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MichaelDuignanSecondPaper 9 - 13 Jan 2012 - Main.IanSullivan
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| | | It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. |
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MichaelDuignanSecondPaper 8 - 26 Apr 2010 - Main.JohnJeffcott
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | | | In the 1947 case of United States v. Carroll Towing Co., J. Learned Hand put forth his eponymous formula for negligence liability. Where the burden of avoiding harm is less than the probability of the harm times the loss associated with the harm (B < P x L), the defendant who chooses not to avoid harm acts without requisite care. In that Hand introduced the idea of cost-benefit analysis as a bright line rule of tort liability, Carroll Towing represents prescient use of rational choice theory to render consistent qualitative judgments in the law. And though the Hand formula was non-binding, it retains analytical significance; it presumes a reasonable person is always capable of making rational decisions before acting. | |
>
> | Does the Hand formula really presume this? It certainly may impose liability on those whose precautions it finds insufficient, but it says nothing about whether reasonable people are always capable of doing that math, themselves. And while it may not bear on your overall point, it might be interesting to note that the Hand formula (or, more generally, cost-benefit analysis of tort claims) tends to be a feature of appellate cases, trial results being commonly controlled by the jury and its variably-informed understanding of the reasonable person standard (On Determining Negligence at 815). | | | Rational Choice Theory and the Law
The contemporary debate is fiercest at U. of Chicago, with Richard Posner representing the traditional law and economics movement, and Richard Thaler leading the developing field of behavioral economics (developing, because, as of yet, the field is without a formal theory). | | | Thaler, along with Cass Sunstein and Christine Jolls in A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, counters that certain peculiarities of human nature, though predictable, lie outside the scope of the traditional model. In so many words, the more evidence one can produce showing human decisions do not mirror neoclassical presumptions, the less explanatory power the traditional model retains as applied to the law. At 1474. | |
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> | It would seem to me that as long as these peculiarities of human nature are predictable, there remains hope for a single, unified theory encompassing the facts explained by both economic theories. In fact, while I can appreciate that the two schools of thought are approaching the same subject from different perspectives, I have trouble understanding why they're presented as though at odds. Much like Arnold's understanding of the constitution as capable of supporting opposing views simultaneously, shouldn't Economics with a capital "E" be big enough to hold a Posner and a Thaler without the appearance of conflict? | | | Reasonable Persons, In Spite of Ourselves | |
<
< | Dan Ariely, author of Predictably Irrational, delightfully exposed the relativity of choice in a social experiment. A group of 100 college students were given an advert from The Economist magazine and asked to select one of three annual subscription options: print-only for $59, online-only for $125, or print-plus-online for $125. A small portion opted for the first, none for the second, and the overwhelming majority for the third, print-plus-online option. Then, Ariely asked another group of students the same question, only this time he removed the second online-only option that no one wanted. When deciding between print-only for $59 and print-plus-online for $125, the majority of students opted for the cheaper package. | >
> | Dan Ariely, author of Predictably Irrational, delightfully exposed the relativity of choice in a social experiment. A group of 100 college students were given an advert from The Economist magazine and asked to select one of three annual subscription options: online-only for $59, print-only for $125, or print-plus-online for $125. A small portion opted for the first, none for the second, and the overwhelming majority for the third, print-plus-online option. Then, Ariely asked another group of students the same question, only this time he removed the second print-only option that no one wanted. When deciding between online-only for $59 and print-plus-online for $125, the majority of students opted for the cheaper package. | | |
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<
< | The shift in students’ subscription choices undermines Becker’s assumption that people make decisions from “a stable set of preferences.” Ariely demonstrates that people’s preferences are not always fixed and absolute, but can be dynamic and relational to the environment in which choice is permitted to occur. According to Ariely, the way to get people to choose option A over option B is to add option A', a clearly less desirable alternative to option A, thereby increasing the relative attractiveness of option A. | >
> | Note: Edited above paragraph to match image (reversed online- and print-only).
The shift in students’ subscription choices undermines Becker’s assumption that people make decisions from “a stable set of preferences.” Does it really? What if, say, their preferences were stable and the second, rarely chosen option served to improve their information (e.g. perhaps absent option two, the average person was underestimating the cost/worth of paper copies). Ariely demonstrates that people’s preferences are not always fixed and absolute, but can be dynamic and relational to the environment in which choice is permitted to occur. According to Ariely, the way to get people to choose option A over option B is to add option A', a clearly less desirable alternative to option A, thereby increasing the relative attractiveness of option A. | | | Choice as a Double-Edged Sword | |
<
< | Under rational choice theory, multiple consumption options increase the likelihood that a given consumer will be able to find a choice suitable to his or her fixed preferences. However, Ariely suggests that benefit may be illusory, because carefully designed choices may actually shape the preferences of the individual. Obviously, this idea bears great significance for generally accepted notions of personal autonomy essential to constitutional law. Yet, for anyone who's ever entered a supermarket with one item in mind, and left carrying something else altogether, the potentiality of relative preferences is not totally far fetched. | >
> | Under rational choice theory, multiple consumption options increase the likelihood that a given consumer will be able to find a choice suitable to his or her fixed preferences. However, Ariely suggests that benefit may be illusory, because carefully designed choices may actually shape the preferences of the individual. Obviously, this idea bears great significance for generally accepted notions of personal autonomy essential to constitutional law. Can you say more about this? It sounds like you're about to drop a legal bomb in the midst of this discussion on theories of economics, but it doesn't actually go off. Perhaps because I'm not as familiar with law and economics, the connection you're making isn't as apparent to me as your prose indicates it should be. Yet, for anyone who's ever entered a supermarket with one item in mind, and left carrying something else altogether, the potentiality of relative preferences is not totally far fetched. | | | | | | What if we are simply so overwhelmed by multiple choices that we are blinded to our true preferences? Or what if a range of choices sometimes animates dormant preferences that we could not see otherwise? Either way, the prospects are not good for neoclassical assumptions. Further, the discovery of relative preferences has begun to infiltrate the way new market regulations are proposed. And neoclassical adherents are successfully shouting down such heretical assertions by labeling them old news. | |
>
> | Is this to say that we were previously blind to our susceptibility to choice-shaping marketing techniques? That would seem a bit of a stretch. Based on the information you've provided, I get the feeling the proposed bill seeks more to scapegoat neoclassical economics post-financial crisis than to reflect the increasing influence of behavioral economics. Perhaps, however, those two motivations are inextricably bound. | | | General Implications for Normative Structures | |
<
< | As Thaler et al did not profess to have an answer to rational choice theory, the movement remains limited to poking holes in the neoclassical model. Neoclassical economists will likely respond with the tested Whac-A-Mole approach: reinterpret rational choice theory in increasingly clever ways to explain away behavioral economists' findings as they arise. | >
> | As Thaler et al did not profess to have an answer to rational choice theory, the movement remains limited to poking holes in the neoclassical model. Neoclassical economists will likely respond with the tested Whac-A-Mole approach: reinterpret rational choice theory in increasingly clever ways to explain away behavioral economists' findings as they arise. Or, seen from another angle, incorporate useful elements of behavioral economic study into rational choice theory? | | | If continuity is an essential goal of a normative structure, then, ideally, this debate engenders productive results for the law and economics movement, by encouraging it to reconsider and revise its premises, thereby strengthening the structure and the legal principles that depend on it. However, Thurman Arnold in The Folklore of Capitalism posited, "[l]aws and morals and economics are always arrayed against new groups which are struggling to obtain a place in an institutional hierarchy of prestige." At 4. If one adopts this view, the escalating debate around rational choice theory might signal the rumblings of an intradisciplinary holy war through which a new set of economic principles emerges. As an aspiring lawyer, the latter scenario presents both an exciting and disconcerting prospect, in that neoclassical assumptions undergird great real estate beneath contract, criminal and property law. My plan is to stay tuned. | |
>
> | Even with my limited study of Economics, I enjoyed your paper immensely. What I'd have liked to see was more tying into what these developments mean to the legal world, and/or why scholars continue to treat them as in conflict with one another rather than attempt to unify them under a single heading. Concerning the latter, perhaps I require a fuller grasp of the situation to understand a limitation on that possibility that is as yet invisible to me.
-- JohnJeffcott - 26 Apr 2010 | | |
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. |
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MichaelDuignanSecondPaper 7 - 17 Apr 2010 - Main.MichaelDuignan
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | | | -- By MichaelDuignan - 06 Apr 2010 | |
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< | Neoclassical economics has, over a half century, come to exert great influence over legal structures. As a positive system, it lends mathematical precision to legal thinking. As a normative system, it shapes vast areas of law dealing with transaction and choice. Some wonder if its legal influence, however, has reached a zenith. As new tools enable researchers to discover the human brain and its cognitive limitations, some economists now question the assumptions neoclassical economics made concerning human nature. If a social theory is ultimately valued by how well it explains the forces guiding human behavior, this essay considers how such questioning might affect normative principles anchored to the neoclassical model. | >
> | Neoclassical economics has, over a half century, come to exert great influence over legal structures. In positive terms, it lends mathematical precision to legal thinking. As a normative system, it shapes vast areas of law dealing with transaction and choice. Some wonder if its legal influence, however, has reached a zenith. As new tools enable researchers to demystify the human brain and its cognitive limitations, some economists now question the assumptions neoclassical economics made concerning human nature. If a social theory is ultimately valued by how well it explains the forces guiding human behavior, this essay considers how such questioning might affect normative principles anchored to the neoclassical model. | | | The Hand Formula | | | 
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< | The shift in students’ subscription choice undermines Becker’s assumption that people make decisions from “a stable set of preferences.” Ariely demonstrates that people’s preferences are not always fixed and absolute, but can be dynamic and relational to the environment in which choice is permitted to occur. According to Ariely, the way to get people to choose option A over option B is to add option A', a clearly less desirable alternative to option A, thereby increasing the relative attractiveness of option A. | >
> | The shift in students’ subscription choices undermines Becker’s assumption that people make decisions from “a stable set of preferences.” Ariely demonstrates that people’s preferences are not always fixed and absolute, but can be dynamic and relational to the environment in which choice is permitted to occur. According to Ariely, the way to get people to choose option A over option B is to add option A', a clearly less desirable alternative to option A, thereby increasing the relative attractiveness of option A. | | | Choice as a Double-Edged Sword | |
<
< | Under rational choice theory, multiple consumption options increase the likelihood that a given consumer will be able to find a choice suitable to his or her fixed preferences. However, Ariely suggests that benefit may be illusory, because carefully designed choices may actually shape the preferences of the individual. Obviously, this idea bears great significance for generally accepted notions of personal autonomy inherent in constitutional law. Yet, for anyone who's ever entered a supermarket with one item in mind, and left carrying a something else altogether, the potentiality of relative preferences is not totally far fetched. | >
> | Under rational choice theory, multiple consumption options increase the likelihood that a given consumer will be able to find a choice suitable to his or her fixed preferences. However, Ariely suggests that benefit may be illusory, because carefully designed choices may actually shape the preferences of the individual. Obviously, this idea bears great significance for generally accepted notions of personal autonomy essential to constitutional law. Yet, for anyone who's ever entered a supermarket with one item in mind, and left carrying something else altogether, the potentiality of relative preferences is not totally far fetched. | | | | | | What if we are simply so overwhelmed by multiple choices that we are blinded to our true preferences? Or what if a range of choices sometimes animates dormant preferences that we could not see otherwise? Either way, the prospects are not good for neoclassical assumptions. Further, the discovery of relative preferences has begun to infiltrate the way new market regulations are proposed. And neoclassical adherents are successfully shouting down such heretical assertions by labeling them old news. | |
<
< | General Implications for Normative Systems | >
> | General Implications for Normative Structures | | | | |
<
< | As Thaler et al did not profess to have an answer to rational choice theory, the movement is limited to poking holes in the neoclassical model. Neoclassical economists will likely respond with the tested Whac-A-Mole approach: reinterpret rational choice theory in increasingly clever ways to explain away behavioral economists' findings as they arise. | >
> | As Thaler et al did not profess to have an answer to rational choice theory, the movement remains limited to poking holes in the neoclassical model. Neoclassical economists will likely respond with the tested Whac-A-Mole approach: reinterpret rational choice theory in increasingly clever ways to explain away behavioral economists' findings as they arise. | | | | |
<
< | If continuity is an essential goal of a normative structure, then, ideally, this debate engenders productive results for the law and economic movement, by encouraging it to reconsider and revise its premises, thereby strengthening the structure and the legal principles that depend on it. However, Thurman Arnold in The Folklore of Capitalism posited, "[l]aws and morals and economics are always arrayed against new groups which are struggling to obtain a place in an institutional hierarchy of prestige." At 4. If one adopts this view, the escalating debate around rational choice theory might signal the rumblings of an intradisciplinary holy war through which a new set of economic principles emerges. As an aspiring lawyer, the latter scenario presents both an exciting and disconcerting prospect, in that neoclassical assumptions undergird great real estate beneath contract, criminal and property law. My plan is to stay tuned. | >
> | If continuity is an essential goal of a normative structure, then, ideally, this debate engenders productive results for the law and economics movement, by encouraging it to reconsider and revise its premises, thereby strengthening the structure and the legal principles that depend on it. However, Thurman Arnold in The Folklore of Capitalism posited, "[l]aws and morals and economics are always arrayed against new groups which are struggling to obtain a place in an institutional hierarchy of prestige." At 4. If one adopts this view, the escalating debate around rational choice theory might signal the rumblings of an intradisciplinary holy war through which a new set of economic principles emerges. As an aspiring lawyer, the latter scenario presents both an exciting and disconcerting prospect, in that neoclassical assumptions undergird great real estate beneath contract, criminal and property law. My plan is to stay tuned. | | |
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MichaelDuignanSecondPaper 6 - 17 Apr 2010 - Main.MichaelDuignan
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | | | Neoclassical economics has, over a half century, come to exert great influence over legal structures. As a positive system, it lends mathematical precision to legal thinking. As a normative system, it shapes vast areas of law dealing with transaction and choice. Some wonder if its legal influence, however, has reached a zenith. As new tools enable researchers to discover the human brain and its cognitive limitations, some economists now question the assumptions neoclassical economics made concerning human nature. If a social theory is ultimately valued by how well it explains the forces guiding human behavior, this essay considers how such questioning might affect normative principles anchored to the neoclassical model. | |
<
< | The Hand formula | >
> | The Hand Formula | | | | |
<
< | In the 1947 case of United States v. Carroll Towing Co., J. Learned Hand put forth his eponymous formula for negligence liability. Where the burden of avoiding harm is less than the probability of the harm times the loss associated with the harm (B < P x L), the defendant causing harm acts without requisite care. In that Hand introduced the idea of using a cost-benefit analysis to create a bright line rule of tort liability, Carroll Towing represents prescient use of rational choice theory to render consistent qualitative judgments in the law. And though the Hand formula was non-binding dicta, it retains analytical significance; it presumes a reasonable person is always capable of making rational decisions before acting. | >
> | In the 1947 case of United States v. Carroll Towing Co., J. Learned Hand put forth his eponymous formula for negligence liability. Where the burden of avoiding harm is less than the probability of the harm times the loss associated with the harm (B < P x L), the defendant who chooses not to avoid harm acts without requisite care. In that Hand introduced the idea of cost-benefit analysis as a bright line rule of tort liability, Carroll Towing represents prescient use of rational choice theory to render consistent qualitative judgments in the law. And though the Hand formula was non-binding, it retains analytical significance; it presumes a reasonable person is always capable of making rational decisions before acting. | | | Rational Choice Theory and the Law | |
<
< | The debate is fiercest at U. of Chicago, with Richard Posner representing the traditional law and economics movement, and Richard Thaler leading the developing field of behavioral economics (developing, because, as of yet, the field is without a formal theory). | >
> | The contemporary debate is fiercest at U. of Chicago, with Richard Posner representing the traditional law and economics movement, and Richard Thaler leading the developing field of behavioral economics (developing, because, as of yet, the field is without a formal theory). | | | | |
<
< | According to Posner, the full range of human psychology can be sufficiently explained within rational choice theory. Fellow Chicagoan Gary S. Becker in his 1976 paper The Economic Approach to Human Behavior said, “[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [1] maximize their utility [2] from a stable set of preferences and [3] accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets. At 14. Though generally accepted, the universality of the rule has invited challenge ever since. | >
> | According to Posner, the full range of human psychology can be sufficiently explained within rational choice theory. Fellow Chicagoan Gary S. Becker in his 1976 paper The Economic Approach to Human Behavior said, “[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [1] maximize their utility [2] from a stable set of preferences and [3] accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets." At 14. Though generally accepted, the universality of the rule has invited challenge ever since. | | | | |
<
< | Thaler, along with Cass Sunstein and Christine Jolls in A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, counters that certain peculiarities of human nature, though predictable, lie outside the scope of the traditional model. In so many words, the more evidence one can produce showing human decisions do not mirror neoclassical presumptions, the less explanatory power the traditional model retains as applied to the law. At 1474. | >
> | Thaler, along with Cass Sunstein and Christine Jolls in A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, counters that certain peculiarities of human nature, though predictable, lie outside the scope of the traditional model. In so many words, the more evidence one can produce showing human decisions do not mirror neoclassical presumptions, the less explanatory power the traditional model retains as applied to the law. At 1474. | | | | |
<
< | Reasonable persons, in spite of ourselves | >
> | Reasonable Persons, In Spite of Ourselves | | | Dan Ariely, author of Predictably Irrational, delightfully exposed the relativity of choice in a social experiment. A group of 100 college students were given an advert from The Economist magazine and asked to select one of three annual subscription options: print-only for $59, online-only for $125, or print-plus-online for $125. A small portion opted for the first, none for the second, and the overwhelming majority for the third, print-plus-online option. Then, Ariely asked another group of students the same question, only this time he removed the second online-only option that no one wanted. When deciding between print-only for $59 and print-plus-online for $125, the majority of students opted for the cheaper package. | |
>
> | | | | | |
>
> | | | | | |
<
< | The shift in students’ subscription choice undermines Becker’s assumption that people make decisions from “a stable set of preferences.” Ariely demonstrates that people’s preferences are not always fixed and absolute, but can be dynamic and relational to the environment in which choice is permitted to occur. According to Ariely, the way to get people to choose option A over option B is to add option A', a clearly less desirable alternative to option A, thereby increasing option A's relative attractiveness. | >
> | The shift in students’ subscription choice undermines Becker’s assumption that people make decisions from “a stable set of preferences.” Ariely demonstrates that people’s preferences are not always fixed and absolute, but can be dynamic and relational to the environment in which choice is permitted to occur. According to Ariely, the way to get people to choose option A over option B is to add option A', a clearly less desirable alternative to option A, thereby increasing the relative attractiveness of option A. | | | | |
<
< | Choice as a double edged sword | >
> | Choice as a Double-Edged Sword | | | | |
<
< | Under the rational choice theory, multiple consumption options increase the chance that a given consumer will be able to find a choice suitable to his or her fixed preferences. However, Ariely suggests that benefit may be illusory, because the availability of choices may actually be guiding the preferences of the individual. Obviously, this idea bears great significance on generally accepted notions of personal autonomy. Yet, anyone who's ever entered a supermarket with one item in mind, and left carrying a something else altogether, might be able to entertain the prospect of this latter view. | >
> | Under rational choice theory, multiple consumption options increase the likelihood that a given consumer will be able to find a choice suitable to his or her fixed preferences. However, Ariely suggests that benefit may be illusory, because carefully designed choices may actually shape the preferences of the individual. Obviously, this idea bears great significance for generally accepted notions of personal autonomy inherent in constitutional law. Yet, for anyone who's ever entered a supermarket with one item in mind, and left carrying a something else altogether, the potentiality of relative preferences is not totally far fetched. | | | | |
>
> | | | |  | |
>
> |
What if we are simply so overwhelmed by multiple choices that we are blinded to our true preferences? Or what if a range of choices sometimes animates dormant preferences that we could not see otherwise? Either way, the prospects are not good for neoclassical assumptions. Further, the discovery of relative preferences has begun to infiltrate the way new market regulations are proposed. And neoclassical adherents are successfully shouting down such heretical assertions by labeling them old news. | | | General Implications for Normative Systems | |
<
< | As Thaler et al did not profess to have an answer to rational choice theory, so long as behavioral economics lacks a formal theory of its own, the movement is limited to poking holes in the neoclassical model. Neoclassical economists will likely respond with the tested Whac-A-Mole approach: reinterpret rational choice theory in increasingly clever ways to explain away the behavioral economists' findings as they arise. | >
> | As Thaler et al did not profess to have an answer to rational choice theory, the movement is limited to poking holes in the neoclassical model. Neoclassical economists will likely respond with the tested Whac-A-Mole approach: reinterpret rational choice theory in increasingly clever ways to explain away behavioral economists' findings as they arise. | | | | |
<
< | Ideally, this debate engenders productive results for the law and economic movement, by encouraging it to reconsider and revise its premises, thereby strengthening the structure and the legal principles that depend on it. But, if one adopts the views of Thurman Arnold, the escalating debate might signal the rumblings of an intradisciplinary holy war through which a new set of economic principles emerges. As an aspiring lawyer, the latter scenario presents both an exciting and disconcerting prospect, in that neoclassical assumptions undergird great real estate beneath contract, criminal and property law. | >
> | If continuity is an essential goal of a normative structure, then, ideally, this debate engenders productive results for the law and economic movement, by encouraging it to reconsider and revise its premises, thereby strengthening the structure and the legal principles that depend on it. However, Thurman Arnold in The Folklore of Capitalism posited, "[l]aws and morals and economics are always arrayed against new groups which are struggling to obtain a place in an institutional hierarchy of prestige." At 4. If one adopts this view, the escalating debate around rational choice theory might signal the rumblings of an intradisciplinary holy war through which a new set of economic principles emerges. As an aspiring lawyer, the latter scenario presents both an exciting and disconcerting prospect, in that neoclassical assumptions undergird great real estate beneath contract, criminal and property law. My plan is to stay tuned. | | | | |
<
< | ...the debate between libertarian and paternalistic ... | | |
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. |
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MichaelDuignanSecondPaper 5 - 17 Apr 2010 - Main.MichaelDuignan
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | | | -- By MichaelDuignan - 06 Apr 2010 | |
<
< | Neoclassical economics has, over a half century, come to exert great influence over legal structures. As a positive system, it provides mathematical precision to legal thinking. As a normative system, it shapes vast areas of law dealing with transaction and choice. Some wonder if its legal influence, however, has reached a zenith. As new tools enable researchers to learn more about the human brain and its cognitive limitations, some economists have begun to question the assumptions neoclassical economics made considering human nature. If a social theory is ultimately valued by how well it explains the forces guiding human behavior, this essay considers just how the answers to these questions might impact normative principles anchored to the neoclassical model. | >
> | Neoclassical economics has, over a half century, come to exert great influence over legal structures. As a positive system, it lends mathematical precision to legal thinking. As a normative system, it shapes vast areas of law dealing with transaction and choice. Some wonder if its legal influence, however, has reached a zenith. As new tools enable researchers to discover the human brain and its cognitive limitations, some economists now question the assumptions neoclassical economics made concerning human nature. If a social theory is ultimately valued by how well it explains the forces guiding human behavior, this essay considers how such questioning might affect normative principles anchored to the neoclassical model. | | | The Hand formula | | | Rational Choice Theory and the Law | |
<
< | The debate over rational choice theory is fiercest at the U. of Chicago, with Richard Posner representing the traditional law and economics movement, and Richard Thaler leading a mutiny in the developing field of behavioral economics (“developing,” because, as of yet, the field is without a formal theory). | >
> | The debate is fiercest at U. of Chicago, with Richard Posner representing the traditional law and economics movement, and Richard Thaler leading the developing field of behavioral economics (developing, because, as of yet, the field is without a formal theory). | | | | |
<
< | According to Posner, the full range of human psychology can be sufficiently explained within rational choice theory. Fellow Chicagoan Gary S. Becker in his 1976 essay The Economic Approach to Human Behavior said, “[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [1] maximize their utility [2] from a stable set of preferences and [3] accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.” (p. 14). Though generally accepted, the breadth of this rule has invited challenge ever since. | >
> | According to Posner, the full range of human psychology can be sufficiently explained within rational choice theory. Fellow Chicagoan Gary S. Becker in his 1976 paper The Economic Approach to Human Behavior said, “[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [1] maximize their utility [2] from a stable set of preferences and [3] accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets. At 14. Though generally accepted, the universality of the rule has invited challenge ever since. | | | | |
<
< | Conversely, Thaler asserts certain peculiarities of human nature, though predictable, lie outside the scope of the traditional model. In so many words, this view posits that, the more evidence showing human decision-making processes differ from neoclassical presumptions, the less explanatory power the traditional model retains. | >
> | Thaler, along with Cass Sunstein and Christine Jolls in A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, counters that certain peculiarities of human nature, though predictable, lie outside the scope of the traditional model. In so many words, the more evidence one can produce showing human decisions do not mirror neoclassical presumptions, the less explanatory power the traditional model retains as applied to the law. At 1474. | | | Reasonable persons, in spite of ourselves | | | Choice as a double edged sword | |
<
< | Under the rational choice theory, multiple consumption options increase the chance that a given consumer will be able to find a choice suitable to his or her fixed preferences. However, Ariely suggests that benefit may be illusory, because the availability of choices may actually be guiding the preferences of the individual. Anyone who has ever entered a supermarket with one item in mind, and left carrying a completely dissimilar item, might relate to this latter view. | >
> | Under the rational choice theory, multiple consumption options increase the chance that a given consumer will be able to find a choice suitable to his or her fixed preferences. However, Ariely suggests that benefit may be illusory, because the availability of choices may actually be guiding the preferences of the individual. Obviously, this idea bears great significance on generally accepted notions of personal autonomy. Yet, anyone who's ever entered a supermarket with one item in mind, and left carrying a something else altogether, might be able to entertain the prospect of this latter view. | | | | |
<
< | General Implications for the Normative System | >
> | General Implications for Normative Systems | | | | |
<
< | The more we as human beings come to understand our cognitive function, the more we recognize rigid definitions of rationality do not comport with the world as it is. Lacking a formal theory of their own, behavioral economists will keep poking holes in rational choice theory. Neoclassical economists will continue to play Whac-A-Mole with by crafting clever ways to fit behavioral economists' debilitative findings into the confines of rational choice theory. This competition between the dominant intellectual regime and the experimental uprising will likely continue to frame the debate between libertarian and paternalistic regulatory approaches for some time to come. | >
> | As Thaler et al did not profess to have an answer to rational choice theory, so long as behavioral economics lacks a formal theory of its own, the movement is limited to poking holes in the neoclassical model. Neoclassical economists will likely respond with the tested Whac-A-Mole approach: reinterpret rational choice theory in increasingly clever ways to explain away the behavioral economists' findings as they arise.
Ideally, this debate engenders productive results for the law and economic movement, by encouraging it to reconsider and revise its premises, thereby strengthening the structure and the legal principles that depend on it. But, if one adopts the views of Thurman Arnold, the escalating debate might signal the rumblings of an intradisciplinary holy war through which a new set of economic principles emerges. As an aspiring lawyer, the latter scenario presents both an exciting and disconcerting prospect, in that neoclassical assumptions undergird great real estate beneath contract, criminal and property law.
...the debate between libertarian and paternalistic ... | | |
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. |
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MichaelDuignanSecondPaper 4 - 17 Apr 2010 - Main.MichaelDuignan
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="SecondPaper" |
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | |
<
< | Behavioral Economics: The More We Learn, The Less We Seem To Know? | >
> | Behavioral Economics: The More We Learn, The Less We Seem To Know | | | -- By MichaelDuignan - 06 Apr 2010 | |
<
< | Rationality is v. Rationality does | >
> | Neoclassical economics has, over a half century, come to exert great influence over legal structures. As a positive system, it provides mathematical precision to legal thinking. As a normative system, it shapes vast areas of law dealing with transaction and choice. Some wonder if its legal influence, however, has reached a zenith. As new tools enable researchers to learn more about the human brain and its cognitive limitations, some economists have begun to question the assumptions neoclassical economics made considering human nature. If a social theory is ultimately valued by how well it explains the forces guiding human behavior, this essay considers just how the answers to these questions might impact normative principles anchored to the neoclassical model. | | | | |
<
< | Neoclassical economics has, over a half century, become a pillar of contemporary legal thought. As a positive system, it provides mathematical precision to legal theory. As a normative system, it shapes vast areas of law dealing with transaction and choice. Some wonder if its legal influence, however, has reached its zenith. As new tools enable researchers to learn more about the human brain and its cognitive limitations, some economists have begun to question certain assumptions about human nature that constitute its core. If a social theory is ultimately valued by the accuracy with which it exposes the impetuses behind human behavior, this essay considers just how these questions might affect the legal principles anchored to the neoclassical model. | >
> | The Hand formula | | | | |
<
< | Rational Choice Theory and the Law | >
> | In the 1947 case of United States v. Carroll Towing Co., J. Learned Hand put forth his eponymous formula for negligence liability. Where the burden of avoiding harm is less than the probability of the harm times the loss associated with the harm (B < P x L), the defendant causing harm acts without requisite care. In that Hand introduced the idea of using a cost-benefit analysis to create a bright line rule of tort liability, Carroll Towing represents prescient use of rational choice theory to render consistent qualitative judgments in the law. And though the Hand formula was non-binding dicta, it retains analytical significance; it presumes a reasonable person is always capable of making rational decisions before acting. | | | | |
<
< | The debate is loudest at U. of Chicago, with Richard Posner at the helm of the traditional law and economics movement, and Richard Thaler leading a mutiny in the developing field of behavioral economics (“developing,” because, as of yet, the field is without a formal theory). According to Posner, the full range of human psychology can be sufficiently explained within rational choice theory as is. Conversely, Thaler asserts certain peculiarities of human nature, though often predictable, lie outside the scope of the traditional model. Further, the more we learn that human decision-making processes differ from neoclassical presumptions, the less explanatory power of the traditional model retains. | >
> | Rational Choice Theory and the Law | | | | |
<
< | The Hand formula | >
> | The debate over rational choice theory is fiercest at the U. of Chicago, with Richard Posner representing the traditional law and economics movement, and Richard Thaler leading a mutiny in the developing field of behavioral economics (“developing,” because, as of yet, the field is without a formal theory). | | | | |
<
< | In the 1947 case of United States v. Carroll Towing Co., J. Learned Hand put forth his eponymous formula for negligence liability. Where the burden of avoiding harm is less than the probability of the harm times the loss associated with the harm (B < P x L), the defendant causing harm acts without requisite care. In that Hand introduced the idea of using a cost-benefit analysis to create a bright line rule of culpability within a tort claim, Carroll Towing represents prescient use of rational choice theory to aid in rendering consistent qualitative judgments in the law. Though the Hand formula was non-binding dicta, it retains analytical significance. It presumes people are capable of making rational decisions before they act. | >
> | According to Posner, the full range of human psychology can be sufficiently explained within rational choice theory. Fellow Chicagoan Gary S. Becker in his 1976 essay The Economic Approach to Human Behavior said, “[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [1] maximize their utility [2] from a stable set of preferences and [3] accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.” (p. 14). Though generally accepted, the breadth of this rule has invited challenge ever since. | | | | |
<
< | Fellow Chicagoan Gary S. Becker in his 1976 essay The Economic Approach to Human Behavior said, “[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [1] maximize their utility [2] from a stable set of preferences and [3] accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.” (p. 14). Though generally accepted, the breadth of this rule has invited challenge ever since. | >
> | Conversely, Thaler asserts certain peculiarities of human nature, though predictable, lie outside the scope of the traditional model. In so many words, this view posits that, the more evidence showing human decision-making processes differ from neoclassical presumptions, the less explanatory power the traditional model retains. | | | Reasonable persons, in spite of ourselves | | |
The shift in students’ subscription choice undermines Becker’s assumption that people make decisions from “a stable set of preferences.” Ariely demonstrates that people’s preferences are not always fixed and absolute, but can be dynamic and relational to the environment in which choice is permitted to occur. According to Ariely, the way to get people to choose option A over option B is to add option A', a clearly less desirable alternative to option A, thereby increasing option A's relative attractiveness. | |
<
< | You don't have to twist my ARM to get be to buy
Unlike fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs), where monthly payments are constant, adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) permit monthly payments to vary based on a predetermined market rate that resets each year. Their meaningful difference comes down to which party bears the interest rate risk over the life of the loan: FRM lenders or ARM borrowers. In exchange, ARM borrowers pay a lower premium than FRM borrowers do. | >
> | Choice as a double edged sword | | | | |
<
< | Rational choice theory would expect utility-maximizing home buyers choosing between an FRM and an ARM to engage in a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account, all else equal: 1) their preference for risk, and 2) the current interest rate spread between FRMs and ARMs. But, under Ariely’s findings, how might the availability of a third mortgage option affect homebuyer preferences? | >
> | Under the rational choice theory, multiple consumption options increase the chance that a given consumer will be able to find a choice suitable to his or her fixed preferences. However, Ariely suggests that benefit may be illusory, because the availability of choices may actually be guiding the preferences of the individual. Anyone who has ever entered a supermarket with one item in mind, and left carrying a completely dissimilar item, might relate to this latter view. | | | | |
<
< | Hybrid ARMs function like a FRM at the outset of the loan, usually for 3, 5, 7 or 10 years, after which they convert to a traditional ARM, where rates float with the market. Introduced after traditional ARMs and having proven more popular with home buyers, what if the traditional ARM is the option A’ that boosts the relative appeal of the hybrid ARM? In this regard, traditional ARMs, which confer all interest rate risk to the borrower, would make hybrid ARMs, which confer some interest rate risk to the borrower, even more attractive to risk-averse borrowers by virtue of their relative comparison. And, if Ariely’s observation has any value in this unproven hypothetical, more borrowers might choose hybrid ARMs than would be the case if the traditional ARMs were no option at all. | >
> | | | | | |
<
< | General Implications for the Normative System | >
> | General Implications for the Normative System | | | | |
<
< | The more we as human beings come to understand ourselves and the way we function cognitively, the more we recognize rigid definitions of rationality do not comport with the world as it is. Behavioral economists will keep poking holes in rational choice theory so long as they cannot come up with a formal theory of their own. Neoclassical economists will continue to play Whac-A-Mole with behavioral economists by crafting clever ways to fit their debilitative findings into the confines of rational choice theory as it stands. This competition between the dominant intellectual regime and the experimental uprising will likely continue to frame the debate between libertarian and paternalistic regulatory approaches for some time to come. | >
> | The more we as human beings come to understand our cognitive function, the more we recognize rigid definitions of rationality do not comport with the world as it is. Lacking a formal theory of their own, behavioral economists will keep poking holes in rational choice theory. Neoclassical economists will continue to play Whac-A-Mole with by crafting clever ways to fit behavioral economists' debilitative findings into the confines of rational choice theory. This competition between the dominant intellectual regime and the experimental uprising will likely continue to frame the debate between libertarian and paternalistic regulatory approaches for some time to come. | | |
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. |
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MichaelDuignanSecondPaper 3 - 16 Apr 2010 - Main.MichaelDuignan
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="SecondPaper" |
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | | | Rationality is v. Rationality does | |
<
< | Neoclassical economics has, over a half century, become a pillar of contemporary legal thought. As a positive system, it provides mathematical precision to legal theory. As a normative system, it shapes vast areas of law dealing with transaction and choice. Some wonder if its legal influence, however, has reached its zenith. A decade into the 21st century, the model has come under attack. As new tools enable researchers to learn more about the human brain and its cognitive limitations, some economists have begun to question certain assumptions about human nature that constitute its core. If a social theory is ultimately valued by the accuracy with which it exposes the impetuses behind human behavior, this essay considers just how these questions might affect the legal principles anchored to the neoclassical model. | >
> | Neoclassical economics has, over a half century, become a pillar of contemporary legal thought. As a positive system, it provides mathematical precision to legal theory. As a normative system, it shapes vast areas of law dealing with transaction and choice. Some wonder if its legal influence, however, has reached its zenith. As new tools enable researchers to learn more about the human brain and its cognitive limitations, some economists have begun to question certain assumptions about human nature that constitute its core. If a social theory is ultimately valued by the accuracy with which it exposes the impetuses behind human behavior, this essay considers just how these questions might affect the legal principles anchored to the neoclassical model. | | | Rational Choice Theory and the Law | |
<
< | The debate is loudest at U. of Chicago, with Richard Posner at the helm of the traditional law and economics movement, and Richard Thaler leading a mutiny in the developing field of behavioral economics (“developing,” because, as of yet, the field is without a formal theory). According to Posner, the full range of human psychology can be sufficiently explained within rational choice theory as is. Conversely, Thaler asserts certain peculiarities of human nature, though often predictable, lie outside the scope of the traditional model. Further, the more we learn that human decision-making processes differ from neoclassical presumptions, the less explanatory power of the traditional model retains. With the battle lines set, how might a search for “bounded rationality” affect legal standards whose efficiency aims largely depend on the perfect rationality of the actors to whom they apply? | >
> | The debate is loudest at U. of Chicago, with Richard Posner at the helm of the traditional law and economics movement, and Richard Thaler leading a mutiny in the developing field of behavioral economics (“developing,” because, as of yet, the field is without a formal theory). According to Posner, the full range of human psychology can be sufficiently explained within rational choice theory as is. Conversely, Thaler asserts certain peculiarities of human nature, though often predictable, lie outside the scope of the traditional model. Further, the more we learn that human decision-making processes differ from neoclassical presumptions, the less explanatory power of the traditional model retains. | | | The Hand formula | |
<
< | In the 1947 case of United States v. Carroll Towing Co., J. Learned Hand put forth his eponymous formula for negligence liability. Where the burden of avoiding harm is less than the probability of the harm times the loss associated with the harm (B < P x L), the defendant causing harm acts without requisite care. In that Hand introduced the idea of using a cost-benefit analysis to create a bright line rule of culpability within a tort claim, Carroll Towing represents prescient use of rational choice theory to aid in rendering consistent qualitative judgments in the law. Though Hand’s formula was non-binding dicta, its association of the reasonable person standard with rational choice theory was a first and retains analytical significance. It presumes people are capable of making rational decisions before they act. | >
> | In the 1947 case of United States v. Carroll Towing Co., J. Learned Hand put forth his eponymous formula for negligence liability. Where the burden of avoiding harm is less than the probability of the harm times the loss associated with the harm (B < P x L), the defendant causing harm acts without requisite care. In that Hand introduced the idea of using a cost-benefit analysis to create a bright line rule of culpability within a tort claim, Carroll Towing represents prescient use of rational choice theory to aid in rendering consistent qualitative judgments in the law. Though the Hand formula was non-binding dicta, it retains analytical significance. It presumes people are capable of making rational decisions before they act. | | | Fellow Chicagoan Gary S. Becker in his 1976 essay The Economic Approach to Human Behavior said, “[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [1] maximize their utility [2] from a stable set of preferences and [3] accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.” (p. 14). Though generally accepted, the breadth of this rule has invited challenge ever since. | | |
The shift in students’ subscription choice undermines Becker’s assumption that people make decisions from “a stable set of preferences.” Ariely demonstrates that people’s preferences are not always fixed and absolute, but can be dynamic and relational to the environment in which choice is permitted to occur. According to Ariely, the way to get people to choose option A over option B is to add option A', a clearly less desirable alternative to option A, thereby increasing option A's relative attractiveness. | |
<
< | You don't have to twist my ARM to get me to buy | >
> | You don't have to twist my ARM to get be to buy
Unlike fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs), where monthly payments are constant, adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) permit monthly payments to vary based on a predetermined market rate that resets each year. Their meaningful difference comes down to which party bears the interest rate risk over the life of the loan: FRM lenders or ARM borrowers. In exchange, ARM borrowers pay a lower premium than FRM borrowers do.
Rational choice theory would expect utility-maximizing home buyers choosing between an FRM and an ARM to engage in a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account, all else equal: 1) their preference for risk, and 2) the current interest rate spread between FRMs and ARMs. But, under Ariely’s findings, how might the availability of a third mortgage option affect homebuyer preferences?
Hybrid ARMs function like a FRM at the outset of the loan, usually for 3, 5, 7 or 10 years, after which they convert to a traditional ARM, where rates float with the market. Introduced after traditional ARMs and having proven more popular with home buyers, what if the traditional ARM is the option A’ that boosts the relative appeal of the hybrid ARM? In this regard, traditional ARMs, which confer all interest rate risk to the borrower, would make hybrid ARMs, which confer some interest rate risk to the borrower, even more attractive to risk-averse borrowers by virtue of their relative comparison. And, if Ariely’s observation has any value in this unproven hypothetical, more borrowers might choose hybrid ARMs than would be the case if the traditional ARMs were no option at all. | | | General Implications for the Normative System |
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MichaelDuignanSecondPaper 2 - 16 Apr 2010 - Main.MichaelDuignan
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="SecondPaper" |
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<
< | | | | It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | | | It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | |
<
< | Paper Title | >
> | Behavioral Economics: The More We Learn, The Less We Seem To Know? | | | -- By MichaelDuignan - 06 Apr 2010 | |
<
< | Section I
Subsection A | >
> | Rationality is v. Rationality does | | | | |
>
> | Neoclassical economics has, over a half century, become a pillar of contemporary legal thought. As a positive system, it provides mathematical precision to legal theory. As a normative system, it shapes vast areas of law dealing with transaction and choice. Some wonder if its legal influence, however, has reached its zenith. A decade into the 21st century, the model has come under attack. As new tools enable researchers to learn more about the human brain and its cognitive limitations, some economists have begun to question certain assumptions about human nature that constitute its core. If a social theory is ultimately valued by the accuracy with which it exposes the impetuses behind human behavior, this essay considers just how these questions might affect the legal principles anchored to the neoclassical model. | | | | |
<
< | Subsub 1 | >
> | Rational Choice Theory and the Law | | | | |
<
< | Subsection B | >
> | The debate is loudest at U. of Chicago, with Richard Posner at the helm of the traditional law and economics movement, and Richard Thaler leading a mutiny in the developing field of behavioral economics (“developing,” because, as of yet, the field is without a formal theory). According to Posner, the full range of human psychology can be sufficiently explained within rational choice theory as is. Conversely, Thaler asserts certain peculiarities of human nature, though often predictable, lie outside the scope of the traditional model. Further, the more we learn that human decision-making processes differ from neoclassical presumptions, the less explanatory power of the traditional model retains. With the battle lines set, how might a search for “bounded rationality” affect legal standards whose efficiency aims largely depend on the perfect rationality of the actors to whom they apply? | | | | |
>
> | The Hand formula | | | | |
<
< | Subsub 1 | >
> | In the 1947 case of United States v. Carroll Towing Co., J. Learned Hand put forth his eponymous formula for negligence liability. Where the burden of avoiding harm is less than the probability of the harm times the loss associated with the harm (B < P x L), the defendant causing harm acts without requisite care. In that Hand introduced the idea of using a cost-benefit analysis to create a bright line rule of culpability within a tort claim, Carroll Towing represents prescient use of rational choice theory to aid in rendering consistent qualitative judgments in the law. Though Hand’s formula was non-binding dicta, its association of the reasonable person standard with rational choice theory was a first and retains analytical significance. It presumes people are capable of making rational decisions before they act. | | | | |
>
> | Fellow Chicagoan Gary S. Becker in his 1976 essay The Economic Approach to Human Behavior said, “[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [1] maximize their utility [2] from a stable set of preferences and [3] accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.” (p. 14). Though generally accepted, the breadth of this rule has invited challenge ever since. | | | | |
<
< | Subsub 2 | >
> | Reasonable persons, in spite of ourselves | | | | |
>
> | Dan Ariely, author of Predictably Irrational, delightfully exposed the relativity of choice in a social experiment. A group of 100 college students were given an advert from The Economist magazine and asked to select one of three annual subscription options: print-only for $59, online-only for $125, or print-plus-online for $125. A small portion opted for the first, none for the second, and the overwhelming majority for the third, print-plus-online option. Then, Ariely asked another group of students the same question, only this time he removed the second online-only option that no one wanted. When deciding between print-only for $59 and print-plus-online for $125, the majority of students opted for the cheaper package. | | | | |
>
> | | | | | |
<
< | Section II | >
> | The shift in students’ subscription choice undermines Becker’s assumption that people make decisions from “a stable set of preferences.” Ariely demonstrates that people’s preferences are not always fixed and absolute, but can be dynamic and relational to the environment in which choice is permitted to occur. According to Ariely, the way to get people to choose option A over option B is to add option A', a clearly less desirable alternative to option A, thereby increasing option A's relative attractiveness. | | | | |
<
< | Subsection A | >
> | You don't have to twist my ARM to get me to buy | | | | |
<
< | Subsection B | >
> | General Implications for the Normative System | | | | |
>
> | The more we as human beings come to understand ourselves and the way we function cognitively, the more we recognize rigid definitions of rationality do not comport with the world as it is. Behavioral economists will keep poking holes in rational choice theory so long as they cannot come up with a formal theory of their own. Neoclassical economists will continue to play Whac-A-Mole with behavioral economists by crafting clever ways to fit their debilitative findings into the confines of rational choice theory as it stands. This competition between the dominant intellectual regime and the experimental uprising will likely continue to frame the debate between libertarian and paternalistic regulatory approaches for some time to come. | | |
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. |
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MichaelDuignanSecondPaper 1 - 06 Apr 2010 - Main.MichaelDuignan
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>
> |
| META TOPICPARENT | name="SecondPaper" |
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.
Paper Title
-- By MichaelDuignan - 06 Apr 2010
Section I
Subsection A
Subsub 1
Subsection B
Subsub 1
Subsub 2
Section II
Subsection A
Subsection B
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.
To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" on the next line:
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