I like your idea of harnessing the unconscious on a personal level, though I'm a little ambivalent about and uncertain as to what it would even mean to apply this to "the institution of law." To try and depart from logical reasoning would seem to be a move away from the entire enterprise of being a legal practitioner; it's the tool we have to work with, and there are other disciplines that are far better equipped to deal with the utility of emotional memory than the legal profession. Then, again, if we believe that an institution is not a monolithic entity, but comprised of and informed by its constituent parts, I think allowing more than legal reasoning to inform the way we, as individuals, personally think about our practice, and view our role as lawyers, would already go a long way towards making the profession one we're proud to be a part of. But anything beyond that just strikes me as, perhaps, unrealistic.

Edited to add: I just read the essay "On Bullshit" and came across two paragraphs that made me pause, because I felt they really spoke to what I wrote earlier and the way in which my instinct is to turn inward and make my application of these ideas "personal", because I'm skeptical about what can be applied to the world outside myself. I might need to think about this some more, and maybe flesh out my ideas in my second paper:

"The contemporary proliferation of bullshit also has deeper sources, in various forms of scepticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality, and which therefore reject the possibility of knowing how things truly are. These "antirealist" doctrines undermine confidence in the value of disinterested efforts to determine what is true and what is false, and even in the intelligibility of the notion of objective inquiry. One response to this loss of confidence has been a retreat from the discipline required by dedication to the ideal of correctness to a quite different sort of discipline, which is imposed by pursuit of an alternative ideal of sincerity. Rather than seeking primarily to arrive at accurate representations of a common world, the individual turns toward trying to provide honest representations of himself. Convinced that reality has no inherent nature, which he might hope to identify as the truth about things, he devotes himself to being true to his own nature. It is as though he decides that since it makes no sense to try to be true to the facts, he must therefore try instead to be true to himself.

But it is preposterous to imagine that we ourselves are determinate, and hence susceptible both to correct and to incorrect descriptions, while supposing that the ascription of determinacy to anything else has been exposed as a mistake. As conscious beings, we exist only in response to other things,and we cannot know ourselves at all without knowing them. Moreover, there is nothing in theory, and certainly nothing in experience, to support the extraordinary judgment that it is the truth about himself that is the easiest for a person to know. Facts about ourselves are not peculiarly solid and resistant to sceptical dissolution. Our natures are, indeed, elusively insubstantial - notoriously less stable and less inherent than the natures of other things. And insofar as this is the case, sincerity itself is bullshit."

-- RumbidzaiMaweni - 21 Apr 2012