TheodoreSmith-SecondPaper 4 - 04 Apr 2008 - Main.TheodoreSmith
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< < | Draft: | > > | Almost Final Draft (1032 Words): | | | |
< < | Law school grades are commonly understood to be one of the most important factors in law firm associate hiring. Common wisdom ascribes the value of the grade as a hiring metric to its capacity to measure the production of excellent legal work. A cursory examination of the basis of law school grades, however, shows that the law school examination system measures little to nothing to do with a students skill at turning out the work of an associate lawyer. Looking harder at the purpose of grades in associate hiring, we find that, to the degree that they play a substantive role, they likely measure adaptability and the ability to conform to a set of externally imposed institutional motivations. Indeed, the firms’ use of the grade system as a hiring metric conveniently creates the very external goal structure that the student is being tested on conforming to. Grades are primarily used not to separate students on the basis of skill, but rather on the basis of their ability to be motivated by an external institutional set of values; grades show which students can be motivated by grades, and at the same time give the law firms a tool to | | | |
< < | Quality of work is the characteristic most popularly linked to grade performance; however, it is difficult to make a case for law school grades reflecting facility with the type of work that associate work requires. First year grades, and the majority of second and third year grades, are based on a short exam at the end of a semester of reading and lectures. Although this exam doubtless tests some degree of aptitude at writing and legal thinking, it is hard to see how a four hour snapshot of writing under severe time constraints measures a students ability to write legal documents, research, and otherwise perform the duties of an associate lawyer.
It is not possible to show for certain that the timed exam does not somehow provide a heuristic for measuring quality of associate work; however, the difficulty of showing how this metric would function leads us to the proposition that the law firms are not actually looking at grades for a substantive measure of future work quality.
If the firm is not looking at grades as a measure of possible work quality, it is possible that they are looking at the grades as a measure of motivational capacity. To the degree that grades are (to some extent) based on the effort put into learning and preparing for the exam, the law school exam is measuring effort output. In general, the motivation for this effort is going to come either from the student herself, or from external social and institutional pressures. As the exam becomes more and more stilted and less indicative of actual learning and useful skills (i.e. approaches the four hour in-class exam), the internally motivated students interested in actual learning are likely to perform more and more poorly. The students influenced by external motivations – the students most likely to adapt to and be motivated by the institutional goals of the law firm – are thereby separated from students who are unaffected by the institutional pressures to conform. This substantive explanation of grades matches well with the limited data that exists on the topic. A Michigan Law School study has shown a strong correlation between high grades in law school and law firm retention, but a very small correlation between grades and future earning capacity. Law firms are selecting for students that are insecure or lack strong internal drive: students that can be easily absorbed, motivated, and held by an institution. | > > | The Role of Grades in Law Firm Hiring | | | |
< < | Although this explanation provides some substantive basis for the use of grades by law firms, it does not explain the existence of the system, or address any additional non-substantive explanations for the law school grading system. In addition to providing a way to identify externally motivated students, an emphasis on grades provides a way for law firms to use a preexisting external structure to capture and hold these students as associates. By emphasizing grades as a vital piece of the hiring process, the firm is using the anxiety and insecurity that the school has created through the grading process as a tool to play on the same weaknesses that the grades are testing. A student who has accepted the law school’s grading system as an indicator of value is likely to jump at an offer by a law firm that purports to only hire top GPA students. Students that have “barely made the cut” and who have been turned down and later accepted are even more likely to take the job – allowing the firm to hire associates both insecure about their own worth and overly grateful for the chance to produce work.
Not only does the law firm’s ability to use the grading system to prey on the insecurities of students provides an addition explanation for the use of grades in hiring, but this feature of the system additionally allows us to explain the existence of the system in the first place. A strong emphasis on grades in law school is essential to create the artificial value metric and conditions of insecurity and self-doubt that the firm uses to capture and hold new associates. Law firms use the reliance on grades to | > > | | | | |
> > | Introduction
Law school grades are generally understood to be one of the most important factors in associate hiring. Common wisdom links the value of the grade to its capacity to measure the quality of legal work. A cursory examination of the basis of law school grades, however, shows that the skills tested have nothing to do with the ability to turn out the work of an associate lawyer. Looking harder at the purpose of grades in associate hiring, we find that, to the degree that they play a substantive role, they likely measure adaptability and the ability to conform to a set of externally imposed institutional motivations. Indeed, in a functional role, the firms’ use of the grade system as a hiring metric creates the very external goal structure that the student is being tested on conforming to. Grades not only show which students can be motivated by grades, but at the same time provide a perfect tool to motivate and retain these students. | | | |
> > | What does a grade represent? | | | |
> > | Quality of work is the characteristic most popularly linked to grade performance; however, it is difficult to make a case for law school grades reflecting facility with the type of work that associate work requires. First year grades, and the majority of second and third year grades, are based on a short exam at the end of a semester of reading and lectures. Although this exam doubtless tests some degree of aptitude at writing and legal thinking, it is hard to see how a four hour snapshot of writing under severe time constraints measures a students ability to write legal documents, research, and otherwise perform the duties of an associate lawyer. | | | |
< < | Notes For Second Paper: | > > | If the firm is not looking at grades as a measure of work quality, it is possible that they are looking at the grades as a measure of motivational capacity. To the degree that grades are based on the work put into learning and preparing for the exam, the law school exam is measuring effort output. In general, the motivation for this effort is going to come either from the student herself, or from external social and institutional pressures. As the exam becomes more stilted and less indicative of actual learning and useful skills (i.e. approaches the four hour in-class exam), the internally motivated students interested in actual learning are likely to perform more and more poorly. The students influenced by external motivations – the students most likely to adapt to and be motivated by the institutional goals of the law firm – are thereby separated from students who are unaffected by the institutional pressures to conform. This substantive explanation of grades matches well with the limited data that exists on the topic. A Michigan Law School study has shown a strong correlation between high grades in law school and law firm retention, but a very small correlation between grades and future earning capacity. Law firms are selecting for students that are insecure or lack strong internal drive: students that can be easily absorbed, motivated, and held by an institution. | | | |
< < | Why are law firms looking at grades? | | | |
< < | Possible Reasons: | > > | The Wheel of Suffering
In addition to providing a way to identify externally motivated individuals, an emphasis on grades provides a way for law firms to use the preexisting grading structure to capture and hold these students as associates. By emphasizing grades as a vital piece of the hiring process, the firm is using the anxiety and insecurity that the school has created through the grading process as a tool to play on the same weaknesses that the grades are testing. A student who has accepted the law school’s grading system as an indicator of value is likely to jump at an offer by a law firm that purports to only hire top GPA students. Students that have “barely made the cut” or who have been turned down and later accepted are even more likely to take the job – allowing the firm to hire associates both insecure about their own worth and overly grateful for the chance to produce work. | | | |
< < | Regardless of the substantive meaning of the grade, the firms may simply be looking at some quantifiable metric in order to make their jobs easier. | > > | This functional purpose of the grading system additionally allows us to explain a feature of the system’s development. A strong emphasis on grades in law school is essential to create the artificial value metric and conditions of insecurity that the firm uses to capture new associates. Law firms advertise their reliance on the grading system produced by the schools in order to enhance their leverage over new graduates. The schools recognize the purported value of grades in law firm hiring, and, seeking the donations made by large firms and wealthy alumni, increase their emphasis on grades in an attempt to gain more influence (rankings). This increased focus on grades within the law school creates more anxiety among the law students, which increases their willingness to rely on grades as a rational value metric and sell their futures to the firm. The cycle persists as a feedback loop - law schools and firms interacting to produce an ever stronger emphasis on grades, and placing the student in a position of increasing anxiety as the external signals echo and grow. | | | |
< < | This is a simple explanation, but probably is too naïve. It is probably not reasonable to posit that grades have no meaning to law firms. Although some of the value of the grade is probably in its role as a quantifier, it is likely that it is quantifying something of value to those that use it in hiring calculations. | | | |
< < | Another possible explanation here is that grades (and law schools) are valued by law firms because they are valued by the law firms’ customers. Value in this case could come from a Veblen-esque understanding of high grades and elite schools as signifiers of _. A cultural understanding of highly graded and _ individuals as being indicative of social status and value could lead law firms to hire individuals that matched this _, allowing their customers to show _ while hiring. Although this may help explain the law firms’ hiring focus on schools and grades, it again does not foreclose the possibility of schools and grades making some substantive difference for the firm. A Michigan study has shown a strong correlation between high grades in law school and law firm retention. While it may be possible to explain some of this in terms of the lower grade-ranked associates responding to negative expectations by the firm, it is much more likely that grades are actually measuring something substantively usefully for firm hiring.
Therefore, we are left with the proposition that the grades given by the law school are most likely quantifying something valuable to the law firm hiring process. Studies on this topic are scarce, however we can make conjectures given the structure of law school exams and associate work.
Very broadly, a law firm is probably focusing on three broad characteristics of a potential hire: The ability to perform legal work at a certain level of effectiveness; the ability of the hire to follow the cultural and codified rules of the firm; and the tendency of the hire to stay at the firm.
The first | > > | Conclusion: But Do Grades Matter? | | | |
< < | Law firms: what are they looking for?
- Someone who will perform with meticuliousness and compitance.
- Someone who will be comfortable with the (im)moral implications of their work
- Someone who will not leave
- Someone who is good at figuring out and adapting to the rules of an institution
- Someone who produces work at the bequest of an external motivation.
- Someone who is susceptible to social value settings
- Someone who is insecure
- Someone who wants to belong
- Not too smart
- Not too dumb
- Tests measuring ability to adopt the reasoning and language of a particular area of law, and draw small conclusions without questioning the framework of the question. | | \ No newline at end of file | |
> > | Although the above analysis may provide be a plausible explanation of the use of GPA in firm hiring practices, it is important not to overstate the role that grades play. Regardless of the substantive or functional characteristics of the grade, firms may simply be looking for some quantifiable metric in order to make their jobs easier. Indeed, it seems inconceivable that a firm would not meet its hiring target simply because it could find students that met a grade cutoff. While it is probably not accurate to hold that grades have no substantive meaning to law firms, and while it is likely that they do perform some functional role in the process of attracting and retaining associates, it is important to note that these characteristics are largely results of the role of grades in the hiring cycle itself. The actual value of the grade is not a fundamental, or even largely significant, factor in the overall purpose of the firm hiring process: to acquire associates able to produce a minimum standard of work product at a fraction of their billing cost. |
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TheodoreSmith-SecondPaper 3 - 04 Apr 2008 - Main.TheodoreSmith
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META TOPICPARENT | name="WebHome" |
Draft: | |
< < | Law school grades are commonly understood to be one of the most important factors in law firm associate hiring. Common wisdom ascribes the value of the grade as a hiring metric to its capacity to measure the production of excellent legal work. A cursory examination of the basis of law school grades, however, shows that the law school examination system measures little to nothing to do with a students skill at turning out the work of an associate lawyer. Looking harder at the purpose of grades in associate hiring, we find that, to the degree that they play a substantive role, they likely measure adaptability and the ability to conform to a set of externally imposed institutional motivations. Indeed, the firms’ use of the grade system as a hiring metric conveniently creates the very external goal structure that the student is being tested on conforming to. Grades are primarily given not to separate students on the basis of skill, but rather on the basis of their ability to be motivated by an external institutional set of values; grades show which students can be motivated by grades, and at the same time give the law firms a tool to | > > | Law school grades are commonly understood to be one of the most important factors in law firm associate hiring. Common wisdom ascribes the value of the grade as a hiring metric to its capacity to measure the production of excellent legal work. A cursory examination of the basis of law school grades, however, shows that the law school examination system measures little to nothing to do with a students skill at turning out the work of an associate lawyer. Looking harder at the purpose of grades in associate hiring, we find that, to the degree that they play a substantive role, they likely measure adaptability and the ability to conform to a set of externally imposed institutional motivations. Indeed, the firms’ use of the grade system as a hiring metric conveniently creates the very external goal structure that the student is being tested on conforming to. Grades are primarily used not to separate students on the basis of skill, but rather on the basis of their ability to be motivated by an external institutional set of values; grades show which students can be motivated by grades, and at the same time give the law firms a tool to | | Quality of work is the characteristic most popularly linked to grade performance; however, it is difficult to make a case for law school grades reflecting facility with the type of work that associate work requires. First year grades, and the majority of second and third year grades, are based on a short exam at the end of a semester of reading and lectures. Although this exam doubtless tests some degree of aptitude at writing and legal thinking, it is hard to see how a four hour snapshot of writing under severe time constraints measures a students ability to write legal documents, research, and otherwise perform the duties of an associate lawyer.
It is not possible to show for certain that the timed exam does not somehow provide a heuristic for measuring quality of associate work; however, the difficulty of showing how this metric would function leads us to the proposition that the law firms are not actually looking at grades for a substantive measure of future work quality. | |
< < | If the firm is not looking at grades as a measure of possible work quality, it is possible that they are looking at the grades as a measure of motivational capacity. To the degree that grades are (to some extent) based on the effort put into learning and preparing for the exam, the law school exam is measuring effort output. In general, the motivation for this effort is generally going to come either from the student herself, or from external social and institutional pressures. As the exam becomes more and more stilted and less indicative of actual learning and useful skills (i.e. approaches the four hour in-class exam), the internally motivated students interested in actual learning are likely to perform more and more poorly. The students influenced by external motivations – the students most likely to adapt to and be motivated by the institutional goals of the law firm – are separated from students who are unaffected by the pressures of the institution to conform. This substantive explanation of grades matches well with the limited data that exists on the topic. A Michigan Law School study has shown a strong correlation between high grades in law school and law firm retention, but a very small correlation between grades and future earning capacity. Grades are selecting for students that are insecure, or lack strong internal drive: students that can be easily absorbed, motivated, and held by an institution. | > > | If the firm is not looking at grades as a measure of possible work quality, it is possible that they are looking at the grades as a measure of motivational capacity. To the degree that grades are (to some extent) based on the effort put into learning and preparing for the exam, the law school exam is measuring effort output. In general, the motivation for this effort is going to come either from the student herself, or from external social and institutional pressures. As the exam becomes more and more stilted and less indicative of actual learning and useful skills (i.e. approaches the four hour in-class exam), the internally motivated students interested in actual learning are likely to perform more and more poorly. The students influenced by external motivations – the students most likely to adapt to and be motivated by the institutional goals of the law firm – are thereby separated from students who are unaffected by the institutional pressures to conform. This substantive explanation of grades matches well with the limited data that exists on the topic. A Michigan Law School study has shown a strong correlation between high grades in law school and law firm retention, but a very small correlation between grades and future earning capacity. Law firms are selecting for students that are insecure or lack strong internal drive: students that can be easily absorbed, motivated, and held by an institution.
Although this explanation provides some substantive basis for the use of grades by law firms, it does not explain the existence of the system, or address any additional non-substantive explanations for the law school grading system. In addition to providing a way to identify externally motivated students, an emphasis on grades provides a way for law firms to use a preexisting external structure to capture and hold these students as associates. By emphasizing grades as a vital piece of the hiring process, the firm is using the anxiety and insecurity that the school has created through the grading process as a tool to play on the same weaknesses that the grades are testing. A student who has accepted the law school’s grading system as an indicator of value is likely to jump at an offer by a law firm that purports to only hire top GPA students. Students that have “barely made the cut” and who have been turned down and later accepted are even more likely to take the job – allowing the firm to hire associates both insecure about their own worth and overly grateful for the chance to produce work.
Not only does the law firm’s ability to use the grading system to prey on the insecurities of students provides an addition explanation for the use of grades in hiring, but this feature of the system additionally allows us to explain the existence of the system in the first place. A strong emphasis on grades in law school is essential to create the artificial value metric and conditions of insecurity and self-doubt that the firm uses to capture and hold new associates. Law firms use the reliance on grades to | | |
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TheodoreSmith-SecondPaper 2 - 04 Apr 2008 - Main.TheodoreSmith
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META TOPICPARENT | name="WebHome" |
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> > | Draft:
Law school grades are commonly understood to be one of the most important factors in law firm associate hiring. Common wisdom ascribes the value of the grade as a hiring metric to its capacity to measure the production of excellent legal work. A cursory examination of the basis of law school grades, however, shows that the law school examination system measures little to nothing to do with a students skill at turning out the work of an associate lawyer. Looking harder at the purpose of grades in associate hiring, we find that, to the degree that they play a substantive role, they likely measure adaptability and the ability to conform to a set of externally imposed institutional motivations. Indeed, the firms’ use of the grade system as a hiring metric conveniently creates the very external goal structure that the student is being tested on conforming to. Grades are primarily given not to separate students on the basis of skill, but rather on the basis of their ability to be motivated by an external institutional set of values; grades show which students can be motivated by grades, and at the same time give the law firms a tool to
Quality of work is the characteristic most popularly linked to grade performance; however, it is difficult to make a case for law school grades reflecting facility with the type of work that associate work requires. First year grades, and the majority of second and third year grades, are based on a short exam at the end of a semester of reading and lectures. Although this exam doubtless tests some degree of aptitude at writing and legal thinking, it is hard to see how a four hour snapshot of writing under severe time constraints measures a students ability to write legal documents, research, and otherwise perform the duties of an associate lawyer.
It is not possible to show for certain that the timed exam does not somehow provide a heuristic for measuring quality of associate work; however, the difficulty of showing how this metric would function leads us to the proposition that the law firms are not actually looking at grades for a substantive measure of future work quality.
If the firm is not looking at grades as a measure of possible work quality, it is possible that they are looking at the grades as a measure of motivational capacity. To the degree that grades are (to some extent) based on the effort put into learning and preparing for the exam, the law school exam is measuring effort output. In general, the motivation for this effort is generally going to come either from the student herself, or from external social and institutional pressures. As the exam becomes more and more stilted and less indicative of actual learning and useful skills (i.e. approaches the four hour in-class exam), the internally motivated students interested in actual learning are likely to perform more and more poorly. The students influenced by external motivations – the students most likely to adapt to and be motivated by the institutional goals of the law firm – are separated from students who are unaffected by the pressures of the institution to conform. This substantive explanation of grades matches well with the limited data that exists on the topic. A Michigan Law School study has shown a strong correlation between high grades in law school and law firm retention, but a very small correlation between grades and future earning capacity. Grades are selecting for students that are insecure, or lack strong internal drive: students that can be easily absorbed, motivated, and held by an institution. | | Notes For Second Paper: |
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TheodoreSmith-SecondPaper 1 - 30 Mar 2008 - Main.TheodoreSmith
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Notes For Second Paper:
Why are law firms looking at grades?
Possible Reasons:
Regardless of the substantive meaning of the grade, the firms may simply be looking at some quantifiable metric in order to make their jobs easier.
This is a simple explanation, but probably is too naïve. It is probably not reasonable to posit that grades have no meaning to law firms. Although some of the value of the grade is probably in its role as a quantifier, it is likely that it is quantifying something of value to those that use it in hiring calculations.
Another possible explanation here is that grades (and law schools) are valued by law firms because they are valued by the law firms’ customers. Value in this case could come from a Veblen-esque understanding of high grades and elite schools as signifiers of _. A cultural understanding of highly graded and _ individuals as being indicative of social status and value could lead law firms to hire individuals that matched this _, allowing their customers to show _ while hiring. Although this may help explain the law firms’ hiring focus on schools and grades, it again does not foreclose the possibility of schools and grades making some substantive difference for the firm. A Michigan study has shown a strong correlation between high grades in law school and law firm retention. While it may be possible to explain some of this in terms of the lower grade-ranked associates responding to negative expectations by the firm, it is much more likely that grades are actually measuring something substantively usefully for firm hiring.
Therefore, we are left with the proposition that the grades given by the law school are most likely quantifying something valuable to the law firm hiring process. Studies on this topic are scarce, however we can make conjectures given the structure of law school exams and associate work.
Very broadly, a law firm is probably focusing on three broad characteristics of a potential hire: The ability to perform legal work at a certain level of effectiveness; the ability of the hire to follow the cultural and codified rules of the firm; and the tendency of the hire to stay at the firm.
The first
Law firms: what are they looking for?
- Someone who will perform with meticuliousness and compitance.
- Someone who will be comfortable with the (im)moral implications of their work
- Someone who will not leave
- Someone who is good at figuring out and adapting to the rules of an institution
- Someone who produces work at the bequest of an external motivation.
- Someone who is susceptible to social value settings
- Someone who is insecure
- Someone who wants to belong
- Not too smart
- Not too dumb
- Tests measuring ability to adopt the reasoning and language of a particular area of law, and draw small conclusions without questioning the framework of the question. |
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