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| | | I. Corley, Elcom, and 321 Studios | |
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< | The Digital Millennium Copyright Act significantly altered the copyright landscape. In Universal City Studios v. Corley 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), 321 v. MGM Studios, 307 F.Supp.2d 1085 (N.D.Cal. 2004), and U.S. v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.Supp.2d 1111 (N.D.Cal. 2002), courts have analyzed the relationship between the DMCA, the First Amendment, and fair use. In this essay, I respond to these cases and argue that the DMCA undermines fair use and strikes a poor balance between rights-holders and the public. | >
> | The Digital Millennium Copyright Act significantly altered the copyright landscape. In Universal City Studios v. Corley 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), 321 v. MGM Studios, 307 F.Supp.2d 1085 (N.D.Cal. 2004), and U.S. v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F.Supp.2d 1111 (N.D.Cal. 2002), courts have analyzed the relationship between the DMCA, the First Amendment, and fair use. In this essay, I respond to these cases and argue that the DMCA undermines fair use and strikes a poor balance between the rights of authors and the public. | | | A common defense of the DMCA is the claim that anyone who possesses property rights is entitled to prohibit access by unauthorized persons. In Corley for example, the court noted that homeowners can padlock their doors or place valuables in a safe; the court considered the DMCA as empowering similar protection for DVDs. This comparison is flawed, however, because there is no doctrine of fair use for burglary but there is for copyright law. Under the fair use doctrine, the public has a right to borrow your valuables and innovate therefrom, within section 107's parameters. The DMCA fundamentally altered this right.
In Corley, 321 Studios, and Elcom, the courts downplayed this alteration by concluding that the DMCA does not prohibit fair uses. Instead, it bars "trafficking in a decryption code that enables unauthorized access to copyrighted materials." Corley, 273 F.3d at 459. "Fair use of a copyrighted work continues to be permitted, . . . even though engaging in certain fair uses of digital works may be made more difficult if tools to circumvent use restrictions cannot be readily obtained." Elcom, 203 F.Supp.2d at 1125 (emphasis added); see also 321 Studios, 307 F.Supp.2d at 1102. | |
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< | The distinction these courts drew is largely illusory. When media is broadly encrypted, you cannot have the relevant speech without the decryption. By barring the tools providing access, the court bars the access itself for many users. See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA's Anti-Device Provisions, 19 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 111, 115 (2005) ("[A]lthough copyright law technically allows circumventing technologies in order to make a fair use, [a] lack of technological resources [can] effectively destroy[] this allowance."). This is especially true if circumvention programs like the one in Elcom are impermissible, because that tool was aimed specifically at fair uses. See ElcomSoft Press Release; ElcomSoft's Motion to Dismiss. If tools intended for fair uses are impermissible, what circumvention tools are proper? According to the DMCA, none. | >
> | The distinction these courts drew is largely illusory. When media is broadly encrypted, you cannot have the relevant speech without the decryption. By barring the tools providing access, the court bars the access itself for many users. See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA's Anti-Device Provisions, 19 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 111, 115 (2005) ("[A]lthough copyright law technically allows circumventing technologies in order to make a fair use, [a] lack of technological resources [can] effectively destroy[] this allowance."). This is especially true if circumvention programs like the one in Elcom are impermissible, because that tool specifically encompassed fair uses. See also ElcomSoft's Motion to Dismiss. If tools intended for fair uses are impermissible, what circumvention programs are proper? According to the DMCA, none. | | | II. Restricting Innovation | |
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< | Courts have suggested that fair uses are still possible because individuals can, for example, quote from works. However, today's fair users quote not only in text, they speak in the language of video. The courts' theories give insufficient value to such speech, and fail entirely to encapsulate other important fair uses like making back-up copies. | >
> | Courts have suggested that fair uses are still possible because individuals can, for example, quote from works. However, today's fair users innovate not only in text, they speak in the language of video. The courts' theories give insufficient value to such speech, and fail entirely to encapsulate other important fair uses like making back-up copies. | | | | |
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< | The impact of the DMCA on speech is real. There is mounting evidence that the DMCA's chilling effect is significant. It is ironic that Congress specifically stated in the DMCA that the Act would not affect First Amendment rights or the fair use defense. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201(c)(1), (c)(4). The DMCA has clearly undermined both. See, e.g., Ryan L. Van Den Elzen, Decrypting the DMCA: Fair use as a Defense to the Distribution of DeCSS? , 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 673, 691-92 (2001). | >
> | The impact of the DMCA on speech is real. There is mounting evidence that the DMCA's chilling effect is significant. It is ironic that Congress specifically stated in the DMCA that the Act would not affect First Amendment rights or fair use. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201(c)(1), (c)(4). The DMCA has undermined both. See, e.g., Ryan L. Van Den Elzen, Decrypting the DMCA: Fair use as a Defense to the Distribution of DeCSS, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 673, 691-92 (2001). | | | III. Alternatives | |
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< | There are at least two possible solutions. The first is within the Act itself; broad exception-making under section 1201(a)(1)(C). Thus far, however, that has not occurred. See U.S. Copyright Office, Rulemaking on Anticircumvention. It is not clear that such efforts would succeed given the historically narrow exceptions authorized. Id. A second possibility would be reworking the DMCA to focus on improper circumvention, instead of blindly discriminating against tools facilitating circumvention. This modification would be a significant change to the DMCA. However, the DMCA would still provide protection to rights-holders against uses that are not "permitted by law." See WIPO Treaty Art. 11. Accordingly, this revision would also be consistent with US treaty obligations. See id. at Art. 11, 12. | >
> | There are at least two possible solutions. The first is within the Act itself; broad exception-making under section 1201(a)(1)(C). Thus far, however, that has not occurred. It is not clear that such efforts would succeed given the historically narrow exceptions authorized. A second possibility is reworking the DMCA to focus on improper circumvention, instead of blindly discriminating against all circumvention tools. This option would thus permit distribution of tools that specifically target, in good faith, circumvention for noninfringing uses. Both revisions would improve access to encrypted works for non-infringing uses, and would thereby help restore balance to the authors-public scale. And under both alternatives, the DMCA would still provide protection against uses that are not "permitted by law" (as international treaties require it to) because circumventing-to-infringe would still be heavily punished. See WIPO Treaty, Art. 11 & Art. 12. | | | IV. Conclusion | |
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< | As lawyers, scholars, and Congress itself have noted, the DMCA's protections "have little, if anything, to do with copyright law." See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673, 686 n.66 (2000). They are instead a form of paracopyright, id.; "para," for me, suggesting a different meaning. The DMCA takes from public rights but gives little in return. Further, by restricting production and access to circumvention tools, the DMCA obstructs less sophisticated users from making fair use of a work while largely failing to stop those the Act fears most. See also DRM: The State of Disrepair, Endgadget.com (Feb. 16, 2007) (noting the categorical success in dismantling encryption by sophisticated parties). "[A] law such as the DMCA that focuses on regulating circumvention technologies per se simply cannot facilitate socially desirable access to and use of works while at the same time prohibiting harmful access and use...." Lipton, 19 Harv. J.L. & Tech. at 119. The DMCA as crafted is a brain surgeon wielding a machete; in the delicate area of author rights vs. user rights, a finer tool is required. | >
> | As lawyers, scholars, and Congress itself have noted, the DMCA's protections "have little, if anything, to do with copyright law." See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673, 686 n.66 (2000). They are instead a form of paracopyright, id.; "para," for me, suggesting something darker. The DMCA takes from public rights but gives little back. Further, by restricting access to circumvention tools, the DMCA obstructs less sophisticated users from making fair use of a work while largely failing to stop those the Act fears most. See, e.g., DRM: The State of Disrepair, Endgadget.com (Feb. 16, 2007) (noting the categorical success in dismantling encryption by sophisticated parties). "[A] law such as the DMCA that focuses on regulating circumvention technologies per se simply cannot facilitate socially desirable access to and use of works while at the same time prohibiting harmful access and use...." Lipton, 19 Harv. J.L. & Tech. at 119. The DMCA as crafted is a brain surgeon wielding a machete; in the delicate area of author rights vs. user rights, a finer tool is required. | | | The Supreme Court has recognized that fair use plays a longstanding, important role in copyright law. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) ("From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose....'"). The DMCA, however, undermines fair use. By inhibiting the progress of knowledge and creativity possible through fair use, the DMCA upsets the author-public rights balance. Congress should remedy that imbalance. Revising the DMCA to be consistent with fair use is an important step.
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> | Additional Reading:
Big Content's "theater of the absurd" at DMCA hearings, ArsTechnica.com | | | # * Set ALLOWTOPICVIEW = TWikiAdminGroup, BrianS | | |
-- BrettJohnson - 20 Nov 2009 | |
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Brett,
Thank you for the detailed citations and comment. I appreciate it. I thought about approaching this essay initially from a First Amendment/fair use angle. I actually wrote in an initial, barebones analysis of the O'Brien test being applied in my first several drafts. I deleted it only because I didn't think I could do it justice in 1000 words. It is a matter I intend to return to, however, in my writings in the coming years. I will look back on this post to your citations when I do so. Thank you.
-- BrianS - 24 Nov 2009 | | |
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