that separates the right of having a voice from the right of being heard; that suggests that, at the very core, man need not have an active choice, but be able to believe that he does. That much, we are entitled to. That much, we are guaranteed.
>
>
The phrase “conscious choice” is also laden with immense implications. Foremost, Arnold suggests that these institutional habits become normalized without the knowledge or admission of man—that much is clear. Even more curious, however, is the very construction of the phrase “conscious choice.” It seems redundant, because it is expected that any choice that is made will be made consciously. Are unconscious or subconscious choices, choices at all?

Is this a word game, whether to call decisions made unconsciously something other than decisions? Or are you asking whether unconscious mental activity causes behavior to occur? The former isn't worthy of time or argument. The latter, I would have thought, is not really open to much contradiction. The center of the idea we call Freud, like that of the idea we call Darwin, is for all human purposes well-established.

In constructing this paradox, Arnold illuminates the concept of the illusion of free will. This ‘illusion’ is the hazy and hazardous area that separates and distinguishes the right to “the pursuit happiness” from the right to “happiness”; that separates the right of having a voice from the right of being heard; that suggests that, at the very core, man need not have an active choice, but be able to believe that he does. That much, we are entitled to. That much, we are guaranteed.

 This all leaves us in a pretty bleak place. We are trapped in an institution we did not create, perpetuating beliefs that are not our own, robbed of any genuine opportunity to be active, and are completely unaware of it all. The question that follows, then, is self-evident.
Added:
>
>

No. That didn't, and doesn't, follow. It's as though from an attempt to grasp the idea we call Freud we had immediately passed to a completely different idea, that had no value in assisting human liberation. But that appears more to be a result of not learning enough rather than one brought about by having learned too much. Those who attempted to make new ideas based on both the ideas we call Marx and Freud, in the late 20th century, found no bleakness at all, but rather a fairly clear and hopeful call to (different) action. Norman O. Brown, Paul Goodman, Herbert Marcuse were all in their ways quite undepressed thinkers. So is Angela Davis, whose thought-projects sometimes intersected with theirs. Meeting them would be good for you.

 II: How do we get out?

“A hibernation is a covert preparation for a more overt action.”

Line: 34 to 81
  ‘Individual liberty,’ ‘individual sovereignty,’ and ‘individual freedom’ all have a single word in common: individual. The dictionary defines ‘individual’ as distinctive, lone, or singular (dictionary.com). In order to assert yourself as an individual, you must act like an individual; in order to act like an individual, you must think as an individual; and in order to be able to think as an individual, you must learn to be alone. To be invisible. To forge out a space either mentally or physically (or in many cases, both) where you are able to reintroduce yourself to your own mind, beliefs, and your own visceral and essential needs free from the contamination of “institutional habits” and cultures. The conclusion is paradoxical but quite simple: in order to see yourself, you must become invisible.
Added:
>
>
This appears to be two word games, one about "individual" and one about "invisible," but I don't know what the prize is for which the games are played. The theme of the essay isn't visible, at any rate, and it needs to be.

  Without this space or time, you will not be able to distinguish actual rights from illusory rights. The right to have, from the right to chase. Making a ‘conscious choice’ requires consciousness, which is bound with reflection and genuine self-awareness. To surrender this would be to surrender your agency, which is, whether conscious of it or not, an indispensable part of what makes us not only individuals, but human.
Line: 55 to 109
 individual. 2016. In dictionary.com. Retrieved February 18, 2016, from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/individual?s=t
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Marx, K., & Rjazanov, D. B. (1930). The Communist Manifesto.
>
>

You have access to the Oxford English Dictionary online, the greatest monument of ongoing descriptive historical lexicography on Earth, as a Columbia student. Don't use the paltry, low-quality substitutes: you lose immeasurably an opportunity to learn deeply about your language each time you don't consult the OED.

 
Deleted:
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<
Smith, P., & Riley, A. (2009). Cultural theory: An introduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
 
Added:
>
>
 
Added:
>
>
Marx, K., & Rjazanov, D. B. (1930). The Communist Manifesto.

Why can't we use the original English translation by Engels in its public domain copies?

Smith, P., & Riley, A. (2009). Cultural theory: An introduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

 
Changed:
<
<

You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" character on the next two lines:
>
>
Why make a source list in web writing? Link to texts that will help the reader confirm as well as understand what you are saying, and find other ideas that help to illuminate yours.


This is a good draft for clearing the ground so you can build strongly next time. I've tried to mark a series of particular places where I believe rethinking can make a stronger draft. These have mostly to do with the relations between you and your sources, however: editorially, the question at those junctures is mostly about the extent to which the ideas on which you seem to depend are carrying the weight you have assigned to them in your construction.

About that construction, however, it's harder to speak now, because its outline is still too indistinct. What is the theme of the essay? At some points, it appears to be that we are "trapped" in social organizations that are built around appeals to non-conscious mental activities that have evolved as part of the human toolkit for sociality. But that is to say that we are trapped in being human, which at other points in the essay is the supposed route of liberation from the supposed trap. We are social animals with consciousness, in other words. Those are only partly consistent attributes, as you see. But the consequence of the inconsistency is not a nightmare from which we can through any means awake. Hence the less coherent second part of the essay, which—as a requirement of the too-dark and not-deep-enough analysis in the first part—attempts to deliver what cannot be manufactured. Reconsideration here is what the great improvement in the second draft will flow from.

 
Changed:
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<
>
>
 
Deleted:
<
<
Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules for preference declarations. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of these lines. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated ALLOWTOPICVIEW list.

MeronWerknehFirstEssay 1 - 19 Feb 2016 - Main.MeronWerkneh
Line: 1 to 1
Added:
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>
META TOPICPARENT name="FirstEssay"
It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.

Ghost Writer

-- By MeronWerkneh - 19 Feb 2016

I: How did we get in?

“Culture [is]…a mere training to act as a machine…Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property…”

-Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto

Social theorists and philosophers have devoted much of their careers to identifying the factors that influence society. Karl Marx asserted that the economic structure of society—controlled by the ruling class—provides the base from which society’s moral and cultural values are born. Additionally, in distinguishing class from status, Max Weber contended that it is a group’s status—their common “style of life”—that gives them authority and cultural influence (Smith & Riley, 2009). The two perspectives intersect at the following point: a group creates culture, and society reflects that culture. The alternative theory is that culture reflects society, and it is possible that, to a certain extent, the process is a reciprocal interaction. Nonetheless, the contention that society reflects culture is the infinitely more accurate theory.

In The Folklore of Capitalism, Thurman Arnold discusses some of the commonalities of social organizations. The third element, of particular importance, is a set of “institutional habits” that allows men to work together “without any process of conscious choice” (Arnold, 1937). This could have been broken into two separate factors, listing both the presence of “institutional habits” and the absence of “conscious choice,” but their amensalistic relationship joins them enough to be listed together. “Institutional habits,” then, suggest that the actual patterns of practices prevalent in society are not that of society, but of the “institution.” This is done through a repeated process of “habit and acceptance,” where the habit is created, acceptance is covertly compelled, and dissent is ostracized (Arnold, 1937).

The phrase “conscious choice” is also laden with immense implications. Foremost, Arnold suggests that these institutional habits become normalized without the knowledge or admission of man—that much is clear. Even more curious, however, is the very construction of the phrase “conscious choice.” It seems redundant, because it is expected that any choice that is made will be made consciously. Are unconscious or subconscious choices, choices at all? In constructing this paradox, Arnold illuminates the concept of the illusion of free will. This ‘illusion’ is the hazy and hazardous area that separates and distinguishes the right to “the pursuit happiness” from the right to “happiness”; that separates the right of having a voice from the right of being heard; that suggests that, at the very core, man need not have an active choice, but be able to believe that he does. That much, we are entitled to. That much, we are guaranteed.

This all leaves us in a pretty bleak place. We are trapped in an institution we did not create, perpetuating beliefs that are not our own, robbed of any genuine opportunity to be active, and are completely unaware of it all. The question that follows, then, is self-evident.

II: How do we get out?

“A hibernation is a covert preparation for a more overt action.”

-Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man

Visibility, in regards to agency and action, is not a binary condition. It is not restricted to either being visible and active, or absent and inactive. Visibility occurs on a spectrum with varying and uncorrelated degrees of agency. At any given moment, one could be invisible and unseen (Ellison), hyper-visible and exposed (the ‘eccentric’), or pseudo-visible with an expertly crafted mask (The Spook Who Sat by the Door). The condition most relevant here is invisibility (or the parts of pseudo-visibility that focus on a degree of absence). In short, in order to recognize and reclaim your individual agency, you must, at some point, be absent.

‘Individual liberty,’ ‘individual sovereignty,’ and ‘individual freedom’ all have a single word in common: individual. The dictionary defines ‘individual’ as distinctive, lone, or singular (dictionary.com). In order to assert yourself as an individual, you must act like an individual; in order to act like an individual, you must think as an individual; and in order to be able to think as an individual, you must learn to be alone. To be invisible. To forge out a space either mentally or physically (or in many cases, both) where you are able to reintroduce yourself to your own mind, beliefs, and your own visceral and essential needs free from the contamination of “institutional habits” and cultures. The conclusion is paradoxical but quite simple: in order to see yourself, you must become invisible.

Without this space or time, you will not be able to distinguish actual rights from illusory rights. The right to have, from the right to chase. Making a ‘conscious choice’ requires consciousness, which is bound with reflection and genuine self-awareness. To surrender this would be to surrender your agency, which is, whether conscious of it or not, an indispensable part of what makes us not only individuals, but human.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arnold, T. W. (1937). The folklore of capitalism. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ellison, R. (1995). Invisible man. New York: Vintage International.

Greenlee, S. (2002). The spook who sat by the door: A novel. Chicago, IL: Lushena Books.

individual. 2016. In dictionary.com. Retrieved February 18, 2016, from http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/individual?s=t

Marx, K., & Rjazanov, D. B. (1930). The Communist Manifesto.

Smith, P., & Riley, A. (2009). Cultural theory: An introduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell.


You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" character on the next two lines:

Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules for preference declarations. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of these lines. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated ALLOWTOPICVIEW list.


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