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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | | | -- By WenweiLai - 17 Apr 2010 | |
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< | The Declaration of Independence said, "All men are created equal." Yet, the early Constitution permitted slave importation for 20 years after its ratification, and the domestic slave trade was not fully barred until the 13th Amendment passed after the Civil War. While the intervening years were marked by a moral ambiguity regarding the rights of men, rare individuals like Henry David Thoreau and John Brown took to civil disobedience in protest of slavery. For Thoreau, this meant an 1849 call for tax resistance with the penalty of imprisonment. For Brown, it meant an 1859 armed insurrection with the penalty of death. In Thoreau's words, "[l]aw never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice." Thoreau and Brown knowingly partook in demonstrative violations of the law, yet each did so having a zealous and wholehearted belief that his was the moral high ground. The positivist response might be to say, if Thoreau and Brown wanted to affect change, they should have taken their protests to court. However, considering the formalistic holding of Dred Scott v. Sanford in 1857, judicial avenues may have become a dead end for the abolitionist movement. Considering the social context surrounding their transgressions, we look for any legal justification to efforts by Thoreau and Brown in furthering the abolitionist cause. | >
> | The Declaration of Independence declared, "All men are created equal." Yet, the early Constitution permitted the importation of slaves for 20 years after its ratification, and the domestic slave trade was not fully barred until the introduction of the 13th Amendment following the Civil War. While the intervening years were largely marked by a moral ambiguity regarding human rights in America, rare individuals like Henry David Thoreau and John Brown took to civil disobedience in protest of slavery. For Thoreau, this meant an 1849 call for tax resistance with the penalty of imprisonment. For Brown, it meant an 1859 armed insurrection with the penalty of death. In Thoreau's words, "[l]aw never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice." Thoreau and Brown knowingly partook in demonstrative violations of the law, yet each did with a zealous belief that illegality, in the context of slavery, was the moral high ground.
One might wonder, if Thoreau and Brown wanted to affect sweeping change, why did they not take their grievances to the courts instead of the streets? Considering the formalistic holding of Dred Scott v. Sanford in 1857, judicial remedy may have proven a dead end for the growing abolitionist cause. If so, were abolitionists not justified in turning to extra-judicial remedies as judicial means were foreclosed? This essay, using a positivist framework, searches for legal justification behind the extra-judicial efforts of Thoreau and Brown to further the abolitionist cause. | | | We the People as the rule of recognition | |
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< | In his treatise on legal positivism, The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart posited that the validity of laws regulating human conduct can be identified by a generally accepted "rule of recognition." According to Kent Greenawalt, the rule of recognition "expresses society's ultimate criteria for what counts as law." In the United States, this standard is largely rooted in but not limited to the U.S. Constitution. If the mid-nineteenth century "rule of recognition" were to afford legality to Thoreau's actions in 1849 or Brown's in 1859, a first step might be to search out any broader notions of equality contained in the pre-Reconstruction Constitution. | >
> | In his treatise on legal positivism, The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart argued the validity of laws regulating human conduct could be identified by a generally accepted "rule of recognition." According to Kent Greenawalt, the rule of recognition "expresses society's ultimate criteria for what counts as law." In the United States, this standard is largely rooted in but not limited to the U.S. Constitution. If the mid-nineteenth century rule of recognition were to afford legality to Thoreau's actions in 1849 or Brown's in 1859, a first step might be to find a mechanism through which to place contemporary notions of equality within the pre-Reconstruction Constitution, beyond the narrow interpretations then provided by the Supreme Court. | | | | |
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< | Bruce Ackerman suggests the reference to "We the People" in the preamble of the Constitution provides an implicit means of constitutional amendment preceding the formal processes of Article V. Ackerman notes the appearance of "constitutional moments," marked by a rise in political consciousness and mobilization among a normally passive citizenry, as periods where a sea change in popular will lays the foundation for a formal constitutional amendment. The period leading up to and through the Civil War, in Ackerman's opinion, was exactly such a moment. If the "We the People" scheme can be accepted as an element of the Constitution and, thus, the rule of recognition, then, prior to the Reconstruction Amendments, it is possible that slavery may have been deemed unconstitutional through the preeminent will of the people. The crux of this argument, then, boils down to identifying the moment where the will of the people reaches a critical mass sufficient to amend constitutional law. | >
> | Bruce Ackerman suggests the reference to "We the People" in the preamble of the Constitution provides an implicit means of constitutional amendment preceding the formal processes spelled out in Article V. Ackerman cites "constitutional moments," defined by a sharp rise in political consciousness and mobilization among a normally passive citizenry, as periods where a sea change in the popular will paves the way for formal constitutional amendment. The events leading up to and through the Civil War, in Ackerman's opinion, were the second of three such moments since the Constitution's inception. Thus, if we accept the "We the People" scheme within the Constitution and, thus, the rule of recognition, it is possible that slavery may have been deemed unconstitutional through the preeminent will of the people well before it was recognized by the Reconstruction amendments. | | | We the People as the justification for resisting an unjust government | |
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< | It seems reasonable to conclude that the people's will did not change overnight; there was, if anything, an escalating public opposition to slavery that coalesced in the 1830s and peaked amid the Civil War. Notably, the relative timidity of Thoreau's call to civil disobedience compared to Brown's more aggressive armed attack ten years later seems to track a rising arc of popular anti-slavery sentiment. However, even if one assumes a critical mass in the popular will was reached prior to the Civil War, how might we justify Thoreau's resistance or John Brown's more violent efforts to free slaves? | >
> | It seems reasonable to conclude that the popular will regarding slavery did not change overnight; there was, if anything, an escalating public opposition that coalesced in the 1830s and peaked during the Civil War. Notably, the relative calm of Thoreau's call to civil disobedience compared to Brown's more aggressive armed attack ten years later seems to trace a rising arc of anti-slavery sentiment. However, even if one assumes the popular will reached a critical mass for informal amendment at some point prior to the Civil War, how does one justify John Brown's more violent efforts to free slaves? | | | | |
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< | Notably, the public fallout of Brown's armed attack on Harper's Ferry greatly eclipsed that of Thoreau's call for indirect civil disobedience. Aside from Thoreau's A Plea for Captain John Brown, little editorial sympathy could be found in the newspapers covering the raid on Harper's Ferry. Brown's attack was largely depicted as a misguided, wild, and apparently insane effort. However, a lack of editorial support for civil disobedience in 1859 does not necessarily mean was not altogether there. Rather, perhaps the popular will was aligned with the ends sought by these protests, but was not fully accepting of the more extreme means chosen to reach these ends. Thus, if "We the People" is taken as part of the rule of recognition, it seems that any degree of legality afforded to resistance depends on many factors, not the least of which include the form of the resistance sought, and the seriousness of the oppression met. | >
> | The public fallout of Brown's attack on Harper's Ferry eclipsed that of Thoreau's call for tax resistance. Aside from Thoreau's A Plea for Captain John Brown, little editorial sympathy could be found in the press. Brown's attack was largely depicted as a misguided, wild, and apparently insane effort. However, a lack of editorial support for civil disobedience in 1859 does not mean public support was not altogether present. Rather, perhaps the popular will was aligned with the ends sought by these protests, but could not yet accept the more extreme means chosen. This important distinction between the means and the ends of civil disobedience did not go unrecognized by Martin Luther King Jr. a century later. Inspired by Gandhi's nonviolent approach to dismantling British rule in India, King emphasized that non-violent (though often illegal) protest could tip the popular will in favor of civil rights, which it ultimately did. Thus, it seems that any legality afforded to extra-judicial resistance depends on many factors, not the least of which include the form of the resistance sought, and the seriousness of the oppression met. | | | Would Thoreau agree with this attempt? | |
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< | In order to justify Thoreau and Brown, many practical difficulties must be overcome: 1) It must be accepted that "We the People" in the preamble of the Constitution is a part of the rule of recognition, 2) A workable standard to identify the will of the people must be found, and 3) "We the People" must be able to provide an extra-judicial method to challenge the status quo. In fact, these difficulties all stem from an inherent difficulty of legal positivism: it is based on a formalistic scheme lacking in substantive moral value. Thoreau's main appeal was that people had an obligation to reject injustice, which is not an obligation that can be found in my attempt to justify his acts from the positivist perspective. Rather, for Thoreau, that obligation may come at a cost to legality: "[i]t is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right." If he were alive today, chances are he would tell me to stop writing and go do something instead. | >
> | In order to fully justify Thoreau and Brown, many practical difficulties must be overcome: 1) It must be accepted that "We the People" in the preamble of the Constitution is a part of the rule of recognition, 2) A workable standard to identify the will of the people must be found, and 3) "We the People" must be capable of providing an extra-judicial method to challenge the status quo. In fact, these difficulties all stem from an inherent difficulty of legal positivism: it is based on a formalistic scheme lacking in substantive moral value. Thoreau's main appeal was that people had an moral obligation to reject injustice, which is not an obligation that can be found within the positivist perspective. Rather, for Thoreau, that obligation may come at the cost of legality: "[i]t is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right." If he were alive today, chances are he would tell me to stop writing and do something instead.
Wenwei-
I liked the ambitious goal of your essay. There are a few key changes I focused on during revisions:
1) I think the more interesting point of discussion is the contrast between positivist and moral justifications for an act, rather than engineering a positivist justification alone. I tried to provide a groundwork for engaging in that discussion given the context (Thoreau & Brown) provided.
2) You argue that it is very difficult to accept extra-judicial protests under the positivist mode of thought, because of the complexity of the assumptions required. But then you conclude by saying none of that really matters because there is an underlying flaw in positivism -- its ignorance of moral value. I imagine you intended to demonstrate the weakness of the positivist argument to show why a moralist conclusion is inevitable. But, I think this technique leaves the reader wondering why they bothered reading the preceding 900 or so words. Instead, I tried to allude to moral bases during the positivist portion of the argument so as to better foreshadow the conclusion you ultimately reached.
3) Though citations aren't required, I think it is important to provide as many direct links to online resources as you can, so that the reader can refer to the materials you rely on in making your argument. Links make the reading experience more dynamic, and help clarify the complex ideas addressed. Take full advantage of the html medium.
That all said, you can use the history function to compare this edit to your original copy. I'm happy to answer any questions you may have.
-Michael | | |
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. |
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