Law in Contemporary Society

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NonUnitarySelfRealizingCohen 6 - 25 Jan 2009 - Main.EbenMoglen
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Question 1: Application of the Unitary & Non-Unitary Self Distinctions: Within class we probed the fiction of the unitary-self. We recognized the potential danger in treating as pathologies variations in humans’ behavior/inner-states. I am willing to accept that a skilled attorney understands and is attentive to the multiplicity of persons within an individual. I acknowledge the danger of the unitary-self outlook is that the subscriber to this outlook is less likely to take notice of human “aberrations.” What is less clear to me is how being sensitive to the non-unitary self concept further skills the attorney who presumes a unitary-self but recognizes the range of human emotion and tailors his actions accordingly. Is there a practical difference between these two outlooks? Is it that the non-unitary-self concept compels one not to merely recognize the multiplicity of human states but to search for their causes in prior experiences? If yes, then what bearing and what benefit does this have on persuasive advocacy before non-realist justices?
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 -- DanielMargolskee - 25 Jan 2009
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  • I don't think we came to be talking about self-states because Holmes or Cohen discusses them, is interested in them, or has any opinion to offer about them. I raised the issue because Theo identified the integrity of the individual consciousness with the preservation of his "necessary fictions," which are Felix Cohen's transcendental nonsense. Among my other questions about Theo's analysis, I took leave to doubt that the attribute he was considering it urgent to preserve ever existed in the first place. That led us to consider other consequences of relaxing the assumption of the integrated self.
 
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  • Someone should refactor this page into two pages, one for each of the essentially independent questions originally asked, so that they won't be unnecessarily interdependent. To restate them more concisely:

  1. What does a lawyer do differently depending on the variations in the "self psychology" portion of her consilient stack of ideas about the roots of human behavior? How does relaxing the assumption of personality integrity in particular affect her professional activities?
  2. If judges refuse (as we can assume they will) to view their own opinions as rationalizations, how can legal change be predicated on the insight?

 
 
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Revision 6r6 - 25 Jan 2009 - 19:07:50 - EbenMoglen
Revision 5r5 - 25 Jan 2009 - 18:44:45 - DanielMargolskee
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