The use of the word "revolution" here is inconsistent, sometimes meaning more or less its conventional denotation, and sometimes denoting a change in the prevailing cultural patterns rather than social structure and order of power. For someone who believed in semiotic determinism, I suppose, the uses might be consistent, but for everyone else they are a powerful source of unclarity.

I think the basic point being made, if made simply, works well: some objectives lawyers might have would require the construction of social movements to achieve. In that case, a social movement might be both an instrument and a client. I recognize this configuration of practice. But I don't think Thurman Arnold is more than a secondary theorist for such a lawyer: the issue isn't the creeds of existing institutions, but the cultural paraphernalia that holds the social movement together. Its own creeds, in Arnold's terms, are the first matters in view.

In my own experience, it is the elaboration of the institutions permitting the organization of the movement that requires the primary ingenuity. This you do not spend the requisite attention on, being led astray by your own "revolutionary" rhetoric. Building a revolution means creating organizations, of however innovative a kind, and it is the work of creation, not the work of destruction, which induces success.