| |
| META TOPICPARENT | name="SecondPaper" |
|---|
Criminal Confessions as Evidence: A Failure of the Adversarial System | | | 1. Confessions in Criminal Law | |
<
< | The prosecuting attorney and the accused are pitted in direct competition in the (adversarial) criminal justice system. Neither party seeks the truth per se. Rather, each party stretches the evidence, facts, and law to represent their cause, constrained only by a legal duty to act in “good faith” and a practical need to maintain credibility. The arbiter (i.e., judge and/or jury) decides the accused party’s guilt by comparing the evidence, facts, and law to some variant of the “reasonable doubt” standard. | >
> | The prosecuting attorney and the accused are pitted in direct competition in the criminal justice system. Neither party seeks the truth per se. Rather, each party stretches the evidence, facts, and law to represent their cause, constrained only by a legal duty to act in “good faith” and a practical need to maintain credibility. The arbiter (i.e., judge and/or jury) decides the accused party’s guilt by comparing the evidence, facts, and law to some variant of the “reasonable doubt” standard. | | | The adversarial system is, of course, imperfect. The prosecutor and the accused often have very different resources available to present their case. The arbiter is inevitably influenced by his own biases and idiosyncrasies. Still, society generally accepts the adversarial system of criminal justice as legitimate despite these (and many other) imperfections.
However, it is the contention of this essay that the adversarial system breaks down completely when criminal confessions are used in place of substantive evidence in criminal trials. When a confession is given, the accused party “gives up,” while the prosecutor stays focused on "winning" rather than on determining the truth. Worse still, the arbiter, lacking more substantive evidence, is left only with his almost irrelevant intuition that "an innocent person would almost never confess" in rendering a verdict. | |
<
< | As a result, innocent people are convicted of crimes that they did not commit. While wrongful conviction obviously harms the accused, it also harms society. Wrongful convictions drain societal resources (incarceration and rehabilitation are expensive), corrode the legitimacy of the criminal system, and allow actual criminals to remain free and unchecked. | >
> | As a result, innocent people are convicted of crimes that they did not commit. While wrongful conviction obviously harms the accused, it also harms society. Wrongful convictions drain resources (incarceration and rehabilitation are expensive), corrode the legitimacy of the criminal system, and allow actual criminals to remain free and unchecked. | | |
2. Why are Confessions Admissible as Evidence? | | | Educated, mentally-healthy, and economically-prosperous adults generally do not confess to crimes that they did not commit. However, among certain socioeconomic groups, likely numbering in the millions, false confessions are common. | |
<
< | People who are have low-IQ or who are non-obviously mentally-challenged may confess to crimes they did not commit while agitated from having been hauled into an unfamiliar environment and confronted by authority figures (a situation worsened by police interrogation techniques, which often encourage intimidation and application of psychological pressure to elicit confessions). Disadvantaged immigrants, who additionally are not yet acclimated to the legal culture of the United States, may confess for related reasons. Those with undiagnosed mental-illness may confess, actually believing that they committed the crime. | >
> | People who are have low-IQ or who are non-obviously mentally-challenged may confess to crimes they did not commit while agitated and confronted by authority figures (a situation worsened by police interrogation techniques, which often encourage intimidation and application of psychological pressure to elicit confessions). Disadvantaged immigrants, who additionally are not yet acclimated to the legal culture of the United States, may confess for related reasons. Those with undiagnosed mental-illness may confess, actually believing that they committed the crime. | | | | |
<
< | Social outcasts and “drifters” are likely to view the legal system as arbitrary, or worse, as against them, and may confess from a utilitarian decision to minimize their expected penalty. Further, those who feel powerless and voiceless in society may enjoy the short-lived attention that confessing brings them (especially if the alleged crime is particularly visible). Some individuals may confess because they find familiarity and stability in the prison system and want to return to it. Finally, those involved even tangentially in organized crime may confess to cover for the serious crimes of other members of the organization. | >
> | Social outcasts and “drifters” are likely to view the legal system as arbitrary, or worse, as against them, and may confess from a utilitarian decision to minimize their expected penalty. Further, those who feel powerless and voiceless in society may enjoy the short-lived attention that confessing brings them (especially if the alleged crime is highly visible). Some individuals may confess because they find stability in the prison system and want to return to it. Finally, those involved even tangentially in organized crime may confess to cover for the serious crimes of other members of the organization. | | |
4. False Confessions and the Prosecutor | |
<
< | Unfortunately, in the adversarial system, an overworked prosecutor’s office has little incentive to dig beneath the surface of a confession and check for authenticity (for example, in the form of corroborative evidence). Doing so, would only hurt the office’s conviction rate, and, at a minimum, the prosecutor would have to spend her limited resources on a case that is “solved,” in the legal sense. Further, the victimized groups of people described above are unlikely to mobilize or complain as a cohesive whole over even egregious and systemic abuses of the confession system. | >
> | Unfortunately, in the adversarial system, an overworked prosecutor has little incentive to dig beneath the surface of a confession and check for authenticity (for example, in the form of corroborative evidence). Doing so could hurt her conviction rate, and would exhaust her limited resources on a case that is “solved,” in the bureaucratic sense. Further, the victimized groups of people described above are unlikely to mobilize or complain as a cohesive whole over even egregious and systemic abuses of the confession system. | | | 5. False Confessions and the Arbiter | |
<
< | The lack of corroborative evidence in confession cases makes it difficult for the arbiter to fulfill his role as a safeguard in the adversarial system. In determining “reasonable doubt,” the arbiter must calculate, at least on some intuitive level: | >
> | The lack of corroborative evidence in confession cases makes it difficult for the arbiter to fulfill his role as a safeguard in the adversarial system. Without any other evidence to go on, the arbiter must base his "reasonable doubt" decision solely on: | | | "the probability that the accused party is innocent given than he confessed." | |
<
< | For the reasons stated above, in Section 3, this probability may often be large enough to merit serious contemplation. Unfortunately, very few arbiters will find this quantity intuitive. Instead, the arbiter, especially if it is a jury consisting of lay persons, will likely evaluate a much more intuitive, but almost irrelevant, quantity | >
> | As stated in Section 3, above, this probability may often be large enough to merit serious contemplation. Unfortunately, very few arbiters will find this quantity intuitive. Instead, the arbiter, especially if it is a jury consisting of lay persons, will likely evaluate a much more intuitive, but almost irrelevant, quantity | | |
"the probability that an accused person would confess given that they are innocent." |
|