|
RobLaserSecondPaper 3 - 13 Jan 2012 - Main.IanSullivan
|
|
<
< |
| META TOPICPARENT | name="SecondPaper" |
|---|
| >
> |
| META TOPICPARENT | name="SecondPaper2010" |
|---|
| | | It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. |
|
|
RobLaserSecondPaper 2 - 25 May 2010 - Main.JenniferGreen
|
| |
| META TOPICPARENT | name="SecondPaper" |
|---|
| |
<
< | | | | It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | | | Last term, my professor in Torts used Palsgraf as a fundamental case on the issue of proximate cause. He set the two opinions (the first by Cardozo, the second by Andrews) as opposites of each other with Cardozo claiming a foreseeability requirement and Andrews applying a directness test. Epstein also conspicuously places this case as his lynchpin in the causation chapter of his casebook and also only mentions it as the focus for the subsection "foreseeability" within the section of "causation" in his hornbook. The problem with this trend is the fact that Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf rests in no way, and makes no addition to the law of causation. This is especially the case with regards to a foreseeability test in establishing proximate cause. | |
>
> | Why is this problematic? Furthermore, why can’t foreseeability be analyzed as a duty or proximate cause question? Finally, providing a simple thesis statement about what you will argue would be great to help guide the reader through your discussion. | | | Cardozo's Opinion Rests on Duty grounds
"The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us ... we do not go into the question now. The consequences to be followed must first be rooted in a wrong."
Cardozo specifically points out in his opinion that since there was no breach of duty in the defendant's actions, causation does not even need to be examined. The often quoted passage regarding what the "eye of ordinary vigilance" foresees is not related to causation in any way, but instead is built into the construction of duty that is owed to particular classes of possible plaintiffs. In Cardozo's words, "the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed." Therefore, because the defendants in this case had no reason to apprehend harm to Palsgraf based on their actions, they had no duty to her to refrain from those actions. Whether there was a duty to a particular person was a calculation of whether there was an unreasonable risk in relation to that particular person, whether there was a duty to anyone else to refrain from the action(s) is immaterial. | |
>
> | But does Cardozo’s statement completely bar viewing the case through a causation lens? If the foundation of negligence theory is duty, by declaring that the defendant’s owed no duty to the plaintiff and ending the analysis there, has Cardozo precluded a causation analysis in other cases? Put differently, if foreseeability itself is grounded in the principle of causation, as some would argue, does Cardozo’s declaration do anything to negate this? | | | Andrews's response
The main disagreement between Andrews and Cardozo in Palsgraf is whether the violation of a duty to one person would result in liability for the harms to a third person (proximately caused by the violation). Cardozo claims that allowing liability would let a plaintiff sue as "the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another." Andrews's response to Cardozo in his dissent is that while harm to Palsgraf may not have been foreseeable, it was foreseeable that harm could occur to either the passenger they assisted, or his property. Andrew combines this fact to the notion that due care is a universal duty, not relative like Cardozo asserts. If we recognize a foreseeable harm to any individual, then we have a duty to all individuals to refrain from causing it. Andrews cites In re Polemis as a decision that lays out his version of negligence. | |
>
> | *By highlighting that Andrews and Cardozo disagree on the question of proximate causation in parenthesis, have you weakened your fundamental argument – that Cardozo’s view is not about causation, but duty? If a point about Polemis is what you want to ultimately highlight in this paragraph, perhaps you will want to further develop it here (by, for example, stating its essential holding and why it is relevant) as a lead into the subsequent discussion about Andrews’ mischaracterization. * | | | Cardozo, Not Andrews follows Polemis
Andrews mischaracterizes Polemis. He claims that since there is foreseeable harm that would arise from the defendants' actions, it didn't matter who or what was actually harmed. This is incorrect. While Polemis does state that the type of harm is immaterial, it does not state in the opinion an explicit statement on whether the foreseeability of the entity harmed is essential. There is a clue though in the special verdict presented by the jury. When asked about foreseeable harm, the jury stated that the type was not foreseeable, but damage to the ship (which was the entity actually damaged) was foreseeable. Additionally, the opinion does state that "the act causing the plank to fall was in law a negligent act, because some damage to the ship might reasonably be anticipated." This could be support for the fact that the actual entity harmed must be foreseeable in order for a duty to arise. Which would mean that Cardozo, not Andrews would fall in line with Polemis. | |
>
> | The opening sentence could benefit from being further developed – what is the main argument of this paragraph? A clearer statement on why it is important to distinguish whether Cardozo or Andrews falls in line with Polemis would strengthen the argument. | | | Conclusion and Importance
Cited as the opinion that popularized the test of foreseeability in proximate cause, Cardozo is strikingly different minded from what current law professors make him out to be. He appears to support a test of foreseeability of victims within the conception of duty, not causation. In fact, Cardozo seems to accept the directness test of causation from Polemis when he says "we may assume, without deciding, that negligence ... in relation to the plaintiff would entail liability for any and all consequences, however novel or extraordinary." Therefore, for Cardozo negligence "is thus a term of relation" in which foreseeability of plaintiffs is essential, yet in causation he takes the exact opposite view, allowing for liability of all consequences directly caused by the negligence without any regard to whether or not they are foreseeable.
This means that a new conception of the history and development of Tort Law is imperative and that the "great" professors of law may not be infallible after all. In fact, it is the clearness of the error that makes it so shocking. | |
>
> | The opening sentence does a good job of setting up what the paragraph might be about. However, beginning at the second sentence, it is not clear what you are asserting. Are you saying that Cardozo asserts a causation argument, after all? If so, what does this mean for your earlier claims? Further, is your personal experience with your professor and Epstein textbook sufficient evidence to establish a widespread misinterpretation of Cardozo, as you claim? It might be better to frame your view as simply an alternative to a conventional approach as opposed to a making somewhat intuitive, yet unsubstantiated, general claim. Finally, based solely on what you have provided in this paragraph, your Cardozo/Polemis claims seem a bit tenuous. This analysis could also stand for more development and more substantive discussion. | | | It also is what gives me pause. How can this misconception continue when thousands of law students read the case every year? It creates the feeling that there must be something I am missing. Yet, I cannot continue to sit silently and look at this without saying that the scholars I have been exposed to this year at Columbia seem to have gotten Palsgraf seriously wrong. | |
>
> | Ron, it was very gutsy of you to tackle this topic. I have actually had similar thoughts about the conventional view of some of the cases we came across this past year. If the purpose of the paper is to underscore this more general point through a discussion of Palsgraf, it might help tie the paper together by highlighting it from the outset. In fleshing out your arguments specific to Palsgraf, it appears you assume that the reader is knowledgeable, or at least familiar, with the case. This is likely true (fellow law students and Eben are most likely your only audience). Still, you may want to flesh out some of the case law more, or describe it in your own words, so the reader can fully appreciate the building blocks of your argument. Overall, I think this was a great job at tackling, again, a difficult topic. Great job! Jennifer
*Form-Style Edited version:*
Set-Up
Last term, my Torts professor used Palsgraf as a fundamental case to demonstrate the issue of proximate cause. He highlighted its two contrasting opinions: Cardozo’s majority opinion establishes a foreseeability requirement and Andrews’ dissent applies a directness test. Richard Epstein also conspicuously situates this case as his lynchpin in the causation chapter of his casebook, and only mentions it as the focus for the subsection "foreseeability" within the section of "causation" in his hornbook. The problem with this trend is that Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf rests in no way, and makes no addition to the law of causation. This is especially true with regards to the foreseeability test used to establish proximate cause.
Cardozo's Opinion Rests on Duty grounds | | | | |
>
> | "The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us ... we do not go into the question now. The consequences to be followed must first be rooted in a wrong." Cardozo specifically points out that since the defendant did not breach his duty to the plaintiff, causation does not even need to be examined. The often-quoted passage regarding what the "eye of ordinary vigilance" foresees is not related to causation in any way, but instead is built into the construction of duty that is owed to particular classes of possible plaintiffs. In Cardozo's words, "the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed." Therefore, because the defendants in this case had no reason to apprehend harm to Palsgraf based on their actions, they had no duty to her to refrain from those actions. In determining whether there is a duty to a person, one must calculate whether there is an unreasonable risk in relation to him; whether there was a duty to anyone else to refrain from given actions is immaterial.
Andrews's response
Andrews and Cardozo primarily disagree on whether violation of a duty to one person results in liability for the harms to a third person (proximately caused by the violation). Cardozo claims that allowing liability would let a plaintiff sue as "the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another." Andrews believes that while harm to Palsgraf may not have been foreseeable, it was foreseeable that harm could occur to either the passenger they assisted, or his property. Andrews further asserts that due care is a universal duty, not relative as Cardozo claims. If we recognize a foreseeable harm to any individual, then we have a duty to all individuals to refrain from causing it. Andrews cites In re Polemis as a decision that lays out his version of negligence.
Cardozo, Not Andrews follows Polemis
Andrews mischaracterizes Polemis. He claims that since there is foreseeable harm that would arise from the defendants' actions, it doesn't matter who or what was actually harmed. This is incorrect. While Polemis does state that the type of harm is immaterial, it does not explicitly rule on whether the foreseeability of the harmed entity is essential. There is a clue, though, in the special verdict presented by the jury. When asked about foreseeable harm, the jury stated that the type was not foreseeable, but damage to the ship – the entity actually damaged – was foreseeable. Additionally, the opinion states that "the act causing the plank to fall was in law a negligent act, because some damage to the ship might reasonably be anticipated." This could be support for the proposition that the actual entity harmed must be foreseeable in order for a duty to arise. This would mean that Cardozo, not Andrews would fall in line with Polemis.
Conclusion and Importance
Cited as the opinion that popularized the test of foreseeability in proximate cause, Cardozo’s view is strikingly different from what law professors typically make it out to be. Cardozo appears to support a test of foreseeability of victims within the conception of duty, not causation. In fact, Cardozo seems to accept the directness test of causation from Polemis when he says "we may assume, without deciding, that negligence ... in relation to the plaintiff would entail liability for any and all consequences, however novel or extraordinary." Therefore, for Cardozo negligence "is thus a term of relation" in which foreseeability of plaintiffs is essential, yet in causation he takes the exact opposite view, allowing for liability of all consequences directly caused by the negligence without any regard to whether or not they are foreseeable. This means that a new conception of the history and development of Tort Law is imperative and that the "great" professors of law may not be infallible after all. In fact, it is the clearness of the error that makes it so shocking.
It also is what gives me pause. How can this misconception continue when thousands of law students read the case every year? It creates the feeling that there must be something I am missing. Yet, I cannot continue to sit silently and look at this without saying that the scholars I have been exposed to this year at Columbia seem to have gotten Palsgraf seriously wrong. | | |
|
|
|
RobLaserSecondPaper 1 - 17 Apr 2010 - Main.RobLaser
|
|
>
> |
| META TOPICPARENT | name="SecondPaper" |
|---|
It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.
A Complete and Prevalent Misstatement of Palsgraf
-- By RobLaser - 17 Apr 2010
Set-Up
Last term, my professor in Torts used Palsgraf as a fundamental case on the issue of proximate cause. He set the two opinions (the first by Cardozo, the second by Andrews) as opposites of each other with Cardozo claiming a foreseeability requirement and Andrews applying a directness test. Epstein also conspicuously places this case as his lynchpin in the causation chapter of his casebook and also only mentions it as the focus for the subsection "foreseeability" within the section of "causation" in his hornbook. The problem with this trend is the fact that Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf rests in no way, and makes no addition to the law of causation. This is especially the case with regards to a foreseeability test in establishing proximate cause.
Cardozo's Opinion Rests on Duty grounds
"The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us ... we do not go into the question now. The consequences to be followed must first be rooted in a wrong."
Cardozo specifically points out in his opinion that since there was no breach of duty in the defendant's actions, causation does not even need to be examined. The often quoted passage regarding what the "eye of ordinary vigilance" foresees is not related to causation in any way, but instead is built into the construction of duty that is owed to particular classes of possible plaintiffs. In Cardozo's words, "the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed." Therefore, because the defendants in this case had no reason to apprehend harm to Palsgraf based on their actions, they had no duty to her to refrain from those actions. Whether there was a duty to a particular person was a calculation of whether there was an unreasonable risk in relation to that particular person, whether there was a duty to anyone else to refrain from the action(s) is immaterial.
Andrews's response
The main disagreement between Andrews and Cardozo in Palsgraf is whether the violation of a duty to one person would result in liability for the harms to a third person (proximately caused by the violation). Cardozo claims that allowing liability would let a plaintiff sue as "the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another." Andrews's response to Cardozo in his dissent is that while harm to Palsgraf may not have been foreseeable, it was foreseeable that harm could occur to either the passenger they assisted, or his property. Andrew combines this fact to the notion that due care is a universal duty, not relative like Cardozo asserts. If we recognize a foreseeable harm to any individual, then we have a duty to all individuals to refrain from causing it. Andrews cites In re Polemis as a decision that lays out his version of negligence.
Cardozo, Not Andrews follows Polemis
Andrews mischaracterizes Polemis. He claims that since there is foreseeable harm that would arise from the defendants' actions, it didn't matter who or what was actually harmed. This is incorrect. While Polemis does state that the type of harm is immaterial, it does not state in the opinion an explicit statement on whether the foreseeability of the entity harmed is essential. There is a clue though in the special verdict presented by the jury. When asked about foreseeable harm, the jury stated that the type was not foreseeable, but damage to the ship (which was the entity actually damaged) was foreseeable. Additionally, the opinion does state that "the act causing the plank to fall was in law a negligent act, because some damage to the ship might reasonably be anticipated." This could be support for the fact that the actual entity harmed must be foreseeable in order for a duty to arise. Which would mean that Cardozo, not Andrews would fall in line with Polemis.
Conclusion and Importance
Cited as the opinion that popularized the test of foreseeability in proximate cause, Cardozo is strikingly different minded from what current law professors make him out to be. He appears to support a test of foreseeability of victims within the conception of duty, not causation. In fact, Cardozo seems to accept the directness test of causation from Polemis when he says "we may assume, without deciding, that negligence ... in relation to the plaintiff would entail liability for any and all consequences, however novel or extraordinary." Therefore, for Cardozo negligence "is thus a term of relation" in which foreseeability of plaintiffs is essential, yet in causation he takes the exact opposite view, allowing for liability of all consequences directly caused by the negligence without any regard to whether or not they are foreseeable.
This means that a new conception of the history and development of Tort Law is imperative and that the "great" professors of law may not be infallible after all. In fact, it is the clearness of the error that makes it so shocking.
It also is what gives me pause. How can this misconception continue when thousands of law students read the case every year? It creates the feeling that there must be something I am missing. Yet, I cannot continue to sit silently and look at this without saying that the scholars I have been exposed to this year at Columbia seem to have gotten Palsgraf seriously wrong.
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable.
To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" on the next line:
# * Set ALLOWTOPICVIEW = TWikiAdminGroup, RobLaser
Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of that line. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated list |
|
|