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| | | This supposedly is the clear line between “letting die” and “killing.” | |
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< | A Functional Approach | >
> | Lengthening the Handle | | | | |
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< | The superficial attempts to differentiate assisted suicide and the act of ‘pulling the plug’ are examples of Cohen’s transcendental nonsense. How is the intent of a doctor to ease the passing of his patient so significantly different in these situations to justify labeling one action murder, and the other an acceptable act? How is there an omission of action by ‘pulling the plug,’ removing feeding tubes or turning off a respirator? Why does it really matter if it is labeled an omission of action? What makes a fatal disease a better causation of death rather than lethal injection, especially when the latter can cause less suffering? Even if material differences between the two acts actually existed, under a functionalist approach, they would not matter. If the definitions of the concepts of (1) the administration of lethal medication to mentally competent, terminally ill patients, and (2) the termination of life supporting treatment, were tied to real word facts and results, there would be little significant difference between the two. However, “in every field of law we should find the same habit of ignoring practical questions of value or of positive fact and taking refuge in “legal problems” which can always be answered by manipulating legal concepts in certain approved ways” (Cohen, 80). | >
> | Rationally analyzing these cases, it is apparent that the courts’ attempts to differentiate assisted suicide and the act of ‘pulling the plug’ are very superficial. How is the intent of a doctor to ease the passing of his patient so significantly different in these situations to justify labeling one action murder, and the other an acceptable act? How is there an omission of action by ‘pulling the plug,’ removing feeding tubes or turning off a respirator? Why does it really matter if it is labeled an omission of action? What makes a fatal disease a better causation of death rather than lethal injection, especially when the latter can cause less suffering? Under a functionalist approach, the two acts are one and the same. | | | | |
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< | Helping People Ignore the Truth | >
> | So why do we claim there is a difference between assisted suicide and the termination of life sustaining treatment, a difference so substantial that one act merits acceptance and the other criminal prosecution? Because these distinctions help us distance ourselves from a thought we will never want to confront, a concept we choose to keep at bay with words and legal reasoning. As social creatures, we do not want to believe that people–especially ourselves—are capable of killing a person they love. | | | | |
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< | Since reading Cohen’s article, I have noticed transcendental nonsense in many of the cases I read. I question why the courts cannot take a more functionalist approach in their analyses, and why they do not define legal concepts in terms of what they actually do instead of the result the court wishes to attain. I also become frustrated with unsupported holdings such as, “Logic and contemporary practice support New York's judgment that the two acts are different, and New York may therefore, consistent with the Constitution, treat them differently.” Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. at 808. Instead of enlightening people, courts use transcendental nonsense to help people ignores truths they do not want to face (such as assisted suicide and the ending of life sustaining treatment are the same), either because of discomfort, confusion or laziness. | >
> | “But that’s not it,” people will rationalized. “The person was suffering, he freely made the choice to end his life, she only gave assistance through compassion and mercy, he would have tried another way anyway,” and so on. These are all important considerations, of course, but they are not part of the essence of “the thang.” Helping another—a friend, a spouse, a family member—to end his or her life not only has consequences for the deceased, but also the assistant who is left to live with what she has done. This person may be consoled by that fact that her loved one is no longer suffering, but that does not mean the experience is not traumatic. | | | | |
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< | We did briefly discuss several of these ideas in regards to Barber in the classroom. But instead of recognizing the farce of the courts and confronting the issue, the conversation mainly consisted of “Is this distinction ridiculous? Probably. Now let’s move on to the next topic.” | >
> | Inconceivable Thoughts
The thought of having to confront this despairing scenario is distressing. Trying to imagine a suffering family member asking me to help him end his life, doing the act, and then having to live with the fact that my loved one is gone forever due to my actions is impossible. My mind prevents me from fully exploring the idea because it is too painful to conceive. Therefore we keep such thoughts at a safe distance away, wrap them in legal jargon, and never have to actually consider them.
But what happens when such uncomfortable thoughts are brought to us by a confused client? To be a good lawyer, we must be able to think through such difficult issues, not just for our sake, but for our clients’ sake as well (that is, if we choose to be lawyers who interact with clients). Yet these important lessons, unfortunately, will never be taught in the law school classroom.
Word Count: 990 | | | It might have helped at
that point in the conversation if someone had pointed out that this |
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